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Abstract 
Based on ethnographic research on exiled Tibetan political institutions and 
practices in India, this thesis investigates sovereignty in exile. The Tibetan 
Government-in-exile (TGiE), based in India since 1960, remains internationally 
unrecognised, has limited judicial powers and lacks de jure sovereignty over 
territory in both Tibet and in exile. However, this exiled administration claims 
legitimacy as the official representative of the Tibetan population, attempts to 
make its voice heard within the internationa~ community and performs a number 
of state-like functions in relation to its diasporic 'citizenry'. Given that conventional 
political theory is premised on the territorially-bounded sovereign nation-state as a 
container for political activity, and governments are legitimated according to the 
territory over which they hold authority, this is an exceptional case of a 
government which appears to refute these orthodox assumptions. As such, this 
study of the form, functioning and limitations of TGiE and of its existence and 
state-like operations within another sovereign state, raises important theoretical 
issues which speak directly to political geography's concerns with power and space. 
These include the nature of sovereignty, the extent to which sovereignty can be 
disentangled from jurisdiction over territory, and the role of 'the exception' in 
geopolitical discourses. Employing multi-sited ethnographic methodologies, the 
broad aims of this research are to investigate what kind of political entity the TGiE 
is, and to examine the nature ofthe sovereignty it articulates. To do so, attention is 
paid to Tibetan settlements in exile as sites of sovereignty, TGiE's construction of a 
Tibetan 'population' in exile and its management of livelihoods, the negotiation of 
exilic political identities, and the strategic spatialities of TGiE's election systems. 
Rejecting realist arguments that polities such as TGiE should be viewed merely as 
discrepant forms of political practice, it is argued that if sovereignty is understood 
as historically contingent and socially constructed - and the state, sovereignty, and 
territory thereby conceptually disentangled - this opens up the theoretical 
possibility of territorial-less sovereign polities. 
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Glossary and abbreviations 
Glossary of Tibetan terms 
Phoenetic spellings of Tibetan terms vary considerably and transliteration based 
on the Wylie (1959) system, whilst popular within Tibetan studies, can be unwieldy 
for those unfamiliar with it. To make Tibetan terms readable I have used a 
phonetic transliteration of Tibetan terms based loosely on Kapstein (2006). The 
following is primarily for translation purposes and the possible problematic fixing 
of meaning of such terms is noted. 
Amdo Province in North-East Tibet. Also known as Domed 
Bon Oldest spiritual tradition of Tibet. Pre-dates Buddhism 
Chatrel Voluntary contribution made to TGiE by exile Tibetans 
Chenresdzig 
Chitue 
Chorten 
Choyon 
Chuba 
Gangchen Kyishong 
Gyabon 
Inji 
Kalon 
Kalon Tripa 
Kashag 
Kham 
Kora 
Kyab cholwa 
Men-tse-khang 
Mi-ser 
Nga-wang 
Phayul 
Rangzen 
Rangzen Lagteb 
Remey 
Rogs ram 
Shi chaya 
Tsongdu 
Tsogka Choksum 
D-Tsang 
Yul-mi 
Protector deity of Tibet 
Member of the Tibetan Parliament 
Tibetan Buddhist structure 
Religious patron-priest relationship 
Traditional Tibetan robe 
'Happy Valley of Snow': the site ofTGiE headquarters in 
Dharamsala 
'Leader of 100' or camp leader 
Slang for foreigner or, specifically, Westerner 
Government Minister 
Chief Minister, equivalent to Prime Minister 
Cabinet 
Province in Eastern Tibet. Also known as Dotoe 
Circumambulation of a temple or holy structure 
Refugee 
Tibetan medicine clinic 
Agricultural tenant or serf 
Political subject 
Fatherland 
Independence or freedom 
Freedom book or 'Green Book' issued by TGiE to exile 
Tibetans 
Usually translated as 'secular' but more accurately means 
that the state will not discriminate among different 
religions, rather than the absence of religion 
Sponsorship of Tibetans by foreigners 
To settle 
National Assembly in pre-1959 Tibet 
'13 Settlements' movement 
Traditional province in Central Tibet 
Local inhabitant 
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Glossary of Indian terms 
Ahimsa 
Benami 
Chai 
Idli sambar 
Kannada 
Karom 
Lok Sabha 
Panchayat 
Puja 
Rajya Sabha 
Satyagraha 
The avoidance of violence 
Informal property or land arrangement 
Tea 
South Indian snack of fermented steamed rice pancakes 
with spicy lentil stew 
Dravidian language spoken in the state of Karnataka 
Board game played widely in South Asia 
Lower House of the Parliament ofIndia 
Village council 
Devotional acts 
Upper House of the Parliament of India 
Literally 'insistence on truth': Mahatma Gandhi's 
philosophy and practice of non-violence 
Abbreviations: 
CCP 
CRO 
CTA 
CTRC 
DIIR 
FRO 
Gol 
HRLN 
IC 
IDP 
IR 
LTTE 
MEA 
NDPT 
NGO 
NORI 
PKK 
PLA 
PLO 
PRC 
RC 
TCC 
TCHRD 
TCV 
TDS 
Chinese Communist Party 
Chief Representative Office 
Central Tibetan Administration 
Central Tibetan Relief Committee 
Department of Information and International Relations 
Foreigners' Registration Office 
Government of India' 
Human Rights Law Network (based in Delhi) 
Indian Identification Certificate for Tibetans 
Integrated Development Plan 
International Relations 
Liberation Tigers ofT;amil Eelam 
Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India) 
National Democratic Party of Tibet 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
No Objection to Return to India (stamp placed on IC) 
Kurdistan Workers Party 
People's Liberation Army (of the People's Republic of China) 
Palestine Liberation Organisation 
People's Republic of China 
Indian Registration Certificate for Tibetans 
Tibetan Chamber of Commerce 
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy 
Tibetan Childrens' Village 
Tibetan Demographic Survey 
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TGiE' 
TPiE· 
TPPRC 
TSG 
TWA. 
TYC 
SADR 
SC 
SEP 
SFT 
SP 
ST 
UN 
UNDP 
UNHCR 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile 
Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre 
Tibet Support Group f, 
Tibetan Women's Association 
Tibetan Youth Congress 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
Scheduled Caste 
Special Entry Permits for persons of Tibetan origin 
Students for a Free Tibet 
Superintendent of Police 
Scheduled Tribe 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations High Commissioner for RefugE:'es 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Political Geographies of the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile 
Clinging to the mountainside, mid-way between the bustling Indian town of 
Dharamsala and the former British hill-station of McLeod Ganj, is a cluster 
of low buildings - the headquarters of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
(TGiE). Turning off the road you pass under an elaborate painted archway 
proclaiming the entrance to 'Gangchen Kyishong Central Tibetan 
Administration'. On the right are steps down to an impressive building 
housing the 'Department of Information and International Relations', its 
name written in both English and Tibetan beneath the snow-lion 
emblazoned crest of the TGiE. Ahead is the staff mess which serves up daily 
meals of Tibetan noodles and steamed bread - cooked by local Indians - and 
the tiny grocery shop run by Tibetans but stocked with the Indian brand 
confectionary, and where Indian rupees are the only currency in use. 
A bell rings and an assortment of Tibetan men, women and monks, all in 
traditional dress, drift out of a two-storey building. A Tibetan flag flies 
above the porch and a sign reads 'Parliament-in-Exile of Tibet'. They mingle 
on the veranda, sipping tea, flicking through budget reports and catching up 
on political gossip. Meanwhile, a small gaggle of younger Tibetans armed 
with cameras and reporters' notebooks huddle in one corner of the 
courtyard, their TGiE-issued 'PRESS' badges in prominent view. The second 
bell sends the Members of Parliament scurrying back to their seats, where 
the newly installed cable TV camera is trained on them, broadcasting their 
every word live into Tibetan homes in McLeod Ganj. 
Entering the Department of Home, you notice the building is weathered and 
worn. A far cry from a temporary refugee set-up, the mildewed walls and 
peeling layers of paint are evidence of decades of summer deluges and 
attempted repairs. The office of the Additional Secretary is typical of TGiE 
offices throughout this land - from Cooperative Offices in Ladakh to 
Settlement Offices in the jungles of Karnataka or the Tibetan Bureau in 
Delhi. There's the photo of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a map of Tibet and 
one of India, a panorama photograph of Lhasa and a promotional calendar 
from a local Indian printer hopeful for a renewed contract. The talk in the 
Department of Home is of infrastructure problems in Arunachal Pradesh, 
agricultural yields in Orissa and eviction notices in Delhi. Next door, the 
Department of Security is screening applications for 'Indian Registration 
Certificates for Tibetans,' with batches of forms ready to be dispatched to 
the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. At the Department of Education they 
are rolling out the new 'Tibetan Education Policy' and across the courtyard 
the Department of Health is concerned with rising tuberculosis cases and 
the recruitment of Tibetan doctors. Things are more upbeat in the 
Department of Finance. The government budget is in surplus for the first 
time, and the voluntary taxation contributions are on the rise. Meanwhile, 
staff on the ground floor are processing applications for Rangzen Lagteb, the 
exile Tibetan 'passport' which every 'bona fide Tibetan' must hold, but which 
neither permits the holder to travel, nor offers any legal security.l 
I Whilst not taken directly from field-notes, these observations are based on my fieldwork in Tibetan 
settlements in India in 2006-2007. 
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Conventional political theory is premised on the territorially-bounded sovereign 
nation-state as a container for political activity (Weber 1948; Giddens 1985; Taylor 
1994), and governments are legitimated according to the territory over which they 
hold authority. This study of sovereignty in exile focuses on a case which appears 
to refute these orthodox assumptions. As indicated by the short vignette above, the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGiE) is a polity ridden with contradictions.2 It has 
state-like functions and attributes, but is not a recognised state. It claims authority 
and legitimacy vis-a.-vis its exile population, but operates within the sovereign 
territory of India. In seeking to explore the form, functioning and limitations of the 
TGiE, this study raises important theoretical issues which speak directly to 
political geography's concerns with power and space (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; 
Painter 1995; Taylor and Flint 2000). These include the nature of sovereignty and 
statehood, the extent to which sovereignty can be disentangled from jurisdiction 
over territory, and the role of 'the exception' in geopolitical discourses. 
1.1 Between statehood and statelessness: the Tibetan Government-
in-Exile 
In 1949 China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet and declared its 
'peaceful liberation'.3 Ten years later, the PLA crushed the Tibetan national 
uprising in the capital Lhasa and the Dalai Lama and some 80,000 Tibetans 
crossed the Himalayas to seek refuge in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Today, the 
Tibetan diaspora numbers approximately 122,000, with 70% residing in India 
(Planning Council 2000). After unsuccessful accommodation in transit camps and 
road construction sites across the Indian Himalayas, the Government of India (Gol) 
initiated a strategy of creating self-contained agricultural settlements throughout 
India; a deliberately non-assimilative policy in line with the Dalai Lama's wishes 
(Office of The Dalai Lama 1969). 
2 Whilst the exiled government officially uses the title 'Central Tibetan Administration' when dealing with 
other governments, within the Tibetan community both in exile and in Tibet the administration is known as 
the 'Tibetan Government·in-Exile'. In light of this and the arguments made in this research, the latter term 
is used throughout this study. The political significance of this and other semantic choices made by the 
TGiE is discussed in Chapter 9. 
;1 As explored in Chapter 3, controversy surrounds the legal, territorial and political status of Tibet. Chinese 
authorities maintain that Tibet has been and remains an inalienable part of China's territory (Wei 1989) 
whilst Tibetans and a number of Western lawyers (e.g. International Commission of Jurists 1960; 
McCorquodale and Orosz 1994) contend that Tibet existed as an independent state prior to the Chinese 
occupation in 1949. 
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On 29 April 1960 the Dalai Lama re-established the Tibetan Government in the 
North Indian hill-station of Dharamsala, with the twin task of restoring freedom in 
Tibet and rehabilitating the Tibetan refugees. Over the following decades the 
exiled Tibetan community, under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and more 
recently the democratically elected Tibetan Prime Minister (Kalon Tripa) , has 
developed, expanded and institutionalised the TGiE; an exilic political structure 
that is widely regarded as one of the most established and well organised in the 
world (Goldstein 1978; Fiirer-Haimendorf 1990). A series of changes have been 
implemented to reorganise the TGiE according to democratic principles and, 
following reforms in 1991, the government has developed a participatory 
democracy for the first time in Tibet's history. Today, operating under the 
constitution-like 'Charter of Tibetans in Exile', TGiE consists of a legislative 
parliament with members elected from the diaspora, a judiciary (albeit with 
limited powers) and an executive body (the Kashag) in charge of seven 
governmental departments. 
Whilst less functionally operational than a territorial nation-state, the Tibetan 
community-in-exile is more politically organised and established than a socially-
networked diaspora. Not only has the exiled community transplanted its 
government structures and institutionalised and democratised them, but it has 
established a state-like polity in exile. These state-like functions include the 
organisation of democratic elections, the provision of health services and a 
comprehensive education system for Tibetans living in India and Nepal, a 
'voluntary' taxation system for the entire diaspora, the issuing of Tibetan 
'passports' and the establishment of quasi 'embassies' in a number of states. 
Furthermore, the fact that TGiE represents over 120,000 Tibetans living in exile, 
that it perceives itself as the de jure representative of Tibetans living in Tibet, and 
that it is increasingly acknowledged by the international community, implies that 
this political administration has considerable authority and (internal) legitimacy. 
However, as TGiE remains internationally unrecognised and lacks sovereignty over 
territory in both Tibet and in exile, this polity faces significant barriers to fulfilling 
the conventional remit of statehood. It has limited juridical powers, restricted 
economic decision-making, no police or military and is unable to legally defend its 
'citizens'. 
As such, TGiE is characterised by a series of tensions between opposing aspects of 
statehood and statelessness. For example, TGiE has state-like qualities, yet is 
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territory-less; it is a polity which is intended to be temporary but is becoming 
increasingly settled; it engages with simultaneous processes of de-territorialisation 
and re-territorialisation; and it combines nationalism (the assertion of belonging to 
a place and community) with exile (the removal from and absence of such a 
community). Analysing these contradictions means going beyond issues of identity 
and nationalism (IQieger 1992; Yeh 2007), cultural preservation (Harris 1997; 
Korom 1997) and socio-cultural adaptation (Subba 1990; Norbu 2001) through 
which the exile Tibetan case has been viewed to date, to examine the political 
institutions and practices of TGiE and its relationship with the host state India. 
Doing so opens up a conceptual space through which to interrogate key political 
concepts such as the nature of the state, questions of sovereignty and the role of 
territory. 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study aims to analyse the political relationships TGiE has established in 
terms of conventional and critical understandings of political authority and the 
organisation of political space. Based on multi-sited ethnographic research 
conducted with the exiled Tibetan government and community based in India, the 
broad aims of this research are: 
(i) to examine the nature of sovereignty articulated by this territory-less 
polity; 
(ii) to investigate what kind of political entity the TGiE is. 
Turning to the first aim, in an international political environment dominated by 
state intervention, extra-territorial sites of detention and security concerns 
regarding insurgent movements and failed states (Agnew 2005; Elden 2006), 
sovereignty is an increasingly important and contested issue debated in political 
geography, international relations and political anthropology (Ashley 1988; Weber 
1995; Krasner 1999; Sidaway 2002; Hansen and Stepputat 2005). In light of this, a 
focus on a positive story of nascent democracy and community cohesion operating 
within the global South is expedient and pertinent. In teasing apart TGiE's 
articulations of sovereignty in exile, the following questions will be asked: Without 
the coercive powers of sovereign statehood and a monopoly over the use of violence, 
how does TGiE enforce loyalty and exercise authority, and what limitations does it 
face? Given its lack of legal recognition as a government, what forms of legitimacy 
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can this type of political entity draw upon? To what extent is territory a limiting 
factor for TGiE's articulation of political power, and what spatial politics does it 
produce? How does TGiE negotiate its governance strategies whilst operating 
within the sovereign state of India? Overall, through locating and examining the 
key moments, sites, relations, practices, discourses and materialities through 
which TGiE is constituted, I critically analyse the modalities of sovereignty 'at 
work' in this case, the nature of the relationship between sovereignty and territory 
and possible frameworks for shared sovereignty. 
With regards to exploring what type of polity TGiE is and aspires to be, this study 
will explore both the ways in which TGiE is unique and how it partially fits a 
Western-centric model of the sovereign state. In the following chapters, I will 
investigate TGiE's state-like functions and limitations, examine how this 
administration combines and daily negotiates aspects of statehood and 
statelessness and outline the extent to which nationalism and a state-citizen 
relationship is being actively negotiated between TGiE and Tibetans in exile. Such 
queries will facilitate the exploration of a series of broader questions which tap into 
key contemporary debates within and beyond political geography. These include: 
what constitutes a state and is territory an essential pre-requisite to statehood? To 
what extent is governmentality is a state or non-state practice and how central is 
territory to governing practices? Can multiple legal and political identities be held 
simultaneously and what does this say about the state-citizen relationship more 
generally? How is the binary of refugee hood and citizenship constructed and 
subverted? What can the existence and functioning of polities such as TGiE offer 
existing models of autonomy and transnational governance, and what they can tell 
us about the future (re)configuration of political space and authority? 
My primary focus in this thesis is on TGiE as an entity in its own right, examining 
the political structures established by this exiled administration in order to 
address issues of governance, legitimacy, political representation, identity 
construction and welfare provision. Cross-cutting these themes are a series of 
relationships which TGiE has established and daily negotiates over a range of 
scales. First is the relationship between TGiE and 'its' population in exile which 
raises key questions of citizenship without territory, legitimacy without coercive 
powers, nationalism in exile and dispersed democracy. Important to note is the fact 
that while the international diaspora and TGiE's operations within Nepal form an 
important backdrop to this study, the primary focus is on the exile community in 
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India. Secondly, the relationship between TGiE and its host state India will be an 
important and recurrent theme. Central to grasping what TGiE is and what it can 
do, relations with the host state are especially pertinent in terms of where the 
boundaries of sovereign power and legitimacy lie, how these are enforced and, 
therefore, the degree of the exile administration's autonomy within the domestic 
arena of the host. Moreover, an analysis of how two sovereignties, albeit one 
unrecognised, can co-exist in the same territory and how this relationship is 
(re)negotiated as TGiE becomes increasingly institutionalised, is instructive to 
ongoing debates on multiple and overlapping sovereignties and the nature of 
sovereignty more generally. Finally, the relationship between TGiE and the 
international community of states will form an important historical and legal 
context for this study, enabling a focus on issues of external legitimacy, 
(non)recognition and the performances and practices of (para)diplomacy. 
In order to unpack and explore these relationships, the dual dimensions of elite 
and popular politics will be examined. This brings together the official 'top-down' 
view with the perspective from the bottom-up; what it means to live under the 
TGiE, the restrictions faced and the nature of everyday interactions with this exile 
polity. The use of multi-sited ethnographic methods is crucial to such an approach, 
enabling TGiE's self-representation to be distinguished from and contrasted with 
the view of Tibetans 'on the ground' in exile communities in India. This contributes 
to a growing body of ethnographic work in political geography and critical 
geopolitics (e.g. Secor 2001a; Mountz 2003; Megoran 2006). In addition to being 
original in its focus on multiple Tibetan settlements, this study is innovative in its 
ethnographic examination of the everyday functioning of TGiE in India and, in 
particular, how the relationship between the exile administration and the GoI is 
constructed through mundane interactions at a range of scales. 
1.3 Unpacking the political geographies of the TGiE 
Having set out here the broad context and research aims of this study, the next 
chapter will contextualise TGiE vis-a.-vis other geopolitical anomalies and will 
situate this study within and between literatures on states and on statelessness. 
By positioning this research within a theoretical trajectory from statist approaches 
based on realism and positivism to non-statist approaches based on critical and 
poststructuralist theories, my aim is to consider how this case might be viewed 
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from various perspectives, how this enables us to understand and theorise this 
polity and, in turn, what such an empirical focus can lend to broader theorisations 
of sovereignty, territory, the state, diaspora and transnationalism. With the case 
having been made in Chapter 2 for a focus on TGiE as a case study, Chapter 3 will 
set out the historical and geopolitical context of this exile administration. This will 
entail sketching out the complex legal and political status of the territory of Tibet, 
relations between Tibet, China and India and providing an overview of the history 
and development ofTGiE and wider Tibetan diaspora. 
Chapter 4 then sets out the methodologies employed in this study in light of the 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2. Turning first to qualitative methods, 
this chapter describes the in-depth interviews and focus groups undertaken with 
TGiE and Indian officials and a cross-section of exile Tibetans in six Tibetan 
settlements across India during three research trips in 2006-2007. Focusing on the 
quotidian geographies of this non-state polity, ethnographic approaches to the 
everyday state are also outlined, including attention paid to the mundane actions, 
objects and people which constitute the administrative milieu of the TGiE (Thrift 
2000; Painter 2006). Finally, issues of researcher positionality and the advantages 
and limitations of my involvement in Tibet activism are discussed. 
Drawing on this ethnographic research and working with and across the 
relationships and scales set out above, Chapters 5 to 8 explore and analyse four key 
aspects of TGiE's state-like functioning in exile: the Tibetan settlements in exile as 
sites of sovereignty; TGiE's construction of a Tibetan 'population' in exile and its 
governance of lives and livelihoods; the negotiation of exilic political identities 
based on refugeehood and citizenship; and the development of exile Tibetan 
democracy and parliamentary elections. Drawing on a range of theoretical 
approaches, each of these substantive chapters highlights key aspects of TGiE's 
articulation of sovereignty and, together, they build up a picture of the form, 
functioning and limitations of this polity. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the key issue of territory and addresses the apparent paradox 
of a stateless nation managing a series of territorialised settlements. In unpacking 
the spatiality of the Tibetan government and community in exile attention is 
turned to three distinct geographies: diasporic networks; the TGiE's territorialised 
administrative hierarchies; and the Tibetanised landscapes of the 35 TGiE-run 
settlements in India. As spaces where TGiE has autonomy over its own affairs and 
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partial de facto sovereignty, the establishment, sustainability and day-to-day 
administration of these settlements is key to understanding the underlying 
rationale of TGiE, issues of nationalism, homeland and displacement, and the 
operation of Tibetan and Indian legal systems within the same territory. As such, 
this chapter examines the role, function and management of these settlements 
from the internal perspective of the Tibetan 'state'-in-exile, and considers 
settlements as key sites of interaction between the Tibetan and Indian 
Governments. Situating these issues in relation to theories of (de)territorialisation, 
Tibetan spatiality in exile is interpreted as lying between state space and diaspora 
space and the idea of these settlements as sites of 'displaced sovereignty' is posited. 
In light of the territorial and legal limitations of TGiE outlined in Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6 employs a different theoretical perspective on political power in order to 
further examine the form and functioning of this exile administration. Drawing on 
the extra-territorial and non-state centric form of power found in Foucault's 
notions of governmentality and biopower, this chapter focuses critical attention on 
TGiE's management of lives and livelihoods. Not only does govern mentality open 
up the possibility of polities other than states governing, but it also allows for 
entities other than territory to be what is governed. As such, this chapter examines 
the intersection of the case of TGiE with ongoing debates regarding the 
relationship between governmentality and the state, and governance and territory. 
In doing so, TGiE's construction of three objects of governance is examined -
population, civil society and the economy - in relation to which TGiE creates itself 
as a 'state'. Not only does this shift attention to the importance of non-Western 
cultural politics vis-a-vis governmentality and empirically grounds these often 
abstract ideas, but it speaks to broader concerns regarding issues of welfare, the 
fostering of nascent economies and the development of civil society. 
Turning to the relationship individual Tibetans have with their government, 
Chapter 7 focuses on the construction and negotiation of political and legal 
identities in exile. At the heart of the relationship between identity and the state is 
the construction of a binary between the citizen resident in a bounded territorial 
and national community, and its archetypal 'other', the refugee. As simultaneously 
refugees in the eyes of the Indian state and international community (although 
India's lack of refugee legislation complicates this picture in important ways) and 
Tibetan 'citizens' in the eyes of TGiE, exile Tibetans fundamentally challenge this 
dualism. Turning a critical spotlight onto this legal limbo, this chapter examines 
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these contradictory relationships between Tibetans in India and each of the two 
'states' which identify, label and document them. Drawing on and speaking to a 
growing body of sociological and anthropological literature on identity documents, 
this chapter shows how individual Tibetans are both victims and agents of these 
identification regimes, and how TGiE strives to claim legitimacy through 
constructing state/citizen-like relations. This chapter therefore exposes the politics 
of identity labelling and encourages a productive engagement with and dialogue 
between research agendas around refugeehood and citizenship, statehood and 
statelessness. 
In the final substantive chapter, attention turns to an aspect of TGiE which brings 
together the key themes of territoriality, governance and political identities: the 
establishment of democracy in exile and the organisation of Tibetan parliamentary 
elections. With the democratisation of Tibetan politics perceived as a key 
achievement of this exile polity and central to how it presents itself to the 
international community, this examination of the development of Tibetan 
democracy and its material manifestation in the parliamentary election system 
provides an important insight into both the raison d'etre of TGiE, and into what a 
territory-less polity can contribute to existing theories of democracy. As such, 
Chapter 8 examines the unique evolution of and rationale behind Tibetan 
democracy and the limitations faced by operating in exile and asks the question: if 
elections are conventionally based on political representatives representing voters 
in territorially defined constituencies, what happens in parliamentary elections in 
a 'state' without sovereignty over territory? In response, this chapter teases apart 
the instrumental and strategic roles of democracy and analyses the relationship 
between political representation and territory - both 'real' and symbolic. 
Finally, Chapter 9 returns to the initial research aims in light of this ethnographic 
study and outlines the implications of this research for understandings of 
sovereignty and thinking about alternative geopolitical configurations. 
Interrogating and problematising the constituent elements of TGiE's sovereignty. 
issues of legitimacy and legality and concepts of de facto and de jure sovereignty 
are disaggregated and the idea of displaced sovereignty proposed whereby there is 
a dislocation between the source and enactment of sovereign authority. With 
regards to the ambiguous and often contradictory relationship between TGiE and 
GoI the notion of tacit sovereignty which is assumed through everyday practices 
and implicit understandings is posited. Turning to what kind of polity this is, the 
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state-like nature of TGiE IS assessed, its position between statehood and 
statelessness explored and the utility of categorising geopolitical anomalies 
questioned. The thesis ends by broadening the focus to explore the extent to which 
this polity can offer a framework for other stateless nations, indigenous 
communities and refugee groups and to outline what the existence and functioning 
of non-state polities such as TGiE mean for the (re)pluralising of political space and 
constructing more progressive geopolitical futures. 
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Chapter 2 
Theorising Governments-in-Exile: Statehood, Statelessness and the 
Reconfiguration of Territory and Sovereignty 
2.1 Introduction 
In light of the research aims set out in the previous chapter - to examine the 
nature of sovereignty articulated in this case and to investigate what kind of polity 
the TGiE is - the obvious place to theoretically situate this study is within the sub-
discipline of political geography with its focus on the relationship between power 
and space. My aim in this chapter is to address three questions: Why should 
political geographers pay attention to polities such as governments-in-exile? How 
might we go about understanding and theorising such entities? And how would a 
critical analysis of governments-in-exile within political geography productively 
encourage us to rethink disciplinary boundaries, analytical approaches and 
research agendas? 
In attending to the former, I will contextualise governments-in-exile with regards 
to the emergence of a range of geopolitical 'anomalies' in the twentieth-century. 
These geopolitical 'exceptions' will be discussed in relation to their articulation of 
sovereignty, territory and statehood, with the category of governments-in-exile 
emerging as the most apposite for interrogating the phenomenon of sovereignty 
without territory. The genealogy and common characteristics of governments-in-
exile will then be sketched out and this category unpacked historically, 
geographically and analytically. Attention then shifts to how a polity such as TGiE 
can be theorised. Given my focus on its state-like functioning in exile, I will situate 
this case within the epistemological manoeuvres that have occurred within the 
study of the state, sovereignty and territory, drawing on literature from political 
geography and (critical) international relations (IR). Rejecting realist arguments 
that polities such as TGiE should be viewed merely as discrepant forms of political 
practice, I will argue that if sovereignty is understood as historically contingent 
and socially constructed and the state, sovereignty and territory 
thereby conceptually disentangled - this opens up the theoretical possibility of 
territory-less polities and allows us to explore the governmental functions that 
TGiE employs, and the degree of de facto sovereignty that it exercises. However, in 
acknowledging that theories of the state fail to address key issues faced by TGiE 
and its exile population - including refugee status, relations with the host state 
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and temporariness in exile - attention then turns to theories of statelessness. 
Focusing on refugee studies and literature on diaspora and transnationalism, three 
key points of intersection between these research agendas and the case of TGiE 
will be analysed: the role of the state vis-a.-vis the stateless; reconceptualisations of 
territory and the role of the homeland; and the construction of political identities in 
exile. By situating this case theoretically and empirically within and between these 
literatures on the state and on statelessness, I make the case for thinking 
productively across research fields, focusing on relational and processual rather 
than categorical frames of analysis and thinking critically about a political 
geography of statelessness. 
2.2 Geopolitical anomalies, governments-in-exile and the 'norms' of 
international politics 
Contemporary geopolitical anomalies are non-state entities which in diverse ways 
challenge, disrupt or reconfigure the relationship between sovereignty and 
territory. My focus here is on examples which exist, or aspire to exist, within the 
state system, and therefore not on multi-national companies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or transnational social movements.. Whilst also 
fundamentally challenging conventional interpretations of sovereignty and 
territory, these latter entities have logics and motives which significantly diverge 
from those of the interstate system. After setting out the issues regarding 
sovereignty and statehood that such anomalies raise I turn attention to 
governments-in-exile, outlining how these polities have been classified, the 
diversity of forms within this category and the important theoretical questions a 
case such as TGiE raises. 
2.2.1 Contextualising geopolitical 'anomalies' 
Concomitant with the dramatic increase in the number of nation-states since the 
end of World War II - from 51 members of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 to 192 
at present (www.un.org/membersllist.shtm1)5 - has been another story: the 
formation of political entities which do not fit the nation-state model. Diverse in 
size and rationale (whether or not they are aspiring to independent statehood), 
such polities are often the product of the same geopolitical processes -
decolonisation and secession - and principles of international law - self-
4 Having said this, the relationship between TGiE and the label 'NGO' will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
6 The UN is perceived as the prime arbiter among legitimation and recognition issues whereby admission as 
a member state has come to be regarded as axiomatic with statehood (Dugard 1987). 
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determination and territorial integrity - which have led to this proliferation of 
nation-states. Crucially, however, these political entities are often the ad hoc 
manifestation of 'failures' or incompletion of these processes, or the institutional 
outcome of tensions between these legal principles and prevailing international 
norms. These include 'the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence 
for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries' (Elden 
2006: 11). 
The decolonisation of territories forming part of European overseas empires altered 
the complexion of the international system in the period from 1945 to 1960 
(Bartmann 2004). At the core of the decolonisation process, and central to the 
activities of the newly formed UN, was the principle - and right - of self-
determination (Castellino 1999; UN Charter, Article 1).6 Alongside the formation of 
nation-states from former colonies, other territorial entities emerged which were 
framed as the result of partial or suspended decolonisation. These included League 
of Nation Mandates which later became UN Trust Territories (see Anghie 2002), 
Non Self-Governing Territories7 and the broader category of dependent territories 
(Armstrong and Read 2000). Whilst colonial territories had always posed a problem 
to conventional concepts of sovereignty, these polities resulting from a stalling of 
the process of decolonisation further complicated and challenged the relationship 
between sovereignty and international law (Anghie 2002). For example, a recurrent 
(and indeed rarely resolved) issue in these cases is determining where the 
sovereignty over these territories was vested. Was it in the former colonial power? 
In the institutions of the international community (League of Nations or later the 
UN)? Or with the community itself in the form of 'latent sovereignty' that would 
emerge in its actualised form upon the termination of the mandate (Elden 2006: 
19)? 
Moreover, as forms of incomplete and divided sovereignty, these forgotten vestiges 
of empire have an often ambiguous temporality. On the one hand they are 
conventionally perceived as a stage en route to complete independence or 
6 The UN actions on decolonisation meant that self·determination applied only to former colonies. not to 
independent countries. For the latter, territorial integrity overrides other possible claims by groups of 
people (Elden 2006: 12). 
7 This label describes peoples who, as a consequence of colonialism, are not able to immediately exercise 
fully their right to self·determination. In 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 (XV). 
promulgating the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', which 
declared that all remaining Non·Self·Governing Territories (NSGTs) and Trust Territories were entitled to 
self·determination and independence. However, 16 territories remain on the UN's NSGT list, including 
Western Sahara, the Falkland Islands. Guam and Gibraltar. 
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assimilation into an existing nation-state. However, in reality they are often stuck 
in limbo: 'complex mixtures of formal dependence, internal self-government, and 
international personality' (Strang 1996: 24).8 Finally, it should be noted that often 
neglected from literatures on such geopolitical anomalies are national liberation 
movements which are directed against the occupying powers of 'third world' states 
and which are the visible outcomes of the continuation of colonialism in the 
postcolonial period. With colonial rule conventionally interpreted to refer only to 
white Europeans, the international community and the writings and practices of 
realist IR have struggled to recognise and intervene in cases where colonialism 
took place after the establishment of the UN charter in 1945, and where the 
coloniser is not a European or 'first world' state (Castellino 1999: 526). The case of 
Tibet is illustrative, as the international community was faced with a new 
colonisation with China's occupation of Tibet in 1949-1950, but failed to frame this 
case as one of colonisation and subsequently has not recognised Tibet as a 
decolonisation issue (see Chapter 3). 
A second category are 'shared sovereignties'; geopolitical anomalies which are the 
result of extraterritoriality, where 'the jurisdiction and laws of one sovereign state 
extend over the territory of another' (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002: 103). These 
include binational territories and condominiums (e.g. Brcko district of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, see Jeffrey 2006), international territories such as Antarctica (Dodds 
1997) and international oceans (Steinberg 2001), 'trans-state entities' (e.g. the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, see Relyea 1998), enclaves 
(Vinokurov 2007) and leased territories (Strauss 2007). These shared sovereignties 
illustrate a range of complex and constantly negotiated legal arrangements, 
produced as the interstate system attempts to regularise its 'awkward spaces' and 
historical irregularities. Critical examinations of these entities therefore disrupt 
traditional understandings of sovereignty and open up the possibilities for 
overlapping, shared and constantly negotiated sovereignties (see Ong 1999; 
Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002). 
Finally, there is the eclectic range of polities which have emerged as a result of the 
post-Cold War tension between increasing nationalist bids for secession, and the 
unwillingness of the international system to approve secessionist wishes when 
8 It should be noted that, in the case of contemporary dependencies, this in·between status is often 
supported in these territories, as the balance between autonomy and external protection can be 
advantageous for what are predominantly small or sparsely populated territories. 
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their claims for self-determination are 'pitted against the equally sacrosanct 
principle of territorial integrity' (Bahcheli et al 2004: 7).9 These polities include 
national liberation or insurgent movements such as the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) and LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) (Eyman 2001); stateless 
nations such as Catalonia and Kurdistan (Guibernau 1999); and de facto states 
(Pegg 1998; Kingston and Spears 2004). 
As perhaps the most 'state-like' of these 'less-than-state' entities, de facto states 
such as Somaliland (Kaplan 2008), Abkhazia (Walker 2007), and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin 2005) are fascinating cases of 
reconfigured sovereignty and the unintended by-product of changing international 
norms concerning the criteria for statehood and the relationship between legality 
and legitimacy. In traditional international law, recognition was ostensibly a legal 
act and was acquired only after successfully demonstrating the capacity to govern 
(Murphy 1999). Statehood was thus premised on empirical criteria and the 
'doctrine of effective control' (see Weber's (1948) definition of the state and the 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933). However, as the 
twentieth-century progressed it became increasingly apparent that many states 
fall short of these criteria. As a result, the international community has 
increasingly come to accept a juridical approach to statehood which includes a 
former colony's right to self-determination (Spears 2004). As such, 'rulers can 
acquire independence solely by virtue of being successors of colonial governments' 
(Jackson 1990: 34). This 'new sovereignty game' (ibid) thus led to the 
establishment of a number of quasi states which are 'internationally recognised as 
full juridical equals ... yet which manifestly lack all but the most rudimentary 
empirical capabilities' (pegg 1998: 3).10 De facto states are therefore the flip side of 
these quasi states; having state capabilities but lacking recognition (Mihalkanin 
2004). Granting legal recognition to states which are in a state of domestic collapse 
on the one hand while more viable de facto states remain legally unrecognised 
therefore exposes the 'egregious double standards' of the contemporary 
international system (Bartmann 2004: 13) and demonstrates the importance 
international society continues to place on territoriality and the sanctity of 
recognised borders (pegg 2004). 
9 As Pegg points out, although secession and decolonisation are based on the same principle of self· 
determination, the international community has embraced the latter but there has been a traditional bias 
against the former, based on the fear of never-ending secession and 'Balkanisation' (1998: 193). 
10 Jackson (1990) describes this as quasi states possessing 'negative sovereignty' but lacking 'positive 
sovereignty'. The colonial binary logiC underpinning such literature on quasi states and de facto states is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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Returning to the tension between secessionist demands for independent statehood 
and opposition from established nation-states that see it as a challenge to the 
'international order' (Guibernau 1999: 27), three possible routes for resolving this 
can be identified. Firstly, a territorial approach granting independent statehood 
has resulted in the creation of new microstates. As entities at the margins of the 
international community, microstates such as San Marino, Liechtenstein and 
Andorra in Europe and Niue, Kiribati and Nauru in the Pacific can be used to 
interrogate the minimum criteria of statehood as they represent 'border cases of 
independence' (Duursma 1996: 423).1l An alternative approach, and in line with 
prevailing international norms of preserving territorial integrity, is to keep 
existing (multi-ethnic) nation-states intact, but to accommodate secessionist 
demands through consociational forms of power-sharing. Involving a near-endless 
array of autonomous or confederal arrangements within existing states (Pegg 1998) 
examples include cases of sub-state nationalism such as Scotland and Quebec 
(Keating 2001; Lijphart 2004) and indigenous communities in North America 
(Bruyneel 2007). Such judicial 'solutions' of plurinational accommodation therefore 
'provide new ways of coping with the present, post-sovereign order' (Keating 2001: 
ix) and raise important questions regarding the nature and limits of autonomy and 
its relationships with self-determination and sovereignty. A third option, and one 
which I will return to in Chapter 9, entails the continued existence of non-state 
entities in their current form, but with significant shifts in the interpretation and 
implementation of international norms so that these polities are accommodated 
within a heterogeneous international system. This decidedly more utopian solution 
might also take inspiration from Gottlieb's (1993) states-plus-nations model 
whereby national homelands would overlap with existing states in a multi-tiered 
system of sovereignty. 
This brief overview of the shifting political and legal contexts for, and key 
characteristics of, a range of geopolitical anomalies has touched on a range of 
varying degrees of sovereignty. These include shared, multiple and overlapping 
sovereignties. would-be sovereignties and sovereign nations (rather than sovereign 
states). Importantly, these are all entities which, in the contemporary international 
II Not to be confused with micro·states are so-called 'micro·nations' or virtual states. These eccentric and 
often ephemeral self·proclaimed 'states' are weak simulations of states, typically involving a small group of 
people (most claim a membership of less than 50) and lacking both international recognition and any basis 
in international law. Examples include the Principality of Sealand, a World War II anti·aircraft platform 
lOkm off the Suffolk coast founded in 1967 and the Republic of Minerva established between Tonga and Fiji 
in 1972. 
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system, are seen to lack key attributes of statehood: legal sovereignty, 
international legitimacy and recognition. As such, they are entities which have 
international status short of sovereign statehood and are key manifestations of 
Clapham's claim that the world is no longer 
'crisply divided into entities which do and do not count as "states". It 
consists instead of a mass of power structures which, regardless of formal 
designation, enjoy greater or lesser degrees of statehood' (1998: 157). 
In addition, though constructed as legally and politically incomplete, these are 
entities which actively seek to operate within the international system and their 
logic is similar to that of sovereign states. Their purpose is not to challenge or 
undermine the system, but rather to alter the boundaries of the system and 
thereby gain permission to play the game (pegg 1998). Moreover, as sketched out 
above, these polities are the result of, and speak to, international legal discourses 
of self-determination, secession, minority rights, decolonisation and territorial 
integrity. Indeed, these cases aptly illustrate the continued persistence and 
inflexibility of these international norms and therefore the failure of realist IR and 
the international community to keep pace with changing geopolitical realities. 
2.2.2 Genealogy and geopolitics of governments-in-exile 
One key factor sets governments-in-exile apart from the non-state polities outlined 
above and makes them of particular interest to political geographers. Whilst 
control and authority over territory is a pre-requisite for the majority of geopolitical 
'anomalies' and the populations concerned are residing in their homelands, 
governments-in-exile have no jurisdiction over territory and operate from within a 
'foreign' sovereign state. As such, these entities are instructive to addressing the 
relationship between sovereignty and territory. Often lacking diplomatic 
recognition whilst commanding significant political authority, governments-in-exile 
are a relatively rare geopolitical phenomenon. Complex and highly differentiated, 
they are 'as varied as the countries they purport to rule', differing considerably in 
structure, functions and 'clout' (The Economist, 22 December 2001: 45).12 
In the introductory chapter to Governments-in-exile in Contemporary World 
Politics, Shain (1991: 3-4) categorises governments-in-exile according to the goals 
U What I am not including within the (problematic) category of 'governments-in-exile' are the 'numerous 
liberation organisations, national councils or committees, free movements, and other opposition groups in 
exile which have neither claimed or purported to be governments nor have been recognised as such' 
(Talmon 1998: ix). Rather, any legal entity which claims to be a government-in-exile and to represent its 
'nation', or has been given the label of 'government-in-exile' by others will be considered, irrespective of 
whether or not they have been legally recognised as a government. 
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and grounds on which they appeal for international support. First are deposed 
governments which struggle from abroad to regain political independence or 
territory lost in a war. The London-based allied governments-in-exile during World 
War II are key examples of this, and were recognised as governments by most 
allied and neutral states (Conway and Gotovitch 2001).13 Of these, Poland's 
Government in London, established in June 1940 and commanding Polish armed 
forces during the war, was the most extensive and enduring, remaining in 
existence until the end of Communist rule in Poland in 1990 when it formally 
passed on its responsibilities to the new government in situ (Coutouvidis and 
Reynolds 1986).14 Secondly, illustrating a post-war shift from 'no longer [being] 
dispossessed governments trying to prolong a de jure international status, but 
rather aspiring exiled contenders seeking... de facto control of a given target 
territory' (Shain 1991: 226), are groups striving to overthrow and replace their 
home country's native, and often oppressive, regime. Presenting themselves as 
either lawfully elected or their nation's traditional representatives, examples 
include the Government of Cuba in Arms-in-Exile established in 1961 in Miami, 
the National Government of Iran in Exile (1962), and the National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (1990). Thirdly, reflecting a shift from 
European-based governments-in-exile to exiled governments being 'almost 
exclusively the tool of liberation movements and other aspirants in Third World 
countries' (Shain 1991: 8), are those emerging due to the political instability 
surrounding the end of European colonialism (e.g. Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
Republique Algerienne established in 1958 and based in Cairo and then Tunis). 
Finally, there are groups aspiring to independent political status due to occupation 
of their homeland by a neighbouring state (e.g. the Polisario government of 
Western Sahara established in 1973; the Kuwaiti Government-in-Exile based m 
Saudi Arabia in 1990 and the TGiE). 
It is important to note that few exiled administrations since 1945 - especially those 
established as a result of secession, political opposition or civil war - have been 
I;] These included the governments of Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Luxembourg, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece based in London and colonies of allied countries, including the 
Philippine Commonwealth Government·in-exile based in Washington DC and the Government of Burma 
based in Shimla, India. Three governments-in-exile aligned with Germany were also established; the 
Bulgarian National Government-in-exile, Delegation gouvernementale francais pour la defence des interets 
nationaux and the Serbian Government-in-exile. These entities were based in Germany or German occupied 
Vienna and were recognised only by Germany. 
14 Indeed, when Lech Wal~sa became the first post-Communist president of Poland, he received the symbols 
of the Polish Republic (the presidential and state seals and the original text of the 1935 Constitution) from 
the last president of the Government-in-exile, Ryszard Kaczorowski. This therefore re-established the 
continuity of the Republic and in effect retroactively recognised the legitimacy of the Government-in-exile 
(Stachura 2004: 45). 
29 
recognised, and formal declarations of non-recognition have been made in several 
cases (Talmon 1998). A key reason for this is the considerable weight of the 
principle of territorial integrity in the legal discourses through which recognition is 
applied for and conferred or denied. Crucially, the act of recognition creates a zero-
sum-game with respect to territory as diplomatic recognition cannot be 
simultaneously accorded 'to more than one aspirant to govern the same territorial 
entity' (Shain 1991: 220). With the power dynamics of the current international 
system favouring territorially bounded 'conventional' nation-states, this therefore 
precludes the international recognition and legitimation of many governments-in-
exile which challenge the authority and legitimacy of an in situ state. In summary, 
therefore, like other anomalous political entities, governments-in-exile are most 
likely to form during periods of domestic political upheaval and geopolitical 
instability and closely relate to international legal doctrines of decolonisation, 
secession and self-determination (Reisman 1991). 
In general, governments-in-exile are a neglected feature of international politics, 
with their achievements under-reported and their existence under-theorised. 
Existing studies of exile governments 'are written either by the exiles themselves 
or their successors' (Goddeeris 2007: 397), or are in-depth but one-off analyses of 
specific cases (e.g. Palmier 2006). There have been few attempts to study 
governments-in-exile comparatively or to theoretically assess the implications of 
these entities for contemporary international society (although see Shain 1989, 
1991: Talmon 1998).15 Consistent among these latter studies has been a reliance on 
secondary sources, a focus on the formal politics and political elites of governments-
in-exile and an emphasis on abstract concepts of international law and 
international diplomacy. My assertion, therefore, is that there is an important 
place for (critical) political geography and the employment of ethnographic methods 
to focus on the lived realities of governments-in-exile, examining how they function 
on the ground and how relationships with their 'citizens' and host states are daily 
negotiated. In light of this, whilst Shain's schema is useful in setting out the 
contexts and circumstances from which governments-in-exile develop, this 
I~ Whilst calling for an imposition of theoretical order regarding the study of governments-in·exile. Shain's 
edited collection (1991) in many ways fails to meet this challenge, and instead is ultimately more 
descriptive than analytical. A more theoretically rigorous analysis is made in Shain's monograph The 
Frontier of Loyalty (1989) which, coming from a political science perspective, compares the political 
activities of groups of exiles (not necessarily governments-in-exile) and proposes replacing the 'impractical' 
concept of legitimacy with the concept of 'loyalty'. Meanwhile, Talmon's (1998) comparative study employs a 
legalistic frame of analysis and systematic approach to examine 70 twentieth·century governments-in-exile. 
Whilst illuminating in terms of its analysis of diplomatic relations and protection of property and nationals 
by governments.in.exile, Talmon's focus is primarily on the legal intricacies of recognition rather than the 
nature of governments.in-exile as entities in their own right. 
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categorisation tells us little about how governments-in-exile actually function or 
about broader issues of sovereignty, territory and statehood. In order to think of 
these entities in a different way, it is instructive to consider governments-in-exile 
as processual and, echoing Pegg's (1998) analytical framework of the birth, life and 
death of de facto states, we can chart a similar 'life-cycle' for governments-in-exile 
(Figure 2.a). 
Figure 2.a: The life-cycle of Governments-in-Exile 
Circumstances leading 
to the establishment of 
a government-in-exile 
e.g. 
- Wart civil war 
- colonial occupation 
- annexation 
- political opposition to 
the ruling regime 
- secession 
- decolonisation 
Period in exile and the Possible outcomes for 
state-like functioning of governments-in-exile, 
the government-in- whether aspired to 01' 
xile r--___ ...l...J ........ not 
International 
recognition 
internal legitimacy 
and relationship with 
the 'dependent' 
refugee population 
relationship with the 
host state 
- Return to govel'ning 
in the homeland 
- Disbanding of 
government-in-exile 
Existing literature focuses overwhelmingly on the 'birth' and 'death' stages of this 
cycle. I argue instead that it is the period in-between - the 'episode entre 
parentheses' (Conway and Gotovitch 2001: 268) when the government exists and 
functions in exile - which raises key questions for political geography, These 
include issues of legitimacy, authority, the nature of statehood and the relationship 
between sovereignty and territory. Although for many governments-in-exile their 
'sojourn' in exile is short-lived - with their (self)declaration a symbolic strategy to 
elicit international support without the intention of actually operating as a 
government whilst in exile - for others this period is protracted and they continue 
to function in exile for many decades . Examples of such governments-in-exile 
include the TGiE, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) established on 
Algerian territory in 1976 following Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara 
(Shelley 2004),16 and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which has been 
perhaps the most active non-state participant in international politics (Moshe 
I r. The SADR was created by the Polisal'io Front as a tool in the independence s truggle and the institutions 
of the SADR and Polisa l'io are hi ghly intertwined. 
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1996). More than 'simply' a political and legal technique 'to influence, undermine or 
replace a particular government in situ' (Reisman 1991: 238), these polities have an 
additional set of functions compared to more 'conventional' war-time governments-
in-exile. These include increasingly permanent state-like structures in exile; the 
provision of welfare services for a sizeable dependent population; the promotion of 
nation-building policies; the establishment of democratic institutions; and their 
operation (although not jurisdiction) within defined territories in the host state. 17 
These important dimensions of functioning in exile, which are notably not 
contingent on the polity being legally recognised, opens up questions about the 
nature of the relationships established during this period. These include relations 
between the government-in-exile and the population(s) they claim to represent, the 
government in situ, the host state and other governments. 
Indeed, with regards to the latter relationships, despite the significant material, 
political and legal limitations faced, IS a lack of recognition does not mean that 
these governments-in-exile cannot conduct interactions with other governments. 
Rather, as Shearer asserts, 'non-recognition... does not necessarily mean non-
intercourse with non-recognising states, just as non-intercourse does not 
necessarily signify non-recognition' (1994: 129). A key aspect of unofficial 
engagements with the international community are practices of paradiplomacy. 
Whilst the term has to date been applied primarily to the foreign policy capacity of 
sub-national governments (Aldecoa and Keating 1999), it can fruitfully be extended 
to the diplomatic strategies through which exiled administrations seek to translate 
their de facto control into de jure acceptance in the international arena. Such 
activities and performances include the establishment of quasi-diplomatic facilities 
such as 'pseudo' embassies and foreign missions, engagement with international 
donor agencies and the issuing of passport-like identity documents. As attempts to 
project an image of credibility and some measure of international personality, these 
practices open up the question of the relationship between recognition and 
legitimacy and the extent to which these can be teased apart in light of such 
polities. 
17 Despite the fact that 'understanding the relationship between host and guest is central to grasping what 
governments-in-exile are and can do' (Reisman 1991: 243), surprisingly little academic attention has 
focused on the relationship between a government-in-exile and its host state. The relationship is mentioned 
only in passing in most accounts of governments-in-exile and is spoken about in general terms, with a focus 
on wider geopolitical contexts and alliances. 
18 For example, without legal recognition governments-in-exile cannot enter into diplomatic relations, gain 
membership in intergovernmental organisations (Duursma 1996: 115) or enter into or benefit from bilateral 
or multilateral treaties and alliances (Mihalkanin 2004: 157). 
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These polities therefore constitute very particular configurations of sovereignty and 
territory and claims to legitimate governance. They are holders of state-potential, 
builders of social capital and have intriguing parallels to, but lack direct 
equivalence with, both the category of governments-in-exile and de facto states. 
With regards to the latter, whilst the TGiE and SADR have existed longer than a 
number of de facto and, indeed, de jure states (e.g. East Timor, Montenegro) these 
neither are nor strive to be states per se. Their function is not to remain in exile 
but rather to regain political authority in the homeland, and thus the projection of 
their future is fundamentally different from their present.19 In terms of the 
category of governments-in-exile, if, as discussed above, cases such as TGiE and 
SADR are qualitatively different from previous war-time governments-in-exile and 
therefore an exception to this geopolitical exception, questions arise as to whether 
these entities can or should be classified as 'governments-in-exile.' In turn, this 
raises the issue of how instructive 'government-in-exile' is as a descriptor and 
category. Indeed, whilst a comparative study between TGiE and SADR would be 
enlightening,20 the incoherence of the classification of 'government-in-exile', the 
scope of a PhD thesis and the adoption of an ethnographic approach meant that it 
is more productive to focus on one exile polity and explore its functioning in depth. 
In light of this, and given my previous experience working with the exile Tibetan 
community in India as well as language and access issues (see Chapter 4), the 
Tibetan case was selected. Framing TGiE in its own terms - rather than with the 
conceptual and historical baggage of the 'government-in-exile' category - the form, 
functions, relationships and limitations of the TGiE will be unpacked and analysed 
in the following chapters in order to explore and examine what kind of political 
entity it is, and what can be learnt from it. 
2.2.3 Summary 
I want to end this section by summarising the reasons why political geographers 
should focus critical attention on non-state entities, and governments-in-exile in 
particular. Despite their limited numbers, relatively small populations and 
territorial size and often lack of substantive economic power, these anomalies can 
provide an invaluable window on the nature and reality of international legal 
processes, being able to 'rip through modernity's dominant spatial story and 
19 Both governments-in-exile have formulated detailed plans and constitutions for the future of their 
homelands and these, along with the transfer of institutions and staff from exile. are perceived to facilitate 
a smooth transition of power if or when the occupying regime is overthrown. 
20 SADR bears striking resemblances to TGiE in terms of its historical circumstances (both homelands were 
occupied by neighbouring states), the lack of effective international action despite UN recognition of their 
right to self-determination, the establishment of functioning democratic exile governments which have the 
dual purpose of providing for dependent refugee populations and continuing the 'freedom struggle'. 
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elucidate the limits of an International Relations discourse' (Soguk and Whitehall 
1999: 681). In addition to opening up questions regarding future trends within 
international society and theoretical issues pertaining to how international law can 
adapt to the presence of such non-juridical entities, these entities have a pivotal 
place in current international politics and a measurable impact on issues of conflict 
and war (pegg 1998). Therefore, as lived realities of these (re)configurations of 
political space and power, these polities are worthy of a 'more balanced and less 
judgemental treatment than they have often received in the past' (ibid: 251). 
Finally, with an ambiguous relationship to statehood, an empirical focus on polities 
such as TGiE can throw into relief and problematise the nature of sovereignty, 
territory and statehood, and the relationships between these core concepts of 
political geography. 
2.3 Theorising governments-in-exile: from realist approaches to 
critical re-interpretations 
Having made the case for a sustained political geography focus on polities such as 
governments-in-exile I now want to shift attention to how we can go about 
theorising such polities. Crucial to such an analysis is, J argue, the conceptual 
triangle of state-sovereignty-territory. This framework not only constitutes the key 
concepts upon which debates in political geography are based, but is central to 
analysing the functions performed and limitations faced by these polities. Focusing 
on and charting the ontological and epistemological shifts that have occurred 
within the study of the state, sovereignty and territory from realist and statist 
approaches to critical non-statist perspectives, this section will situate the study of 
TGiE within this theoretical trajectory. 
2.3.1 Realist approaches and the statist paradigm: governments-in-exile as 
geopolitical 'exceptions' 
I want to begin with traditional realist and statist approaches to these concepts, 
not as a straw-man to topple, but because this is the prevailing framework through 
which such polities are conventionally viewed. Indeed, not only has this statist 
paradigm 'exercised a stranglehold on International Relations theory' and shaped 
policy discourses and diplomatic practices, but it has also 'monopolised our 
understanding of the political' (Castoriadis 1987: 7). Dominant in mainstream JR, 
political science and 'traditional' political geography, the conceptualisation of 
'containers' of socio-political analysis is central to such perspectives whereby 
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political authority, territory and population are collapsed into a 'single 
unproblematic actor: the sovereign state' (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 5). This 
bundling of state and territory is fundamental to both the legal criteria for 
statehood (see Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933, Article 
1)21 and definitions of the state. These include Weber's sociological understanding 
of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1948: 78), through Mann's 
(1984) designation as a set of centralised institutions which exercise power over a 
specific territory, to Giddens' definition as a 'political organisation whose rule is 
territorially ordered and which is able to mobilise the means of violence to sustain 
that rule' (1985: 20). This coalescing of bounded territory and political power in the 
form of the sovereign state has been adeptly critiqued by Agnew (1994) as a three-
pronged 'territorial trap': an ahistorical reification of states as fixed units of 
sovereign space; a view of the state as the pre-existing container of 'society' and a 
dichotomising of domestic and foreign or inside and outside. 
Turning to sovereignty, conventionally defined as the ultimate law-making 
authority within given territorial boundaries, this concept has been fundamental to 
theories of state-formation and IR theory. Sovereignty is traditionally seen to 
originate with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and, as such, this moment ofthe rise 
of modern states 'becomes the foundational fiction of a system of mutual 
recognition of sovereignty' (Sidaway 2002: 44). Agnew argues that three 
assumptions are critical to this dominant approach: that there is equality between 
states claiming sovereignty; that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible; and that 
sovereignty is invariably territorial (2005: 440-441). In terms of the latter, 
sovereignty is taken to be a 'political legal fact within an already given and 
demarcated territory, simultaneously signifying sovereignty over the same 
territory' (Bartelson 1995: 29). Meanwhile, territory itself is conceptualised by such 
approaches as fixed location, as rigidly bounded and as contiguous. 
With regards to how realist approaches perceive and theorise non-state entities, a 
number of trends are apparent. Most simply, geopolitical 'anomalies' are 
overlooked by realist theorists with their existence under-theorised and their 
achievements under-reported. Pegg's observations regarding the reasons for the 
21 Article 1 states that 'The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
Qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with the other states.' 
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scant academic attention paid to de facto states is equally applicable to 
governments-in-exile, as he argues that: 
'[I]f the territorial map is seen as unalterable there is little incentive to 
devote much attention to de facto states because their ultimate defeat and 
reincorporation into existing states is both assumed and sought' (1998: 8). 
In a similar vein, Kolossov and O'Loughlin describe such anomalies as 'geopolitical 
black holes' (2008: 152) and Shain argues that exile politics' position between the 
national and the international proves an awkward fit for disciplines traditionally 
premised on this division (1989: 6-7). Even though such non-state entities seek to 
operate within the international system (see above), still they are perceived by 
realist approaches as residing outside the territorial logic of sovereignty and 
operating in 'gaps' between, within and across territorially-bounded sovereign 
states. Rather than a 'deviation' from the state, governments-in-exile are thus 
conceptualised by the realist paradigm as extra-territorial exceptions, placed 
alongside statist readings of the transnational stories that: 
'haunt the embassy, the law of the sea, the UN, the internet, international 
financial systems, and offshore economic zones ... such are exceptions that 
define the rule whose primary "author", "creator" and "guarantor" remains 
the state' (Soguk and Whitehall 1999: 679). 
Moreover, these entities demonstrate the continued persistence and inflexibility of 
international norms of sovereignty, recognition and statehood - a rigidity which 
has governed both what can be asked for and what can be granted - and thus 
illustrate the failure of realist IR to keep pace with changing geopolitical realities. 
The statist paradigm has therefore shaped and limited how we imagine geopolitical 
space both as it exists today and in terms of future possibilities, 'ignoring the fact 
that there are many other layers and spaces of politics' (Mandaville 1999: 656) and 
obscuring the 'possibility that distinctly new political forms are emerging' 
(Anderson 1996: 133). 
A key component of this exceptionalising of non-state polities is the assumption 
that there exists either 'absolute' sovereignty or no sovereignty at all. As the 'other' 
to internationally recognised sovereign states, geopolitical anomalies are thus 
framed as lacking international status and legitimacy. This enduring hierarchical 
(and often colonial) binary logic of distinctions such as weak/strong sovereignty or 
positive/negative sovereignty (Jackson 1990) therefore offers little by way of 
constructive analysis of what such polities have realised (see Sidaway 2003). 
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Related to such binaries are normative descriptions of geopolitical anomalies which 
vary according to their origins and the extent to which they are seen to threaten 
the interstate order. So, for example, those resulting from incomplete 
decolonisation (e.g. trust territories, protectorates, dependencies) are often 
infantilised and perceived as not (yet) ready for independent statehood (Strang 
1996). Meanwhile, shared sovereignties (e.g. leased territories, enclaves and 
condominiums) are conceived as inconvenient but necessary legal compromises, 
negotiated as the system of states attempts to regularise its 'awkward spaces'. At 
the other end of the spectrum are stateless nations and de facto states which, in 
the context of current fears of, and opposition to, secession are perceived as 
unlawful interventions and discrepant forms of political practice which are 
systemically disruptive to the established 'order of things' (Ashley 1988: 230). 
Entities such as TGiE can be placed towards the latter part of this spectrum. 
Although often regarded as benign due to TGiE's adherence to non-violence and the 
regard with which the Dalai Lama is generally held, the existence of this polity is 
nevertheless perceived as disruptive and, as I shall explore in the following 
chapters, the legal personality of TGiE is rarely openly acknowledged or declared. 
Such framings of non-state entities in consistently negative terms (e.g. as illegal, 
anarchic and clandestine) and with regards to what they fail to achieve (sovereign 
territorial statehood) ultimately restricts analysis of these political structures and 
denigrates their achievements (Robinson 2003). If, as I assert, it is more productive 
to focus not on what governments-in-exile lack, but on their functionality and 
leverage of aspects of sovereignty, then more flexible and diverse notions of the 
organisation of political power over space are needed (Kingston and Spears 2004). 
These must, as Sidaway puts it, move 'beyond the issue of more or less sovereignty, 
beyond the presence or absence of undifferentiated sovereign power, towards a 
contextual understanding of different regimes, apparatus, expressions and 
representations of sovereignty' (2003: 174). I want to argue, therefore, that 
examining a case such as TGiE from a non-statist vantage point and employing 
critical rather than realist approaches can offer a more fruitful analysis of these 
polities, allowing us to unpack their workings and explore the parameters of their 
exercise of sovereignty. 
2.3.2 De-centring the state and critical reinterpretations of power and space. 
The state system is under challenge, 'not only in terms of its control over territory, 
but also its capture of cultural imagination' and there is an increasing drive to 
37 
'render mobile, fragile and contestable what traditional political discourses tend to 
naturalise' (Shapiro 1996: xxii, 138). Premised on such critiques, and in light of 
geopolitical events challenging the position and role of the state, a number of 
alternative approaches to statehood and territorial sovereignty have emerged 
within political geography, political anthropology and the fringes of IR (for critical 
IR see Ruggie 1993; Walker 1993; Weber 2001). Instrumental to such a shift within 
geography has been the field of critical geopolitics (see Dalby 1991; Dodds and 
Sidaway 1994; 6 Tuathail 1996; 6 Tuathail and Dalby 1998). Employing a 
heterogeneous collection of theoretical perspectives associated with 
poststructuralism, and increasingly influenced by postcolonial and feminist 
approaches, critical geopolitics is premised upon denaturalising and problematising 
the concepts of the state and interstate system. This theoretical toolbox has 
therefore expanded political geography's gaze, broadening 'the scope of research, 
highlighting hidden acts of power that structure identities' (Dowler and Sharp 
2001: 165) and fundamentally altering how geographers consider the relationship 
between politics, power and space (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). This section 
unpacks these trends in light of their utility for a focus on geopolitical anomalies 
such as TGiE. It will chart the journey of political geography from its traditional 
focus on the state and formal 'Politics', through the poststructuralist-informed shift 
to issues of power, governance and 'politics,' and finally to the critical return and 
productive problematisation of issues of the state, sovereignty and territory (Cox 
and Low 2003; Desbiens et a1 2004). 
Since the late 1980s there has been a growing consensus that political geography's 
traditional fixation with the state, its territoriality and a narrow conception of 'the 
Political' as formal institutionalised politics has profoundly limited the geopolitical 
imagination. In light of this, and influenced by feminist critiques and post-
structuralist perspectives, there has been a shift of attention from institutional 
politics (''big P" politics) to 'politics understood as an aspect, potentiality, in any 
social relationship on any scale of social life ("little p"),' including everyday 
practices at the scale of the individual or the body (Hakli 2003: 658). The resulting 
diversification of political geography has thus 'engendered a greater sensitivity to 
the complexity of the spatial organisation of the world and the multiplicity of sites 
and processes that political geography ... has to be concerned with' (Cox et a1 2008: 
2). A key element of this diversification, and in line with a post-positivist shift in 
human geography more generally, has been the emergence of power as a core 
concept within the sub-discipline (Painter 1995) and a concomitant shift of 
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attention away from issues of the state. This has meant increasing attention paid 
to what power means, how it should be understood in relation to issues of authority 
and legitimacy and the nature of the relationship between power and space. 
Broadly speaking, this has entailed a shift to seeing power not as absolute, centred 
and something which can be possessed and thus lost, but as diffused, decentred 
and networked: a relational effect rather than an attribute or property. 
In an influential examination of modes of power and their relationship to space, 
Allen explores three 'spatial vocabularies of power': centred, networked and 
immanent (2003a: 6-9, 13-91). Examined in detail in the following chapters, each 
of these formulations of power intersects in important ways with the case of the 
TGiE's functioning within India. For example, Chapter 5 focuses on the tension 
between territorially bounded centralised power and territorially unbounded 
networked power (see Castells 1996; Giddens 1984; Mann 1993). Meanwhile, 
Chapter 6 attends to the crucial question of how power works by drawing on 
Foucault's (1977) theorisation of extra-territorial and immanent power where the 
state is relegated to a second-order institutional apparatus (Dean 1999. see also 
Hardt and Negri 2000).22 Indeed, political geographers' mobilisation of Foucault's 
work on discipline, governmentality and biopower has profoundly altered how this 
sub-discipline has approached issues of power and space, shifting attention from 
so-called scales of power (e.g. Taylor and Flint 2000) to issues surrounding 'the 
varied points or sites of power and the relations between them' (Allen 2003b: 102. 
see Philo 1992; Hannah 2000; Legg 2007a). 
A key influence of Foucault's work upon political geography has been the opening 
up of a research agenda around issues of governance and governmentality. As a far 
broader category than 'government', governmentality - the organised practices 
through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves - 'breaks 
with many of the characteristic assumptions of theories of the state, such as 
problems of legitimacy, the notion of ideology and the questions of the possession 
and source of power' (Dean 1999: 9). It thereby 'provides a language and a 
framework for thinking about the linkages between questions of government, 
authority and politics and questions of identity, self and person' (ibid: 13). In thus 
22 Foucault's approach to the state is complex. In his earlier work, Foucault is renowned for his criticisms of 
state theory, rejecting outright a state·centred notion of power and advocating instead a bottom· up 
approach to power (e.g. Discipline and Punish 1977; Driver 1985). However, his later work on 
governmentality and biopolitics (Foucault 1991) marks 'a decisive turn ... to interest in changing forms of 
statehood and statecraft' (Jessop 2007: 34). The intersection of this case with such issues is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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eschewing the assumption of an inextricable relationship between territory and 
sovereignty and displacing the notion of the state, Foucault's conceptualisation of 
governmentality opens up the possibility of diverse and heterogeneous agencies 
controlling the mechanisms of authority (Dean and Henman 2004: 483. See also 
Ong 1999; Rose-Redwood 2006). As such, this proves to be a valuable, flexible and 
nuanced framework for exploring the functioning of a non-state and territory-less 
polity such as TGiE (see Chapter 6). 
However, despite the theoretical insights offered by such post-structuralist 
approaches, there are also notable drawbacks. These include the danger of 
emptying 'the political' of meaning through finding it everywhere and thus 
ultimately nowhere, and the problem that terms such as 'power,' 'governmentality' 
or 'spaces of flows' can be in many ways just as reifying as those they replace - 'the 
state' and 'sovereignty' (Low 2003: 630). In light of such critiques, there has been a 
revival of interest by political geographers in the traditional concepts of the sub-
discipline - the state, sovereignty and territory - albeit examining these 'through 
an energetic engagement with wider social and political theory' (Cox et al 2008: 7). 
Low's reasoning is persuasive in this regard, when he argues for placing a concept 
'in a critical context that allows us to go on using it, while recognising and 
acting on its insufficiency in relation to the claims it ostensibly makes ... To 
note that, for example, state sovereignty (Ashley 1995) and popular 
sovereignty (Derrida 1984) are at some level "impossible" concepts, 
necessarily involving performative contradictions when they are invoked, is 
not to somehow get away from their nagging indispensability' (2003: 629, 
630). 
Returning to the conceptual framework of state-sovereignty-territory, I want to 
sketch out briefly how each of these elements has been problematised and 
conceptually unbundled, whilst also remaining useful. Turning first to the state, in 
a reaction against both the marginalisation of the state by post-structuralist 
approaches and the 'end of the state' (Ohmae 1996) and 'borderless world' 
(Appadurai 1990; O'Brien 1992; Caste lIs 2000) globalisation theses of the 1990s, 
there has been a recent trend within political geography towards a 'de-centred 
centrality of the state' (Low 2003: 625).23 This is based on an acknowledgement 
that transnational networks exist alongside traditional sovereign states (Ruggie 
23 Critiques of the 'death of the state' school of thought have coalesced around an argument that, though the 
state may indeed have lost some of its erstwhile importance and be increasingly 'hollowed out' by supra. 
national and sub·national process, it can hardly be said to be 'withering away' (Jessop 1994). Rather, whilst 
being qualitatively transformed in form and function, 'the concept.metaphor "nation·state'" manifests a 
'ferocious recoding power' (Spivak 1992: 101 cited in Shapiro 2003: 272). 
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1993), and thus 'a mixture of old, new and hybrid forms and processes are now 
operating at and between different levels, above, below and including the state' 
(Anderson 1996: 150). 
Such an approach is essential for understanding non-state entities. In 
comprehending sovereign statehood as only one particular mode of territorial 
practice this opens up the possibility of different forms of political territoriality 
which selectively adapt and promote aspects of statehood so as to further their 
agendas (Forsberg 1996). Indeed, somewhat counter-intuitively, an empirical focus 
on a non-state entity such as TGiE does not call for the removal of the state from 
our theoretical framework. Rather, the idea and ideal of the state is fundamental 
to understanding this polity. Not only does TGiE have a number of state-like 
qualities (as explored in the following chapters), but polities such as this are one of 
the strongest vindications of the power inherent within the state concept. As 
Talmon explains vis-a-vis governments-in-exile in general, the very existence of 
these entities is contingent on their home state being occupied by a 'colonising' 
state, their political activities are curtailed by their operating within a host state, 
and their ultimate aspiration is often to (re)establish their own independent state 
(1998: vii).24 Therefore, rather than a transnational phenomenon that debunks the 
notion of the nation-state per se, a polity such as TGiE in fact reconfirms the 
salience of the idea of the sovereign state model, both in reality (the lack of 
recognition of these entities by other states restricts their functioning) and in the 
imagination (the desire for sovereign statehood in the 'homeland'). As such, the 
complex and often contradictory relationship between TGiE and the idea of the 
state necessitates and validates a framework such as that outlined above which, 
while decidedly not state-centric, does acknowledge the importance of the state as 
an ideal to aspire to. 
Early critical problematisations of the state itself include Poulantzas' (1978) 
concept of institutional materiality whereby the state should be regarded not as an 
intrinsic entity but as a social relation (see also Camilleri and Falk 1992). 
However, arguing that this is the replacement of one reification (state-as-entity) 
with another (state-as-structure), Mitchell asserts that the state has conventionally 
been seen as an abstract concept, something elusive with 'ghost-like' (1991: 91) 
qualities, which Abrams has termed the 'idea of the state' (1988: 77). Such 
2~ It should be noted that, in the case of TGiE, the administration's current position is not to call for an 
independent Tibetan state but rather for genuine Tibetan autonomy within a greater China (see Chapter 3). 
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approaches have marked a significant shift in thinking about the state from an 
emphasis on the material to one on the discursive whereby the more statehood is 
analysed and 'deconstructed' the more elusive and intangible it seems (Cox 2008: 
92). Central to such approaches is an empirical and theoretical conjoining of the 
cultural and political. This enables us to see state institutions and governmental 
policies as fundamentally cultural and contested constructs, with the arena of 
formal politics legitimated through culture (Baldwin et al 1999) and the 
distinctiveness of the state and its priority over other entities being the result of 
cultural techniques (Steinmetz 1999). With regards to this case, the following 
chapters explore the extent to which Tibetan culture and religion underpin and 
influence the form, function and political ideologies of TGiE. In broader terms, the 
relationship between formal political structures and cultural theory can create a 
mutually beneficial dialogue between traditional political and cultural disciplines. 
The reciprocal exchange of approaches engenders a more critical and theoretically 
informed approach to the study of state structures and the interstate system, and 
imports concrete and material ideas regarding political institutions and 
international politics to an increasingly esoteric cultural geography. 
In focusing critical attention on the ontological status of the state, Mitchell argues 
that it is a 'structural effect' and 'should be examined not as an actual structure, 
but as the powerful metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures 
appear to exist' (1991: 94). Thus conceiving the state as socially constructed and a 
'historically and geographically specific institutional complex' (Low 2003: 630), 
statecraft can be understood not as relations between different state units, but as 
the construction and reconstruction of the units themselves (Campbell 1992; Weber 
1998; Painter 2006). In a similar vein, perceiving statehood as relative, different 
entities can be seen to meet the criteria for international statehood to a greater or 
lesser degree, with conventional states often failing to enact the range of statehood 
functions, and less-than-state entities taking on attributes customarily associated 
with sovereign statehood (Clapham 1998: 143). As such, statehood - and its 
signifiers and institutions - can be understood as strategic resources which are 
continually deployed by both 'recognised' and unrecognised polities. 
The concept of sovereignty has also both re-emerged as an issue of critical analysis 
and undergone a number of reconceptualisations in recent years in light of post-
structuralist approaches and emerging global discourses (Agamben 1998; Elden 
2006). Like the concept of the state, the aim here is not to join calls for the rejection 
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of the sovereignty problematic (Camilleri and Falk 1992), but rather to work with 
the concept of sovereignty in order to explore the extent to which it can be 
'subverted and challenged and yet reinscribe itself (Edkins et af 1999: 2). Such 
critical readings denaturalise and problematise sovereignty, positing it as a 
heterogeneous and complex array of concepts and processes. Sovereignty is thereby 
conceptualised as contingent upon, rather than fundamental to, political science 
and its history (Barkin and Cronin 1994; Bartelson 1995), with Krasner (1999) 
arguing that states have never been as sovereign as some have supposed. 
Similarly, rather than proceeding from the assumption that all states are 
sovereign, a number of political anthropologists and critical IR theorists have 
focused on how states constantly negotiate and reconfigure their sovereignty 
through practices, performances, discourses and everyday materialities (Biersteker 
and Weber 1996; Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Such conceptualisations of 
sovereignty as historically contingent and socially constructed (Ashley 1988; 
Walker 1993; Weber 1995) are vital for a theoretical analysis of polities such as 
TGiE. Not only do they blur the line between the sovereign and the non-sovereign 
and conceive sovereignty as divisible and incremental (Agnew 2005), but they 
enable key questions to be asked: if polities 'can lose sovereignty, can they also gain 
it' (Elden 2006: 18)? What is it that is sovereign: an abstract notion of the TGiE 
structure itself, or the practices of its officials and interactions between exiled 
'citizens' and 'their' government? Can two sovereignties (albeit one unrecognised) 
overlap and co-exist within the same territory? 
Reconceptualisations of political space have also moved beyond reified, abstract 
and absolute notions of territory and state-space as bounded and contiguous (e.g. 
Elkins 1995; Forsberg 2003). This has involved sensitivity to different forms of 
territory - with a focus on networks - and the conceptualisation of territory as a 
process as opposed to merely a location (Weber 1998). As Forsberg asserts: 
'boundaries don't have to be fixed, they can be fluid, they don't have to be 
linear, they can be zonal, they don't have to be continuous they can be 
disconnected, they don't have to be mutually exclusive they can overlap' 
(1996: 363). 
If we are to accept territory as socially constructed, then critical readings of 
'territoriality', a 'device to create and maintain the geographic context through 
which we experience the world and give it meaning' are highly instructive (Sack 
1986: 219. See also Gottman 1973; Malmberg 1980). As the main exponent of this 
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concept within geography, Sack rejects conventional interpretations of territoriality 
as an appendix to sovereignty and instead posits it as a phenomenon in its own 
terms. Similarly, Kolst0, in conceiving it as a fluid and malleable property, argues 
that 'territoriality is not a given, it is determined not only by geography, 
demography and history, but also by such intangibles as perceptions and ideas' 
(1999: 607). This is an assertion which, as I shall argue in this study, is invaluable 
when examining the relationship between 'rear and symbolic territory in the 
context of TGiE. 
Such nuanced readings of the state, sovereignty and territory enable the 
conceptual unbundling of the these traditional constituent elements of sovereign 
statehood so often conflated in political analysis (Anderson 1996). Following Ruggie 
(1993), Anderson argues for the 'dispersal of authority to different types of 
institutions at different levels' (1996: 140) reminiscent of the vertically segmented 
and overlapping authority which existed in Europe before the rise of the modern 
state. Similarly, Biersteker and Weber assert that such disentangling of state and 
sovereignty 'enables us to consider whether the salience of territoriality has 
changed historically such that entities other than territorial states can begin to 
make legitimate (externally recognised) claims of final authority' (1996: 19). My 
argument here is that critical analytical attention paid to polities such as TGiE 
would add important empirical weight to such conceptual unbundling and further 
enhance our reappraisals of the notions of sovereignty, statehood and territory. 
However, a note of caution is worth sounding regarding these critical 
reinterpretations of the core concepts of the state, sovereignty and territory, 
especially in light of this case. Whilst there is increasing acknowledgement within 
critical political geography that the traditional 'geopolitical gaze triangulates the 
world political map from a Western imperialist vantage point, measures it using 
Western conceptual systems of identity/difference, and records it in order to bring 
it within the scope of Western imaginings' (0 Tuathail 1996: 53), more sensitivity 
to the structural positionality of seemingly 'universal' concepts of the political is 
vital, including those made in critical guise (Sidaway 2008: 48). In light of this, the 
Western concepts of the state and sovereignty, which carry with them 'specific 
assumptions about order, the secular and the sacred' (Sidaway et a1 2004: 1046), 
will be applied with caution to this case. In the following chapters, attention will be 
paid to how the exile Tibetan elite have both drawn on Tibetan cultural, religious 
and political values and appropriated Western political discourses (notably 
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democracy, citizenship and civil society, see Chapters 6, 7 and 8), often reflecting 
back Western ideals to a Western audience in order to seek legitimacy. This case 
therefore speaks to calls within political geography to adopt a critical intellectual 
stance of postcoloniality, to learn from 'different traditions of scholarship and 
diverse political contexts' (Robinson 2003: 648) and thus to re-pluralise political 
space. 
2.3.3 Summary 
The relations between state, power and territory are perceived by contemporary 
political geographers as increasingly contingent, with the insistence that political 
power is not necessarily only state power (Dalby 1991) nor necessarily territorially 
constituted (Anderson 1996; Agnew 2005). With such nuanced accounts of 
sovereignty, territory and statehood being attentive to the diversity of state forms 
and sovereign practices, they can potentially open up different ways in which 
geopolitical 'anomalies' such as governments-in-exile can come into view. However, 
despite this, non-state polities have as yet failed to figure significantly on research 
agendas within political geography. One suggestion for such neglect is that whilst 
the empirical focus of critical geopolitics has to date been predominantly on 
dramatic geopolitical processes and events - accelerated globalisation (Herod et al 
1998; Sparke 2004a), post-soviet fragmentation and the 'new world order' (6 
Tuathail and Luke 1994), and the war on terror (Dalby 2007; Dodds 2008) -
governments-in-exile challenge the geopolitical world order in markedly 
understated ways. As explored below and in the following chapters, it is at the local 
level and through everyday interactions, objects and people that the TGiE both 
constructs its claims to legitimacy, and asserts its presence as a government. 
Indeed, it is precisely because of these qualities that governments-in-exile should 
be on political geography's research agenda, as knowledge of them can enrich 
existing debates and go some way to countering critical geopolitics' fixation with 
discourse, representation and textuality (see Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 
2004). Moreover, not only would a focus on non-state polities enable a much-needed 
shift of attention to the global South by a sub-discipline whose traditional focus has 
been on the formal politics of stable states of the (English-speaking) developed 
world (Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2008: 152. For critiques see Robinson 2003; 
Sidaway 2003), but entities such as TGiE are in essence 'positive' stories of political 
achievement, nascent democracy, innovative bureaucracies and community 
cohesion. As such, they call for a re-valuing of the political and offer a welcome 
counterweight to contemporary political geography's focus on conflict, violence and 
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terror (Flint 2005; Gregory and Pred 2007. For calls to engage with issues of non-
violence and co-operation see Kearns 2008; Megoran 2008). 
2.4 Political geographies of statelessness 
Critical reconceptualisations of the state, sovereignty and territory are, as I have 
argued, a vital framework for analysing polities such as TGiE. However, the 
inherently contradictory nature of TGiE leaves important issues unaddressed -
issues which do not come under the rubric of 'normal' states and governments. 
These include the displacement and uncertain legal status of exilic populations, the 
relationship with a host state, the political agenda of returning to a homeland and 
concerns of rootlessness in exile. There is a tendency for mainstream statist 
discourses to privilege borders, to devalue migrations and to construct the stateless 
and their administrations as deviations from the norm of geopolitics (Shapiro 
1996). Although critical and cultural approaches have significantly altered our 
view of political space, power and identity, the study of migrants, refugees and 
diaspora remain on the margins of analysis, 'rooted in(between) states' (Soguk and 
Whitehall 1999: 681). Thus. if 'statehood' is not a completely satisfactory descriptor 
for governments-in-exile. then we need to look elsewhere. to political geographies of 
statelessness. I therefore want to shift attention to a body of knowledge which. 
rather than defining refugees/exiles/migrants as 'mere appendages to the presumed 
master history of borders, boundaries and states' (ibid: 675) focuses upon and 
privileges the lives and politics of the stateless. Spanning disciplines of law. 
anthropology, development studies and cultural and political geographies. such an 
alternative can be found in refugee studies, diaspora literature and theories of 
trans nationalism. Taking each of these literatures in turn - a progression from 
legalistic refugee studies to cultural theory.informed trans nationalism and 
diaspora studies - I want to briefly sketch out how each raises important issues for 
populations associated with governments-in-exile, and, in turn. how an empirical 
focus on TGiE challenges key tenets of these literatures. Finally, I will focus on 
three key debates in this literature regarding the role of states, conceptualisations 
of territory and constructions of political identity with which this case directly 
intersects. 
2.4.1 Refugee studies, diaspora literature and theories of transnationalism 
Drawing on literature from refugee studies is an obvious step for an investigation 
of polities such as TGiE as it facilitates a focus on the legal status of exiles within 
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the host state (Chimni 2000; Samaddar 2003). This includes issues around 
humanitarianism (Hyndman 2000), human rights and refugee law (Harvey 1999); 
discourses of refugee hood and the political project of 'returning home' (Bakewell 
2000); and issues raised by refugee camps and settlements (Malkki 1995; Perouse 
and Mwangi Kaganja 2000). Refugee studies has grown dramatically in the latter 
part of the twentieth-century, developing into an independent research domain 
whose output has conventionally been policy-oriented and often conducted 
collaboratively with policy organisations and relief agencies. This emphasis on 
policy concerns to the neglect of critical theoretical reflection and integrated 
scholar~hip has, as Black (2001) argues, served to marginalise refugee studies from 
mainstream social science. Such a critique is reminiscent of those levelled at the 
broader field of international migration studies which, traditionally rooted in 
positivism and employing quantitative methods, often presents migrants as a de-
personalised undifferentiated mass whose movement across borders leaves the 
position of the state undisputed (Turton 2003: 4-5).25 However, as explored in 
Chapter 7, exile communities such as the Tibetan case complicate and 
fundamentally disrupt both the state/stateless binary of citizenship and 
refugee hood, and conventional understandings of the legal and political categories 
of 'refugee' and 'citizen'. 
Whilst not a research field per se, literary discussions regarding the concept and 
label of 'exile' offer an alternative perspective (Rose 2005). In a useful 
disentangling of terms, Said asserts that, while 'the word "refugee" has become a 
political one, suggesting large herds of innocent bewildered people requiring urgent 
international assistance', 'expatriates' on the other hand, live voluntarily in alien 
countries while emigres 'enjoy an ambiguous status' and finally exiles, forced to 
leave their home and cut off from their history, are in a 'discontinuous state of 
being [carrying] ... a touch of solitude and spirituality' (1984: 49-56). Often 
employed as a self-definition rather than a label imposed from above, 'exile' carries 
with it connotations of displacement, dislocation, dispossession and, as discussed 
below, foregrounds the important issues of non-assimilation in the host state and 
the trials of waiting for 'return' (see Chapters 5 and 7). 
2~ However. looking beyond refugee studies per se. the theoretical situating of refugee issues within other 
disciplines such as geography (Black 1991; Hyndman 2000), sociology (Hein 1993) and anthropology (Malkii 
1995; Colson 2001) has led to the use of the particular circumstances of refugee situations to illuminate 
more general issues (Black 2001: 61). 
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Offering a more theoretically informed and critical approach to issues of 
statelessness, literatures on diaspora and trans nationalism challenge the state-
centrism of policy-oriented scholarship focused on refugees and international 
migration. Influenced by the cultural and critical turns within the social sciences, 
theories of diaspora and trans nationalism disrupt the categories through which we 
understand the political world, turning attention to multiple scales, the 
transgression of boundaries and the contestation of identities. These literatures 
therefore offer ways out of the trap of refugees and exiles being considered 
imitations of 'rear citizens and stateless populations standing in a hierarchically 
subordinate relation to nation and homeland (Braziel and Mannur 2003: 8). This 
enables 'the stateless' to be seen as running 'with, and not against, the grain of 
identity, movement and reproduction' (Appadurai 1996: 171). As such, and key to 
this project, transnational political practices challenge conceptions of membership 
and rights, opening up space for notions of non-state citizenship and leading to 
processes of extra-territorial nation-building. 
Diaspora studies, and contemporary theorisations of diaspora as a specific terrain 
within and beyond postcolonial studies, has emerged as a vibrant area of research 
since the early 1990s (see Clifford 1994; Brah 1996; Cohen 1996; Lavie and 
Swedenberg 1996). Transformed from a descriptive condition applied largely to 
Jews in exile, diaspora has increasingly become a catch-all phrase to speak of and 
for 'a multitude of ethnic, religious and national communities who find themselves 
living outside of the territory to which they are historically "rooted'" (Carter 2005: 
55) and, as I shall explore below, has emerged as a contested theoretical space. 
Whilst the concept of diaspora is clearly associated with trans nationalism, with the 
'dispersed diasporas of old hav[ing] become today's "transnational communities'" 
(Vertovec 1999: 499) the terms are not synonymous. On the one hand, diaspora is a 
specifically human phenomenon with diasporic identities being practised, 
experienced and lived, and with diaspora studies focusing on issues of belonging 
and imagined geographies of the homeland. On the other hand, transnationalism is 
seen as a descriptor of the processes and flows initiated and negotiated by 
communities rather than solely acting on the communities themselves. As such, it 
can speak to larger more impersonal and material forces, being used to describe 
NGOs, multi-national corporations and dissident political organisations as well as 
individuals (Braziel and Mannur 2003: 15). In light of this, transnationalism would 
appear, at first glance, to be a more useful framework for focusing on exile political 
structures such as TGiE as well as the populations they represent. 
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Theoretical issues surrounding transnationalism gained ground in the late 1990s 
across a range of disciplines as academics sought to 'define and trace the 
development of transnational communities and practices, and examine the 
ramifications for identity and citizenship in an increasingly globalised world' (AI-
Ali et al 2001: 578). Unlike earlier theories of migration which characterised border 
crossings as one of either permanent rupture followed by assimilation in a new 
society, or as one of temporary 'sojourning' followed by a return home, 
transnationalism describes an ongoing series of cross-border movements in which 
numerous economic, political and cultural links are maintained in more than one 
nation.26 Theoretically, studies of trans nationalism can be grouped into two broad 
categories. Firstly, political economy approaches which attend to the material 
transformations associated with the accelerated globalisation of capitalism, and, 
secondly, writings situated within postmodern and postcolonial discourses which, 
as discussed below, highlight issues of hybridity, rootlessness and 
deterritorialisation (Hyndman 2000). Across these approaches, in what is a 'highly 
fragmented, emergent field' (portes et al 1999: 218), empirical research on 
transnationalism has to date focused on phenomena as diverse as transnational 
urban politics and social movements (Smith and Ouarnizo 1998), emerging 
transnational cultural forms (Appadurai 1996), transnational labour and 
transnational elites (Yeung 1998), transnational identities (Morely and Robins 
1995) and transnational inter-governmental agencies and NODs (Jackson et al 
2004). 
However, whilst claiming to offer progressive attempts 'to find sites of resistance to 
dominant hegemonies ofrace and nation' (Mitchell 1997a: 533), many scholars are 
increasingly critical of the elite ideology underpinning post-foundational 
approaches to trans nationalism and diaspora (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Sparke 
2005). Such critiques assert that the overuse of abstract spatial metaphors such as 
'third space' and the fetishisation of the term 'trans nationalism' and its 
disarticulation from geopolitical history can lead to theories and politics which 
neglect both powerfully oppressive socio-economic forces underpinning these 
geographies and the everyday lives and grounded practices of the people caught up 
~6 Whilst there has been enlightening debate as to the extent to which transnationalism is a new 
phenomenon or merely a new take on an old and ongoing phenomenon (Vertovec 1999), there is a growing 
consensus that contemporary transnational connections are different from the past in terms of range and 
depth, density and significance and scale of intensity and simultaneity (Portes e/ al 1999; Jackson e/ al 
2004). 
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in them (Mitchell 1997a). This therefore leads to the potential danger of theories of 
trans nationalism, mobility and the 'hype ofhybridity' (Mitchell 1997b) ending up in 
a 'global babble' (Abu-Lughod 1991) which is emptied of political efficacy (Ong and 
Nonini 1997). Three research agendas proposed by such critiques are salient here 
and, as I will argue in the following chapters, the case of TGiE can also work to 
challenge some of the theoretical assumptions made by this literature. 
2.4.2 Statelessness theory and questions of the state, territory and identity 
In general, diasporic communities and their transnational practices navigate 
between nations and across space, cross-cutting the dominant framing of territorial 
sovereignty and thereby challenging the hegemony of the nation-state (Diener 
2008). As such, they go some way to dis-ordering the conventions of statehood as 
presented in traditional and neorealist geopolitics (Hyndman 2000). Influenced by 
cultural studies approaches and theories of poststructuralism, some promoters of 
trans nationalism have claimed that a 'post-nationalist' order (Basch et al 2004: 
222) is emerging 'in which the nation-state is becoming obsolete and other 
formations for allegiance and identity have taken place' (Appadurai 1996: 166-
167). 
However, whilst acknowledging that transnational flows of people, commodities 
and ideas have disrupted the significance of national boundaries, there has also 
been a shift of attention to the ongoing and active role of nation-states in defining 
the terms under which transnational processes are played out (see Smith and 
Guarnizo 1998; Ong 1999; Jackson et al 2004). As such, a growing body of 
literature is charting the expansion of home state links with their expatriate 
communities (see Basch et al 1994; Levitt et al 2003) and the impact of host state 
political contexts on the transnational practices of migrants and refugees 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). As indicated in Chapter 1, the role ofthe host state and 
the relationships and interactions between TGiE and the GoI will be a key part of 
this project. An important aspect of this, and one that literature on diaspora and 
exile offer an important analytical framework for, are temporal issues surrounding 
the temporariness or permanence of life within the host state, the contested 
adherence to a politics of 'return' and the uncertainties and insecurities such an 
existence 'in limbo' entails (Said 1984; Rose et al 2005). Indeed, Shain argues that 
it is the 'exiles' continuous struggle to facilitate the conditions for their return but 
also their determination not to establish life abroad as a comfortable option, even 
temporarily' (1989: xix) which distinguishes them from other diasporas. The 
50 
strategies through which TGiE seeks to intervene in such temporal issues will be 
explored in the following chapters. 
Crucially, the institution of TGiE itself adds an important angle to this literature. 
Alongside supporting calls for a sustained focus on the internal dynamics of 
immigrant groups (Veronis 2007) and the role of institutions and disciplining 
structures (Ong 1999), the position and state-like functioning of TGiE turns 
attention to the important political structures that transnational communities 
bring with them and (re)establish in exile (AI-Ali et al 2001).27 Moreover, with its 
defined political agenda, established bureaucratic structures, welfare provision and 
construction of Tibetan citizenship, the TGiE and its exile population is a far more 
clearly defined and structured community than most diasporas. As such, this raises 
the question of the extent to which 'diaspora' - a term increasingly adopted by the 
exile Tibetan elite - is the best descriptor for this community or, indeed, whether 
TGiE can offer a more robust and contextualised conceptualisation of diaspora 
(Anand 2003; Diener 2008). In addition, the fact that this is ostensibly a refugee 
community means that this case can provide an empirical platform for connecting 
contemporary diaspora discourses with issues raised by refugee studies. As 
Wahlbeck (1998) argues, such a juncture of refugeehood with transnational 
practices can be mutually beneficial for the theoretical debates in each field, 
refining conceptualisations of refugee experiences and grounding the idea of 
diaspora (see also Shami 1996). Cross-cutting this is recent research on subaltern 
cosmopolitanism (Gidwani 2006; Mitchell 2007). Distinct from both 
cosmopolitanism as a normative political project (Pogge 2002) and as representing 
an ephochal transition in the nature of modernity (Beck 2006), such an approach 
offers a potentially more productive framework for examining TGiE's capacity to 
mediate its position between different cultural and political environments. 
Moreover, as Jeffrey and McFarlane (2008) argue, performing cosmopolitanism can 
be read as a strategic resource through which non-elite people and institutions seek 
to consolidate and legitimate practices of power. 
Secondly, paralleling this focus on the role of states vis-a-vis transnational 
practices is a reconsideration of the issue of territory. In opposition to the 
27 AI-Ali et afs distinction between 'transnational activities' and 'transnational capabilities' (2001: 1594) is 
enlightening in the case of relationships between transnational individuals and their home and host states. 
For example, transnational capabilities focuses attention on the extent to which individuals and 
communities identify with their home countries, the skills and resources available to them to become 
involved in their countries of destination and, central to this case, the internal organisation of exile 
communities and the level of motivation to maintain group solidarity (ibid: 1581). 
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spatialities associated with the nation - territory, belonging and rootedness - post-
structuralist approaches to transnationalism and diaspora posit political space in 
terms of dislocation, rootlessness and in-betweeness (Jackson et al 2004: 4). Highly 
influential in this field are the ideas of Appadurai (1990) who, in elaborating on 
Deleuze and Guttari's (1987) uncoded flows of de-territorialisation, specifies five 
dimensions of disjunctive 'cultural flows' ethnoscapes, mediascapes, 
technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes - which undermine 'the power of the 
modernist conceptions and assumptions on space/movement/identity' and decentre 
the state (Soguk 1996: 288). However, in calling for increased empirical focus, re-
politicisation and geographical 'grounding' of transnationalism, a number of 
geographers have turned attention to issues of materiality in relation to processes 
of re-territorialisation as well as de-territorialisation (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). 
Indeed, Carter (2005) suggests drawing on the reconfiguration of political 
territoriality developed within critical geopolitics to focus on these processes within 
transnational and diasporic communities. As such, the extent to which the exile 
Tibetan community in India supports Lavie and Swedenberg's assertion that 
diasporas have a 'doubled relationship or dual loyalty' to places in terms of 'their 
connections to the space they currently occupy and their continuing involvement 
with 'back home' (1996: 14. see also Huang et al 2000) will be explored in the 
following chapters. This will entail examining the multiple attachments and re-
attachments to 'real' territory, spaces and places within the host state and 
important symbolic and material attachments to the homeland of Tibet.28 However, 
given the contested relationship between exile Tibetans and their 'home' state of 
China (see Chapter 3), the degree to which the conventional transnational role of 
home state and homeland is displaced and re-worked in this case will also be 
outlined (see Chapter 5). 
The third key point of intersection between TGiE and theories of trans nationalism 
and diaspora is the issue of identity. The conventional statist notion of political 
identity is founded upon a presumption of equivalence between the locatedness of 
people in territory and the limits of their political practices (M:ach 1993). In a 
similar vein, more traditional approaches to diaspora portray 'closed' homogenous 
ethnic groups rooted metaphorically to the homeland and are premised on the 
nation-state and identity as bounded and unquestioned categories. In contrast, 
28 The fact that the importance of TGiE's territorial base in India (Chapters 5 and 6) runs counter to 
Armstrong's definition of diaspora as 'any ethnic collectivity which lacks at territorial base within a given 
polity' (1976: 393) again questions the extent to which this case fits the label of'diaspora'. 
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rejecting such fIxed and essentialised renditions of identity, much contemporary 
literature on transnational and diasporic identities emerging from a cultural 
studies approach theorise identity as fragmented, multiple, contingent and fluid 
(Venturino 1997). This represents a shift from 'diaspora as condition' to 'broader 
conceptualisations of travel, displacement, dislocation, and divided loyalties' 
(Mitchell 1997a: 534; Patterson and Kelley 2000). Focused on decentred 
attachments to place, diaspora has become synonymous with living 'in-between' 
spaces and cultures, celebrations of nomadic or 'travelling' identities and ideas of 
hybridity and creolisation (see Gilroy 1993; Brah 1996; Clifford 1997). Work on 
diasporas and transnational communities has also increasingly rejected the 
assertion that diaspora consciousness is incommensurate with nationalism and 
instead stresses that 'nationalism in all its forms, ranging from more subtle 
versions to fIerce nationalist struggles, often goes side by side with 
trans nationalism, and might even be a reaction to it' (AI-Ali et ol 2001: 588). The 
extent to which the case of TGiE supports and extends this idea of a 'creative 
tension' between diaspora and nationalism (Ong 1999: 17) will be explored in the 
following chapters through a focus on the exile administration's nation-building 
activities, its efforts to unite the exile community and its promotion of a single 
Tibetan identity. In light of this, the case of TGiE will be used to shed an empirical 
spotlight on the perceived binary between identity as hybrid, mutable and 
transnational on the one hand and as essentialised, static and nationalised on the 
other (see Lavie and Swedenberg 1996). 
2.4.3 Summary 
In light of literatures on statelessness, I have highlighted the need to negotiate a 
careful path between traditional perspectives which consider essentialised 
categories such as 'refugee,' 'migrant' and 'diaspora' unproblematically and post-
structuralist approaches to transnationalism which foreground hybridity, fluidity 
and in-betweeness. More generally, I have argued that whilst there has been 
increasing attention paid both to the state and to political aspects of statelessness 
within contemporary political geography, these research trends are rarely 
integrated. In addition, I have argued that an exiled polity such as TGiE both 
intersects with and fails to fit the conventional remit of theories related to the state 
and to statelessness. As a polity and community which fundamentally disrupts the 
fixed binaries of state/non-state, sovereign/non-sovereign, refugee/citizen this case 
is therefore a useful lens through which these divergent issues can be viewed 
simultaneously and can go some way to creating conceptual dialogue and empirical 
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connections between these bodies of knowledge. This would require state-centred 
IR and political geography to more fully embrace issues of displacement, instability 
and contingency and, in turn, identity-focused diaspora and trans nationalism 
studies to engage with institutional structures, formal politics and issues of power 
and governance. Therefore, whilst the literatures discussed above may contribute 
to a political geography of statelessness, they each fail to add up to it. Rather, I 
suggest that drawing upon, bringing together and working across these research 
fields can offer a productive way to rethink issues of authority, legitimacy, 
governance, identity, territory and statehood. 
2.5 Conclusion: from binaries and categories to relationships and 
practices 
This chapter has examined how non-state polities such as governments-in-exile 
intersect with political geography literature in both confirmatory and challenging 
ways, highlighting gaps in existing theory and taking debates in new and 
unexpected directions. In sketching out the 'network of islands of "transitional" or 
"incomplete" statehood' which has become an increasingly unavoidable part of 
contemporary geopolitical reality (Kolossov and O'Loughlin 2008: 151-152), I have 
argued for the expansion of political geography's gaze to critically engage with a 
range of non-state polities; entities whose existence and functioning speak directly 
to political geography's concerns with the relationship between power and space. In 
order to find a theoretical perspective in which governments-in-exile and the 
populations they represent are defined in terms of having key political attributes 
instead of lacking them, and as belonging to the geopolitical order instead of 
existing outside it, a progression through a range of literatures has been charted. 
This has included realist informed statist views of the state and interstate system, 
non-statist approaches based on critical and cultural theory through a range of 
literature, on statelessness. In turn, not only does the exception has something to 
tell us about the rule, but the functioning of such polities throws into relief far 
broader themes and processes. Therefore, polities such as TGiE should not be 
analysed solely for their 'quirkiness', as 'one ofthe weirdest corners of international 
politics' (The Economist 22, December 2001: 45). As lived experimentations in 
international law they are significant, rather than marginal, actors in 
reconfiguring notions of sovereignty, territory and statehood. 
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Moreover, in addition to encouraging the blurring of disciplinary boundaries, the 
tensions between statehood and statelessness which characterise the functioning of 
TGiE productively complicate taken-for-granted categories within political 
geography. As outlined above, there is often a poor fit between conventional 
categories such as 'state', 'citizen', 'diaspora' or 'refugee' and the lived realities of 
governments-in-exile and their dependent populations. In light of this, it is 
arguably more productive to focus on the processes, practices and relationships 
which are involved, rather than the categories which non-state polities (fail to) fit 
into. Therefore, whilst acknowledging the utility of categories in framing and 
making comprehensible the world around us (Cloke and Johnston 2005), the 
ambiguity of geopolitical 'anomalies'29 fundamentally problematises the process of 
categorisation (Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007). Indeed, as indicated in Section 2.2, 
even the label 'government-in-exile' is arguably inadequate to describe the 
divergent group of entities to which it is attached and therefore hinders rather 
than helps our understanding of exiled administrations. However, I want to argue 
that it is precisely this ambiguity that should be of key interest to political 
geographers. In particular, the political ambiguity of polities such as governments-
in-exile can be instrumental in exposing the power relations inherent in the 
categorising and labelling process, demonstrating the Foucauldian argument that 
'categories do not simply mimetically represent the world but instead 
simultaneously create it and limit it' (Jones 2009: 4). Crucially, therefore, the 
heterogeneity of non-state - yet state-like - entities such as TGiE fundamentally 
limits the utility of the entire 'state' concept (Pegg 1998: 45), exposing its partial 
and processual nature. This project is therefore an attempt to shift attention away 
from thinking in terms of closed categories - such as the state, (absolute) 
sovereignty, refugee. citizen, diaspora - organised into binary relationships as 
either nation-states or anomalies deviating from this model. Instead it moves 
towards the variety of ways in which seemingly universal and standard concepts 
such as sovereignty. legitimacy and territoriality can be (re)articulated in a 
situation of exile. Moreover, by focusing on the single elucidatory case of the TGiE 
this enables such issues to be examined in a range of ways and from a number of 
different theoretical perspectives, and it is to contextualising this case study that I 
now turn. 
29 In light of this. my use of the terms 'anomaly' and 'non-state' and the normative hierarchies upon which it 
is based should also be problematised. 
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Chapter 3 
Setting the Scene: The Legal Ambiguity of Tibet and its 
'(Re)establishment' in Exile 
3.1 Introduction 
In March 2008 the sight of maroon-robed monks demanding Tibetan independence 
and armed Chinese military on the streets of Lhasa (re)turned the world's 
attention to Tibet. The site of a protracted and oft-ignored struggle over homeland, 
identity and self-governance, this is a case which conjures up strong and often 
conflicting pictures in the popular imagination. On the one hand, it is the fabled 
and romantisiced Shangri-la (Bishop 1989; Dodin and Rather 2001) and, on the 
other hand, it is a nation whose inhabitants and religion are feudal and inferior 
(Goldstein 1971). Whilst this thesis seeks to shine an academic spotlight on a key 
but often overlooked player in this story - the TGiE, and the broader 
reconfigurations of territory and sovereignty it signals - this chapter sets this 
polity in its wider historical and geopolitical context. It begins by sketching out the 
complex and often ambiguous legal and political status of the territory of Tibet, 
focusing on relations between Tibet, China and India and outlining conflicting 
historical, territorial and sovereignty claims. Attention will then shift to the 
Tibetan government and community in exile, setting out four key contexts which 
underpin this study: the development and institutional structures of TGiE itself; 
the relationship between religion and politics and the role of the Dalai Lama; 
TGiE's relations with India and the international community; and an overview of 
the exile population including refugee displacements and the wider diaspora. 
Finally, the ways that Tibet and the exile community have been approached in and 
through academic literature will be sketched out and this study situated within 
this research field. 
3.2 The ambiguous status of Tibet: conflicting historical, territorial 
and sovereignty claims 
Controversy surrounds the legal, territorial and political status of Tibet, a vast 
high altitude plateau north of the Himalayas which has been contested for over 
1000 years. Chinese authorities maintain that Tibet has been and remains an 
'inseparable part of China' (Wei 1989: 27) and, as such, treats its relation with 
Tibet as one of internal affairs. The counter-narrative, posited by TGiE, their 
supporters and an increasing number of Western scholars and lawyers (e.g. van 
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Walt van Praag 1987; McCorquodale and Orosz 1994) asserts that Tibet is an 
independent state under unlawful Chinese occupation.3o In order to explore these 
historical and political 'confrontations of representations' (Goldstein 1997: 56) I 
want to briefly sketch out some of the historical assertions underlying these claims 
and then turn attention to the role India has played in this region. The section 
concludes with some comments on how the contemporary situation is understood 
and represented by these various actors. 
3.2.1 China and Tibet: imperial prerogatives. religious alliances and 
recognition of 'suzerainty' 
Beijing's principal claims to Tibet rest upon two historical assertions. Firstly, that 
the government of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) is the rightful inheritor of 
the territories ruled by the succession of Chinese dynasties, and, secondly, that 
since the early medieval period the ethnically Tibetan territories have been subject 
territories of such imperial rule (People's Republic of China 1992). In contrast, 
Tibetans assert that over the centuries Tibet both extended its influence over 
neighbouring polities and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the 
influence of powerful foreign rulers such as the Mongol Khans, the Manchu 
emperors and the British rulers of India (van Walt van Praag 1987). Moreover, 
TGiE asserts that Tibet's diplomatic relations were religious alliances with the 
Mongol dynasties that invaded and ruled the China in the thirteenth-century, and 
only secondarily with China itself (DIIR 1996). Thus, while these various 
arrangements involved differing degrees of constitutional dependence and 
independence vis-it-vis China, they did not constitute Tibet's subjugation to, or 
unification with China, but rather a continued status somewhere between 
autonomy and independence.31 
Turning to the twentieth-century, the TGiE asserts that the 13th Dalai Lama 
unilaterally declared independence in 1913 and, until 1950, Tibet was a sovereign 
state whose full independence was recognised in numerous ways on the 
international stage. This included formal communications between the 13th Dalai 
Lama and foreign leaders, Tibet's neutrality during World War II (despite pressure 
from China, Britain and the USA) and the Tibetan Government's establishment of 
;l() See Powers (2004) for a fascinating comparison of literature on Tibetan history produced by Tibetan and 
Chinese authors in English which illustrates how the narratives on both sides are fraught by internal 
contradictions and inconsistencies. 
31 These relations were modelled on the explicitly 'religious patron'priest (or chiiyon) relationship, in which 
- through acting as the spiritual guides to successive emperors - key Tibetan leaders acted as their 
religious superiors. for which they received economic support and military protection' (Scottish Parliament's 
Cross-Party Group on Tibet 2008: 6). 
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independent diplomatic and economic relations with its neighbours, most of whom 
themselves had diplomatic representatives in Lhasa (van Walt van Praag 1987).32 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by contrast, claims that this period was 
marked by a continuation of Chinese rule under the new Nationalist Government 
(People's Republic of China 1992). 
Underpinning these divergent histories presented by Beijing and Dharamsala are 
important ambiguities surrounding issues of sovereignty, territory and colonial 
prerogatives. Indeed, in many ways the history of this region is a colonial history, 
albeit a colonialism which, carried out by non-white colonisers, is rarely recognised 
by Western states (see Chapter 2). With regards to twentieth-century Tibetan 
history, TGiE has, through policy reports in recent years, claimed not only that the 
events of 1949-1950 were a colonial occupation of Tibet by China, but that Chinese 
development policies in the region since have been framed in distinctly colonial 
discourses (DUR 2001a; Fischer 2002). With regards to issues of territory, whilst 
the territorial extent of the Tibetan empire waxed and waned across central Asia 
over the centuries, each side in this dispute implies a different territorial area 
when they refer to 'Tibet' (see Figure 3.a). From the Tibetan perspective 'Tibet' 
consists of the three traditional provinces of V.Tsang, Amdo and Kham. This is the 
region with a traditionally majority ethnic Tibetan population, and is the 
interpretation used in this study (the symbolic importance of this reading of 
Tibetan territory will be discussed in Chapter 8). However, this 'greater Tibet' was 
far from a politically homogenous territory. In the nineteenth- and early twentieth· 
centuries the Tibetan Government's tax·levying capacity extended only to V.Tsang 
province, with Kham and Amdo perceiving Lhasa as a cultural and religious centre 
rather than a political one and maintaining a degree of political autonomy. As will 
become apparent in this study, these regional divisions have important ongoing 
repercussions for exile politics. In contrast to this Tibetan interpretation, Chinese 
authorities use the term 'Tibet' to refer only to the 'Tibetan Autonomous Region', a 
province.level autonomous region of the PRe created in 1965 which corresponds 
only to V· Tsang and part of Western Kham. Amdo and remaining regions of Kham 
were subsume~ within the expanded borders of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and 
Yunnan provinces, with the ethnically Tibetan areas designated as 'Tibetan 
prefectures' (Figure 3.a). 
;12 These count.~ies included British India, Bhutan, Sikkim and, to a limited extent, Russia and Japan. 
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Figure 3.a: Map of Tibet showing both traditional Tibetan regions and 
Chinese provinces (DIlR 2000a: ix) 
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With regards to issues of sovereignty, the ongoing, conflicting and often ambiguous 
interpretations of political authority in this region have proved a major barrier to 
resolving the Tibet issue. As indicated above, the diverging views of Beijing and 
Dharamsala rest in their interpretations of history as the basis of claims to 
sovereignty in the region. In general, China's claims to Tibet are based on its 
understanding of pre-twentieth-century imperial Chinese history, whilst TGiE has 
focused attention on Tibet's early twentieth-century history and the Tibetan 
people's desire for, and recognised right to, self-determination (Dulaney et al1998). 
Moreover, the legal and socio-cultural concepts used to describe political authority 
during these periods - Chinese notions of imperial vassalage and Tibetan notions 
of religious patronage (chOyon) - not only confused the neighbouring colonial 
powers of Britain and Russia in the nineteenth-century, but, crucially, failed to 
translate into the modern framework of international law and statehood (Scottish 
Parliament's Cross-Party Group on Tibet 2008). Indeed, they also fail to equate 
with each other, leading to the disputed claims and counter-histories presented 
above. 
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Further confusing the legal and political status of this territory was the British 
declaration of Chinese 'suzerainty' over Tibet. In an effort to settle on-going 
disputes over the Sino-Tibetan border and come to some resolution as to the 
political status of Tibet, Britain convened a tripartite British, Tibetan and Chinese 
conference in the Indian hill-station of Shimla in 1914.33 Under the Shimla 
Convention, Britain - informed by its own lack of desire for an independent Tibet, 
but lack of wish for full Chinese sovereignty in the region (Strong 1912) - denoted 
two distinct areas to Tibet: 'Inner Tibet' (Kham and Amdo), which came under 
direct Chinese sovereignty but over which the Dalai Lama maintained religious 
authority; and 'Outer Tibet' (roughly coterminous with the modern Tibetan 
Autonomous Region) whose governmental system was dominated by the Dalai 
Lama's government at Lhasa, but over which China maintained a nominal 
'suzerainty' (Oberoi 2006: 78). On the one hand, this declaration of suzerainty - a 
pre-World War II diplomatic practice which describes a region as being under 
protectorate relations of a more powerful state, although never fully subsumed by 
that state - can be read as a distinctly Western interpretation of this non-Western 
situation (Anand 2004. See also Strang 1996). Alternatively, this rendition of 
Tibet's status, which remained official British policy until October 2008,34 can be 
seen as a compromise position between Chinese claims of sovereignty over Tibet 
and Tibetan claims of independence. However, a third perspective perceives 
suzerainty as a concept which fails to fit with contemporary theories of 
international law in which there is no space for overlapping territorial jurisdictions 
and where sovereignty either exists or does not (Anand 2006). 
3.2.2 India and Tibet: ambiguities and geopolitical strategising 
With regards to India's position vis-a-vis the legal status of Tibet, in the initial 
years after Indian independence in 1947, Nehru followed the British government 
policy in treating Tibet as a de facto independent state (Kharat 2003a: 314).35 In 
line with such a position, whilst declining Lhasa's request for troops in 1949 due to 
its ill-equipped and fledgling army, India did not hesitate to deplore China's 
'invasion' of Tibet (1fehrotra 2000). However, through a series of diplomatic 
;13 Tibet entered the Shimla Convention as an "independent nation" - a point regularly cited by TGiE as 
verification of Tibet's independent status. 
a4 In a short statement published on his Ministry's website the Foreign Secretary, David Milliband, asserted 
that the concept of suzerainty was 'based on the geopolitics of the time' and was thus outdated and 
misleading. Therefore, whilst the British government continues to call for greater autonomy for the 
Tibetans, it regards Tibet as part of the PRC (The Economist 6 November 2008: 64). 
35 Cited as evidence of such a stance is the first communication from the Government of independent India 
to the Foreign Office of the Tibetan Government - a request for the latter to ratify the 1914 Shimla 
Convention - which assumes Tibet had relations with other states on an equal footing (Mehrotra 2000: 14· 
15). 
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exchanges between 1950 and 1953 (including demoting the Indian Political Officer 
in Lhasa to the position of Consul General) and statements to the Indian 
parliament, Nehru's terminology regarding Tibet changed significantly. No longer 
recognising Tibet as an autonomous state, India now regarded it as a province of 
China, a shift that was in direct contravention of the Shimla Convention (Arpi 
2000). This stance was confirmed through the signing of the 'Panchsheel 
Agreement' between China and India on 29th April 1954, whereby India agreed to 
relinquish its extra-territorial rights in Tibet inherited from the British, and 
recognised China's sovereignty over Tibet. In examining what prompted such a 
shift in the Indian position on Tibet, Chaturvedi argues that Nehru, in attempting 
to position India as spearheading a postcolonial intervention into Western 
dominated international affairs, saw China not only as a large and powerful 
neighbour which needed to be placated, but as representing key ally 'destined to 
lead the emancipation of hitherto dependent Afro-Asian countries' (2004: 79). 
However, such optimism was premature and misplaced as, with the 1962 Chinese 
invasion of North-East India and the ensuing Indo-Chinese border war, China 
violated the principles of the Panchsheel Agreement and it is only through 
increasing economic interactions in recent years that Sino-Indian diplomatic 
relations have begun to be 'normalised' (Mehrotra 2000: 65). Yet, despite these 
shifting Sino-Indian relations, India's position on Tibet has remained unchanged 
and India neither interferes nor assists TGiE in its dialogue with Beijing (Rajya 
Sabha debate, 25 March 1983, TPPRC 2006b: 88). 
3.2.3 The situation today: competing claims of sovereignty. autonomy and 
independence 
Notable from the above discussion is the sheer number of terms used to describe 
the nature of political authority that has been exercised over Tibet and to frame 
claims over this territory. This continues today, with a range of international legal 
discourses and concepts being appropriated and marshalled by the various sides. 
The Chinese continue to claim sovereignty over Tibet, and most states officially 
recognise such sovereignty. Meanwhile, the official stance of the UN, as codified in 
the General Assembly's three resolutions on Tibet (resolutions 1353, 1723 and 2079 
passed in 1959, 1961 and 1965 respectively) has been to call for the respect of the 
fundamental human rights of the Tibetan peoples and the recognition oftheir right 
to self-determination. From the Tibetan perspective, opinions regarding the future 
of the homeland are sharply divided. In September 1987, after sending four fact-
finding expeditions to Tibet and engaging in two rounds of exploratory talks with 
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the Chinese leadership in Beijing, the Dalai Lama presented his 'Five Point Peace 
Plan for Tibet' to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus.36 Nine months 
later, His Holiness announced his 'Framework for Sino-Tibetan Negotiations' at 
Strasbourg whereby he formally renounced Dharamsala's previous demands for 
independence. Forming the basis of the 'Middle Way Approach', this framework is 
in effect a compact in which China would accede to genuine Tibetan autonomy 
within Tibet without compromising China's borders, security or geostrategic 
posture (Lafitte 1999), and has been the TGiE's official policy to this day.37 
However, both the Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal were 
rejected by the Chinese leadership in 1990 (Zhou 1990) and, despite eight rounds of 
Sino-Tibetan dialogue since 2002, no tangible agreements have been reached. 
Many Tibetans however strongly disagree with the Dalai Lama's request for a 
political status less than independence and are increasingly frustrated with the 
lack of political progress. They call instead for rangzen or full Tibetan 
independence (Tsundue 2004; Norbu 2007).38 Such a stance is articulated most 
strongly by Tibetan NGOs in exile such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYe) and 
Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), and was boosted by Tibetans inside Tibet 
demanding rangzen during the protests of 2008 (Reuters 13 March 2008).39 As the 
most controversial political issue facing the Tibetan community, this split in 
visions for the future of the homeland is a defining feature of exile politics and, as 
explored in the following chapters, permeates many aspects of exile life. 
3.3 Tibet in exile: the TGiE and Tibetan diaspora 
Shifting attention to the (re)establishment of key aspects of Tibetan cultural, 
religious and political life outside the homeland, I want to outline here four 
important contexts. Firstly the development and institutional structures of TGiE 
itself, secondly the role of the Dalai Lama and relationship between religion and 
politics in this case, thirdly TGiE's negotiation of relations with India and the West 
:16 The Peace Plan proposed the transformation of the Tibetan Plateau into a de·militarised 'zone of peace', 
the abandonment of China's population transfer policy to Tibet, respect for Tibetans' fundamental human 
rights, and commencement of earnest negotiations on Tibet's future status. 
;17 This strategy gave rise to two important tasks within the exile community. Firstly, in order to clearly 
define what kind of autonomy it was proposing for Tibet, TGiE has conducted research into autonomous 
regions around the world (Herzer 2001). Secondly, TGiE has sought to educate the Tibetan community on 
the issue of autonomy through an ongoing series of workshops across the diaspora. 
;18 The word 'rangzen' was introduced into the Tibetan lexicon in exile and was coined by combining 'rang' 
meaning self and 'btsan' meaning power (Nowak 1978: 187). 
39 Although persevering with his Middle Way Approach. the Dalai Lama has recently shown signs of 
frustration with the Chinese authorities (The Economist 6 November 2008: 64). 
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through practices of paradiplomacy and finally a demographic overview of the exile 
diaspora. 
3.3.1 The Government of Tibet and TGiE: an historical and institutional 
overVIew 
In the first half of the twentieth-century, Tibetans were ruled by an unusual form 
of feudal theocracy (Kharat 2003b). A central government in Lhasa was headed by 
the Dalai Lama and administered by the Tsongdu, a national assembly which 
consisted of religious and lay-representatives (TPPRC 2003: 14). This government 
maintained a military force, issued currency and postage stamps, collected taxes, 
was the final source of adjudication and negotiated with other governments 
(Mehrotra 2000). In terms of governing the vast territory of Tibet, a complex 
decentralised bureaucracy was in place which gave local control to numerous 
monastic and aristocratic estates which, functioning as government offices, 
collected taxes and settled disputes. 
In October 1950, 40,000 troops from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
entered Cham do in Eastern Tibet and, after 12 days, defeated the 8,000 strong 
Tibetan army. The Tsongdu convened an emergency meeting in November to 
request the 14th Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, to assume full political 
authority as head of state of Tibet. However, by 1951 China had declared Tibet's 
'peaceful liberation'. The so-called 'Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet' affirming Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was signed between 
Chinese and Tibetan officials in May 1951 and, whilst the Chinese regard this as a 
legal document, Tibetan authorities consider it as having been signed under duress 
and therefore invalid (Powers 2004). By 1959, growing popular resentment to 
Chinese rule culminated in an open revolt in Lhasa and, beginning on 10th March 
of that year, daily protests were held in the capital. The PLA crushed the revolt, 
killing around 90,000 Tibetans and imprisoning many thousands. A week later, the 
Dalai Lama, most of his senior government officials and over 80,000 Tibetans fled 
the capital and crossed the Himalayas to seek refuge in India, Nepal and Bhutan. 
Upon his arrival in India in March 1959, the Dalai Lama announced the formation 
of an exile government, declaring 'Wherever I am, accompanied by my government, 
the Tibetan people recognise us as the Government of Tibet' (cited in Dulaney et al 
" 
1998: 11). As such, the TGiE is effectively the continuation in exile of the Lhasa-
based Tibetan Government. After a brief stay in the North Indian town of 
.~. : 
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Mussouri, and in consultation with the Indian authorities, this nascent exile 
administration was established in Dharamsala - a hill-station in Himachal 
Pradesh - in April 1960. On 2nd September 1960, the Dalai Lama called the first 
democratic elections for a newly created representative body, the Commission of 
Tibetan People's Deputies and, a year later, tasked his officials with devising a 
Tibetan constitution based on democratic principles. Officially adopted on 10th 
March 1963, and closely following the Indian model, this 'Constitution of Tibet' was 
the first written constitution in Tibetan history (Sangay 2003).40 Combining 
Western concepts of parliamentary and popular democracy with principles of 
Tibetan Buddhism, and renouncing force as an instrument of national policy, the 
Constitution documents democratic reforms which would s'erve as a guideline and a 
basis for a future Tibet. However, whilst the Constitution can only be finalised 
after consulting the wishes of all Tibetan people and is thus a provisional document 
for exile, it nevertheless set out the structures for TGiE and most of its directives 
have since become a working reality (see Chapter 8). 
The TGiE was gradually expanded, developed and institutionalised over the 
decades through a series of governmental reforms which reorganised the 
administration according to democratic principles. A key milestone in this process 
was reached with the promulgation of the 'Charter of Tibetans in Exile' on 14th 
June 1991. A revision of the 1963 Constitution, the Charter was specifically 
designed for the interim exile situation, is effectively the supreme law governing 
TGiE and is binding on all Tibetans under the jurisdiction of the government-in-
exile (Tsomo 2004). As with constitutions of conventional states, the 1963 
Constitution and 1991 Charter offer a valuable insight into both the political 
culture of the exile Tibetan polity and the formal rules by which this polity is 
organised, outlining the main institutions of the 'state', and enshrining the rights 
and obligations that formalise the relationship between political authority and the 
people. Moreover, whilst the 1963 Constitution in particular is an idealistic 
document which has yet to be implemented, its very existence is significant in 
positioning TGiE within international norms and discourses of statehood. 
With regards to the functioning ofTGiE, the 1991 Charter provides for a system of 
government not unlike a constitutional monarchy, with the Dalai Lama as the 
40 The administration in the pre-Chinese occupation Tibet was guided by 'custom and usage' in the absence 
of a written con~titution which included 16 general moral principles' laid down by Tibetan King Srongtsen 
Gampo (Subramanya 2004: 48, 51). 
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head of state and a separation of powers among three branches of government (see 
Figure 3.b). As such, with some 3,500 full-time government employees (Sangay 
2003: 120) and no credible contenders for political authority within the exile 
community, TGiE claims to function 'as a veritable government and has all the 
departments and attributes of a free democratic government' (www.tibet.net). The 
TGiE frames this modernising of existing Tibetan institutions and structures of 
governance and the development of new ones, in terms of both preserving in exile 
what was destroyed by the Chinese occupation, and as preparation for governance 
in a future independent or genuinely autonomous Tibet (Planning Council 1994, 
Section 9.1.1). These temporal discourses will form an important theme running 
through the following chapters. 
Figure 3.b: Organisational structure of the TGiE (DIIR 2001b: 10-11) 
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As the highest executing organ of TGiE, the Kashag makes policy decisions, in 
consultation with the Dalai Lama, on matters relating to the Tibetan refugee 
community and has the main responsibility of trying to keep the question of Tibet 
alive (Planning Council 1994, Section 1.2.3). Kalons (ministers) were initially 
appointed by the Dalai Lama but the 1991 Charter ruled that these individuals be 
elected by the exile parliament. Since 2001 the Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) has 
been directly elected by the diaspora. Previously chairman of the exile parliament, 
the current Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rimpoche is known in India as the 'Tibetan 
Gandhi' for his espousal of the principles of ahimsa (non-violent resistance) and 
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satyagraha or 'insistence on truth' (Ardley 2003a). Indeed, Samdhong Rimpoche's 
administrations have placed such values at the core of TGiE's political philosophy, 
a strategy which has important repercussions for the functioning of this polity (see 
Chapters 5, 6 and 8). 
The exile legislature was established as the Commission of Tibetan People's 
Deputies in 1960 with 13 members and the present Tibetan Parliament-in-exile 
(TPiE) has 43 directly elected members representing the three provincial regions 
and five major religious sects of Tibet (see Chapter 8). The TPiE has broad 
legislative powers and responsibilities which include electing members of the 
Kashag, overseeing the work of TGiE departments, enacting laws, issuing policy 
decisions and managing the TGiE's finances. In session in March and September 
each year, the TPiE also hears public grievances and petitions of Tibetans in exile, 
liaises with parliaments and NGOs across the world to gain backing for the cause 
of Tibet and lobbies for support from the Government and people of India (Tsomo 
2004). The third pillar of TGiE's democratic structure is the Tibetan Supreme 
Justice Commission established in 1992 under the Charter of Tibetans in Exile. 
This 'judiciary' is responsible for framing a judicial code and civil procedures 
appropriate to the situation of exile but, given its limited functioning within the 
state of India, is only able to settle civil disputes between exile Tibetans in 
accordance with arbitrational procedures. Meanwhile all criminal cases are dealt 
with by the Indian judicial system (see Chapter 5). Finally, three independent 
statutory commissions reaffirm the democratic status of TGiE. These are the 
Election Commission, which conducts and oversees elections to TPiE and Local 
Assemblies and the direct election of the Kalon Tripa (see Chapter 8); the Public 
Service Commission which recruits and trains Tibetan civil servants; and the Audit 
Commission which appraises the accounts of all TGiE departments and Tibetan 
public institution and advises Tibetan institutions and businesses on Indian tax 
issues. 
With regards to the governmental departments, the Department of Religion and 
Culture oversees the preservation of the religious and cultural heritage of Tibet 
through assisting the re-establishment of almost 200 monasteries and nunneries in 
India, Nepal and Bhutan, producing religious and cultural publications and 
administering a number of Tibetan cultural institutions (for example the Tibetan 
Institute of Performing Arts and the Norbulinka institute for traditional arts and 
crafts near Dharamsala). The Department of Home is responsible for managing the 
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Tibetan settlements, scattered communities, handicraft centres and agricultural 
cooperatives in exile (see Chapter 5), while the Department of Finance formulates 
TGiE's annual budget, administers financial donations to the exile government and 
collects annual 'voluntary contributions' from exile Tibetans (see Chapter 6). As 
one of the first departments established in exile, the Department of Education is 
responsible for overseeing 85 Tibetan schools in India, and Nepal, devising Tibetan 
curricula and publishing Tibetan textbooks (see Chapter 5), while the Department 
of Health runs primary health centres and Tibetan medicine centres in almost all 
the exile settlements, administers seven hospitals and develops public health 
policies. Meanwhile, the duties of the Department of Security include ensuring the 
personal security of the Dalai Lama and providing assistance for Tibetans 
acquiring and renewing their Indian 'Registration Certificates' (see Chapter 7). 
Finally, the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) acts as 
the TGiE's protocol office, disseminating information about Tibet, monitoring 
human rights and environmental issues in Tibet and liaising with international 
Tibetan Support Groups (TSGs). 
Besides the official organs of the state, the Tibetan community in exile has also 
seen the development of institutions of civil society (see Chapters 6 and 8). 
Numerous NGOs have been established across the diaspora to deal with a vast 
array of issues, from campaigning for the future of the homeland to providing 
health and education services, supporting women, former political prisoners, and 
refugees from particular regions in Tibet and raising awareness of environmental 
issues. The most prominent NGOs include the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA) 
and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). Exile Tibetan media has also grown over 
the years, now consisting of at least six Tibetan and four English language 
publications. These newspapers and magazines, alongside radio services such as 
Radio Free Asia and Voice of Tibet have encouraged often heated political debate 
within the exile community, thereby 'contributing to the building of a Tibetan civil 
society [and] strengthening ... the roots of the exiles' nascent democracy' (Samphel 
2004: 170).41 Meanwhile, web-based media and web-forums such as 
www.phayul.com have brought the internationally dispersed diaspora together. 
~I The launch of the Tibetan service radio in particular gave Tibetan exiles the ability to reach out to 
Tibetans in Tibet, which has proved to be a powerful unifying and nation·building tool (Samphel 2004: 179). 
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3.3.2 Combining religion and politics: monasteries in exile and the role of 
the Dalai Lama 
Readily apparent from this overview of TGiE is the centrality of the relationship 
between religion and politics in this case and the key role played by the Dalai 
Lama. Indeed, the gradual shift from religious power to secular (democratic) power 
and the constantly negotiated relationship between religion and politics is central 
to attempting to understand Tibetan political culture. To set some context, 
Buddhism was fIrst brought to Tibet in the seventh-century by Songtsen Gampo, 
the Tibetan King who consolidated and expanded the Tibetan empire and, under 
the following Tibetan Kings, Buddhism became established as the state religion.42 
Between the seventeenth-century and 1959, the Dalai Lamas - a lineage of 
religious leaders of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism - were both the religious 
and political leaders of Tibet, heading the Lhasa based Tibetan Government. As 
such, religion and politics were intimately connected in Tibet, with the government 
constituted of a diarchy of equivalent ecclesiastical and secular offIces at every 
level of administration (Klieger 1992). 
In exile, both religion and the fIgure of the Dalai Lama continue to be central and 
unifying elements in the diasporic community. Indeed, Harris (1997) asserts that 
the potency of religion as a pan-Tibetan defIner is even more marked in exile than 
pre-1959 Tibet, as refugees from all parts of Tibet have been brought together for 
the first time. As the personification of Chenresdzig, the protector deity of Tibet, 
the role of the current Dalai Lama in defining Tibetanness, embodying Tibetan 
culture and providing continuity to the history of Tibet cannot be overemphasised 
(KohlS 1996). Functioning 'as the central locus of power and identity within the 
Tibetan diaspora' (Houston and Wright 2003: 218) the Dalai Lama's unique 
position as spiritual and secular leader is 'the one institution perhaps which forges 
together all Tibetans, whether in Tibet or in exile, into one united people' (Office of 
The Dalai Lama 1969: i). With regards to monasteries, these remain vital 
institutions in the exile community with one or more in each exile settlement. 
Indeed, Tibetan Buddhism has both been preserved and advanced to a far greater 
extent in India than inside Tibet as, due to the destruction of thousands of Tibetan 
monasteries during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and ongoing 
repression of Buddhist teachings, most senior Tibetan lamas have fled to exile and 
established exile 'institutions' of the major monasteries in Tibet. 
42 Whilst Tibet was and is an overwhelmingly a Buddhist society, there is a small Tibetan Muslim 
population, now predominantly in exile. Based mainly in Kashmir, this community receives some welfare 
support from TGiE but is largely independent (Siddiqui 1991; Mondal 2001) 
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However, whilst Buddhism and the Dalai Lama continue to be central to the 
diasporic Tibetan community, this polity is not a theocracy and the relationship 
between church and state has altered somewhat in exile. On the one hand, 'the 
doctrines enunciated by the Lord Buddha' (His Holiness the Dalai Lama 1963: v) 
are at the core of the 1963 Constitution and 1991 Charter, and the exile elite assert 
that their unique form and system of democracy is shaped by and thus in tune with 
Tibetan Buddhist values (see Chapter 8). Indeed, himself a reincarnate lama, the 
current Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rimpoche's doctrine of satyagraha and the TGiE's 
'Middle Way Approach' more generally are further evidence of a polity infused with 
religious ethics and ideals. As explored in the following chapters, this is a political 
philosophy which some amongst the secular-educated population in exile are 
increasingly frustrated with, especially when it is perceived to obstruct the 
nationalist freedom struggle. 
On the other hand, although seats are reserved for representatives of the four sects 
of Tibetan Buddhism (Gelugpa, Nyingma, Kagyu and Sakya) and the traditional 
faith Bon, the first exile Tibetan Parliament saw the abolition of dual posts for 
monk and lay officials. Moreover, the 1991 Charter described the Tibetan polity as 
'secular' albeit defined in Tibetan as remey meaning that the state will not 
discriminate among different religions, rather than the absence of religion 
(Shiromany 1998: 272). Likewise, despite their important function within the exile 
communities, the political role, position and material impact of Tibetan 
monasteries has undergone important changes (KoHlS 1996). Not only have the 
governmental monastic offices been abolished, but the monasteries themselves 
have lost the key economic and political foundation they had in Tibet as 
landholders, tax collectors and local political administrators. Therefore, rather 
than forming a core part of the government structure, monasteries are now largely 
autonomous institutions which come under the remit of a single TGiE department 
which itself now handles all state-level religious matters.43 
H Though uniting the various sects of Tibetan Buddhism is an aspirational goal in exile, and certainly all 
modern sects acknowledge the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet, traditional divisions and power struggles 
have been transferred to exile. For example, intrinsically linked to the Tibetan government through the 
lineage of Dalai Lamas, the Gelugpa sect received direct payment from Lhasa, a practice which continued in 
exile with Oclugpa monks receiving a small annual allowance from TGiE. Without such a source of income, 
other sects looked abroad for financial support, often establishing Buddhist institutions in the West (Imeger 
1992). Such a strategy proved highly successful and, today, Nyingma and Kagyu monasteries in India are 
often better funded than their Gelugpa counterparts. 
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Finally, the Dalai Lama has, over the decades, attempted to reduce his political 
role within the community through devolving political authority to the directly 
elected Kalon Tripa and TPiE (see Chapter 8). Not only is this a deliberate strategy 
to separate religious and political leadership in the Tibetan polity, but it is also an 
important attempt to prevent a power vacuum after his death. Traditionally, the 
death of a Dalai Lama leads to a search for a reincarnation, with Regents 
temporarily taking political power until the next Dalai Lama is found and has 
reached the age of 18. In these interim periods, Tibet has historically suffered 
political instability and national crises and so the existence of a democratically 
elected political leader should, in theory, be able to circumvent such problems. 
However, concerns about a post-Dalai Lama future remain significant in the exile 
community, both in terms of considerable continued dependence on the institution 
of the Dalai Lama and what the loss of such a charismatic leader would do to the 
international standing of the Tibetan cause (Tsundue 2004). 
3.3.3 TGiE's relations with India and the West: (non)recognition and 
paradiplomacy 
One area of particular concern regarding the future of the exile community is its 
relationship with the host state India. Whilst the nature of this relationship will 
emerge in the following empirical chapters and be analysed in Chapter 9, I want to 
outline here some of the important background factors and issues. On the one hand 
India has been an extraordinarily generous and tolerant host, and exile Tibetans 
have been grateful and largely obedient guests.44 Such a relationship is founded on 
the basis of a long-standing spiritual and cultural connections between Tibet and 
India (French 1991), the high regard with which the Dalai Lama is held by the 
Indian public and government, and the fact that Tibetans are largely seen as model 
refugees (Furer-Haimendorf 1990; Diehl 1997). However, despite such hospitality, 
India has never afforded TGiE formal legal or political recognition as a 
government, nor the Dalai Lama the status of a legitimate political leader 
(Grunfeld 1987).45 In addition, India has abstained from voting on the resolutions 
concerning Tibet that were put forward in the UN General Assembly in 1959 and 
1961 (Oberoi 2006: 86). Yet, at the same time, the Gol granted asylum to the Dalai 
Lama, accepts his leadership over the exile community, and grants TGiE tacit 
approval to speak for the Tibetan refugees, manage the exile settlements and 
engage with international donor agencies. 
44 For example, in March 2009 TGiE hosted a 'Thank You India' festival in New Delhi dedicated to 'the 
generosity and hospitality ofthe government and the people ofIndia' (www.50yrsinexi1e.com). 
if> It should be noted that there has been considerable Indian public support for such recognition, especially 
after the 1962 Sino·Indian war (Norbu 2001: 12). 
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Such a contradictory position has to be seen through the lens of geopolitical 
strategising. Historically perceived as an important and peaceful buffer zone 
between India and China, Tibet has increasingly become a major security concern 
for India, especially with the increased Chinese militarisation of the region and the 
advance of Chinese forces in the Himalayan borders in recent years (Mehrotra 
2000). As such, the Indian Government has used the presence of TGiE on its 
territory as a bargaining chip to regulate its relations with Beijing, officially 
prohibiting but often unofficially permitting Tibetan's anti-Chinese protests on 
Indian soil (Norbu 1996). Finally, on cultural and social levels the relationship 
between TGiE and GoI has in many ways been mutually beneficial. As outlined in 
the following chapters, TGiE has relied on Indian political and fiscal expertise for 
the development of its constitution, election system, implementation of its census 
and training of its civil servants (Planning Council 1994, Section 9.5.1). In turn, 
the presence of the Tibetan exile community and its numerous successful 
institutions has instigated a cultural and religious revival in India's Buddhist 
Himalayan regions and contributed significantly to India's tourism economy. 
Considering TGiE's 'international relations' more generally, as noted in the 
previous chapter, although this polity is not legally recognised as a government by 
any state such non-recognition does not mean that TGiE lacks all contact with 
other states and governments. Since coming into exile, the issue of Tibet has been 
internationalised both by the charismatic figure of the Dalai Lama and the growing 
international network of TSGs.46 However, whilst engagement with cultural, 
humanitarian, and religious organisations which share and support the exile 
community's goals is central to how TGiE positions itself on the international stage 
and indeed secures much needed funding (Dulaney et 011998. see also Shain 1989), 
the exile administration has also engaged in a range of distinctly state-like 
(para)diplomatic practices. 
Central to these is the administration of a series of pseudo embassies. Coming 
under the jurisdiction of the DIIR, in effect TGiE's foreign office (chhisee khang), 
there are ten such 'Offices of Tibet' established in cities across all continents (in 
New Delhi, New York, Geneva, Tokyo, London, Canberra, Brussels, Moscow, 
Pretoria and Taipei). Although their diplomatic activities are restricted, the Offices 
~6 An umbrella organisation, the 'International Tibet Support Network' was launched in 2000 in order to 
coordinate the now 150 TSG's in over 30 countries (www.tibetnetwork.org). 
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of Tibet nonetheless maintain direct contacts with governments and NGOs, 
spearhead the administration's UN initiatives and function as a channel of news 
from Tibet. Given budgetary constraints, each of these Offices was established with 
clear strategic goals. For example, the Bureau in New Delhi liaises directly with a 
number of central GoI Ministries and assists in the processing of documents of 
Tibetans going to and from India (see Chapter 6). Established in 1960, the New 
York office provides support to TGiE officials lobbying the UN and serves as the 
focal point for the increasing number of Tibetans settled in North America. 
Similarly, the Office of Tibet in Brussels liaises with sympathetic parliamentarians 
in the European Union and the office in Geneva lobbies the UN Human Rights 
commission and supports the sizeable Tibetan population in Switzerland. 
Alongside these foreign missions and their diplomats, other paradiplomatic 
practices include engagement in alternative international fora such as the 
Unrecognised Nations and Peoples Organisation,47 parliamentary exchanges -
visits of parliamentarians to Dharamsala and tours of Tibetan MPs to European 
parliaments48 - and a series of 'World Parliamentarian Conventions on Tibet'.49 
With the objective of garnering international governmental support for TGiE's 
proposed resolution of the issue of Tibet, these events are key examples of TGiE's 
performance of legitimate statehood on the international stage. 
3.3.4 Tibetans in exile: refugee displacements, demographics and diaspora 
Finally, I want to turn attention to the Tibetan population in exile. Whilst a small 
permanent Tibetan minority became assimilated into the Himalayan regions of 
India in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, emigration from Tibet to 
India prior to the 1950s was generally limited to seasonal traders, religious 
pilgrims and the children of the aristocracy sent to British missionary schools in 
Darjeeling and Kalimpong (Grunfeld 1987: 185). This situation changed 
dramatically in March 1959 with the arrival of the Dalai Lama and around 80,000 
Tibetans. These first 'Tibetan refugees' (a term which will be interrogated in 
Chapter 7), came from all regions of Tibet and from a variety of socio-economic 
47 This is a membership organisation of political communities such as stateless nations and indigenous 
groups not adequately represented at major international fora (such as the United Nations) which provides 
a forum through which they can become effective participants and contributors to the international 
community (www.unpo.org). 
4H The most recent of these trips was a delegation of four Tibetan MPs to Westminster in June 2009. This 
included meetings with the Home Office and the AlI·Party Parliamentary Group on Tibet to discuss the 
current situation in Tibet and the development of democracy in exile. 
49 The first convention was held in New Delhi in 1994, the second in 1995 in Vilnius in Lithuania, the third 
in April 1997 in Washington, DC and the most recent in Edinburgh in 2005 which I attended as an 
observer. The number of parliamentarians attending and the number of countries represented has 
increased at each meeting, from 69 parliamentarians from 25 countries in 1994 to 130 parliamentarians 
from 40 countries in 2005. 
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backgrounds (MacPherson et al 2008). After the peak years of exodus from 1959 to 
1961, the borders of Tibet were effectively closed and the political isolation of China 
meant that there was 'little contact between Tibetans inside Tibet and the refugee 
community for more than two decades' (Yeh 2007: 652). 
The second wave of refugees from Tibet began in the 1980s, with 25,000 Tibetans 
arriving in India between 1986 and 1996 as a result of reforms in China following 
the death of Mao and the gradual loosening of travel restrictions imposed on 
Tibetans (Moynihan 1997). Members of this second exodus - 'new arrivals' or 
'newcomers' as they are referred to -left for a variety of reasons including religious 
persecution, political repression, aggressive sinocisation and a lack of educational 
opportunities (Hess 2006). An estimated 2000-3000 Tibetans left illegally for India 
every year from the late 1990s until 2008, with increasing numbers of children sent 
by their parents for a Tibetan education in India, young people seeking better 
education and employment opportunities and individuals visiting family members 
in exile (Yeh 2007). Since the protests across Tibet in March 2008 the flow of 
Tibetan refugees from Tibet to India via Nepal has all but stopped due to stringent 
border controls (MacPherson et al 2008). The principle escape route was, and 
continues to be, an arduous and dangerous journey of one to three months across 
the Himalayas on foot to Nepal (Ziman 1996). After registering with the UNHCR 
Office in Kathmandu, most refugees travel to Dharamsala where TGiE arranges an 
audience with the Dalai Lama, provides short-term accommodation and organises 
placements in Tibetan religious and educational institutions (see Chapters 5 and 
6). For several years, TGiE has encouraged those coming to India on pilgrimage or 
to study to return to Tibet to maintain the Tibetan population in the homeland in 
the face of increasing Chinese migration. 
With regards to the Tibetan diaspora, the Tibetan Demographic Survey conducted 
in 1998 (see Chapter 6) recorded 122,078 Tibetans in exile, with 70% residing in 
. India (Figure 3.c): 
Figure 3.c Population figures for the Tibetan diaspora (Planning Council 
2000: 38) 
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The majority of exile Tibetans are from V-Tsang province (70%), with 25% 
originating from Kham and 5% from Amdo (Kharat 2003b: 79). Within India, 
Tibetan refugees are concentrated in Karnataka (35,002), Himachal Pradesh 
(19,593), Arunachal Pradesh (6,858), Uttar Pradesh (6,300) and Jammu and 
Kashmir (6,242) (Planning Council 2000: 34-37. See Chapter 5). As Bhatia et al 
(2002) note in a demographic study of 65,000 Tibetans in India in 1995, the 
declining birth rate, increasing life expectancies, and growth in the proportion of 
the elderly population all indicate a transition to the demographic pattern of more 
middle income societies, an assertion supported by socio-economic trends within 
the community. This population is also characterised by high mobility within India 
and abroad, a significant unregistered population (lacking Indian identity 
documents) and a high proportion of monks and nuns. Due to these demographic 
characteristics, there is a high dependency ratio and a number of vulnerable 
cohorts within the Tibetan community.5o Alongside the elderly, infirm and very 
young, these include recent exiles who lack family support networks, unemployed 
graduates, and those living under TGiE's poverty line of 30 Indian Rupees per 
person per day (see Chapter 6). 
The migration of Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal to the West began in the 
1960s when the Swiss Red Cross resettled around 1,500 Tibetans in Switzerland, a 
community which continues to thrive today. The success of this experiment led the 
Dalai Lama to encourage the Canadian and US governments to accept Tibetan 
refugees and, in 1971-1972, 228 Tibetans arrived in Canada from India and Nepal 
(M"acPherson et al 2008). The large-scale movement of Tibetans from South Asia to 
the USA occurred after the passage of the 1990 US Immigration Act, with Section 
134 of the Act - the Tibetan US Resettlement Program - granting permanent 
resident status to 1000 'displaced' Tibetans living in India and Nepal (Tibetan 
Review 1991 26(8): 6-7). These individuals, selected through a quota system 
administered by TGiE, were assigned to resettlement clusters in 18 states and, 
from 1996, became eligible to bring their families to the US (Hess 2003). Not only 
did the remittances sent back to India and the high proportion of Tibetan elites 
migrating encourage further migration to the West, but it has meant that 'the 
West' has come to be seen in the South Asian exile communities as a surrogate 
50 The Tibetan DemocrRJlhic SUr've)' (1998) calculaled the lOla' dependel~' otin IG be ;J4,rl4, although Ihi. doe. nol inrlurle monkl and nuna who aft' mOllt~· 
emnarnlc.lly i.ach .. (planning Council 2000)· 
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Shangri-la, diametrically opposed to China (Diehl 2002). Tibetans have also 
increasingly migrated to other European countries, Taiwan, Japan and Australia, 
and in many cases have taken citizenship of these states. In these host countries, 
most Tibetans are in regular contact with Tibetan associations and community 
organisations (usually with strong links to TGiE) which organise cultural 
activities, political protests and liaise with local TSGs. 
3.4 Conclusion: researching Tibet, the TGiE and Tibetans in exile 
A number of the issues described above as context will be critically interrogated in 
what follows. These include the role of China and the relationship between the 
exile Tibetan community and its host state India; contested definitions of 
sovereignty, autonomy and self-determination; the complex intertwining of 
religion, culture and politics; and issues of population, diaspora and nation-
building in exile. However, to round up this brief overview of the case of Tibet I 
want to focus here on how the territory, population and government of Tibet has 
been considered in academic literature. In terms of Tibet itself, besides the 'vast 
data bank of information about the region' collated by missionaries, diplomats, 
soldiers and travellers in the nineteenth-century (Korom 1997: 2), academic 
literature has overwhelmingly focused on classical history (Beckwith 1993; McKay 
2003) and the evolution of Tibetan Buddhism (Thurman 1995; Mills 2001). The 
issue of Tibet has remained marginal in IR scholarship, appearing if at all as a 
'footnote to the cold war or as a pawn in Sino-Western or Sino-Indian relations' 
(Anand 2004: 212). Such neglect can be attributed to the conventional focus on 
strategic interests of major Western powers and the lack of fit of this case with 
orthodox understandings of territory, statehood and imperial power. What 
scholarly research there is has focused on documenting the post-1950 occupation 
history (Shakabpa 1967; Grunfeld 1987; Shakya 1999; Dreyer and Sautman 2005), 
the legal status of Tibet (van Waalt van Praag 1987; McCorquodale and Oroz 1994; 
Dulaney et al1998) and the role of the British in Tibet (Fleming 1961; David-Neel 
1983). 
With regards to literature on the Tibetan community in exile, although the plight 
of Tibetans commands international attention, this diaspora remains 'relatively 
understudied and under-theorised' (Houston and Wright 2003: 217). Pioneering 
research in the 1970s until early 1990s was undertaken by Indian and Western 
anthropologists and sociologists who conducted in-depth studies of the social 
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structures and evidence of socio-cultural adaptation within specific Tibetan 
settlements in exile (see Goldstein 1978; Palakshappa 1978; Arakeri 1980; Patel 
1980; Subba 1990). To a large extent, these descriptive studies were premised on 
the idea that exilic Tibetan identity was only worth studying insofar as it contained 
traces of 'how things were in the past' (Prost 2006: 235), and as such often 
overlooked the immediate and concrete problems of exile. In contrast, an increasing 
body of research undertaken by anthropologists, geographers and Tibetologists is 
employing a range of critical theoretical approaches to analytically examine the 
construction and negotiation of Tibetan identity in exile. Forming a new juncture 
in Tibetan studies, such work has focused on the contested construction of 
nationalism and Tibetanness (Kohls 1996; Anand 2000), complex diasporic and 
transnational identities in South Asia and the West (Houston and Wright 2003; 
Hess 2006; Yeh and Lama 2006), the narrative of refugeehood (de Voe 1981; 
Garrett 1997) and the reconfiguration of gender relations in exile (Butler 2003). 
A second strand of contemporary research, informed by similar theoretical 
frameworks, has focused on the strategies employed to ensure cultural 
preservation within the community and the subsequent perceived trade-off 
between traditionalism and modernity (Nowak 1984). Attending to the influence of 
India and the West on Tibetan exile cultural productions these studies have 
examined modern Tibetan art (Harris 1997), music (Diehl 2002) and the 
commoditisation of Tibetan culture by Westerners and the exiles themselves 
(Korom 1997; McGukin 1997). Indeed, the interaction of exile Tibetans with 'the 
West' and 'Westerners' has emerged as an increasingly important research theme. 
An important aspect of this has examined the exoticisation of Tibet and Tibetans in 
the Western imagination and forms of Western cultural representation such as 
films, books and magazines (see Bishop 1989; Dodin and Rather 2001; Anand 
2008). Meanwhile, other research has focused on how Tibetan refugees have in 
turn appropriated and internalised Western representations of the Shangri-la 
myth in the construction and promotion of a Tibetan nation in exile and soliciting 
international support (McGukin 1997). Running parallel to this has been a focus on 
Western involvement in the Tibet freedom movement, with studies focusing on the 
international networks of Tibet activism (McLagan 1996; Davies 2009). 
Whilst continuing to employ critical approaches, this study shifts attention away 
from identity politics and issues of cultural preservation, and instead focuses on 
the under-researched issues of the structures, functions and limitations of TGiE 
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and the relationship between this exile administration and its host state India. 
Extant research on the characteristics and development of the exile community 
and government has focused on specific aspects of socio-economic relations and 
dependence on foreign aid (Norbu 2001; Frechette 2002; Prost 2006), the 
development of Tibetan democracy (Ardley 2003b; Edin 1992; Frechette 2007) and 
quantitative demographic studies (Bhatia et 01 2002; Ruwanpura et 01 2006). This 
research speaks to these studies, but also makes an original contribution in placing 
the institution of the TGiE centre-stage, highlighting the Tibetan perspective on 
the relationship between TGiE and the state of India (for official narratives of the 
Indian viewpoint see Mehrotra 2000; Kharat 2003b) and examining the everyday 
functioning of this polity through ethnographic methodologies. It is to this issue of 
how the material upon which these discussions are based was sourced, collected 
and collated that I now turn. 
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Chapter 4 
Observing the 'State'-in-exile: Methodological Approaches to 
Studying the TGiE. 
'The pmdent social scientist, like the wise investor, must rely on 
diversification to magnify the strengths, and to offset the weaknesses, of any 
single instrument... To understand how an institution works - and still 
more, how different institutions work differently - we must deploy a variety 
of techniques' 
(Putnam 1993: 12). 
4.1 Introduction 
In addition to reflecting the nature of this exile polity as sketched out in the 
previous chapter, the methodologies employed for this research have been 
developed out of the theoretical approaches outlined in Chapter 2. The decision to 
take a cultural approach to formal politics, and to situate this research within 
contemporary critical theorisations of the state, sovereignty and territory, is 
reflected in the choice of qualitative and ethnographic approaches. 
'Epistemologically and methodologically distinct from the more traditional 
approaches of political scientists and political geographers to conceptualizations of 
the state' (Mountz 2003: 630), qualitative methodologies enable the state to be 
perceived as 'a set of social practices' (Painter 1995: 34) and facilitate more 
revealing insights about power and the geographies of politics (Cook and Crang 
1995). 
In outlining how I approached researching the form and functioning of TGiE, the 
first section of this chapter details the research visits to India I undertook and the 
conventional qualitative social science research methods I employed. These 
included semi-structured interviews with TGiE and Tibetan NGO officials and a 
cross-section of Tibetan 'citizens' in six exile settlements, and two focus groups set 
up to explore specific issues. This section also discusses the recruitment of 
gatekeepers, the sourcing and textual analysis of documents produced by TGiE and 
issues regarding language, translation and research ethics. Noting that, whilst 
forming the primary research material for this project these methodologies were 
insufficient for getting a handle on the often undeclared articulations of 
sovereignty In this case, the second section outlines an alternative and 
supplementary approach to researching this polity. Returning to the theoretical 
frameworks discussed in Chapter 2, it contextualises the shifts from textual 
analysis to issues of performance and contemporary calls attend to quotidian 
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geographies and issues of materiality. Drawing on the growing body of literature 
on ethnographies of the everyday state, my own attempts to examine the mundane 
practices, objects, people and words through which TGiE is constituted and 
functions are outlined, and the challenges such an approach raises noted. Turning 
to issues of researcher positionality, the third section discusses how my 
involvement in Tibet activism enabled me to gain access to this polity, attempt to 
mediate power relations in research encounters and 'give back' to the exile 
community. 
4.2 A qualitative approach: researching the TGiE through 
interviews and focus groups 
As a result of the timetable of political events within the exile Tibetan community 
and practical problems obtaining an Indian research visa,5) three periods of 
fieldwork totalling just over nine months were undertaken for this research. Whilst 
having to travel to India on a tourist visa did pose restrictions with regards to 
interviewing Indian officials (discussed below), multiple trips provided a valuable 
opportunity to reflect on findings and refine the research agenda after each visit. 
The first research trip (March-April 2006) was based in Dharamsala and coincided 
with the Tibetan parliamentary elections and Tibetan national uprising day (10th 
March). Held every five years, the TPiE elections provided a key opportunity to 
view the Tibetan state 'in action.' This trip also enabled me to consult TGiE 
documents and press archives in the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in 
Dharamsala and conduct a series of initial information gathering interviews with 
key members of the community, a number of whom proved to be important 
gatekeepers for the subsequent trips. Returning in February 2007 for four months, 
I re-established research contacts in Dharamsala and interviewed TGiE and NGO 
officials in the town before undertaking month long visits to the Tibetan 
settlements and institutions around Dehra Dun, Sonamling settlement in Ladakh 
and the Tibetan colony of Majnuka Tilla in North Delhi (see Figure 4.a). The 
rationale behind this choice of settlements is outlined in Chapter 5.52 The final 
fieldwork visit (September-December 2007) consisted of conducting follow-up 
interviews in Dharamsala and an opportunity to sit in on a session of the TPiE , 
51 Despite applying for a research visa in October 2005 and repeated enquiries at the Indian High 
Commission in umdon and Ministry of Human Resource Development in New Delhi. no communication, or 
indeed visa, materialised. From anecdotal evidence and media reports I was not alone in experiencing 
problems with the Indian research vi~a system (see Levin ~O May 2007). 
52 It is important to note here that, given the confines of thiS proJect, only Tibetan settlements in India were 
visited, and trips were not made to the exile Tibetan communities in Nepal or Bhutan. 
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interviews with Tibetan a nd Indian respondents in South Delhi and a month long 
stay in Bangalore and Lugsum-Samdupling settlement at Bylakuppe, Karnataka. 
Figure 4.a Map of exile Tibetan settlements uisited53 
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As noted in the previous chapter, the majority of research on the Tibetan 
community in India has comprised of detailed studies of the history, development 
and socio-economic structures of particular settlements. In contrast, my choice to 
!\J It is noted that the borders marked on and label attached to sections of this map are problematic and. in 
light of discussions in this study. are in many ways emblematic of the conventional approaches 
represe ntations of political pace which are being critiqued. 
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conduct a multi-sited ethnography - an approach which is increasingly popular in 
studies of trans nationalism (see Marcus 1995; Pratt and Yeoh 2003; Jackson et al 
2004) - was an attempt to capture and reflect the diversity and complexity of this 
exile community and state-like polity scattered across the host state India. This 
was also an attempt to counteract the 'Dharamsala syndrome' prevalent within the 
exiled Tibetan community. Whilst return trips to Dharamsala (and indeed Delhi) 
reflected the fact that these are key hubs within the Tibetan diaspora (see Chapter 
5) and was essential for accessing political networks and keeping up to date with 
current debates, these are sites dominated by the exile elite and have a high 
transient population. In contrast, the majority of the exile population in India live 
in self-contained Tibetan settlements which, whilst in many ways detached from 
the governmental and NGO politics of Dharamshala, are where TGiE's domestic 
policies are implemented and engaged with on a daily basis. In light of this, my 
month-long field studies of Sonamling, Dekyiling, Clementown and Bylakuppe 
settlements are an attempt to explore how this exile polity functions on the ground 
and is perceived by 'ordinary Tibetans'. However, the nature of 'the field' in this 
study goes beyond these spatially discrete settlements. As I explore in the following 
chapter, the Tibetan community in India is highly networked and mobile, and my 
own travels between settlements and stays in Delhi and Bangalore were distinctly 
'exile Tibetan' experiences - often travelling on the same buses and staying in the 
same hotels as Tibetans taking similar journeys - and were an invaluable part of 
my research. In addition, whilst not the immediate focus of this study, the wider 
Tibetan diaspora was an important contextual extension of 'the field', with 
transnational connections between Tibetans in India and relatives in the West a 
recurrent narrative, and five interviews with Tibetans in the UK providing an 
important angle on how the community in India is viewed. As such, the research 
'field' in this case should be seen not only as multi-sited but as multi-scalar (Reid-
Henry 2003). 
Although I had experience working in the exile Tibetan community in Dharamsala 
since 2002 (discussed below), in order to familiarise myself with the structures of 
TGiE, gauge lexicons and identify potential issues for investigation, initial scoping 
exercises were undertaken prior to and during the fieldwork periods. This involved 
consulting reports and data sets produced by TGiE and independent scholars 
including the Tibetan Demographic Survey (planning Council 2000), the five-year 
'Integrated Development Plans' (planning Council 1994), the Department of 
Education's 'Basic Education Policy' (2005), the Charter of Tibetans in Exile (1991), 
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TGiE press releases, statements by TPiE and Kashag (www.tibet.net). socio-
economic surveys of the community (Bhatia et al 2002; Planning Commission 
2004), publications from TGiE departments, 54 reports on the early days of exile 
(Office of the Dalai Lama 1969) and compendiums of the Dalai Lama's speeches 
(Shiromany 1998). Tibetan press archives were also consulted, 55 alongside 
promotional material from Tibetan NGOs and Tibetan websites. The official Indian 
perspective on the exile government and community was ascertained from Indian 
parliamentary discussions about Tibet (TPPRC 2006a, 2006b), accounts by former 
GoI officials and articles in the Indian press.56 Most of these publications, reports 
and press archives were accessed through the Library of Tibetan Works and 
Archives in Dharamshala.57 Whilst the majority of the texts were in English I had 
sections from those published in Tibetan translated. 
In addition to being key sources of background historical and statistical 
information regarding this case, these documents also constitute research data in 
their own right when approached from the theoretical framework of discourse 
analysis espoused within critical geopolitics (see Dalby 1991; Campbell 1992; 6 
Tuathail 1996). From such a perspective, the 'language of stateness' (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001: 9) can be seen as a mechanism through which 'the state' 
reproduces itself. In light of this, examining what the state stated is as important 
for aspirant states and governments-in-exile as it is for established nation-states. 
These texts of governance and their meticulous archiving are vital to the 
construction of the exile Tibetan polity and, as I discuss in the following chapters, 
the language used and discourses employed are key to understanding how TGiE 
defines and presents itself, its relationships with the host state and its place in the 
world. 
In terms of gaining access to the exile community, a series of gatekeepers were 
contacted through my Tibet campaigning connections in the UK and previous trips 
to Dharamsala (discussed below). These individuals were indispensible to my 
54 I"or example, the bi-annual Paljor Bulletin published by the Department of Finance, Tibetan Health 
newsletter produced by the Department of Health and publicity materials from DUR including the bi-
monthly Tibetan Bulletin. 
fi~ Key Tibetan magazines and newspapers include Tibetan Review, Tibetan World Magazine, TibeToday 
and Tibet Times (in Tibetan language). 
1\6 Over the years each of the major Indian national newspapers have run stories on the Tibetan community 
and government in exile. These include the Times of India, Hindustan Times, Indian Express and The 
Hindu. 
57 Established in 1970, the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives is dedicated to the preservation and 
dissemination of Tibetan culture and is a repository for Tibetan artefacts and manuscripts and is part 
funded by 001. 
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acceptance into the community, enabling me to establish trust and access hard to 
reach respondents within the TGiE and in remote settlements (see Herod 1999). 
They included TGiE officials, NGO workers, activist colleagues and relatives of 
Tibetan friends in the UK and Dharamsala. In addition to personal introductions, a 
key 'way in' to the community, particularly in settlements I was visiting for the 
first time, was a series of introduction letters from the Office of Tibet in London, 
the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives and the DIIR. 
Given my focus on both elite and popular politics in order to build up a picture of 
the polity from the top down and bottom up, I interviewed both Tibetan officials -
from the TGiE, Tibetan institutions and NGOs - and Tibetan citizens from across 
the settlements visited. Two focus groups and semi-structured interviews with 159 
respondents were conducted in total. As outlined in Appendix I, interviews were 
conducted with 21 TGiE officials from a number of departments and statutory 
bodies (see Figure 3.b), 9 parliamentarians and MP candidates representing a 
range of different constituencies (see Chapter 8), 13 senior NGO officials from the 
main Tibetan NGOs based in Dharamsala and Delhi and 6 members of the Tibetan 
press covering a range of media including magazines, radio, news video and 
websites. The gender split in each case (18 male and 3 female TGiE officials, 5 
male and 3 female MPs, 8 male and 3 female NGO officials and 5 male and 1 
female reporters! editors) was broadly reflective of the gender split within each of 
these sectors. With regards to recruitment, after being identified by their position 
within the TGiE! TPiE/ NGOs/ Tibetan press these individuals were contacted via 
email or by phone in advance. However, rarely getting a response to these 
messages, I quickly found it easier to arrange interviews in person when I was in 
Dharamsala or Delhi, often facilitated from an introduction by one of my 
gatekeepers. 
In each settlement I interviewed local TGiE representatives and camp leaders, 
staff from Tibetan-run institutions (schools, clinics, handicraft centres, co-
operatives, monasteries), local NGO officials and a number of 'ordinary' Tibetan 
citizens. Due to the concentration of newcomer refugees and Tibetan institutions in 
Dharamsala, more interviews were conducted there (34) than in other settlements 
(12 in Majnuka Tilla, 10 in South Delhi, 16 in and around Dekyiling, 6 in 
Clementown, 11 in Sonamling, 14 in Lugsum Samdupling and 6 in Bangalore). 
Tibetan 'citizens' were approached through face to face contact facilitated by 
gatekeepers and by snowballing techniques whereby respondents are asked to 
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suggest other informants (Valentine 1997). In order to gain a diverse range of 
interviewees and attempt to avoid overdependence on certain networks within the 
community (Bloch 1999), several gatekeepers from different backgrounds were 
used in each settlement. In addition, while by no means a fully representative 
sample, efforts were made to purposefully sample both lay people and monks/nuns, 
men and women, those in a range of occupations, those with different levels of 
involvement in the 'Tibetan cause', those from different regions within Tibet and, 
perhaps most importantly, those from each of three pre-defined 'political 
generations'. These were: the Dalai Lama's generation who lived in Tibet and came 
into exile in the first wave of refugees in the early 1960s; those born in exile; and 
'newcomer' refugees who have arrived in India since the late 1980s. 
In general, given the highly structured life in monasteries and nunneries, lay 
members of the community were easier to access than monks and nuns, and men 
and younger Tibetans were more willing to be interviewed, join focus groups and 
share political opinions than women and older members of the community. Whilst 
the resulting bias towards young male interviewees is important to note, this 
arguable lack of typicality or representativeness was to a degree offset by the 
quality and positionality of the information that individual respondents could offer 
(Cook and Crang 1995). For example, a number of my interviewees had held a 
variety of governmental, NGO and public services posts within the exile 
community and interviews with these information-rich respondents yielded 
opinions which were crucial to understanding the evolution of the exile polity, the 
changing relationship between TGiE and civil society and contextualising 
contemporary issues and debates.58 Finally, although my lack of an Indian research 
visa restricted my access to Indian Government officials - I was only able to 
interview Indian bureaucrats in Dharamsala and Bylakuppe - I sought to include 
Indian opinions and experiences regarding the Tibetan presence in India in other 
ways. At regional and national levels I interviewed Indian journalists, lawyers, 
activists and retired government officials who had worked with the exile 
community. At a local level I attempted, where possible, to interview Indians living 
next to Tibetan settlements. The lack of opinions regarding the Tibetan community 
often expressed by the latter respondents was revealing in itself, indicating that 
the exile community has, over the decades, become an increasingly accepted part of 
08 As an example, the current Kalan for Finance and DIIR has previously held the positions of Secretary of 
the Tibetan Youth Congress, Vice President of the National Democratic Party of Tibet, Director of the 
Tibetan Centre of Human Rights and Democracy, MP for Kham Province and Kalon for Health. Also 
important in this regard were interviews with retired TGiE officials. 
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the Indian social landscape, albeit Tibetans are rarely assimilated into Indian 
society (see Chapter 5). 
Turning to the interviews themselves, enabling 'opinions, networks of relationships 
and ideas to be presented and qualified' (Hoggart et al 2002: 205) and thereby 
producing a 'thick description' of events and experiences, these were an essential 
part of this research. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, and was 
based on a semi-structured interview schedule. Adopting a standard approach of 
asking 'grand-tour' questions (Cook and Crang 1995), interviews were introduced 
with general questions and then moved beyond the descriptive to address opinions 
and motivations (Longhurst 2003). Whilst the intention had been to record the 
majority of interviews in order to ensure comprehensiveness of transcription (May 
2001: 138), many interviewees - particularly TGiE officials and newcomer refugees 
_ were uncomfortable with this. As a result, many interviews were recorded in note 
form with detailed transcriptions written up immediately afterwards. Finally, 
interviews were coded, with resultant themes drawn out and analysed. 
Acknowledging that 'interpretation is a dialogue between one's data ... and the 
researcher who is embedded within a particular intellectual and institutional 
context' (Duncan and Ley 1993: 4, cited in Hoggart et al 2002: 24), a balance 
between voices of officials and 'citizens,' and between the words of the respondents 
('emic' codes) and my own interpretations ('etic' codes) (Silverman 1993) has been 
sought in the following chapters. 
Given the range of people I spoke to, the interview style was adapted to different 
circumstances with interviews with TGiE officials tending to be more formal than 
those conducted with Tibetan 'citizens'. The aim of TGiE interviews was to gain 
factual information about the structure of the government, its functions and 
limitations but also an insight into the roles played by and personal opinions of 
those constituting and employed by the administration. For Tibetan 'citizens', 
interviews were based around a set of core questions and themes. These included 
life in the exile settlements; identity documents and self-identification; democracy 
and elections; access to welfare services and opinions of and relationship with the 
TGiE more generally. This more flexible structure allowed respondents space to 
explore issues in their own terms and enabled issues to arise that may not have 
been anticipated. In addition, new arrivals were encouraged to narrate their 
journey to and initial impressions of life in exile, and older interviewees asked 
about how the community in exile had changed over the decades. 
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Multiple field trips allowed me to conduct follow-up interviews with a number of 
respondents in Dharamsala and Delhi which, alongside establishing trust, enabled 
me to ask for clarification and elaboration on issues. One area where this was 
particularly important was interviewing TGiE officials. It became readily apparent 
that many current and former government employees felt restricted in what they 
could say within an official capacity, especially with regards to TGiE's position vis-
a-vis the independence movement and its relationship with the Indian authorities. 
In light of this, additional interviews with a number of TGiE officials in more 
informal settings where they could be 'out of role' encouraged a more frank sharing 
of opinions. More generally, the interviews were conducted in places convenient 
and comfortable to the research participants such as offices, homes, public spaces 
and cafes (Elwood and Martin 2000) and, on some occasions, having other 
individuals overhear the interview and chip in thoughts and opinions was valuable 
for collating a range of opinions. 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, two focus groups were conducted with 
selected groups within the community and focused on topics set by myself (see 
Appendix I). These were a discussion about the future of Tibetan national identity 
and changes in the exile government held with five older male members of the 
Dharamsala community after a meeting of 'Gyalchen Lhenzon '59 and a wide 
ranging discussion about the TGiE, education in exile and the idea of refugeehood 
with seven Tibetan students (four female, three male) studying at Delhi University 
and living at a Tibetan-run hostel in the city. Held in informal locations - meeting 
room and hostel common room respectively - these focus groups enabled me to 
record a diverse array of opinions and experiences, with the flexible structure of 
these sessions allowing respondents to bounce ideas off each other and explore the 
issues from multiple angles (see Barbour and Kitzinger 1999; Oates 2000). 
With regards to issues of language, given that Tibetan schools follow the Indian 
model and are English medium, respondents who were born in India or who had 
lived there for some time were fluent in the language and therefore the majority of 
interviews and focus groups were conducted in English. Whilst the advantage of 
learning a vernacular language and the significance this has for research 
59 This is a group of 14 'Tibetan patriots', notably all men but a mixture of lay and monks, who meet weekly 
in Dharamsala to discuss the Tibetan freedom struggle and produce a Tibetan language newsletter dealing 
with 'nationalist issues', 
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understandings in cross-cultural settings is noted and appreciated (Watson 2004), 
my Tibetan language training did not reach beyond a basic level. This facilitated 
introductory conversations, was a useful ice-breaker and allowed the gist of 
discussions in Tibetan to be followed, but was not sufficient for conducting 
interviews. As a result, for interviews with newcomer refugees and older members 
of the community translators were used,so and the fact that translation raises a 
number of complex issues and limitations regarding mapping - and potentially 
losing - meaning between and across cultures is noted. In being 'attendant to the 
translations, heterogeneity and hybridity of concepts across and within languages' 
(Sidaway et al 2004: 1046), I have sought and explored Tibetan translations of key 
concepts used in this study and have incorporated Tibetan terms in my writing 
where appropriate in order 'to try to incorporate some of the multiple meanings 
and nuances that are embedded in them' (Watson 2004: 61). 
Finally, as an ethnographic project in a cross-cultural setting, research ethics have 
been duly considered and built into this methodology (Hay 2003), and this research 
was approved prior to fieldwork by the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee. 
Trust and privacy was ensured in my interviews and focus groups through 
informed consent. All participants were fully informed of the nature and purpose of 
the research verbally and through an information sheet (Appendices II and III). 
Consent was sought and recorded with specifically designed consent forms which 
outlined that participants had the right to refuse to participate in the research, 
could withdraw from the study at any stage and could refuse to be tape-recorded 
(Appendix IV). When the interview was conducted in Tibetan these documents 
were translated verbally by my translator and, where literacy was limited, consent 
was achieved verbally and recorded. The concern of misrepresenting interviewees 
was countered through respondent validation of interview transcripts. The 
majority of respondents were assured of anonymity. Names of research 
participants were eliminated, with coding systems used during the fieldwork period 
and pseudonyms used from the transcribing of interviews through to the writing 
process. However, with some Tibetan officials, especially those in senior positions, 
their role prevents complete anonymity and, where appropriate, their job title is 
used rather than a pseudonym when referring to or citing such interview extracts 
60 Three different translators were recruited through existing contacts and used during the research trips: 
one in Ladakh. one in Karnataka and one in Dharamsala who travelJed with me to Dehra Dun. The 
positionaJity of the translator in the research process and the politics of language use. especially where 
abilities to communicate in English can confer status (Smith 2003) is noted. In light of this, the position of 
and discrimination experienced by newcomer refugees within the exile community is discussed in detail in 
the following chapters. 
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or quotations. This was explained before interviews commenced, and consent for 
using the information received sought (Appendix III). Noting that researching 
bureaucracies at the scale of the everyday brings with it the 'the potential and also 
the risk inherent in naming and disrupting the taken-for-granted powers of the 
state' (Mountz 2003: 630), I was careful not to discuss or pass on what individual 
interviewees had said. Such sensitivity is particularly important in this small and 
highly networked community where rumours can be rife. Finally, with regards to 
issues of illicit activity such as forged and illegally acquired identity documents 
(see Chapter 7) and unofficial land transactions (see Chapter 5), these practices are 
alluded to only in general terms in the following chapters. 
4.3 Ethnographies of a (non)state: researching the TGiE through 
performance, practice and the everyday 
Reflections on interview with Chief Representative, Ladakh: Third time 
lucky! Finally secured the interview - a man much in demand. Interview fine 
_ got background to Tibetan communities in Ladakh, his career history and 
the government line on problems faced - unemployment, drought, local 
politics - and how they're trying to deal with them. But little things were as 
revealing as the interview. Was served the ubiquitous Tibetan version of 
Indian chai from a Chinese flask by an elderly 'pion' - identical set-lip to 
every other TGiE office I've been in. Office itself was also very familiar - pen 
holder with small Tibetan and Indian flags, panorama photo of Lhasa and 
TGiE headed reports, letters and stationery. Plenty of interruptions - junior 
staff needing letters signed, a monk looking for a registration form, three 
older school students asking about government internships (each clutching a 
letter from TCV? and local postman calling in for tea and a chat after 
deliveries to the settlement. 
(Field diary, 25.5.2007) 
Although the methodologies outlined above form the core research material for this 
project, reliance on data from interviews and focus groups alone did not allow me to 
fully get to grips with this unusual polity. What is particularly challenging in this 
case is the fact that, as I develop in the following chapters, TGiE's authority and 
sovereignty is rarely openly declared, identified or officially sanctioned. Put simply, 
my interviews and focus groups were unable to get at exactly how the TGiE 
functioned and was able to claim legitimacy vis-a.-vis its exile population. Whilst 
arguably more expedient in this case given TGiE's lack of recognised status, the 
challenges of researching the state more generally have been the discussion of 
much debate (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Das and Poole 2004; Mountz 2004; 
Corbridge et al 2005). Reflecting on critical approaches to the state outlined in 
Chapter 2, these scholars perceive the state not as something concrete there to be 
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observed and analysed but rather as a structural effect, constituted by fleeting 
moments and everyday practices and relations (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991; 
Painter 2006). In light of this, alternative methodological approaches to the state -
ones influenced by ethnography - are required. Before discussing the ethnographic 
methods I engaged with in this project, I want to briefly sketch out the genealogy of 
a shift towards ethnography within political geography more generally. 
Given that critical geopolitics and critical IR are premised on the idea of social 
constructionism, this field rejected participation in 'the realist rituals of strategic 
analysis' (Dalby 1991: 269) in favour of analysing the texts of international politics 
(Der Derain and Shapiro 1989: 2). However, whilst textual analysis is analytically 
rewarding and is engaged with to an extent in this project (see above), this 
approach has been critiqued for ignoring the experiential and performative and 
focusing on the discursive, the macro-scale and elite politics at the expense of the 
material, the everyday and politics from below (Hyndman 2004). In light of this, 
one theoretical and methodological intervention has been the application of 
theories of performance and performativity to the concept of the state by critical IR 
theorists (e.g. Weber 1995, 1998) and critical political geographers (e.g. Sidaway 
2002). At first glance, the 'performance' of statehood can be seen to revolve around 
the public show of 'key metonymic images of nationalism and nationhood' (Hansen 
2001: 226) which, as 'symbols of state legitimacy' (Okafor 2000: 69) represent a 
concerted effort to establish the privileges of sovereign status (Bartmann 2004). As 
such, the symbol-laden nature of heavily 'imagineered' ceremonies (Ley 2000: 782) 
such as national days and meetings of state leaders is indicative of the 'spectacle' of 
statehood performance through which 'states are magicked into existence' 
(Sidaway 2002: xi). 
Focusing less on ritualised practices is a critical engagement with Butler's 
theorisation of performativity (Butler 1990; Gregson and Rose 2000). Rather than 
being a fixed, pre-given and natural entity as theorised in orthodox versions of IR 
or political geography, seen through the lens of performativity, the state is a 
construct evolving through a continuous performance of norms and practices which 
constitute the effects of the material state. Weber (1995, 1998) has been a pioneer 
in this area, with her critical application of Butler's work on performativity to 
states and sovereignty offering a fascinating post-structuralist re-conceptualisation 
of formal politics. By applying theories of performativity, the state is only ever 
what it has been produced as, and the practices which daily constitute the effects of 
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the material state include foreign policy speeches, phone calls between national 
leaders, the daily work of customs officials, the validation of documents and 
participation in international summits (Constantinou 1998). 
However, as feminist scholars have argued, such approaches have still often 
ignored or relegated people's experiences and everyday understandings of politics 
at a range of scales (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004). In order to engage 
with a more sustained focus on agency, the material and how formal political 
structures operate and are experienced on the ground, we need to shift attention 
away from a focus on the discursive, representational and dramatic aspects of 
statehood, and towards mundane everyday political interactions at the micro-level 
(Megoran 2006). A growing body of work has been undertaken in this vein in recent 
years, notably by anthropologists (Shore and Wright 1997; Hansen and Stepputat 
2001, 2005), sociologists (Billig 1995) and geographers (Secor 2001a; Mountz 2003; 
Corbridge et al 2005).61 Focusing on the micropolitics of everyday state-making, 
such scholars employ ethnographic methods to explore how the state is conceived 
and constructed from the bottom up. Crucially, in enabling a productive and 
enriching ore-peopling' of political geography (Megoran 2006: 625; Crang 2002), 
ethnography uncovers 'the processes and meanings that undergird sociospatialhfe' 
(Herbert 2000: 550) and thereby facilitates a 'closer examination of points of 
identification, intimacy, and difference through which the state is constituted' 
(Mountz 2003: 638). As such, ethnographies of state institutions have disclosed the 
mundane but frequently hidden world of state officials, bureaucratic procedures, 
meetings, decision-making and filing (e.g. Gupta 1995). Alongside such empirical 
research, in a short exposition on theoretical trends within critical geopolitics, 
Thrift makes a persuasive argument for a shift instead towards the 'little things'; 
the '''mundane'' objects like files, "mundane" people like clerks and mundane words 
like "the" - which are crucial to how the geopolitical is translated into being' (2000: 
380). This parallel agenda for critical geopolitics, one still based on discourse, but 
on discourse understood in a broader way, is therefore attuned to 'constant hum of 
practices ... shot through with doubts and phantoms' which are crucial to how the 
geopolitical is translated into being' (ibid: 382). 
GI Particularly insightful for this case is Corbridge et al's (2005) study of the Indian state as 'seen' from the 
perspective of its rural po~r as, in reversing the logic of Scott's (1998) ~eeing like a State they investigate 
the abstract state by focusmg on the myriad ways that the state comes mto view and how these encounters 
and engagements are enacted at the local level. 
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In summary, by focusing attention on the non-discursive and on what people do as 
well as what they say, ethnography has the potential to reveal 'the contingent 
nature of state power, and the various tensions, fractures and 
incommensurabilities that characterize state institutions themselves' (Herbert 
2000: 554). As such, ethnographic approaches to the state are therefore highly 
relevant for starting to address the question of 'where and at what level is the 
state?' Indeed, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, viewed from the 
perspective of quotidian practices, performances and objects we see a functioning 
government engaged in democratic decision-making and providing welfare services 
to its exiled population. However, whilst theoretically convincing, this engagement 
with issues of materiality, embodiment and the everyday leaves us with the 
question of how we actually go about putting such an approach into practice. How 
do we observe and then write about the little things which constitute the state? 
Where do we need to be, and how do we document what we see and experience as 
well as hear? 
As an important caveat, acknowledging that "'ethnography" is a term used in 
different and overlapping ways' (Megoran 2006: 625), my interpretation of 
ethnography does not extend as far as that traditionally espoused by 
anthropologists based on extended periods in the field and cultural and social 
immersion. Rather, drawing on more plural and multi-sited interpretations of 
ethnography (e.g. Corbridge et al 2005), I have attempted to observe and document 
some of the objects, people and words through which the Tibetan polity is 
constituted and its legal personality negotiated. In addition, care should be taken 
not to conflate ethnography with other qualitative research methods such as 
interviews and focus groups as outlined in section 4.2 (Herbert 2000). For, whilst 
social science methods produces 'unique forms of data by creating particular 
controlled environments', ethnography is premised on the researcher observing and 
participating in 'social interactions that he/she has not created and does not 
control' (Megoran 2006: 626). 
Perhaps the most obvious displays of TGiE's attempts to construct itself as a 
legitimate polity were a series of ritualised performances of statehood which I was 
able to attend and take extensive field-notes at. 62 These included the 
62 My fieldnotes are in themselves a 'method of data collection' as, in producing a commentary of my 
experiences, thoughts and 'struggles to get "the knowledge'" (Laurier 2003: 133, 136) my notes taken both 
during these official functions and in my engagements with daily life in Tibetan settlements, were an 
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commemoration of 'Tibetan National Uprising' on 10th March, 'Democracy Day' on 
2nd September, the run up to and polling day for the TPiE elections in 2006 (see 
Chapter 8) and the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet (Edinburgh, 
November 2005). I was also able to attend a session of the TPiE and supplemented 
my field-notes with analysis of media coverage of these events and transcripts of 
speeches delivered. However, whilst these displays of nationalism and 
performances of paradiplomacy were key to TGiE's self-representation and offered 
an invaluable insight into how this polity negotiated its position on the 
international stage, it is through mundane everyday practices that this legitimacy 
is reiterated and sustained. 
Crucially, focusing on the mundane foregrounds the messiness, ambiguity and 
contingency of both state politics, and the research process itself (Cook and Crang 
1995). Some of the most revealing and valuable insights into the functioning of 
TGiE came from unexpected encounters and informal conversations on buses, in 
cafes and simply from engaging with peoples' everyday routines in the settlements. 
Indeed, the coincidence of situations, events and encounters was central to my 
research experience. Whilst it was frequently frustrating to find that, for example, 
my arrival in Bylakuppe coincided with an emergency Settlement Officers meeting 
in Dharamsala, I also often found myself in the right place at the right time. I was 
in Leh during fraught local elections and was able to see how the Tibetan 
community and its leaders negotiated their position and maintained a low political 
profile. Meanwhile in Dharamsala I witnessed a violent incident between a Tibetan 
and a local rickshaw driver reignite tensions between the two communities and 
was able to observe first hand how TGiE officials stepped in to attempt to placate 
their own people and mediate with the local Indian authorities. On a micro-scale, 
waiting in back offices for my interviewee to arrive and unexpected interruptions in 
interviews such as those described above provided an opportunity to see the state 
'at work.' In addition, it was through the inconsistencies of bureaucratic practices-
mis-spelled names, paperwork lost between offices and uncooperative local officials 
_ that the nature of the relationship between the Tibetan and Indian 
administrations emerged (see Chapter 7). 
Alongside this, my own encounters with Tibetan bureaucracy were enlightening 
and, whilst as a non-Tibetan my ability to be a participant observer studying this 
attempt to grasp the social understandings of this community and enabled me to glimpse and analyse 
national geographies in action at the level of everyday practice. 
92 
exile polity was in many ways limited, it was in direct interactions with this 
administration that I was able to engage with participant observation in a more 
true meaning of the term. Through a series of interactions with TGiE staff, offices, 
letters and signatures of approval in order to obtain official permission to conduct 
my research, I was able to view the and experience customs and practices of 
Tibetan bureaucracy first hand. Indeed, the series of bureaucratic hurdles I had to 
negotiate in order to access different institutions and the variety of reactions to my 
letters of authorisation from different TGiE officials across India provided an 
invaluable insight into the hierarchies within this polity and how TGiE's authority 
is constructed by the exile elite in Dharamsala and received on the ground. 
Another fruitful methodological approach which tells us a lot about how TGiE 
functions and constructs claims to legitimacy was a focus on the objects that the 
exile administration produces. Drawing on Latour's (1987) work. these included 
TOiE's production of maps of its settlements and services which territorialise its 
existence in exile (Chapter 5); the flow charts and diagrams the Planning 
Commission produces as part of its Integrated Development Plans which set out 
the government's vision for the exile community (Chapter 6); and the demographic 
data and its statistical analysis collated from the 1998 Tibetan Demographic 
Survey through which TGiE comes to 'know' its population (Chapter 6). An aspect 
of this study where objects are particularly important is in my examination of the 
identity documents issued to exile Tibetans by both TGiE and Gol. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, these are objects which form a key interface between individuals and 
the state and are signifiers of authenticity and legitimacy for both the exile 
government and Tibetan refugees. In addition to the materiality of the objects 
themselves. I focused on the paper work and the paper workers that bring these 
documents into existence. This entailed tracing and documenting the role of 
registration forms and clerks. the processes of renewal and validation, where the 
documents are kept, who they are handed over to and what emotions are attached 
to them. Challenges I faced in conducting this kind of research included dealing 
with sensitive issues of forged documents and discrimination and the fact that my 
presence was often not welcome in Indian government registration offices. As a 
result, I recorded information about the practices behind the Gol's registration 
process for Tibetans second-hand from Tibetan interviews and India lawyers and 
former officials. 
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Thrift's (2000) call to attend to mundane people and words also proved 
enlightening when trying to get a handle on the relationship between TGiE and 
Gol. As explored in the following chapters, how the relationship between the two 
administrations is presented at a national level is significantly different from how 
it is played out in everyday local settings. Whilst the former was ascertained from 
records of debates in the Indian Parliament, official reports and interviews with 
senior TGiE officials and former Gol bureaucrats, for the latter I turned attention 
to the everyday language local Tibetan and Indian government officials used and 
their understanding of each others' hierarchies and chains of command (see 
Chapter 5). Crucially, it was at this level that the complexities and subtleties of 
this relationship could be drawn out, located and pinned down. Banal language 
was also significant when considering the relationship between 'ordinary' Tibetans 
and their exile government. For example, the recurrent use of possessives such as 
'our' and 'my' to talk about TGiE offices, institutions and individuals affects 
considerable work in constructing the exiled administration as a 'government' in 
the minds of its people, and is a key mechanism through which this state-which-is-
not-a-state is symbolically legitimated. Finally, having observed, experienced and 
documented these everyday encounters, objects, people and words, I was faced with 
the challenge of how to capture this everyday-ness in my analysis and writing, 
especially as research by its nature is often an exceptionalising practice. Whilst in 
the main I employed a conventional integration of interview quotations and field 
observations into the body of the following chapters, I have attempted to use some 
of this ethnographic material in a different way in the final section of Chapter 8. 
Focusing on the run up to and polling day for the 2006 TPiE elections, I present a 
montage of photographs, field-notes, election posters, interview transcripts and 
press articles in order to provide a 'feel' both for the election process and the 
material on which this study is based (Crang 2005). 
In summary, more unorthodox sources and a more general ethnographic 
participant observation, constitute an expanded sense of what counts as source 
material for a study of TGiE and therefore help piece together a more 
comprehensive picture of its functioning, limitations and lived realities. As such, 
focusing on the mundane and the material gives us valuable conceptual and 
empirical breathing space, a space which is particularly useful for thinking about 
the liminal, the ambiguous and the ephemeral within critical geopolitics. 
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4.4. Negotiating researcher positionalities and 'giving back' through 
activism 
As Mountz notes, 'it is challenging for social scientists to access the state and other 
powerful institutions ethnographically' (2003: 629) and, once accessed, a series of 
power relations and identity constructions need to be negotiated. Critical 
reflections on the complex power relationships inherent within the research 
experience and how these are influenced by the 'positionalities of the researcher 
and the researched is now regarded as accepted practice amongst most feminist 
and critical geographers' (Hopkins 2007: 387. see Twyman et al 1999; Skelton 
2001). Following McDowell, as researchers 'we must recognise and take account of 
our own position, as well as that of our research participants, and write this into 
our research practice' (1992: 409) in ways that are sensitive to the difference our 
presence makes in the research, and how the process of research itself can shape 
social relations (Smith 2003). As such, reflexivity has been promoted by feminist 
geographers (Kobayashi 1994; Rose 1997) in order to subject the research process 
itself to scrutiny. Reflecting on my own research, I want to use this final section to 
discuss my positionality and the crucial role that my involvement in Tibetan 
activism played in accessing this polity, mediating cross-cultural relations and 
'giving back' to the subject community. 
In the first instance, my gender and ethnicity were both key factors in how the 
research encounter was experienced. Whilst gender roles within the Tibetan 
community are more balanced than in many Asian societies (Butler 2003; TWA 
2005), as reflected in my list of interviewees (Appendix I) far fewer women than 
men take an active role in public or political life. Though I encountered no 
problems accessing male dominated organisations and institutions, my presence as 
a lone female researcher travelling independently did raise some eyebrows and 
provoke concerned comments in the more remote settlements. With regards my 
'Britishness' the fact that the Tibetan polity has had a long and ambivalent 
relationship with Britain (see Chapter 3) meant that there is continued interest in 
how British citizens view their country's role in the ongoing Tibetan situation. 
Meanwhile, my Northern Irishness raised a very different set of issues, with the 
Irish freedom struggle frequently brought into conversation - the film Michael 
Collins was popular in Dharamsala at the time - and the extent to which there are 
parallels with the Tibetan situation debated. In light of such contrasting reactions, 
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I was increasingly aware of how my own ethnic and national identity alters 10 
different socio-cultural contexts (see Smith 2003: 186). 
In terms of being white, non-Buddhist and Northern-Irish I was automatically an 
outsider in the Tibetan community. Indeed, in many remote Tibetan settlements I 
was the only inji or 'foreigner' in town. However, my involvement with Tibetan 
campaigning NGOs in the UK and in India since 2002 was a key connection that I 
did have with many respondents and my continued participation in Tibetan 
activism was essential to the research experience.63 The positionality ofthe 'activist 
academic' has been much discussed in geography in recent years (Blomley 1994; 
Castree 2000; Ruddick 2004). The focus of this work to date has been on situations 
where the activist social movement is the empirical focus of the research, and 
where we are encouraged to perceive activism and academia as 'fluid fields of social 
action' (Routledge 1996: 400). Whilst combining both activism and academic 
research, my fieldwork in Tibetan communities in India differs significantly from 
this model. This research does not deal directly with Tibetan activism, nor the 
Tibet freedom movement more generally and, as such, the roles of myself as 
activist and as academic have, in the most part, been distinct and demarcated. In 
therefore offering a different configuration of activism and academia from those 
proposed in debates so far, I want to step back from discussions on how what we 
write and what we do cannot and should not be separated (Blomley 1994) and from 
a notion of a third space of critical engagement (Routledge 1996). Instead, I want to 
highlight three roles that activism played with regards to my research experience 
and positionality. Firstly, as a way of mediating cross-cultural issues within the 
research experience and gaining access to the exile community. Secondly as a 
mechanism through which I could 'give back' to the research community and, 
thirdly, as a way of what I term 'being' in the field. 
Being politically active in the Tibet movement was an integral part of how I 
negotiated my position within the 'field'. As a 'known' activist in the small UK 
Tibet movement, having a number of Tibetan friends and colleagues in India and 
meeting key figures in the community on previous trips to Dharamsala I was able 
to quickly become included in the Tibet activist network in India and get to grips 
with the institutions, internal structures and controversies within the community. 
6:1 I have been involved with the Tibet movement for several years, co-founding the UK branch of 'Students 
for a Free Tibet' (SFT) - an international network of Tibetan and non-Tibetan activists 
www.studentsforafreetibet.org - in 2002, and spending the summers of 2002, 2003 and 2004 in Dharamsala 
working with and learning from Tibetan NGOs and activists. 
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My involvement with Tibetan activism was also a vital way in to research sites I 
was not familiar with, and where I did not already have contacts. Armed with my 
letter of recommendation from the Office of Tibet in London I was inevitably 
ushered to speak to the local Settlement Officer - the highest TGiE official in the 
area (Chapter 5) - and, while such interviews were an intrinsic part of this 
research, with my Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) 'hat' on and activist contacts I 
was also able to quickly engage with 'ordinary' Tibetans in the settlements. In 
addition, I was invited to give presentations in Tibetan schools, and organise 
informal talks with settlers in the evenings about Tibet activism in the West and 
current international campaigns. After I had given such talks, my 'stranger' status 
would reduce, doors would open and people were more willing to talk to me. 
Given concerns regarding Chinese spies, there is a degree of suspicion of 
researchers within the exile community and so a key issue was establishing trust. 
Having a Tibet activism track record meant that I was an accepted part of an 
already known community rather than a difficult to place stranger. In enabling me 
to build up trust quickly and develop rapport within interviews (Valentine 1997), 
this was key to getting beneath the surface of the Tibetan community. This is in no 
wayan attempt to claim 'insider' status, as the research relationship was 
invariably dynamic, fluid and constantly negotiated (Nast 1994; Twyman et al 
1999). Moreover, I am acutely aware that these bonds were not always reciprocal 
nor that collaboration meant that differences in power and status were erased but, 
rather, Tibet activism was a way of starting to normalise my relations in the field 
and I do think it facilitated more equal interactions. For example, exchanges of 
ideas, information and experiences filtered into many interviews, to the extent that 
in one interview with a prominent community leader the conversation rapidly 
shifted from my questions about the organisation of the settlement, to him asking 
me questions about the Tibet movement in the UK. In light of this, and 
acknowledging the unusually politicised situation of the Tibetan community in 
exile, I want to tentatively propose that engagement with activism in the field is a 
mechanism through which some of the challenges of cultural differences, unequal 
power relations and fieldwork ethics associated with cross-cultural research can be 
mediated (Sidaway 1992; Skelton 2001; Smith 2003). 
In terms of negotiating my roles as an activist and academic at an everyday level, 
whilst I was open about my activist work to all my respondents, I did moderate my 
positionality to an extent according to who I was interacting with. On some 
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occasions, for example in interviews with members of the Tibetan press, I would 
choose to 'fit in' by emphasising familiarity with the community in exile, whilst at 
other times I would 'play dumb' in interviews in order to ask 'potentially ... 
challenging questions in a disarming way that can be mistaken for ignorance' 
(Herod 1999: 322). However, there were occasions when the negotiation of my dual 
roles of activist and academic became 'messy' on the ground. One important 
boundary became apparent during the run up to the 2006 TPiE elections. As 
discussed in Chapter 8, I spent some time with a youth movement called 'Youth for 
Better MPs' who were active in raising awareness of the elections and promoted a 
list of young and progressive candidates. A number of my activist colleagues were 
members of the group and, whilst this was key to my access to their discussions 
and meetings, I had to be careful in terms of how my presence with the group as 
they went campaigning in Dharamsala would be perceived. Although being active 
in the wider Tibetan movement is actively encouraged, inji involvement in 
domestic exile politics is disapproved of. Moreover, being involved with a prominent 
and perceived to be 'radical' organisation meant that I was sometimes positioned 
within the complex internal political matrices of the community. I had to tread 
carefully when speaking to members of other political NGOs, and with some 
government officials who, at least within an official capacity, were not supportive of 
some of our actions. 
The second role that activism plays in this research is as a way of giving back to 
the exile Tibetan community. There are the beginnings of research fatigue within 
the community and an increasing expectation that the presence of the researcher 
needs to be justified and mutually beneficial. In light of this and my own 
involvement with the diaspora in India and the UK, I strove to 'give back' in two 
ways. Firstly, this project itself is intended to contribute to the Tibetan government 
and community in exile. The very exercise of analysing what shape and form 
Tibetan polity in exile takes is arguably a form of critical praxis c:vv akefield 2007) 
and an act of critical collaboration (Routledge 2003).64 Through contextualising 
Tibetan politics within the field of political geography and disseminating the 
research findings back to the exile government and community, this will document 
the significant political and logistical achievements of the Tibetan community in 
exile and convey this to an academic and international policy-making audience 
64 In terms of the 'critical' element of 'critical collaboration' this involves treading a fine line between on the 
one hand unconditional support for a social movement and, on the other hand. avoiding critiCising TGiE to 
the extent that the research undermines the delicate nature of Tibetan politics and the freedom struggle 
itself (Routledge 2003). 
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which has often overlooked it, will enhance engagement with and understanding of 
the current exilic political structures within the diasporic Tibetan community and 
will provide TGiE with an overview of the polity. As the Additional Secretary at the 
Department of Home explained to me in an early interview: 
'we don't always see the whole picture. We have nine to five jobs and don't 
visit the settlements much. We don't get a chance to speak to our people, to 
see the work of other offices, departments. But it's important to get the big 
picture, to see we are going in the right direction and what our weaknesses 
are. For you it is important to speak to our staff on the ground - they will 
have different opinions, different ways of presenting their thoughts on how 
this ... on how we work' (18.03.2006). 
However, while this may be perceived as a form of 'giving back' from the 
perspective of TGiE, publicising the case in academic and policy arenas is one step 
removed from 'ordinary' Tibetans in India. As such, activism is a form of giving 
back which is much more relevant to people on the ground and one that is actively 
promoted by the community itself. In terms of what activism as giving back 
actually entails, the 'work' that I undertook included running campaign stalls in 
Dharamsala alongside Tibetan colleagues, editing press releases and funding 
proposals, organising information evenings for Western tourists and being 
interviewed for Tibetan radio about my involvement with the Tibet movement. 
Importantly, I was not there to do the work of local Tibetan activists, but rather to 
share ideas and experiences and act as a 'catalyst' for on-the-ground activism.65 
Moreover, as a way of contributing to the community, activism differs from other 
methods of giving back practiced by Westerners, such as sponsorship and 
volunteering in Tibetan schools and clinics. Whilst the latter is always viewed 
positively, and I participated in English conversation classes with newcomer 
refugees in Dharamsala on two of my research trips, there is increasing criticism of 
the dependency on TOgS Tam (sponsorship) within the community (see Chapter 6). 
Being fundamentally grassroots and non-hierarchical, activism is based on a more 
equal power relationship than sponsorship or even volunteering. It is about 
collaboration rather than dependency, on ideas sharing rather than instruction 
and, with activism continuing 'back home' it is a long term commitment rather 
than an activity confined to being in the field. However, it is important not to give 
the impression that activism is the perfect mechanism through which to give back 
to the research community. An important ethical key issue is the extent to which 
65 A recurrent narrative in the exile community is that young Tibetans are becoming disillusioned with the 
Tibet struggle and that the presence of Western activists alongside Tibetan activist leaders acts as a 
catalyst to motivate people to re-engage with politics: a move which is widely welcomed within the 
community. 
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activism is a fair exchange for research information (Ruddick 2004) and this was 
an issue which I continually negotiated in the field. 
The third role of activism that I want to briefly mention is perhaps more 
ambiguous. An often unacknowledged reality of doing fieldwork abroad is how 
much time there is to fill when you as a researcher do not have pressing 
commitments and yet your respondents' lives are going On as normal with full time 
work and family responsibilities. In addition, fieldwork - and especially dealing 
with Indian and Tibetan bureaucracies - can be a frustrating process, with 
interviews frequently postponed or cancelled and offices shut for holidays you were 
not expecting. In light of this, it is easy to feel 'out of place' and in limbo and it can 
be tricky knowing how to integrate into the community. For me, engaging with 
activist work has been key to being in the field. I am not saying that my activism 
was simply a way of filling the days and keeping myself occupied, but it was 
important in terms of engaging myself with the community and being seen to be 
actively doing something rather than filling the role of the ubiquitous Western 
traveller 'hanging out' in India. In summary, though not the empirical focus of my 
research, my involvement in Tibet activism played a significant role in the research 
process. It was a mechanism for starting to ameliorate power inequalities and 
cross-cultural positionalities, it was a valuable and mutually beneficial form of 
engagement with the community and was an activity which shaped and structured 
my time in the field. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In setting out the research approaches and methods employed in this project, this 
chapter has described and analysed some of the issues and challenges faced 
through a focus on 'conventional' social science research methods, ethnographies of 
the state and the role my positionality and Tibet activism played in the research 
process. Acknowledging the somewhat artificial separation of research methods 
and issues discussed above, I want to use this final section to focus On the 
integration of these methodological approaches. As Law (2004) asserts, there is 
inherent messiness in social science research and these methodologies cannot be 
strictly delineated in practice. In reality, I was conducting interviews, engaging in 
participant observation and negotiating my positionality simultaneously. Indeed, a 
case study approach lends itself to the use of multiple sources and the employment 
of a mixture of different methodological approaches. Such strategies were essential 
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to gaining an overview of Tibetan politics as well as focusing on the everyday 
details of this administration and attempting to understand the inner workings of 
this exile community. A key advantage of using multiple research methods is 
'triangulation' whereby, through combining complementary techniques to gain a 
more complete picture of the research topic, the limitations of individual methods 
can be reduced (Valentine 1997). The complementary combination of textual and 
discourse analysis, ethnographic participant observation and more conventional 
interviews and focus groups therefore enables a fuller understanding of the 
functioning, limitations and lived realities of TGiE to be built up. 
In addition, the fact that this range of methodological approaches work across 
different scales is an attempt to 'understand politics in its multiple manifestations 
and the ways in which the micro scale of the household and the macro scale of the 
nation-state are interdependence and co-productive' (M:arston 2003: 634). For, in 
seeking to construct a picture of the political geographies of TGiE from the top 
down and bottom up, this highlights 'discrepancies between elite and everyday 
political geographical imaginations' (M:egoran 2006: 622), and therefore facilitates 
a more revealing insight into the configurations of power and space in this case. As 
well as trying to work across different scales there is also a juxtaposition of the 
discursive and the material. As I will illustrate in the following chapters, the 
contrast between the representational and the mundane can work to reveal the 
different ways in which an administration that remains internationally 
unrecognised can, through everyday interactions, objects, and people, attempt to 
construct itself as a government. An integrative approach as outlined in this 
chapter, where attention is paid to the material and the symbolic, the everyday and 
the spectacular, practices and images is therefore key to attempting to get a handle 
on the often contradictory nature of this polity. 
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Chapter 5 
Strategic Territorialisation and Sites of Displaced Sovereignty: 
Tibetan Settlements in India 
It's a warm November day and I'm on a government bus leaving the bustle of 
Mysore, a small but very South Indian city in Karnataka. We travel past 
Hindu temples, busy markets, palm trees and maize fields. The first 
indication of where I'm going are a few Buddhist prayer-flags in the 
distance. I get off at Bylakuppe, an Indian village strung out along the main 
highway and make my way under an archway decorated with the eight 
auspicious symbols of Tibetan Buddhism. The track passes a State Bank of 
India - Tibetan branch - Indian shops and hOltses, a Tibetan tractor repair 
workshop and an Indian school, with the buildings becoming more Tibetan 
as I progress. Soon I reach a second archway which marks the formal 
entrance to 'Lugsum-Samdupling Tibetan settlement'. I have entered a 
different world; a world of Buddhist chortens66 and prayer flags, of monks on 
motorbikes, of chubas67 rather than saris, of Tibetan offices, schools, 
hospitals and monasteries. But look a little closer and the picture blurs, 
because while no Indians liv'e in the settlement, and leaving the settlement is 
definitely a process of 'going back to India', this is not an entirely Tibetan 
world. The vegetable sellers and farm labourers are mostly Indian, the 
Tibetan signs are also written in Kannada,68 there are notices reminding 
Tibetans to register their residency papers and the idli sambar69 vendors do 
a roaring trade. 70 
5.1. Introduction 
As the first of four substantive chapters on the form and functioning of TGiE, this 
discussion focuses on the key issue of territory. Conventionally conceived as 
bounded and contiguous territory is perceived as fundamental to realist 
understandings of sovereignty (see Bartelson 1995) and in geographical literature 
is traditionally associated with the modern state (see Gottman 1973; Paasi 2003). 
In light of this, a reasonable prima facie assumption regarding TGiE is that it has 
at most a highly tenuous relationship to territory and territoriality, the 
'geographical expression of social power' (Sack 1986: 5). Indeed, TGiE has no legal 
jurisdiction over territory either in Tibet or in exile, nor does it make claims to such 
jurisdiction in either place.71 However, TGiE is not a non-territorial entity and I 
will argue in this chapter that this is not a case of sovereignty without territory. 
The TGiE manages 35 Tibetan settlements in India such as the one described 
above; official Tibetan communities established on land granted by the Gol. Within 
116 Tibetan Buddhist structure, often decorated with auspicious symbols and around which Buddhists 
circumambulate (see Figure 5,g), 
67 Traditional Tibetan robe worn, in different styles, by both men and women. 
68 One of the main Dravidian languages of India which is spoken predominantly in the state of Karnataka, 
69 South Indian snack of fermented steamed rice pancakes with spicy dal (lentil stew), 
70 These observations are based on my field-diary notes from my visit to Bylakuppe in November and 
December 2007, 
71 All discussed in Chapter 3, following the TGiE's current 'Middle Way Approach,' the exile government is 
seeking genuine autonomy rather than legal sovereignty over the territory of Tibet, 
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each settlement the exiled Tibetan administration has autonomy over its own 
affairs, managing and administering housing, land distribution, agriculture and 
welfare services. Drawing on and weaving together elite narratives and individual 
stories, this chapter addresses this apparent paradox of a stateless nation 
managing a series of territorialised settlements and unpacks the complex spatiality 
of the Tibetan community and government in exile. 
Following arguments made in Chapter 2, the discussion here is premised on critical 
reinterpretations of territory and a conceptual separation of territoriality from 
territorial sovereignty (Forsberg 1996). As such, nation-states are understood as 
not the only form that territory takes in the modern world, nor the only space of 
'the political' (Mandaville 1999: 654) and therefore the importance of unbundling 
territory, sovereignty and the state (Ruggie 1993; Anderson 1996) can be 
recognised and read through this case. In addition, and reflecting the spanning of 
literatures on both the state and statelessness, the relationships between territory, 
diaspora and trans nationalism will also be interrogated in this chapter. This 
means engaging with contemporary debates regarding processes of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation and the nature of'diaspora space' (Brah 
1996) and 'transnational space' (Jackson et al 2004). In thereby embracing 
Delaney's (2005: 12) strategy of exposing issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction 
commonly obscured by default naturalising discourses, this chapter will explore 
how the territorial and juridical operations and limitations of TGiE intersect with, 
extend and challenge such debates about the nature of territory, territorial power 
and the relationships between territory, governance and nationalism at a range of 
scales. 
After setting out the history and context of Tibetan exile settlements in India and 
outlining the various Tibetans spaces visited for this research. this chapter will 
focus on two dimensions of the issue of territory. First, the spatiality of the Tibetan 
community in exile will be explored through three distinct geographies: diasporic 
networks, routes and hubs; the TGiE's territorialised administrative hierarchies 
and nested jurisdictions; and the Tibetanised landscapes of the settlements 
themselves. Charting these geographies will entail discussions of processes of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation within the community and TGiE's 
strategies of territorial. centralised and in many ways state-like governance over 
its non-contiguous territories. This will then be set alongside the discursive. 
material and performative construction of the settlements as 'national' spaces, 
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complex attachments to the homeland and the fundamental contradiction between 
the perceived permanence of the settlements and the temporality of exile. Secondly, 
these material and imaginative territorial issues 'internal' to the Tibetan 
community in exile will be problematised by focusing on the existence of Tibetan 
settlements within the sovereign state of India. This will entail outlining how the 
relationships between, and the relative decision-making powers of, the Indian and 
Tibetan Governments are played out both within official discourses and on a day-
to-day basis. The chapter considers the division of juridical responsibilities and 
explores how settlement boundaries are delimited and nominally policed. Finally, 
Tibetan spatiality in exile is interpreted as lying between state space and diaspora 
space and the idea of these settlements as sites of 'displaced sovereignty' is posited. 
5.2. History and development of Tibetan settlements in India 
The Tibetans who followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959 were initially 
accommodated in Gol administered refugee transit camps at Missamari in Assam 
and Buxa in West Bengal (See Figure 5.a). 
Figure 5.a: Newly arrived Tibetans, Assam, 1969, 
www.tibet.net/en/image/transit%20camp.jpg 
By 1960 there were over 8,000 Tibetans at Missamari and almost 1,500 monks at 
Buxa but, despite Gol assistance, mortality rates were devastatingly high due to 
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the sudden change in climate, their arduous journey across the Himalayas and 
disease outbreaks. In light of this, the Dalai Lama approached the Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs with a request to resettle these refugees in cooler places where 
they might be temporarily employed. In response, the Gol established 95 
temporary construction camps in the Himalayan foothills where 18,000-21,000 
Tibetans were employed as road labourers.72 The remaining monks were relocated 
to Tibetan monasteries re-established in Varanasi and South India. However, the 
road construction camps were not a long-term solution. They failed to provide the 
necessary source of livelihood, conditions were harsh and families were split up. As 
Kharat notes, 'the conditions were so bad that Tibetan refugee officials admitted in 
1964 that these workers were worse offthan if they had remained in Tibet' (2003b: 
54). As a result, the Dalai Lama again requested Nehru to rehabilitate the refugees 
in other parts of India where they could lead a more settled life (Office of the Dalai 
Lama 1969). 
In accommodating this appeal and, in light of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and 
recognition that the Tibetans would not soon be returning to their homeland, the 
GoI initiated a strategy of creating a series of self-contained agricultural 
settlements for the refugees. The motivation for India's generosity in providing 
land for the Tibetan refugees to remain and settle in India is framed within official 
Indian narratives in terms of a moral duty and humanitarian obligation to assist 
(Kharat 2003b: 51).73 As the former GoI Indian-Tibetan Liaison Officer told me; 
'individual states which have harboured Tibetans are motivated by these 
factors - humanitarian cause, an obligation and the fact that India is the 
natural land of their rehabilitation. We feel we have a moral duty to care for 
these Tibetans' (04.06.2007). 
The State of Mysore (now Karnataka) was the first to reply to Nehru's request for 
land. and 3,000 Tibetans were settled on a 1,500 hectare tract of uninhabited 
jungle land on lease at Bylakuppe in 1960 (Norbu 2004). With the settlers paid a 
daily wage for their labour, villages were established with groups of five persons 
allocated a 2Y2 hectare plot and a one-room tenement. Further land was granted by 
the Chief Minister of Mysore at Mundgod. and smaller tracts were later made 
available in Orissa, Maharashtra, Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar 
72 These construction camps were organised by the Indian Public Works Department in co-ordination with 
the Tibetan rehabilitation office (Office of the Dalai Lama 1969: 129). 
7;1 In addition, and more pragmatically, the Indian Government believed that the Tibetan agricultural 
settlements would reduce its economic burden and help India's food needs by bringing unused land under 
cultivation (Kharat 2003b: 55). 
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Pradesh,74 Madhya Pradesh,75 Sikkim, West Bengal and Himachal Pradesh. These 
settlements came to be established on the basis of different economic activities, 
with those in South India generally larger and based on agriculture, and those in 
northern states with less land focusing on handicrafts and agro-industries (see 
Chapter 6). In addition, Houston and Wright note that Tibetan settlements were 
predominantly located in remote regions, a geographic distancing which makes 
them less accessible to political figures and is thereby a strategy through which the 
'Indian Government balances the immediate needs of the Tibetans while 
maintaining cordial relations with China' (2003: 223). 
By the end of the first decade in exile, 30,000 refugees had be'en resettled into 
'permanent' sites and, by the early 1980s, all existing settlements were established, 
and in most cases were at capacity. As a result, few Tibetans who have come to 
India in recent years have moved to the settlements. This has led to a growing 
'unsettled' Tibetan population, today numbering around 9,000 (Planning 
Commission 2000). A high proportion of these 'unsettled' Tibetans reside in a series 
of scattered Tibetan communities in the Himalayan states and in major Indian 
cities. These are areas where TGiE does not administer any land or housing, but 
where TGiE-run Welfare Offices manage Tibetan schools, clinics and cultural 
centres, liaise with local Indian authorities, and resolve minor disputes. 
In order to reflect this diversity of Tibetan spaces within India, six settlements and 
scattered communities were visited for this research. As the first agricultural 
settlement to be established, the settlement of Lugsum-Samdupling at Bylakuppe, 
Karnataka remains one of the largest and most populous with 10,921 Tibetans 
residing in 3,500 acres (Secretary, Lugsum-Samdupling Settlement Office, 
28.11.2007. See Figure 5.b). Seen as a pioneer rehabilitation project, Lugsum-
Samdupling has served as a model for the planning of later settlements, and 
continues to be viewed as the most developed and successful exile Tibetan 
community. The settlement consists of seven villages or camps dispersed across 
agricultural land, with an average of 30 families in each camp. The four sects of 
Tibetan Buddhism have also rebuilt monasteries next to the settlement, with the 
largest, Sera, housing almost 3,000 monks. In stark contrast to the infrastructure, 
facilities and self-sufficiency of Lugsum-Samdupling, Sonamling agricultural 
settlement in Ladakh faces a number of challenges due to its high altitude 
74 A number of settlements are located in what has since become Uttarakhand, established in 2000. 
711 Mainpat settlement lies within what is now Chattisgarh state, established in 2000. 
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environment, remoteness and poor infrastructure, and is one of the Department of 
Home's designated 'priority areas'. Established in 1969 on 522 acres, the initial 
population of 617 were mainly nomads from Western Tibet. 76 Today the population 
of 5,584 reside in 11 camps and, in order to supplement agricultural returns, the 
settlers are engaged in trading, casual labouring and seasonal sweater-selling 
(Chief Representative Ladakh region, 25.05.2007). 
Figure 5.b: Houses in Lugsum-Samdupling. 
Two distinctive settlements were visited around Dehradun, a prosperous Indian 
town in Uttarkhand, several hours north of Delhi. Dekyiling Settlement was 
established in 1981 for the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees from Bhutan,77 
'unsettled' Tibetans in the district of Dehradun and retired TGiE officials. The land 
allocation of 31 acres was intended only for housing, with employment based on 
76 population figures for the settlements are sourced from the 1998 Tibetan Demographic Survey (planning 
Council 2000). 
77 Around 4,000 Tibetans were granted asylum and settled in Bhutan in the 1960s. However, following an 
alleged attempted coup by Tibetans in March 1974, relations between the refugees and the Bhutanese 
authorities deteriorated. The Bhutanese Royal Government subsequently demanded that all Tibetans in 
the state be granted Bhutanese citizenship and assimilated into the host community. Whilst several 
hundred accepted citizenship, many Tibetans believed losing their refugee status would contradict their 
ultimate goal of returning home, and were rehabilitated in Tibetan settlements in India in 1980 (Norbu 
1976). 
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handicrafts manufactured on site, seasonal sweater-selling and the service sector 
in Dehradun. The population has increased from 760 in 1981 to 1,941 today and 
the settlement has a dispensary, school and monastery. Given the availability of 
land, favourable climate and proximity to Delhi and Dharamsala, numerous 
Tibetan institutions have been established around Dekyiling. These include 
Ngoenga school for handicapped children, Songtsen Buddhist library, Rajpur 
handicraft centre, Tibetan Homes Foundation school and several large 
monasteries. In contrast to Dekyiling, Clemen town was established not by TGiE 
but by a group of Tibetans from Amdo province. The settlement has a current 
population of 1,823 and continues to be run by the settlers themselves, with their 
'Clementown Settlement Society' managing the secondary school, health clinic and 
carpet-making centre. Finally, two scattered communities were also visited. 
Dharamsala, a hill-station in Himachal Pradesh, has been the 'capital' of the exile 
community since 1960 (see Figure 5.C).78 It has since developed into a densely 
populated 'busy administrative and commercial centre for the Tibetan refugee 
community' (prost 2006: 234), home to the TGiE, Dalai Lama and numerous 
Tibetan NGOs, media outlets, and cultural and religious institutions. Frequently 
referred to as 'Dhasa' (an amalgamation of Dharamsala and the Tibetan capital 
Lhasa) by its 'local' Tibetan residents, Dharamsala has become the geographical 
centre and base of power for the exiled community, providing a key focal point for 
pilgrimage, religious teachings and political activism. 
Figure 5.c: Upper Dharamsala 
78 Dharamsala is in effect two towns: Lower Dharamsala is a predominantly Indian market town while 
Upper DharamsaJa or 'McLeod ?anj' is where the majority of the Tibetan community is based. The 
headquarters ofTGiE is located mldway between the upper and lower towns at 'Gangchen KyishDng. 
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Lastly, Majnuka Tilla, a Tibetan colony in North Delhi which was established in 
the early 1960s is one of the oldest urban Tibetan communities in India. This is the 
key commercial and transport hub for the exile community, with refugees, 
pilgrims, traders and students passing through en route to Dharamsala, Nepal 
(and from there Tibet), the settlements and monasteries in South India and the 
West. As Samphel writes in Tibetan Bulletin: 
'[while] Dharamsala is considered the heart of the Tibet world ... it is MT 
[Majnuka Tilla] that constitutes the commercial centre of the exile 
community. It is the hub of Tibetan commerce and spreads its limited 
prosperity along its many spokes to other Tibetan communities in all four 
directions of the subcontinent and beyond' (2006: 27). 
Therefore, whilst having broadly the same administrative set-up, the complex 
history of negotiations with the Indian government at central and state levels, and 
their heterogeneous locations, climates and environments means that the Tibetan 
settlements in India are highly diverse. They vary considerably in size, land use, 
economic activity and degree ofTGiE control. 
5.3. The spatiality of the Tibetan community in exile: networks, 
territorialised governance and homeland attachments 
'The realities of exiled Tibet thrive in tile-roofed mosquito· buzzing refugee 
camps; in the narrow streets of Dharamsala; with a newly arrival from Tibet 
who purchases a visa from some unscrupulous agent and sits in an 
aeroplane not knowing whether he is heading "to Space or to Spain;" and 
with a lonesome monk in a train to Bodhgaya that stops in a godforsaken 
station in Bihar. ' 
Sonam, 30 December 2006, www.tibetwrites.org/reviewsllittlelhasa 
Turning to the spatiality of the exile Tibetan community in India and the 
territorialising strategies of TGiE, this section explores three distinct geographies: 
diasporic networks, routes and hubs; a core-periphery structure of hierarchical 
administration and nested 'jurisdictions'; and the place-based politics of the 
settlements themselves. These spatial systems exist simultaneously at a range of 
scales, and cohorts within the exiled community engage with and work across these 
geographies in different ways. Discussing each in turn opens up theoretical 
concerns regarding how notions of territory and territoriality have developed and 
are articulated within this stateless community. These include processes and 
practices of deterritorialisation and (re)territorialisation which cross-cut these 
geographies, the TGiE's articulation of aspects of both state space and diaspora 
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space, and the mechanisms and limitations of TGiE's use of territorialising 
strategies to govern its non-contiguous settlements in exile. Finally, complex 
relationships with the homeland will be unpacked to explore the fundamental 
contradiction between attachments to place, landscape and land in India and the 
temporariness and rootlessness of exile. 
5.3.1. Diasporic deterritorialisation: mobility. networks and hubs 
As discussed in Chapter 2, post-structuralist approaches prevalent in diaspora and 
trans nationalism literature eschew reified, abstract and bounded notions of 
territory in favour of a focus on deterritorialisation and the idea of networks (e.g. 
Brah 1996; Soguk 1996). As Wahlbeck argues, 'deterritorialisation as a lived 
experience seems to be intrinsically connected to life in exile' (1998: 4). In light of 
this, as a diaspora engaged in transnational practices, a logical assumption 
regarding the spatiality of the exiled Tibetan community is that it is highly 
networked and engaged in processes and practices of deterritorialisation, and in 
many ways this is the case. 
Perhaps the most obvious arena in which exiled Tibetans are conceived as 
'networked' is the global 'Free Tibet' movement. Developing rapidly since 1960, and 
receiving considerable attention during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, this network of 
Tibetan activism consists of hundreds of individuals, Tibetan NGOs and Western-
based TSGs whose activities and campaigns are increasingly international. This 
includes protests inside China and Tibet, in exile communities, and at numerous 
national parliaments and corporate headquarters (McLagan 1996; Davies 2009). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, it was my own involvement in Tibet activism that allowed 
me access to transnational Tibetan networks and key contacts in the diaspora 
Within the exile Tibetan community itself, transnational connections are extensive 
and important. Almost everyone I interviewed in India had a network of relatives, 
friends and sponsors across South Asia and in the West, and was engaged in a wide 
range of transnational practices (see Hess 2006; Yeh and Lama 2006). Such 
networks and connections made a significant impression on my research 
experience. Whilst travelling across India, I stayed almost exclusively in Tibetan 
hotels or homes, sometimes even travelled on Tibetan-run buses and found myself 
frequently delivering messages and parcels to friends and family of Tibetans I 
know both in the UK and India. 
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Inseparable from such networks is the fact that the exile Tibetan community has 
been and continues to be highly mobile, with around 65% of Tibetans and almost 
80% of the young population seasonally on the move (Planning Council 2000: 7). 
Exiled Tibetans travel frequently for religious pilgrimages and teachings, sweater-
selling in Indian cities, attending college, participating in political protests and 
visiting relatives. It is commonplace for family members to be scattered in the 
settlements, monasteries, colleges and working 'abroad' in the West. Such an 
itinerant existence and scattered population is summed up by poet and activist 
Tenzin Tsundue when he writes; 
'Ask me where I'm from and I won't have an answer. I feel I never really 
belonged anywhere, never really had a home. I was born in Manali, but my 
parents live in Karnataka. Finishing my schooling in two different schools 
in Himachal Pradesh, my further studies took me to Madras, Ladakh and 
Mumbai. My sisters are in Varanasi but my brothers are in Dharamsala' 
(2003: 28). 
Concomitant with such mobility and transnational connections are extensive 
communication flows within the exiled community. The visible signs of this include 
the international telephone booths, internet cafes and international money transfer 
offices prominent in all Tibetan areas, a common trait of refugee settlements more 
generally (see Perouse and Mwangi Kaganja 2000). Indeed, the internet has 
become a mainstay within the diaspora, with all but the most remote settlements 
having web-connections and news portals such as phayul.com and websites like 
tibet. net creating an increasingly important transnational cyber-community (see 
Rushkoff 1994). This 'virtual Tibet' is central to international Tibetan activism and 
can be read as a de-territorialising mechanism employed to overcome the spatial 
restrictions of a global diaspora and a territory-less nation (see Negroponte 1995; 
Luke 1998). 
This picture of a highly networked and mobile stateless community engaged in 
transnational practices certainly resonates with conventional understandings of 
diaspora space, networks and processes of deterritorialisation (see Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987; Latour 1993; Smith 2005). However, this is far from a smooth 'space 
of flows' (Castells 1996) or a flattened network of 'materially heterogeneous' (Law 
1994: 2) relations. Spend any time in the Tibetan community in exile and you are 
aware of distinct territorial structures. For a start, key routes are evident within 
this network, the most obvious of which are those taken by refugees coming into 
exile from Tibet. Whilst in the 1960s Tibetans came to India via a number of means 
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through Nepal and India, today the majority of refugees follow a distinct route 
which is increasingly 'managed' by TGiE. As a young man recently arrived from 
Tibet and now living in Dharamsala narrated: 
'For me it took many weeks to leave Lhasa ... one guide he took money but 
then disappeared ... [and] we had to wait for all the group be ready. For over 
20 days we walked over the mountains ... walking at night and sleeping in 
the day. Reaching Nepal was OK. .. we were lucky with the Nepali police. In 
the Kathmandu receptions centre I stayed for 27 days ... and they provided 
everything. After we had papers in Kathmandu and we were a big group, 
they sent us by bus to Delhi. In Delhi we stayed in the Reception Centre ... 
but only for one night. I had Reception Centre papers from Kathmandu so I 
presented them in Delhi. That Reception Centre already had a list of names 
of who should be on the bus so they read out those names. From Delhi I 
reached Dharamsala Reception Centre by bus and here they asked more 
questions and gave advice and asked if I wanted to go to school. So after 
maybe 3 weeks in the Dharamsala Reception Centre, I went to transit 
school' (Ugyen, 31.03.2007). 
Apparent from this and numerous accounts I recorded of such journeys, is the 
importance of key 'staging posts' such as the Tibetan/Nepalese border, the Tibetan 
Reception Centres in Kathmandu, Delhi and Dharamsala, and schools and 
monasteries to which the refugees are subsequently sent (see Chapter 6). 
Considering the community in exile more generally, a number of key sites -
Dharamsala, Majnuka Tilla, Bangalore and Kathmandu - can be seen to act as 
administrative, cultural and commercial hubs within this networked diaspora. 
In summary, therefore, this is not an unpatterned network, but rather one with 
defined - though often vulnerable - hubs, nodes and routes. However, what marks 
this case out as distinctive is the fact that whilst networks and processes of 
deterritorialisation are an important feature of the spatiality of the Tibetan 
community in exile, these are overshadowed by more conventional material 
attachments to and appropriation of territory in exile. A focus solely on diaspora 
space and deterritorialisation therefore fails to tell the full story in this case, as it 
obscures the politically important processes of reterritorialisation that occur within 
the community and TGiE. 
5.3.2. Reterritorialisation in exile: governing non-contiguous territories. 
In focusing attention on a more conventionally territorialised set of spatialities, 
hierarchies and scales which are managed by TGiE, I want to shift attention to a 
second important geography of the Tibetan community in exile: the series of TGiE 
designated 'Tibetan spaces' in exile. In attending to such spaces I will argue that 
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TGiE's material and symbolic construction of territories is intricately intertwined 
with its project of state-like governance in exile. Key to understanding such 
territorialised functioning of the exile government is its articulation of a discourse 
of 'settlement'. Appearing numerous times and in multiple ways in official TGiE 
reports and interviews with Tibetan officials, the term 'to settle' (shi chaya) is 
employed to construct a hierarchy of Tibetans' interaction with and dependency on 
TGiE, contingent on where and how they live in exile. How 'settled' an individual is 
perceived to be ranged from the 'ideal' scenario of Tibetans living in self-contained 
and homogenously Tibetan settlements (e.g. Lugsum-Samdupling), through to 
settlements where employment was not based 'on site' (e.g. Dekyiling), scattered 
communities living among their Indian hosts (e.g. Dharamsala) and finally the so-
called 'unsettled population' who are effectively lost to the exile Tibetan 
administration. There is recurrent and ongoing concern regarding this latter 
population, with government reports over the years listing figures of Tibetans yet 
to be 'settled' and the 'success' of TGiE in the early years was often measured in 
terms of how many Tibetans had been 'rehabilitated' in settlements (e.g. Tibetan 
Review, December 1976: 9-11. see Chapter 6 for a discussion on how TGiE 
discursively constructs and attempts to manage this 'unsettled' population). 
Alongside this discourse of 'settlement', the most obviously representational of 
TGiE's territorialising strategies is the administration's mapping of its spaces in 
exile. Whilst the diaspora fails to appear on any conventional maps - its lack of 
legally recognised status or jurisdiction precludes its inscription on political 
representations of India - TGiE produces its own maps of Tibetan settlements, 
schools and health facilities (see Figures 5.d, 5.e, 5.£). These are cartographic 
exercises which serve 'as a sense-making machinery' (Ferguson 1996: 165) for 
TGiE, and thus offer an insight into how this administration inscribes its spaces in 
exile and endows them with 'a content, a history, a meaning and a trajectory' 
(Krishna 1996: 194). Appearing merely as illustrations in brochures produced by 
TGiE departments, it is important not to read too much into these maps. Yet the 
nevertheless 'render visible the space over which government is to be exercised' 
(Rose-Redwood 2006: 475) and thereby facilitate the practice of 'governing at a 
distance' (Miller and Rose 1990). 
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Figure 5.d: Map of Tibetan settlements in India and Nepal (CTRC 2003: 
24).79 
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Figure 5.e Map of Hospitals and Health Care centres, (Department of Health, 
2003: 6-7) 
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Figure 5.f Map of Tibetan 
Children's Village schools and 
institutions (TCV 2006: 4) 
Readily apparent from these 
maps is the fact that Tibetan 
settlements and scattered 
communities in India are non-
contiguous and highly dispersed 
spaces. I want to argue here that 
it is through TGiE's development 
of an increasingly sophisticated 
set of mechanisms to circumvent 
the challenges raised by such a 
spatiality that it constructs itself 
as a 'government.' Whilst being 
conscious not to overstate the 
degree of TGiE's spatial reach and 
control over these spaces (as 
discussed below, several 
settlements were established 
independently of TGiE and 
remain at arms length from it), 
these territorialising strategies 
include the establishment of a 
core-periphery structure of central and local governments, attempts to ensure 
uniformity of governance and facilities across the settlements and a series of 
nested jurisdictions and hierarchies of administration. 
From the early days of exile, the re-established Tibetan Government sought to 
represent and actively manage 'its' refugees, and did so in ways which were 
explicitly territorial. For example, posting its representatives to the numerous 
transit camps and early settlements enabled TGiE to keep 'in touch with the 
refugees in order to . .. gauge their needs and provide for them' (Office of the Dalai 
Lama 1969: 173). In addition, the exiled administration quickly established itself 
as the central authority within the exile community. As Goldstein explains: 
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'the ~eady availability of a core of highly experienced and competent 
governmental administrators provided the Tibetans a ready-made 
organisation through which resources could be effectively aggregated and 
policy decided on and implemented.... The Dalai Lama's Government 
offered the scattered Tibetan refugees a centralised and efficient 
organisation which could integrate and represent their needs' (1975: 20). 
This centralised authority of TGiE has been consolidated over the intervening 
years and is key to how TGiE has attempted to govern its non-contiguous (though 
often bounded) spaces. A key aspect of centralised power is its relationship to the 
periphery, and a number of interviewees described the relationship between the 
Dharamsala-based TGiE and the settlements as one of a central government and 
series of local governments, characterised in terms of hierarchies, communication 
flows, levels of authority and indeed the centre's misunderstanding of local issues. 
The relationship between Dharamsala and the settlements is reinforced by regular 
visits of Tibetan Chitues (MPs) and TGiE officials to monitor progress on projects, 
discuss the implementation of TGiE policies and hear grievances. Whilst 
establishing a valuable connection between TGiE and the majority of its 
population, these visits also expose what is often a problematic relationship. As a 
young and recently elected Chitue explained: 
'so many of the older Chitues they go to the settlements and preach and 
scold the people. They lecture them about how to think and behave .... The 
settlement people are viewed as uneducated, as need [sic] to be told what to 
do by the government. This is something we have to change' (Samphel, 
27.02.2007). 
This somewhat patronising and infantilising attitude is echoed, albeit to a lesser 
extent, in how those based in Dharamsala or Delhi conceive of the 'peripheral' 
settlements and their inhabitants. Many interviewees in these hubs of the Tibetan 
diaspora referred to the settlements as their childhood home, where their parents 
continue to live and where they visit in the holidays. In essence, spaces defined as 
residential and static. Illustrating a familiar core-periphery dynamic, the distance 
between the settlements and Dharamsala can thus be seen to exist both materially 
and in the imagination. 
Shifting attention to how this core-periphery model of governance is played out in 
administrative relationships, key to the management of space in exile is the 
increasingly sophisticated hierarchy of authority and leadership that TGiE has 
developed across different territorial scales. The first tier of administration below 
the TGiE departments in Dharamsala are a series of 'Chief Representative Offices' 
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(CRO) located in Karnataka, Ladakh and Uttarakhand. As official government 
offices at the regional scale, the CROs oversee the implementation of TGiE policies 
in their settlements, distribute project funding and liaise between the respective 
Indian State Governments, the Tibetan communities and the TGiE. Below the 
CROs, each settlement has a Settlement Officer and each sizeable scattered 
community a Welfare Officer who is the official representative of the Department of 
Home at this 'local' level. This official is usually appointed by TGiE, spends 2-4 
years in any given settlement and therefore is not a settler per se and has no 
land.80 The Settlement Officer is charged with overall control of the settlement, 
taking on the roles of Head of the settlement, Chief Diplomat and Chief Justice, 
sitting on school, monastery, hospital and cooperative committees and acting on 
behalf of settlers in their dealings with Indian and Tibetan authorities. As the 
Settlement Officer at Dekyiling explained: 
'our responsibilities are to look after the welfare of the Tibetan people so we 
deliver the Tibetan government services for education, health and general 
welfare ... and also to maintain peace and order in our community and to 
follow the rules and regulations of the land [India], (18.04.2007). 
Within the broader functioning of TGiE, Settlement Officers are key figures and 
important points of interaction which 'ordinary' Tibetan exiles have with their 
government. As such, these individuals wield substantial power within the 
settlement community as they can issue official TGiE letters and documents, 
provide official TGiE stamps and signatures and can thereby recommend (or indeed 
oppose) an individual for sponsorship, scholarships or visa applications. Moreover, 
through annual Settlement Officer meetings and a 'rule book' issued by the 
Department of Home outlining in detail their role and responsibilities, this cadre of 
administrators are fully familiar with the systems and philosophy of the central 
government and are therefore able to implement relatively standardised 
management practices in the different settlements.81 Indeed, with these officials 
being rotated around different settlements every few years, a surprising degree of 
consistency of practice is achieved, albeit some settlement office staff noted that 
this 2-4 year rotation system did have drawbacks for seeing through local 
infrastructure projects which had a longer time frame (Secretary, Lugsum. 
Samdupling Settlement Office 28.11.2007). 
80 In line with the Charter of Tibetans in Exile (1991), settlements are encouraged to elect their own 
Settlement or Welfare Officer. However, there has been a slow uptake on such elections and only 
Dharamsala and ShiJIong currently have elected Welfare Officers. 
81 The 'Guidelines for Settlement Officers' booklet was first issued by the Department of Home in 2003 and 
was to be found in each of the Settlement Offices I visited. 
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Not only do Settlement Officers form a distinct layer within Tibetan officialdom, 
but they and their staff are also the face ofTGiE at a local level. Describing how he 
deals with Tibetans, foreign tourists and local Indians on a daily basis, the 
Dharamsala Welfare Officer explained: 
'we have to do the right thing every time... you see we are the 
representatives of the government, and if we do something wrong then it 
will look really bad for all the Tibetans. We are the public face you see' 
(04.04.2007). 
Moreover, it is this status as 'representative' of TGiE and, by extension, the Dalai 
Lama, which endows these officials with the moral (rather than strictly legal) 
authority to mediate disputes and make key decisions within the settlement 
community. This authority draws strongly on the hierarchies and paternalism of 
the traditional political system (Goldstein 1975), but is also an authority which 
exposes generational differences. As a young graduate in Majnuka Tilla recounted: 
'the older generation, they see the Welfare Officer and other government 
staff as representatives of His Holiness - like the staff from Lhasa. So no 
matter if that person is a devil or a saint, still they will bow to him and stick 
out their tongue.82 They are always showing so much respect, even if they 
don't agree with what he says. But then ... the younger generation, we are 
more straight. If I don't agree with the Welfare Officer, I will tell him 
directly' (Chimi, 07.06.2007). 
At the base of TGiE's hierarchy of authority, and forming a key element of its 
attempts to engage with wider discourses of democracy, participation and 
accountability are Local Assemblies. Elected from within the settlement 
community for three-year terms, assemblies are operating in 37 out of the 47 larger 
settlements.83 Promoted strongly by TGiE as reinforcing 'active and democratic 
grassroots participation both in decision-making and the day-to-day functioning of 
the Settlements' (planning Council 1994, Section 1.2.7), these assemblies function 
as the legislature to the executive role of the Settlement Office. Their activities 
therefore include passing and auditing the local budget, holding the Settlement 
Office to account, and drafting rules and regulations for the settlement.84 Following 
the central governmentllocal government relationship mentioned above, the 
8~ Sticking out ones tongue is a Tibetan sign ofrespect (Dresser 1997). 
83 It is notable that, alongside very few female Settlement Officers or Gyabons, Local Assemblies are 
constituted of predominantly male members. Unlike the TPiE, these elected bodies do not have reserved 
seats for women (TWA 2005: 48). 
84 These rules and regulations include restrictions on liquor and gambling in the settlements, the terms of 
communal labour (for infrastructure repairs and preparations for settlement events) and the organisation of 
pujas (prayers). 
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establishment of Local Assemblies can thus be seen as augmenting the settlements' 
function as municipalities with their own local government structures and 
democratically elected leadership. 
Completing the three pillars of democracy at the 'national', 'regional' and 'local' 
levels is a hierarchical judiciary structure, albeit still in its early stages. As the 
Secretary of the Supreme Justice Commission explained: 
'So there are three layers to our judiciary, so first is Supreme Justice 
Commission, then we have Circuit Justice Commission and then Local 
Justice Commissions. For the Circuit Justice Commissions which is the 
regional level there is provision in the Charter for five but... so far we ... it 
has not yet been implemented. For the Local Justice Commissions these are 
for every settlement but only two are so far fully-fledged and between them 
I think there are maybe only 2 ... maybe 3 cases. So for most settlements the 
Settlement Officer he is also the Local Justice Commissioner' (22.03.2006). 
Before discussing the theoretical issues raised by these territorialising structures 
and strategies of TGiE, it is important to sketch out some of their limitations. 
Starting where we finished, the Tibetan judicial system is more of a paper judiciary 
than a practicing one. Given TGiE's existence within the sovereign state of India, 
its judiciary has very limited powers, only able to hear civil disputes from within 
the Tibetan community and, without powers of detention, is extremely restricted in 
the punishments it can impose let alone enforce (discussed below). In light of this, 
and without prior experience of secular judicial practices in pre-1959 Tibet (French 
1995), there has been a distinct lack of engagement with the different levels of 
Justice Commission. Whilst Dekyiling and Lugsum-Samdupling have new multi-
storey buildings for their 'Local Justice Commissions', to date there was only one 
case pending at each and the buildings remain unused except for occasional school 
visits. As a farmer in Lugsum-Samdupling told me: 
'with our justice commission, there are some staff, but not so much work ... 
people here we joke them [sic] - it's the easiest job! People, they go to their 
camp leader or Settlement Officer if they have a problem. No one goes to 
justice commission. I think our people are scared of the legal system - they 
always sort out arguments among themselves, not go to the court' 
(Thakchoe, 16.11.2007). 
As such, whilst the institutional structures and codified regulations, there remains 
a lack of legal consciousness and awareness of the court model of dealing with 
disputes within the exile community in general (Kaushik, Dharamsala 14.03.2007). 
However, despite their under-use and limited powers, both government officials 
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and settlement residents described how the existence of the justice commissions 
was important for two reasons. Firstly, this nascent judiciary was symbolically 
significant in completing the tri-partite structure of democratic governance 
(legislative, executive and judiciary) and thereby fulfilling a key aspect of statehood 
and validating TGiE as a 'government'. Secondly, the exile judiciary fulfils an 
important aspirational role of providing the refugees with an opportunity to 
experience and become trained in judicial practices in order to implement such a 
system in future Tibet (Thinley 1990). 
In terms of the Local Assemblies, whilst the current Kashag has increased funding 
and training for these bodies in an effort to enhance their effectiveness, in may 
regards they fail to live up to their potential. As Frechette notes in the case of Local 
Assemblies in Kathmandu: 
'because the Charter [1991] itself is not very explicit on what local 
authorities would do, there was considerable disagreement over how to 
proceed once the assemblies were established... how exactly the Local 
Assemblies were supposed to make laws was unclear and undecided' (1997: 
184). 
Such confusion regarding the remit and function of these bodies was echoed by a 
number of interviewees and, across the settlements visited, there was a lack of 
engagement with the assemblies, with a number of settlers regarding it as little 
more than an extra title acquired by members of the settlement elite. 
Taking this dissatisfaction with TGiE-imposed governance structures as a starting 
point, I now want to explore a number of challenges to the exile administration's 
governmental reach and territorialising strategies. The first is the importance of 
non-TGiE governance within TGiE-run settlements. Meaning 'representative of 
100' the Gyabon or 'camp leader' acts as an intermediary between the Settlement 
Office and the camp residents, and is charged with a wide array of responsibilities. 
Being simultaneously 'the local lawmaker, the local police and the local judge' 
(Tsering 2000: 19) these range from passing on TGiE information, settling disputes 
within the camp, collecting utilities payments from settlers, designating 
individuals for scholarships and managing camp construction projects (Chonpel, 
Sonamling, 24.05.2007). As a number of scholars have noted, the continuation of 
traditional administrative structures and indigenous patterns of leadership from 
Tibet in the form of the Gyabon has been key to the smooth and successful 
transition to life in exile (palakshappa 1978; Norbu 2001). Indeed, on the ground, 
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the system of Gyabons appears to work well, with a clear 'chain of command' in 
operation whereby individuals approach their Gyabon with a problem, who then 
takes their case to the Settlement Officer where he vouches for 'his resident'. If the 
issue cannot be dealt with at the Settlement Office level the case is passed on to 
the Department of Home in Dharamsala and these 'proper channels' as one official 
called them also operate in reverse. 
However, what is striking within the settlements is the markedly different ways 
that Tibetans relate to and interact with the traditional system of the Gyabon 
compared to the leadership structures introduced anew by TGiE. Not only are 
minor disputes overwhelmingly resolved by the Gyabon - rarely making it to the 
Local Justice Commission - but settlers are more likely to consult their Gyabon 
than their Local Assembly member about general settlement management issues. 
As such, the TGiE instituted bodies often appear superfluous. They are there to 
complete the democratic model of governance, to tick the policy boxes in 
Dharamsala and provide training for politics in the future homeland, but seem of 
limited practical use in contemporary settlements. Another recurring issue was the 
fact that the Gyabons are 'local people' in contrast to TGiE staff sent from 
Dharamsala, based in the settlement for only a few years and often living in 
separate accommodation literally on the 'outskirts' of the settlement. A case where 
this differentiation between local leadership and TGiE leadership is particularly 
stark is that of Majnuka Tilla. 
Established in 1960 by refugees who had initially been accommodated in 
Arunachal Pradesh and Nepal, Majnuka Tilla was never fully recognised as a 
Tibetan settlement by TGiE and was run by the refugees themselves. As the TGiE· 
appointed Secretary at the Welfare Officer explained: 
'unlike other settlements established by our government where a letter was 
sent by Government of India to Tibetan government saying here is the land, 
you are in charge, you organise the settlement, here you see the people 
began the colony themselves and so it was never registered with our 
government - and so it doesn't enjoy privileges from Tibetan government as 
other settlements' (16.04.2006). 
However, with increasing fiscal capacity and a desire to unite the exile community, 
in 1983 the TGiE 'established a Welfare Office for the Majnuka Tilla people and 
appointed here a government officer to look after the settlers' wellbeing' (Jampa, 
Majnuka Tilla, 05.06.2007). Given this history, the colony has two distinct 
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leadership structures; the original 'local' leadership, and the more recent TGiE 
leadership, with a clear differentiation of roles and responsibilities. The TGiE-run 
Welfare Office manages the Tibetan government institutions within the colony,85 
administers the Department of Home welfare stipends and acts as an intermediary 
between the residents, the TGiE and local Indian authorities. In contrast, the 
locally-run 'Residents' Association' deals predominantly with local issues; 
organising community functions, running the local temple, dealing with utility 
companies and the administration of Indian ration cards, and holding the 
population records for the camp. As such, this Association is often described as 
equivalent to an Indian panchayat or village council. Materially reinforcing these 
different roles is the location of the two offices within the colony, with the Welfare 
Office situated above the TGiE-run health clinic and backing onto the Tibetan 
school, and the Residents' Association located in the heart of the old part of the 
colony, next to the community temple and above the branch offices of TYC and 
TWA. 
The relationship between these two authorities appears to be close yet under 
constant negotiation. From the Welfare Office perspective, the Residents' 
Association is seen as a bridge between themselves and the colony residents, 
whereas the Residents' Association see the Welfare Office as the 'official' 
representatives for the colony, directing me to speak to them first as this was the 
'right order' and 'proper way' of going about things. However, the power dynamics 
between these offices look to change in the near future, as the TGiE - in what 
appears to be an attempt to model the colony along the same lines as other 
settlements - plans to establish a Local Assembly in the community. Such a body, 
although technically also formed of 'local people,' will likely be a direct challenge to 
the authority of the Residents' Association. In summary, these current and 
potential power struggles in Majnuka Tilla therefore offer a valuable insight into 
how TGiE perceives its role in the settlements, and in turn how this is received on 
the ground. On the one hand, TGiE policies and rhetoric have been actively 
encouraging the development of local leadership and 'self-reliance' within the 
settlements in a move which indicates a degree of devolution and decentralisation 
of authority (Secretary, Department of Home, 16.11.2007). Ironically, however, 
where this local leadership is already strong, such as the case of Majnuka Tilla, 
TGiE appears to be uncomfortable and seeks to moderate it. 
8i1 These include a basic medical clinic. branch of Men.tse.khang (Tibetan medicine clinic) and Tibetan 
primary school. 
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Such power struggles are not unique to Majnuka Tilla and, more generally, it is 
important not to paint a picture of homogenous settlements, with TGiE having 
equal authority over each. On the one hand, a challenge to TGiE authority within 
the settlements also comes from the monasteries, which are largely autonomous 
institutions not falling directly under the settlement administration. Whilst 
monasteries have lost many of the important economic and political roles they had 
in Tibet (see Chapter 3), they remain vital institutions in the exile community, 
being the focus for much of the religious practice of the laity (Strom 1995) and are 
often wealthy and powerful. This is particularly the case in the large settlements in 
South India where the different sects of Tibetan Buddhism have re-established 
their main monasteries in exile.56 These institutions fund infrastructure projects 
within the settlements and, in the case of Sera monastery in Bylakuppe, runs its 
own 'monk village' complete with agricultural land, housing, shops and clinics. 
However, though autonomous in many regards, the monasteries do ultimately 
come under the jurisdiction of the TGiE-run CROs and Settlement Offices, which 
monitor the arrival and departure of all monks in their region or settlement and 
have the final say on decision-making in these territories.57 
On the other hand, several settlements besides Majnuka Tilla have been 
established and managed independently of TGiE. One such group of communities 
is the '13-Settlements' (Tsogka Choksum), a loose coalition of settlements 
established in the mid-1960s and populated mainly by refugees from Amdo, whose 
distrust of the D-Tsang dominated TGiE stemmed from historically strained 
relations between central and eastern Tibet.58 The largest of the independent 
communities was Clementown, established by the l3-Settlements leader Gontang 
Tsultrim in 1964 on land donated to him by Acharya Vinoba Bhave, the spiritual 
successor of Mahatma Gandhi. The strained relationship with TGiE was expressed 
by an older resident when he explained that: 
'In the early days the people asked for help from the Tibetan government 
but no help came ... so people decided to do everything themselves so now we 
86 For example, Drepung and Ganden monasteries near Lhasa have been rebuilt in Mundgod settlement 
and Tashi Lhunpo in Shigatse re-cstablished in Bylakuppe. 
87 For example, a lake in Lugsum.Samdupling is maintained by Sera monastery but the Settlement Office 
has the final say on construction projects, for instance, not permitting their building of a chorten on the 
bank side. 
88 This suspicion ran both ways with the TGiE critical of the 13·Settlements' independent operations and 
acceptance of funds from the Commission for Mongol and Tibetan Affairs in Taiwan, with the conflict 
intensifying during the 1970s (Strom 1995). Although the 13·Settlements coalition was disbanded and 
relations are much improved, this remains a sensitive issue within the exiled community. 
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can continue to run the whole settlement and manage everything ourselves. 
The Tibetan government has some problems - I don't think they manage 
settlements right, so we made the decision to continue running our 
settlement ourselves, and for me I think we have been successful' (Jingme, 
20.04.2007). 
The settlement today continues to be run by the settlers with their 'Society', 
headed by the current Rimpoche of Mindrolling monastery, managing a school and 
two clinics, organising welfare stipends, dealing with Indian authorities and 
receiving revenue from property rentals and land sales. Its administration 
therefore functions in a way similar to that of other settlements, but without the 
TGiE-imposed Local Assembly and Local Justice Commission. Significantly, the 
settlement has a very different 'feel' from Dekyiling, the TGiE-run settlement on 
the other side of Dehradun. The former is wealthier, with fewer restrictions 
regarding who can move into the settlement,89 and settlers expressed a greater 
attachment to the settlement, perhaps because they chose to move there rather 
than, in the case of Dekyiling, being sent there by TGiE. 
Whilst there is no obvious TGiE presence within Clementown, the settlement does 
now come under the jurisdiction of the Uttarakhand CRO and the Secretary of the 
Society was keen to point out that the Chief Representative regularly visits the 
settlement and many of the settlers now pay chatrel (voluntary contributions) to 
the TGiE. The 13-Settlements movement itself declined in the 1980s with a 
'general tendency towards a new perception of national unity and the need for a 
centralised administration [and] an institutionalised and democratic system of 
government' (Strom 1995: 94). Most of the settlements are now re-integrated into 
the 'mainstream' of Tibetan refugee society under the authority of TGiE, a trend 
which can be read, as several interviewees pointed out, as TGiE and its institutions 
becoming progressively more powerful and spatially-extended. These 'independent' 
settlements therefore illustrate both the inherent fragility of TGiE authority and 
the territorialising strategies it uses in its attempts to bring 'wayward' settlements 
under its controL 
This process of administrative integration is highly significant, with the extension 
of TGiE's presence and indeed governance into these disparate territories creating 
a relatively cohesive bureaucratic landscape. A similar picture emerges with 
regards to welfare provision (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), with TGiE striving 
89 Several Indians from Himalayan regions such as Ladakh, Sikkim and Lahaul also reside in the 
settlement. 
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to provide integrated and standardised provision of, and access to, health, 
education and welfare support services across its settlements in India: 
'wherever possible we are trying to provide ... at least in the case of welfare 
activities and education it's almost standard everywhere. They may not 
have a school there in that locality but they can send their children to the 
residential schools. In the welfare activities we almost provide the same for 
everywhere - standard like that' (Additional Secretary, Department of 
Home, 18.03.2006), 
'we have twice yearly meetings of the Settlement Officers to discuss the 
major policies in the settlements and to make unanimous rules ... so the 
same thing happening in all settlements. Standardised so there's no 
competition, no-one is saying one settlement is getting priority. Of course 
there are different personalities so some policies are implemented 
differently but we try to make equality [sic]' (Secretary, CRO Bangalore, 
29.11.2007). 
Such deliberately integrative policies are, in many regards, key to TGiE's attempts 
to establish a government-like apparatus and institutionalise and monopolise its 
authority over the exile population. Indeed, TGiE's integration of administrative 
hierarchies and welfare policies can be seen as techniques through which 
Dharamsala is able to act at a distance on, and stretch government across, its 
dispersed territories as a form of distanciated power (Allen 2003a). Moreover, 
whilst acknowledging that one of the great conceits (or deceits) of most state theory 
is 'the suggestion that the writ of London or New Delhi or Islamabad reaches 
without interruption... to the trenches that are at the bottom of the state 
hierarchy' (Corbridge et al 2005: 35), I want to argue here that it is TGiE's 
aspirations to such flows of authority that is particularly revealing. With regards to 
managing its dispersed settlements, TGiE employs what appears to be a 
conventionally state-like centralised and top-down articulation of power across its 
un-state-like territory. Importantly, as 'the production of legitimacy ... requires 
constant enactment of the state as a symbolic centre of society, the source of 
governance, the arbiter of conflicts, the site of authorisation' (Hansen 2001: 225), 
this centralisation of power thereby establishes TGiE as a locus of authority. 
Unpacking the relationship between territory and state power further, I also want 
to argue that it is the existence and fostering of defined Tibetan spaces in India 
which facilitates TGiE's functioning as a government. For a start, TGiE's 
development of a range of scalar networks through which its bureaucracy, welfare-
provision and leadership structures are institutionalised uses the category of scale 
to establish hierarchical and reified power structures (Herb and Kaplan 1999). 
126 
Indeed, in many ways TGiE's structured bureaucratic control of its bounded spaces 
in exile echoes strongly Agnew's description of territoriality as working 'through 
territorial division of space, boundary control, and the hierarchical dissemination 
of authoritative commands' (2005: 442). As an example, when describing the 
spatial reach of their responsibilities, staff in CROs frequently spoke of various 
settlements, scattered communities, schools and monasteries as coming under their 
'jurisdiction.' If the state is spatially understood as 'a nested hierarchy of discrete, 
enclosed jurisdictional spaces' (Cox 1998: 1), then this discursive construction of 
bureaucratic jurisdictions - the TGiE's lack of official sovereignty over these spaces 
meaning that is far from legal jurisdiction - can be seen as a conventionally state-
like articulation of power over space. In addition, the series of spaces in exile in 
many ways facilitate TGiE's governance of its exiled population as the TGiE has 
partitioned its space in exile as a mechanism through which to observe, manage 
and govern its population in a way which motions towards Lefebvre's (1991) 
conceptualisation of the 'production of space'. Crucially, the network of territorial 
settlements functions as a spatial form of regulation, echoing Luke's observation 
that: 
'Territories are ... highly politicized formations inasmuch as they structure 
governmentality; they arrange people with vital systems of things as 
individuals and collectives, giving access to places used for getting security 
benefits, health services, identity codes and infrastructural goods' (1996: 
503). 
In the case of TGiE, such territorial governance ofthe diasporic population in India 
includes monitoring their movement, recording demographic data, collecting 
'taxes', renewing identity documents and facilitating the provision of Tibetan-run 
welfare services (see Chapter 6 and 7).' 
5.3.3. Settlements in exile: nation. homeland and attachment to place. 
What has been presented so far is an overview of the functional role of the 
settlements within the exile Tibetan community and the territorialising strategies 
which TGiE employs to manage and govern these spaces. I now want to shift 
attention to the symbolic importance of the settlements as 'national' spaces 
associated in complex ways with the homeland. Turning first to the discourses 
employed by TGiE to justify and promote the idea of Tibetan settlements in exile, 
in addition to the pragmatic aim of creating economically self-sufficient Tibetan 
communities within the host state, the rationale most frequently articulated is that 
of exclusively Tibetan settlements being a key way of protecting and preserving 
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Tibetan culture, traditions, identity and way of life (CTRC 2003: 7; Diehl 2002). 
'Deliberately designed in such a way as to recreate Tibetan society with its core 
values intact' (Norbu 2001: 15), the settlements are therefore key to the exile 
government's project of reconstructing 'Tibet' in exile and, as the time in exile 
extends, they are increasingly seen as places where the community can pass on 
'authentic' Tibetan culture and traditions to the next generation. Indeed, a number 
of interviewees spoke of the 'real Tibetan community' being in the settlements 
which are in effect spaces where 'Tibetans can be Tibetans' (Tsepak, Lugsum-
Samdupling 25.11.2007). 
An extension to such discourses of cultural preservation has been the recent 
promotion of Gandhian-based narratives regarding the settlements. With its 
antecedents in the Dalai Lama's vision for future Tibet as a 'zone of ahimsa (non-
violence)' (TGiE 1992), this project has been formulated and promoted by the Kalon 
Tripa Samdhong Rimpoche, who explained in a statement to the press after taking 
office in 2001: 
'I believe we Tibetans need to establish a non-violent society to serve as a 
model for the rest of the world. In order to do this, we should first develop a 
culture of ahimsa in our exile communities .... Tibetan settlements in India 
are ideal places for undertaking this experiment' (Tibetan Bulletin July-
August 2001: 25). 
Implementing this vision has to date entailed the promotion of organic farming, 
solar and wind energy projects, and soil and water conservation.90 Crucially, such 
policies are presented as key to the wider TGiE project of using the period in exile 
as an opportunity to experiment with and train the diaspora in political systems 
and resource use which are in tune with Tibetan cultural values, and could be 
transferred to the homeland should the desired 'return' materialise. As such, the 
current Kashag presents the settlements as laboratories where a certain way of life 
can be trialled and cultivated. However, somewhat predictably, such visions of the 
settlements are not universally shared nor supported by the diasporic population. 
As my interviews revealed, many young Tibetans reject the closed, tight-knit 
Tibetan world of the settlements in favour of the employment opportunities and 
faster pace of life in Indian cities. 
90 Attention has focused on Mundgod settlement in Karnataka with the aim of establishing it as a model 
which can then be replicated in the other settlements and. somewhat idealistically, transplanted to a future 
Tibet (Agricultural Officer, Lugsum.Samdupling, 27.11.2007). 
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Remaining with the present, as part of its nation-building exercise and promotion 
of a pan-Tibetan identity, TGiE has adopted a policy of locating refugees from 
different regions in Tibet together in the same settlement (Strom 1995).91 Such a 
deliberate nationalising project has obvious connections with the idea of homeland 
in terms of keeping the collective memory of Tibet alive through sustaining a 
cohesive national community in exile. In turn, as Gupta and Ferguson argue, place-
making is ubiquitous in collective political mobilisation with "'homeland" ... 
remain[ing] one of the most powerful unifying symbols for mobile and displaced 
peoples' (1992: 11). Therefore, through these discourses TGiE uses the spaces ofthe 
settlements to foster essentialised and nationalised Tibetan identities in exile (see 
Lavie and Swedenburg 1996; Veronis 2007). However, the connection between the 
settlements and the Tibetan nation and homeland is not only imposed by the TGiE 
nor only discursive. Reflecting the 'the complexity of ... ways in which people 
construct, remember, and lay claim to particular places as "homelands" or 
"nations'" (Malkki 1992: 25), settlers themselves have also created the settlements 
as spaces of nationalism through important material and performative associations 
with the homeland. 
Despite the majority of Tibetan settlements in India being located in physical 
landscapes and environments starkly different from those of Tibet, each settlement 
is 'Tibetanised' through the recurrent use of Buddhist icons and structures and 
Tibetan architectural styles (see Larsen and Siding-Larsen 2001 for a fascinating 
account of traditional Tibetan architecture). In addition to the cluster of Tibetan 
offices, schools and clinics which form the heart of each settlement, these include 
the monasteries, small temples for the protector deity of each village, archways 
decorated with auspicious Tibetan symbols, prayer-flags atop each building and 
strung through trees, and chortens and mani-stones along roadsides (see Figure 
5.g, 5.h and 5.i). The consistency of these structures across different settlements is 
strikingly evident as while the architectural style of the houses reflects the 
building materials and climate of their location within India, the unfailing 
recurrence of these cultural markers means each settlement can be read in a 
similar way, and feels 'familiar' to exiled Tibetans. As such, Majnuka Tilla is 
frequently described by newcomer refugees as a reassuring Tibetan 'sanctuary' 
within the very Indian - and therefore alien - city of Delhi. Thus, in reading the 
91 However, it should be noted that even within TGiE·run settlements, segregation of regional and sectarian 
groups does occur. For example. followers of the Bon faith are congregated in 2 of the 11 camps in 
Sonamling. and there is a large Amdo 'village' within Dharamsala. 
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landscape of the settlements as socially constructed 'cultural texts through which 
political values are communicated and discourses enacted within particular 
societies' (Till 2003: 349), the playing out of these symbolic links to the homeland 
can be seen as vindicating the TGiE's settlement programme, if only in succeeding 
in the aim of recreating a 'mini' Tibet in exile. 
Figure 5.g: Chortens, Lugsum-
Samdupling 
Fif51J.rp. .'1. i: Mn.n.i .~t()n.p..c; . 
Figure 5.h: Large prayer-wheel, 
Dharamsala 
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The inscription of the Tibetan homeland onto the landscape of the settlements is 
not confined simply to the material environment, but is also evident in the 
everyday practices performed within these spaces. Following Houston and Wright's 
argument that the interpretation of return within a diaspora 'does not invoke a 
physical return to a homeland, but rather a repeated revisiting to the concept of 
homeland via texts, imagery and social and religious rituals' (2003: 230), a focus on 
the experiential and performative aspects of landscape can be highly instructive 
(Hirsch 1995). For example, the social geography of the settlements is often more 
complex than first meets the eye. In a number of settlements there is an unofficial 
division of communities into 'villages' based on where the settlers are from in Tibet, 
and it is this which determines how individuals read and interact with their local 
landscape (Thokmey, Sonamling 28.05.2007). These 'villages' are often 
indiscernible to outsiders, who require a 'local guide' to negotiate these hidden 
geographies of Amdo, Toepa and Ngari areas within the settlements. Moreover, 
this constitutes a key alternative geography within each settlement to that 
instituted by TGiE in its establishment of equally-sized administrative blocks. 
Another key way in which the landscape of the settlements is lived and performed 
by its inhabitants is the traditional Tibetan practice of kora, a circumambulation of 
a temple or holy structure which is performed to venerate these sites and gain 
merit for the next life. Koras are central to Tibetans' use and understanding of 
space with kora routes around chortens, temples and monasteries constituting 
'ritual space' within the settlements. Even as a non-Tibetan visitor to the 
settlements these routes and practices of kom are significant; from dictating a 
clockwise detour around a prayer-flag bedecked tree to how to exit a monastery. 
Moreover, with sacred sites along the route serving as informal meeting places, 
especially for elderly residents, doing kom myself provided an invaluable insight 
into the lived geographies of these communities. With the Dalai Lama's temple and 
residence located there, Dharamsala has the most well defined kora of the 
settlements in exile. As Klieger notes, this 'capital' of Tibet in exile has a heavily 
scripted landscape as it is: 
'a place where memories and nostalgia for a lost way of life are perpetuated 
as no other .... The Dalai Lama's palace on the top of the hill, with Namgyal 
monastery and the Tsuglhakhang nearby, with the people's village down the 
road, neatly reproduces the landscape of Lhasa itself.. .. Such simulation is 
powerful and highly useful as a mnemonic of the golden days of pre-1959 
Tibet' (2002: 3). 
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As a 'reprocessing of popular religious practices' and 'version of the living memory' 
(Fortier 1999: 50, 51) the tradition and practice of kora therefore adds another 
layer to the Tibetanisation of these landscapes and reinforces the argument that 
nationalism requires some sort of territorial base in order to be articulated (Smith 
1981). 
However, this relationship between the settlements, nationalism and homeland is 
further complicated in this case. Not only have the settlements been constructed 
and performed as a series of temporary homelands in exile - islands of Tibetan-
ness established in order to preserve the 'original' homeland in the imagination -
but these Tibetan spaces in India in effect constitute a second or pseudo homeland. 
This is especially the case for second generation Tibetans who have moved from 
India to the West, for whom the network of Tibetan settlements in India, the array 
of cultural and educational institutions and the seat of the Dalai Lama, are in 
effect a surrogate spatial grounding for these individuals who have never seen the 
historic homeland. Such a displacement of ideas of 'homeland' requires a shift in 
conventional frames of reference. Whilst in essence Tibetans in exile are as a whole 
a diasporic population, the role ofTGiE and its base in India has effectively created 
a 'domestic' population (those residing in Tibetan spaces in India and Nepal) and a 
(second) diaspora of Tibetans who have moved from South Asia to the West. As 
such, TGiE acts as a 'home state,' managing the transnational practices of their 
diaspora in the West: remittances flowing back to India; participation in TPiE 
elections; and the acquiring of 'dual' citizenship. This is therefore a situation which 
fundamentally dislocates conventional understandings of diaspora and territory, 
thereby confirming the assertion that exile politics disrupts the division between 
national and international politics, between the inside and the outside (Mandaville 
1999). 
This construction of the settlements as pseudo homelands is articulated and 
materialised in a number of ways. On one level there is a logical attachment to the 
area or settlement where those born in India have grown up. This was expressed 
by a number of my younger interviewees through support for sports teams in inter-
settlement tournaments, alumni associations for settlement schools and websites 
connecting those who have emigrated to the West with their 'home settlement' (e.g. 
www.mainpat.net). Similarly, in the case of Dharamsala, Prost notes the 
development of a: 
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'distinctly "Dharamsalian" exile culture, with its own idiomatic language, 
local community networks .... As the Tibetan exiles' recollection of their 
"homeland" past becomes grounded in their experience of an "exile" present, 
it takes on new meanings and inspiration from Dharamsala as a 
contemporary nexus of identity' (2006: 236). 
More prosaic connections and attachments with spaces and places in exile are also 
evident, with an increasing investment in land and property by some within the 
exile community. A number of interviewees in Dekyiling, Clementown and 
Lugsum-Samdupling commented on how having a property in a settlement was 
seen as providing financial and, to a certain extent, emotional security. Whilst the 
land within the settlements is managed exclusively by TGiE, cannot be exchanged 
privately and reverts to TGiE if or when the family leaves, there is an increasing 
trend of Tibetans investing in and expanding their homes and, in some cases, 
informally leasing additional land from local Indians. 
Such emotive and material attachments to and appropriations of places and 
property in exile not only refutes any argument that diasporic relations to territory 
are confined merely to the imaginary and the nostalgic, but highlights an 
important and pressing issue within the community. What was intended as a 
temporary sojourn in exile is becoming increasingly permanent. This uprooted 
diasporic community is increasingly growing roots (see Malkki 1992; Fortier 1999). 
As such, this raises the crucial question of how easy and desirable it will be for the 
exiled community to 'up sticks' and leave India for Tibet should the situation in the 
homeland be resolved. One view, articulated by a young college graduate as we 
walked around the extensive grounds of Upper TCV (Tibetan Children's Village 
school) in Dharamsala was that: 
'Of course we will leave India if one day we have a free Tibet. When the 
Chinese invaded our people left everything behind and said that they'd be 
back in a few years - it's the same here. As we say, "if it's written on your 
forehead then you go" - these are just buildings. People have a stronger 
attachment to their homeland ... even those like me who have never seen it. 
So of course we will leave here and go back' (Dechen, 01.04.2007). 
However, other interviewees were sceptical that such an upheaval would be easy or 
even possible, arguing instead that the exiled community and TGiE has become too 
established and comfortable in exile to the detriment of the greater project of 
fighting (in whatever way) for the future of the homeland. Indeed, opposition to 
forming attachments to places in exile has been a recurrent issue within the 
community. with an older resident in Dharamsala explaining how: 
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'when land was first given to the Tibetans in South [India] the people they 
begged our leaders not to give them land. They thought you see ... that 
having land in India, it would mean they would not return to Tibet, that 
they would always be in India' (Yonten, 19.02.2006). 
Such fears of putting down roots in exile continue within the community today, 
even from those born in India. For example, one politically active interviewee in 
Dharamsala explained how, though enviously admiring the houses in Kangra 
Valley below Dharamsala, he refuses to own anything in India and it is this 
maintenance of a state of limbo and uncertainty which he claims helps inspire his 
dedication to the Tibetan freedom struggle (Ngawang, 14.03.2007). Such decisions 
_ to rent rather than own property, to be mobile rather than settled - which are 
repeated often within the community, can therefore be seen as deliberate 
deterritorialising strategies. In directly contradicting current TGiE policies of 
(re)settlement, these beliefs and actions indicate that for some within the exile 
community the balance has tipped too far in the direction of providing for and 
settling the exile population at the detriment of furthering the struggle for the 
homeland. 
Intertwined with these spatial discourses of detachment from territory and the 
powerful desire to return - even if it is to a homeland those born in exile have 
never seen - are temporal narratives around the issue of waiting: 
'the very goal of going into exile is but to refill our water bags and restock 
our armory so that we might return home to finish the fight with renewed 
vigor. But in the case of our exile, something else happened: we came, we 
saw, we stayed ... After fifty years of waiting, we are still here - essentially 
waiting. Waiting for what?' (Sherap 18 January 2007 
www.phayul.com/news/a rticle .aspx?id= 15363&article= Escape+from + Exile). 
As Jeffrey (2008) notes, the phenomenon of 'chronic waiting' is an increasingly 
important experience for a number of subaltern communities including asylum 
seekers, refugees, urban slum dwellers, and the unemployed. From my time spent 
in the various Tibetan settlements, waiting as 'an active, conscious, materialized 
practice in which ... time and space often become the objects of reflection' (ibid: 957) 
was a recurrent issue, particularly among newcomer refugees and unemployed 
college graduates. Central to this, and echoing Chakrabarty's (1999) work on the 
inscription of waiting on the urban landscape, were particular spaces within the 
settlements such as tea stalls, pool tables, karom boards and bed-sits where large 
groups of notably male Tibetans would regularly 'hang out'. These individuals 
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spoke of such places as simply for 'time-pass.' They were places to put in the hours, 
days, months, or even years before they get their chance to return to Tibet, or 
emigrate to the West. Dharamsala in particular is dominated by these gendered 
spaces of 'time-pass' which have in many ways shaped the distinctive 'Dhasa' 
subculture noted above. Majnuka Tilla is a site of waiting in another sense, as its 
possible demolition (discussed below) means that the settlers feel paralysed, 
reluctant to invest in their businesses and homes until they know its future, but 
equally unwilling to move in case that seals the colony's fate. 
Indeed, the uncertainties around Majnuka Tilla are emblematic of key moments 
and circumstances which jolt the increasingly settled exile community into 
remembering that they are 'refugees' and are in India on a temporary, and often 
uncertain and insecure basis. The settlements can therefore be seen as inherently 
ambiguous spaces; as condensation points for these exilic contradictions, where the 
debates and realities of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, of temporality 
and permanence are played out and become visible. Therefore, whilst the situation 
of any exiled population is exemplified by the dilemma between meeting immediate 
needs and therefore starting to put down roots in exile, and retaining the emotional 
and political desire to return home by maintaining a sense of restlessness, in the 
Tibetan case the discourses and practices through which these debates are played 
out are intricately linked to broader issues of territory and governance. This 
predicament is manifest both on the level of the individual (as outlined above) and 
the exiled administration itself. In terms of the latter, this can be epitomised by 
reading Beker and van Oordt's observation that 'the formation of quasi-state 
structures in a sanctuary can only provide a temporary solution' (1993: 9) against 
French's claim that 'a government-in-exile that institutionalises itself as the 
Tibetan government has runs the risk of becoming a permanent government-of-
exiles' (1991: 200). 
5.4. The 'lived' and the 'legal': Tibetan settlements within the 
sovereign territory of India 
Focusing on the administrative, discursive and symbolic position of the Tibetan 
settlements within the Tibetan community and government in exile, the 
discussions above have perhaps painted too cohesive an image of these exilic 
spaces, and certainly one which tells only part of the story. The aim of this section 
is to disrupt this picture by widening the focus to look at how the settlements 
135 
function within the sovereign space of India. In exploring how the juxtaposition 
between the lived realities of the settlements and their legal status within India 
plays out, this section will explore land tenure issues, the relationship between 
TGiE and Indian officials at a range of scales, inter-communal relations and 
tensions and how the legal and physical boundaries of the settlements are defined 
and enforced. These issues therefore open up salient theoretical questions 
regarding the division of juridical responsibilities, the exile administration's degree 
of autonomy within the domestic arena of the host, the extent to which TGiE is 
regarded as a 'government' on a day-to-day basis and the possibility of overlapping 
sovereignties. 
5.4.1. Land, law and community relations: the ongoing negotiation of 
Tibetan presence in India. 
Starting with some legal 'realities,' the state of India has not ceded jurisdiction in 
the Tibetan settlements. This remains Indian territory, where Indian law applies 
and where the Indian Government is the ultimate authority (Goldstein 1975). 
Settlement land is on lease from respective Indian states to the TGiE, varying from 
99-year leases to renewable shorter term leases depending on the legal agreement 
with the federal state, and settlers pay land revenue at rates fixed by each regional 
administration (Chief Representative, Ladakh, 25.05.2007). However, no such 
collective land grant exists in the scattered communities and even the TGiE is a 
tenant on land rented from the state of Himachal Pradesh (Dharamsala Welfare 
Officer 04.04.2007). 
In terms of private land ownership, as the Indian Constitution gives land property 
rights to citizens only and the majority of Tibetans in India have chosen to retain 
their refugee status (see Chapter 7), these individuals are barred from owning land 
in India. However, some Tibetans have circumvented this limitation either through 
informal rental arrangements or, in Himachal Pradesh, through what is known as 
a benami transaction where land is illegally purchased in the name of a silent 
Indian partner, often from ethnically Tibetan tribal regions of Spiti or Lahaul. 
However, in a move to regularise these land transactions and as 'a special welfare 
measure keeping in view the Government of India's policy guidelines regarding 
resettlement! rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees' (Order No.Rev,B.F,(10)199/2003, 
8th May 2006), the Himachal government issued 50-year land leases to TGiE in 
2005 which the exile government can then sub-lease to institutions or Tibetan 
individuals (District Commissioner, Kangra 07,11.2007). 
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Turning to the relationship between the Indian and Tibetan administrations, 
although never formally recognising TGiE as a government, from the early days of 
exile the Gol welcomed the delegation of responsibility for the Tibetan settlements 
offered by TGiE, granting it a virtual monopoly to represent the refugees and, as 
discussed below, de facto internal administrative control of and authority over the 
settlements (Norbu 2001). Thus, whilst in the first few years the Indian 
administration was ultimately in control of the settlements - first through the 
Ministry for External Affairs and then the Ministry of Rehabilitation and quasi-
official 'Central Relief Committee' (Grunfeld 1987) - over time authority gradually 
transferred to the Tibetan administration as they consolidated their governmental 
structures. 
With regards to the relationship between these two administrations today, it was 
apparent from interviews with both Tibetan and Indian officials that a structured 
and hierarchical set of interactions have been established. Each level of the 
Tibetan administration is in touch with corresponding levels of administration 
within the Indian state. At the 'national' level the Tibetan Bureau in Delhi acts as 
a liaison between TGiE and GoI, dealing directly with ministries in the Indian 
central administration. Meanwhile, at the federal state level the CROs have 
contact with the Chief Minister and co-ordinate with the State Government, 
Divisional Commissioners and City Corporations where Tibetans are resident. 
Finally, for day-to-day issues arising within the settlements there is regular 
contact between the Tibetan Settlement Offices and Indian District 
Commissioners, Municipal Council, Superintendents of Police and local 
panchayats.92 
In terms of how the relationship between these two administrations is presented 
and actually 'works', the picture is complex and revealing. Framed within official 
discourses on both sides as a relationship between a generous host and a grateful 
guest, a rosy picture of good working relations was painted by Indian and Tibetan 
officials at a range of levels. For example, from the Indian perspective the District 
Commissioner of Kangra stressed that 'the quality of the relationship is good. It 
has always been good - very cordial at all times with a good level of respect' 
92 In light of these structured interactions between Tibetan and Indian administrations the TGiE's 
administrative structures (and its increasing bureaucratisation) can be read as increasingly emulating the 
Indian model; both because this is the bureaucracy TGiE is most exposed to, and it is the bureaucracy it has 
to work with on a daily basis. 
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(07.11.2007), whilst Tibetan officials spoke of having tea with state-level ministers, 
and middle-ranking Indian civil servants regarding them as friends and partners. 
Indeed, illustrating the extent to which Tibetan exiles have engaged with Indian 
political mores and hierarchies within official Tibetan circles, considerable fuss is 
made about official visits of Indian dignitaries to the Tibetan settlements, and the 
ensuing functions result in gushing praise and gratitude on both sides. However, 
probe a little further and the relationship between these 'governments' emerges as 
often highly contradictory, unstable and almost impossible to pin-down. Picking 
apart this 'messiness', it became apparent that there remain significant 
sensitivities regarding how Indo-Tibetan relations are portrayed, with officials on 
both sides keen to play down tensions and skirt around legal issues. 93 
With regards to the nature of the relationship between local level officials, 
important contradictions are apparent. On the one hand, the mutual recognition of 
the other administration's hierarchies can be read as an implicit recognition, on the 
Indian part, of TGiE existing and functioning as a government-like structure. This 
tacit conferral of legitimacy is enacted through the reiteration of a series of 
procedures and discourses. For example, Indian officials spoke of the 'Tibetan 
government' having their entire system in India; 'they are established here with 
offices, ministries, parliament, their Prime Minister' (Assistant to Superintendent 
of Police, Priyapatna, 25.11.2007). From the Tibetan perspective TGiE, officials 
frequently recounted how they and their office were recognised by their Indian 
counterparts, how they were treated as 'local representatives for the Tibetans' 
(Local Assembly member, Dharamsala, 06.04.2007) and were the first port of call 
for local Indian officials. Indeed, evidence of the currency of 'official' titles and the 
perceived social status that they bestow was apparent when, in acknowledging the 
very significant limitations her government faces, a researcher in the DIIR 
explained that; 
'our government can't help or intervene for its citizens officially because we 
are in India, they can only do it unofficially as a Tibetan helping a Tibetan. 
But at the local level sometimes saying you are from the ''Tibetan 
Government", or especially from the "Dalai Lama's government", this makes 
the local Indian officials listen and can help the Tibetan's case' (Loten, 
02.03.2007). 
9:1 For example, the District Commissioner of Kangra was concerned to know whether I was working 'for 
them' meaning TGiE. and was guarded in his response to questions regarding tensions between the 
communities. 
138 
On the other hand, however, the caveats that must accompany these statements 
are revealing. First, it is significant that it is from Indian bureaucrats at sub-state 
levels that such 'recognition' of Tibetan officials as 'government representatives' 
comes. As the connection between Tibetan and Indian officials at this level is that 
of everyday working relationships, this 'recognition' is necessary for bureaucratic 
interactions but is not necessarily a statement on the political and legal status of 
TGiE itself. This is very different from how Indian politicians at the national level 
refer to TGiE, with the latter being cautious in the terminology they use and its 
implied legitimising possibilities (see TPPRC 2006b). Secondly, even at the local 
level, it is a notably unequal relationship. For example, whilst TGiE offices might 
be the primary point of contact Indian officials have with the 'local' Tibetan 
community, in reality they rarely actually visit Tibetan offices. Rather, it is 
Tibetan officials who have to 'report in' with their Indian counterparts. So, for 
instance, it is up to the Settlement Officer in Lugsum-Samdupling to bring records 
of births and deaths in the settlement to the Assistant Commissioner in Hunsur 
(who acts as the Tibetan liaison officer), rather than the Indian authorities 
conducting their own census or collecting population data from the Settlement 
Office. 
The relationship between the Tibetan and Indian administrations also varies over 
time and space. A common narrative within the exile community is that there are 
better relations in Karnataka than in the northern states and, as the duration in 
exile lengthens, relations are arguably becoming less stable. As an Indian 
journalist explained: 
'things are changing in India and soon the position of the Tibetans here 
might not be so secure. Tibetans cannot expect to be treated in the same 
way here over time. The Indian officials dealing with Tibetans to date have 
been those who remember the Tibetans first arriving as refugees when they 
had nothing and had to struggle to make a life in India. Like ... when I was a 
child all Tibetans we saw in Darjeeling were beggars. And these officials 
have always been generous and understanding to the Tibetans because of 
their past, but soon these officials will retire from office and the second 
generation of Indians won't have this institutional memory. They have no 
memory of Tibetans as 'beggars' - all they see is successful refugees who are 
good at business and have a lot of help from India. So they're not going to be 
as sympathetic and understanding, especially when the Tibetans make no 
effort to assimilate' (Manoj, Delhi 11.11.2007). 
Indeed, many Tibetan commentators see the position of their exile community in 
India as inherently vulnerable, with their political and territorial stability 
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contingent on Sino-Indian relations, the future of the Dalai Lama as an individual 
and an institution and the socio-economic and legal position of Tibetans in India. 
An important example of such insecurity is found in Majnuka Tilla. Whilst lease 
papers for most settlements are held by TGiE, in Majnuka Tilla the land was 
granted to the community directly by Jawaharlal Nehru, but this was based on an 
oral understanding and no papers were issued. This has led to a number of recent 
problems as the Delhi Development Authority issued court summonses in 2006 to 
clear the land alongside the Yamuna River, where the colony is located, as part of a 
beautification scheme (Sharma 22 September 2006). With no evidence to prove the 
legality of the colony, demolition is still pending despite support from the Delhi 
Government and numerous petitions from senior TGiE officials to the city's High 
Court (Secretary, Majnuka Tilla Welfare Office, 04.06.2007).94 
Remaining with legal issues, the Tibetan administration and settlers are subject to 
Indian jurisdiction, with the Indian Police having authority for law and order 
within the settlements and any criminal matters being dealt with by the Indian 
courts rather than Tibetan judiciary. Indeed, whilst structured as and attempting 
to function as a judiciary, the Tibetan Justice Commission in reality has the legal 
standing only of an arbitration body operating under the Indian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1996 (Rohit, 06.12.2007).95 Such a division of legal 
responsibilities between the two administrations, with TGiE dealing with civil 
disputes and Gol with criminal cases, is in many ways mutually beneficial. On the 
one hand, Tibetans benefit from India's legal pluralism whereby minority 
communities are granted the freedom to regulate family and succession issues 
according to customary norms. This is particularly important in the Tibetan case 
where keeping family and intra-community disputes within the diaspora is seen by 
TGiE as key to preserving community harmony and cohesion. On the other hand, 
the devolution of dispute resolution to TGiE means that the already over-stretched 
Indian justice system is not burdened by such grievances. 
Whilst this division of juridical responsibilities is clear-cut at the national level, on 
the ground it is predictably more ambiguous. In general, settlement-level Tibetan 
officials ensure that their communities receive, understand and comply with Indian 
laws such as those governing residence certificates and business licenses and act as 
94 At the time of writing the demolition case remains pending at the Delhi High Court. 
95 Indeed, in acknowledgement of its being subject to the overriding authority of Indian law, the judiciary is 
referred to as a 'commission', rather than a court. This forms part of a wider trend in TGiE semantics which 
will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
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intermediaries between Tibetan settlers and a range of Indian officials. So, for 
example, if Indian cattle wander onto Tibetan land, Tibetan farmers go to their 
Settlement Officer who contacts local Indian officials, who in turn approach the 
offending local farmers. Similarly, if local Indians have grievances with Tibetans 
they can in person, or through their panchayat, approach the Settlement Office 
who will then take up the issue with the settler concerned (Kawa, 19.04.2007). 
However, there are situations where local Indians prefer to deal directly with the 
Tibetan administration, both in terms of ease of access and wanting to avoid formal 
legal proceedings. This was the case in Dharamsala in 2007 when, following 
community tensions after a fracas between an auto-rickshaw driver and newcomer 
refugee, Tibetans in the area boycotted Indian taxis and shops. Instead of 
approaching their local panchayat, concerned Indian shopkeepers petitioned the 
Dharamsala Welfare Office directly which called a public meeting and successfully 
defused the situation (Indo-Tibetan Coordinator, Dharamsala Welfare Office, 
20.04.2007). 
Turning to this relationship between Tibetans and Indians at a community level, 
given the duration of the Tibetan refugee stay in India the occurrence of communal 
tension and violence has been surprisingly rare. In general, interactions between 
the refugees and the host population are limited to everyday economic transactions 
and the creation of significant job opportunities for local Indians as labourers on 
Tibetan farms and workers in Tibetan cafes, restaurants and carpet factories can 
be seen as a major factor in ameliorating community relations (Additional 
Secretary, Department of Home, 18.03.2006. See also Norbu 2004).96 In addition, 
Tibetan-run health facilities and schools extend their services to locals, and 
investment in local infrastructure has a trickle down effect on surrounding host 
villages, both pf which are positive reinforcements to cooperation in general. As the 
, , 
Principal ofTCV Sonamling explained: 
. , 
'We do take some Ladakhi students in our school. The local community in 
this area is a poor community with little services, and there have been some 
problems with the Tibetans because they saw them come as refugees and 
stay in tents and now they are more successful. So sometimes there is some 
tension and so we admit some of their children so as to help these relations' 
(21.05.2007) . 
96 This division of labour with Tibetans generally run shops, cafes, travel agencies and hotels while Indians 
in the settlements are construction workers, farm labourers, vegetable sellers and rickshaw drivers has 
arguably created a two tier·society, often replicating Indian caste structures. 
(\ I , . ~ 
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However, since the Tibetan settlements are often enclaves of visible affluence 
compared to the host communities, and there is resistance to community 
integration on both sides, there have been inter-ethnic disputes and isolated 
incidents of anti-Tibetan violence. Whilst in Ladakh such tensions arise from the 
economic protectionism of the powerful local unions which oppose Tibetans 
acquiring licences for hotels, taxis and travel agencies (penpa, 19.05.2007) it is in 
Himachal Pradesh where inter-communal problems have been most acute. This is 
due both to increased economic competition between the refugees and host 
community and, given a number of cultural commonalities, the Tibetans are 
sometimes perceived as politically threatening (Norbu 2001). The most notorious 
incident occurred in Dharamsala in April 1994 when an Indian youth was allegedly 
killed by a Tibetan refugee, sparking a violent riot against the Tibetan community 
during which the TGiE headquarters and many Tibetan shops and homes were 
ransacked and looted. Striking at the heart of Tibetan vulnerability, as Dhondup 
noted at the time, the incident was a 'rude awakening for the Tibetans in 
Dharamsala: an awakening to a reality long suppressed or simply forgotten. 
Tibetans have come as refugees and are expected to live as refugees' (Tibetan 
Review 199429(7): 18). 
Despite being a distinctly traumatic event, this disturbance also had constructive 
outcomes in terms of inter-communal relations as it saw the establishment of 
bridging associations such as Indo-Tibetan Friendship Associations in the areas 
where Tibetans have settled. Consisting of community leaders and representatives, 
these organisations have been instrumental in fostering cooperation and trust. The 
qualified success of this strategy was apparent in 2007 when, after the 
autorickshaw incident mentioned above, leaders from the two communities held 
formal meetings and organised public apologies from the parties involved, although 
some Tibetans and Indians I spoke to at the time were keen to point out that such 
public displays of unity did not fully resolve the issue and that tensions between 
the communities remained. 
5.4.2. Defining settlement boundaries and delimiting sovereign space 
Turning to the issue of settlement boundaries a complex picture emerges, with 
their demarcation varying in different areas within India. At one end of the 
spectrum is Sonamling settlement in Ladakh where, given the similarities between 
the Tibetan and local Ladakhi population, boundaries are barely demarcated, with 
no gateways or signs to mark the entrance to the camps. As such, apart from the 
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TGiE 'branded' schools and clinics, Tibetan and Ladakhi villages are often 
indistinguishable and Sonamling itself is not a contiguous settlement, with land 
between the 14 camps belonging to Ladakhi farmers and Indian military units. In 
the large agricultural settlements at Bylakuppe, given the extent of the land-
holdings the boundaries were somewhat 'fuzzier' than the smaller settlements 
around Dehradun. Nevertheless, the limits of the settlement were defined and 
recognised both by Tibetan settlers and local Indians. At Lugsum-Samdupling, 
these boundaries are marked by the Mysore-Kushalnagar highway on one side, 
impenetrable jungle on the other where the settlement road simply ends, and in 
areas where the settlement bounds Indian land, there is the striking sight of the 
settlement roads at dusk full of Indian labourers leaving the Tibetan area and 
returning to their villages beyond the settlement boundary. Finally, in the 
settlements around Dehradun there are clearly marked walls and fences between 
Tibetan and neighbouring Indian land and with prayer-flags adorning the roofs 
these settlements are visible from afar, standing out in the Indian landscape. In 
addition, the entrance to each settlement is marked by decorative archways, visible 
'border posts' which children learn in school represents the difference between 
what is Indian land and what is Tibetan land (Kalsang, 22.04.2007). 
Indeed, whilst unlike 'conventional' refugee camps there are no checkpoints or 
guarded entrances to Tibetan settlements, in certain circumstances and at key 
moments boundary enforcement practices are employed and the border between 
two communities of different legal standing sharpens into focus. From the Indian 
side, the movement of Tibetan residents in and out of the settlement is monitored. 
This is not a daily policing, but rather when families leave settlements such as 
Lugsum-Samdupling for their winter sweater-selling they must, through the 
Settlement Officer, seek permission to leave from' the local Assistant 
Commissioner, and then register their return in the settlement at the end of the 
season. Yet this is not a one-way enforcement of settlement boundaries, as TGiE 
officials do monitor and regulate what can and cannot happen on settlement 
territory. As an example, when staying in Dekyiling two Indian charity collectors 
came into the settlement seeking donations, but were promptly told to report to the 
Settlement Office to seek permission to solicit contributions. The settlement 
boundaries can therefore be seen to be 'materialised and territorialised in everyday 
life through performative place-making practices' (Jones 2007: 56). 
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In terms of the provision of services, in general Tibetans have little control over 
utilities. Electricity and telephone lines are provided by Indian utilities companies, 
water is usually provided by state government (although sometimes by pumps 
constructed by the settlers) and the Indian post office and Indian banks have 
branch offices on the outskirts of larger Tibetan settlements. In terms of other 
physical infrastructure, land drainage and levelling, flood protection and the 
construction and maintenance of buildings within the settlements is managed 
predominantly by TGiE, albeit with external funding. With regards to roads, those 
connecting to Indian communities are usually constructed by the state government, 
but roads within the settlement are often laid and maintained by TGiE. However, 
there have been cases of permission for roads being denied. For example, the 
panchayat at Selaqui near Dehradun granted a lease for the land between the TCV 
schools established there and the highway, but have denied permission for the 
construction of a tarred road, leaving the TCV administration with two large and 
fully operational residential schools, and inadequate access to them (Pemba, 
16.04.2007). This dependence on Indian authorities for the provision of key services 
means that Tibetan autonomy within India is necessarily limited and the 
settlements are not (and cannot be) fully self-sufficient. 
However, whilst far from hermetically sealed communities, the bounded nature of 
the settlements is key to the construction of identity narratives (Newman and 
Paasi 1998). Not only are the homogenously Tibetan settlements central to TGiE's 
nation-building project in exile (as discussed above), but separate settlements are 
also in Indian interests. This sanctioning of Tibetan settlements separated by 
social and cultural boundaries from the host society, corroborates and enacts 
India's liberal 'non-assimilative' framework (Goldstein 1978). For, whilst a highly 
multi-ethnic society, India is far from a 'melting-pot' and Tibetans are broadly 
regarded as a pseudo caste community which, within the framework of India's 
Hindu caste hierarchy, can maintain their cultural identity and practices (Norbu 
2004). In addition, the settlement boundaries regulate interactions between 
Tibetans and Indians, thereby functioning as 'symbols and institutions that 
simultaneously produce distinctions between social groups and are produced by 
them' (paasi 1998: 80; Mach 1993). On leaving settlements such as Lugsum-
Samdupling and Dekyiling there is a distinct feeling of 'going back to India' and an 
impression that the settlement land is indeed 'Tibetan territory', This is an 
impression which, despite its lack of legal underpinnings, is one sustained by both 
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Tibetan residents and local Indians. For example, whilst Indians are free to come 
and go in the settlements, as one student in Delhi explained: 
'the first time I went to Majnuka Tilla I wasn't sure if I was allowed to go 
into there .... I mean if Indians were allowed to enter there. I thought that 
maybe the government has restrictions and that it is an area just for 
Tibetans' (Lalita, 10.04.2007). 
Such confusion surrounding the legal status and identity claims of these Tibetan 
spaces within India raises important questions regarding sovereignty: To what 
extent do settlement boundaries delimit a sovereign space? What are the practical 
feasibilities of overlapping sovereignties? Does the establishment of an exile 
administration's authority coincide with a decrease of the host state's sovereignty? 
Whilst I will revisit these questions in the following chapters, I want here to start 
to sketch out some preliminary thoughts. Firstly, having started to unpack the 
connections between TGiE and GoI, what has emerged is a relationship where the 
boundaries of authority, legitimacy and legality are constantly negotiated and 
renegotiated. On the one hand, the fact that TGiE is not recognised as a 
government by India and the settlement land legally remains Indian territory 
means that the existence of the these islands of 'Tibetanness' providing 'social 
autonomy in a sea of host population' (Norbu 2004: 204) appears remarkable. On 
the other hand, the Gol's consensual delegation of authority and devolution of 
certain sovereign prerogatives to the exile administration effectively means that 
TGiE's governance over these spaces impinges little on the legal sovereignty of the 
host state. As such, this appears to be a matrix of complex territorial configurations 
and overlapping sites of authority. 
5.5. Conclusion: sites of displaced sovereignty 
In thinking through the issues raised in this chapter and how they relate back to, 
challenge and expand critical interpretations of territory, I want to begin by briefly 
sketching out what the exile Tibetan settlements are not. Firstly, these spaces bear 
few resemblances to the stereotypical refugee camp. Whilst not assimilating with 
the host state and to a degree dependent on humanitarian aid these are neither 
territories 'located outside the legal systems of the host countries ... where the 
complete enjoyment of life and the rights implicit in it is suspended' nor 'seedbeds 
for the recruitment of soldiers and mercenaries' (Mbembe 2000: 270·271). Secondly, 
comparing Tibetan settlements to informal settlements in India, despite 
similarities in terms of insecurity, vulnerability and indeterminate legal status, 
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with their planned houses, roads and utilities and welfare services these are far 
from urban slums. Rather, what has emerged from the discussion in this chapter is 
a complex picture of extra-territorial enclaves which are neither permanent nor 
temporary and which have multiple connections to other Tibetan diasporic spaces, 
to the homeland of Tibet and to the local Indian communities. 
Turning to the spatiality of the Tibetan community and government in exile more 
generally, readily apparent from the overview presented above is the complex 
political geography of TGiE and its diaspora. Running through the three spatial 
structures outlined in Section 5.3 are complex and conflicting accounts of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation: from conventionally diasporic de-
territorialised networks, through (re)territorialisation of TGiE's governance in the 
settlements and the territorialised attachments to these spaces, to the rejection of 
such territorialisation in favour of maintaining a sense of rootlessness in exile. On 
the one hand, the importance of mobility, communication flows and nostalgic 
associations with the homeland signals an archetypal diasporic version of territory, 
'challenging our received notions of place, disrupting those normative spatial 
temporal units of analysis like nation and culture' (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996: 
14). However, ideas and theorisations of deterritorialisation and diaspora space fall 
far short of exposing the spatiality of the exiled Tibetan community, ignoring 
important material attachments to and appropriation of territory in exile. Indeed, 
with its territorialised system of settlements and administrative hierarchies the 
spatiality of the Tibetan community in South Asia is in many ways remote from 
post-foundational conceptualisations of diasporic and transnational territory. As 
such, this case corroborates with critiques of deterritorialisation which argue that 
its tendency to privilege flows, networks and mobility obscures and undervalues 
more rooted and material conceptions of and connections to political space (e.g. 
Mitchell 1997a, 1997b; Veronis 2007). 
On the other hand, coming to this case from the perspective of state territoriality, 
TGiE's (re)territorialising strategies have important resonances with state power 
and state space (Brenner et al 2003; Jessop et al 2008) and can offer important 
tangential interjections into such debates. In unpacking the relationship between 
governance and territory in this case, I have argued that TGiE can be seen to 
employ a number of state-like territorialising mechanisms to circumvent and 
ameliorate the challenges raised by governing non-contiguous and dispersed 
territories. These include the centralisation of authority in Dharamsala, strategic 
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attempts to ensure uniformity of governance and facilities across the settlements 
and the creation of multiple-tiered jurisdictions and administrative networks at 
different scales through which state functions are performed. Through these 
territorialising strategies, therefore, TGiE is actively creating and controlling space 
and striving to institutionalise the Tibetan nation in exile at a range of scales. 
However, as explored throughout this research, given its sovereign limitations and 
. lack of legal statehood this is far from a conventional case of state sovereignty 
operating over absolute, bounded territory. Moreover, in supporting the assertion 
that territory is neither the sole preserve of the state, nor 'inherently tied to the 
state' (Elden 2005: 8; Agnew 2005), the aim ofTGiE's territorialising strategies can 
be seen to be based on a specific set of exilic objectives; community cohesion, 
preserving Tibetan culture and identity and fostering a sense of Tibetan 
nationalism. Carrying with it notions of a deliberate strategy of 'creating' territory 
in the exiled population's imagination, 'strategic territorialisation' (Boudreau 2001) 
is a useful framework for understanding how TGiE manipulates notions of 
territory for tactical political goals, reflecting Paasi's claim that the 
institutionalisation of territories is a 'process where territorial units ... become 
established in the social consciousness' (2003: 112). 
The TGiE's construction of territory and power can thus be seen to be somewhere 
between state space and diaspora space, articulating 'deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation at the same time in the same spaces' (6 Tuathail and Luke 
1994: 382). To use Deleuze and Guattari's description of the Hutu nation, the TGiE 
has 're-territorialized itself precisely in displacement, in a refugee camp' (1987: 
508). Thinking beyond binaries of deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation, 
national/transnational, homelandldiaspora enables us to consider instead the 
notion of displaced sovereignties. Involving 'thinking through re-figurations of the 
geographies of place, settlement and belonging' (Jackson et al 2004: 7), exilic 
displacement and the idea of displaced sovereignties breaks down the assumed 
correlation of sovereignty with a single bounded territory, and instead opens up the 
idea of sovereignty associated with multiple geographies; some 'real' and others 
symbolic or imagined. Indeed, as explored above, tensions between sovereignty 
rooted in and articulated over 'real' territories, and symbolic links to a distant 
homeland tap into the essence of TGiE's spatialised authority and the core 
dilemmas of life in exile; between retaining the desire to return home and the 
community becoming increasingly rooted in exile. Moreover, such unbundling of 
sovereignty, territory and statehood (Ruggie 1993; Anderson 1996) is crucial to 
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understanding both TGiE's articulations of territoriality and the status and lived 
realities of Tibetan settlements as extra-territorial enclaves in India. As outlined in 
the second part of this chapter, Tibetan settlements function as territorial 
exceptions within the sovereign state of India with TGiE's de facto sovereignty 
within these spaces functional through the creation of 'fictions' of sovereignty. The 
TGiE is re-bundling these elements in a new configuration: a sovereignty with a 
substantively reconfigured - indeed 'displaced' - relationship to territory, which is 
often more symbolic than real, and that is overlapping and unstable. And it is ideas 
of sovereignty, governance and governmentality that I want to remain with in the 
next chapter as I shift attention to TGiE's relationship with its diasporic 
population in terms its management of lives and livelihoods. 
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Chapter 6 
Governing Lives and Livelihoods: Constructing a Population, 
Welfare State and Economy in Exile. 
'modern governmentality can be identified by a particular regime of 
government that takes as its object "the population" and is coincident with 
the emergence of political economy ... . Thus government involves the health, 
welfare, prosperity and happiness of the population. ' 
(Dean 1999: 19) 
'We count 122,078 in exile,' females make 44.2% of our population; 74.4% of 
our people can read and write; 26% of our people work; only 25% of Ol~r 
people are aged below 15,' 44.05% of women aged 25-29 are II nmarried,' infant 
mortality rate stands as high as 38.9/1000.' 
(Gyalpo 2004a, www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=7948&t-4&c-l) 
6.1 Introduction 
In exploring the spatiality of TGiE, the previous chapter focused on the 
relationship between territory and sovereignty. However, the significant territorial 
and judicial limitations of the Tibetan government and community in exile 
demonstrate that this mode of power cannot fully explain this case. This chapter 
examines the form and functioning of TGiE from a different theoretical perspective, 
drawing on a different conception of power. Rather than a Weberian sovereign-
territorial model with the state as the centre of power, I want to focus on the extra-
territorial and non-state centric form of power found in Foucault's notions of 
governmentality and biopower. This entails a shift from issues of power over 
territory, land and property to issues of power over population, welfare and 
economy - the management of lives and livelihoods. 
Going beyond the administrative structures of 'government', governmentality 
denotes the micro-political practices through which a governing agency conditions 
people to act in specific ways and through which people govern themselves 
(Foucault 1991). As such, it encapsulates a fundamentally new orientation to the 
study of power and authority and how the individual and the state are connected 
(Dean 1999). At first glance there appear distinct advantages to using these ideas 
for examining the functioning of TGiE. First, whilst Foucault is careful to 
emphasise that governmentality is not the displacement of one form of power 
(sovereignty) with others (disciplinary society and governmentality), nevertheless 
his 'main target is the Hobbesian juridical model of sovereignty, a system of power 
with a single centre' (Neal 2004: 375). Given TGiE's tenuous legal standing and 
lack of legal jurisdiction over territory, this shift away from power being dependent 
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on sovereignty to the 'notion of government as an activity, or an "art" that is plural 
and immanent' (Dean 1999: 103) is a framework which appears highly applicable to 
this case. Secondly, in contrast to theories of government which ask 'who rules?' 
and 'what is the source of that rule?' the idea of governmentality focuses on 'how' 
questions. As such, in focusing on the technologies - the practices, instruments and 
mechanisms - that make different forms of rule possible (Dean 1994: 29, 188) this 
is an approach which is appropriate for what is an often confusingly defined polity. 
Moreover, Foucault's concern with the micro-political and micro-administrative 
practices of power also lends itself to an ethnography of TGiE's governing practices. 
This chapter examines the intersection of the case of TGiE with two ongoing 
debates regarding governmentality: the extent to which governmentality is a state 
or non-state practice, and the question of what is being governed. With regards to 
the former, considering govern mentality as an 'expansive way of thinking about 
governing and rule in relation to the exercise of modern power' (Watts 2003: 13) 
crucially displaces the state as the locus of government and refuses the reduction of 
political power to the actions of the state (Miller and Rose 1990). This facilitates a 
focus on 'the diverse and heterogeneous agencies' through which governance works 
(Dean and Henman 2004: 483), with governmentality as a multidimensional and 
trans-scalar endeavour which can be undertaken by a range of non-state as well as 
state actors (Legg 2005; Sidhu and Christie 2007). Looking beyond Foucault's 
writing, there has been a shift of academic focus towards governance without 
government (Eckersley 2004) and increasing acknowledgement of the technologies 
of governmentality that have arisen beyond the state (Ong 1999; Robinson 1999; 
Rose-Redwood 2006). Yet, we are also accustomed to a certain way of thinking 
about government which derives from the concept of the state. Consequently, the 
majority of literature which draws on the idea of governmentality has viewed it as 
a technique of state power. This includes work by geographers (Philo 1992; 
Murdoch and Ward 1997; Hannah 2000; Watts 2003; Corbridge et al 2005), 
sociologists (e.g. Burchell et al 1991; Barry et al 1996; Dean 1999) and 
anthropologists (e.g. Fuller and Benel 2001; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). Situated 
between and across these approaches to the relationship between governmentality 
and the state, the case of TGiE raises important questions. Do states do 
governmentality in a different way to non-states, and if so, how? Does, as Rose-
Redwood suggests, 'the broad scope of Foucault's notion of "government"". [enable 
us] to consider the interplay between state and non-state practices of government'? 
(2006: 471) 
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Crucially, not only does governmentality open up the possibility of polities other 
than states governing, but it also allows for entities other than territory to be what 
is governed. Whilst governmentality is an inherently spatial concept constituted of 
a range of territorialising strategies, Foucault's writings on governmentality in 
many ways underplay and marginalise the role of territory (Elden 2007). Foucault 
asks whether the emergence of governmentality means that there is 'a shift of 
accent and the appearance of new objectives, and hence of new problems and new 
techniques ... from a "territorial state" to a "population state"?' (2004a: 373 cited in 
Elden 2007: 563). Rather than sovereign power over subjects within a defined 
territorial state, or the disciplinary regulation of bodies within demarcated spaces, 
governmentality regards individuals as members of a population: a resource to be 
used, managed and optimised (Dean 1999). Foucault termed this 'power over life' 
'biopower' (1978) and the subsequent production of knowledge about and regulation 
of the population 'biopolitics'. However, the relative significance of population and 
territory in Foucault's later work remains a topic of debate. Is this a shift from 
governance over territory to governance over a population or, as Elden (2007) asks, 
a shift simply in Foucault's preoccupations? Or, conversely, following Rose-
Redwood (2006), is 'geo-power' a fundamental prerequisite for 'biopower'? 
Given TGiE's lack of contiguous territory and its subsequent inability to govern 
territory in a legal sense, governmentality's construction of entities such as a 
population to be acted upon and thus governed opens up an array of possibilities 
for this exile administration. As such, this chapter explores what it is that TGiE is 
governing in exile, and how such governmentality is operationalised in a territory-
less polity? In seeking to address these questions, this chapter unpacks TGiE's 'arts 
of governing' in exile by examining its construction of three objects of governance: 
population, civil society and the economy. Given its centrality to the concept of 
governmentality, the primary focus will be on the exile administration's 
construction, regulation and governance of a population. Examining the range of 
techniques used by TGiE to bring into visibility the Tibetan population in exile, 
attention will focus on the simultaneous totalising and individualising strategies of 
biopolitics, the importance of population given the lack of territory, and the 
intersection of exile realities with such practices of governmentality. However, 
whilst Foucault's focus was on population, it is important to recognise that 
governmentality can be applied more broadly and that there are other important 
domains of government (Legg 2007a). As such, attention will also focus on the 
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construction of a 'civil society' and an 'economy' in exile. With regards to the 
former, TGiE's state-like rhetoric of welfare provision, individualising strategies, 
archipelago of welfare institutions, and interaction with other welfare providers 
will be explored. Attending to TGiE's changing relationship with Tibetan NGOs in 
exile, it will be argued that the exile government is striving to manage its own 
conduct in relation to a sphere of 'civil society' in exile. Finally, the discursive 
construction of an economy in exile will be examined in the context of seemingly 
intractable limitations. The chapter will conclude by analysing TGiE's creation of 
these separate spheres as an attempt to distinguish itself as a government in 
command of a 'political' sphere, and will return to issues of sovereignty, territory 
and legitimacy. 
6.2 Knowing and governing the Tibetan population in exile 
,[Pjopulation comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of 
government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the 
act of government itself, but the welfare of the poprl-lation, the improvement 
of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health' 
(Foucault 1991: 100). 
With the shift in the eighteenth-century to what Foucault calls governmentality, 
institutions such as the state take a different interest in the people over whom they 
govern. Central to this was 'the identification of the people of the state as a 
population which was understood as the proper focus of the art of government' 
(Painter 1995: 38). Concomitant with governmentality being the regulation and 
optimisation of the population is 'the emergence of population as a datum, as a field 
of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques' (Foucault 1991: 
102). Given TGiE's lack of territorial jurisdiction and the centrality of the diaspora 
to its raison d'etre, the 'creation' of a population is of heightened importance in this 
case. This section seeks to explore how the Tibetan population in exile comes to be 
an object of government and how the relationship between govern mentality and 
this population works in this case of a governing agency lacking jurisdiction over 
territory. In order to address these questions I want to take as a broad framework 
Hannah's (2000) three 'moments' in the cycle of social control: observation, 
normalising judgement and regulation. Through this I will focus on how TGiE 
seeks to know its population through technologies, imagines and normalises the 
population through discourses and manages the population by regulating conduct. 
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6.2.l. Observational moment: knowing the exile population through census 
and statistics 
The Tibetan Government prior to 1959 knew relatively little about its population. 
The boundaries of Tibetan territory were never clearly defined, regional identities 
subsumed a broader Tibetan national identity, and no census had ever been 
conducted (Goldstein 1989). The process of taking refuge in exile has, however, 
rendered this part of the Tibetan population highly visible - as destitute refugees 
and as ethnically, culturally and religiously distinct from their hosts - and, as 
such, was in itself an 'observational moment'. Indeed, whilst the elaboration of a 
notion of the population is conventionally a gradual technical and theoretical 
process (Dean 1999), in the Tibetan case this process was accelerated by the flight 
into exile. 
For the first few years it was the Indian Government which recorded the number of 
Tibetans entering India and where they (were) moved to within the state (TPPRC 
2006a, 2006b). The organised transfer of Tibetan refugees from initial transit 
camps to agricultural settlements facilitated the observation of this population, 
which continues to be monitored by the Indian authorities through registration 
with local police authorities and the administration of 'Registration Certificates' 
(see Chapter 7). With the (re)establishment and subsequent bureaucratic 
development of TGiE, the exiled administration gradually developed mechanisms 
to know more about its population, to the extent that TGiE has collected more 
'information' about the exile population than the Tibetan Government knew about 
the Tibetan population in pre-1959 Tibet. Until 1998, such knowledge about the 
exile population was acquired through a range of ad hoc surveys and registration 
systems. These included: Settlement and Welfare Office records; the 
documentation of newcomer refugees by TGiE Reception Centres in Kathmandu, 
Delhi and Dharamsala; the administration of TGiE-issued identity documents; the 
registration of individuals at Tibetan schools and monasteries; surveys conducted 
for the TGiE's 'Integrated Development Plans'; and DUR records regarding 
Tibetans residing outside South Asia. Whilst significant in developing statistical 
skills within the community, these surveys and processes of registration were each 
aimed at either a specific cohort within the exiled population, or administered 
within a particular sector (health care, education etc), A milestone in how TGiE 
has come to 'know' its population came with the first census - the 'Tibetan 
Demographic Survey' (TDS) - of the exile Tibetan community in 1998, and it is to 
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the processes, techniques and materialities of this census that that I want to 
turn.97 
'The census remains one of the principal conduits of biopolitics' (Corbridge et ol 
2005: 27) and, as Hannah argues in his study of governmentality in nineteenth-
century America, it is 'an unusually revealing institution through which to trace 
the mutual influence of the logic of govern mentality and the larger cultural context 
in which it was embedded' (2000: 222). In the Tibetan case, the TDS was conducted 
under the auspices of TGiE's Planning Commission and was 'carried out 
systematically and scientifically with due cooperation from the Census Commission 
of India' (Planning Commission 2004: 7). 2,375 enumerators were recruited from 
settlement staff, monks and school-teachers to undertake the census in 93 locations 
in India and Nepal on 12th June 1998, while enumeration of overseas Tibetans was 
conducted by volunteers working with the Offices of Tibet. Household and 
individual questionnaires were filled in, with the former covering institutions as 
well as conventional households, and the data fmm the 1998 TDS was published in 
two substantial volumes (Figure 6.a), and has been used extensively by TGiE, the 
GoI and independent researchers.98 
Figure 6.0: Front cover of Tibetan Demographic Survey (Planning 
Commission 2000) 
97 A second census was conducted in April 2009 but, at the time of writing, results had not ye t been 
published. The discussion here is therefore based on the 1998 TDS. 
98 Household questionnaires addressed issues of tenure, facilities , the di tance to the nearest cli nic and 
school. who lives in the household and where they were born while individual questionnaires gathered 
information on age, sex, religion, languages spoken and li teracy, education , marita l tatus, place of birth . 
reasons for migration, employment and citizenship. 
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The census is conventionally associated with the state. Generally considered to be a 
national technique of power, the census, alongside the map, is a key way in which 
state power is extended and consolidated and the homogenous space of the nation 
constructed (Anderson 1991; Hannah 2000). Thus, as a non-state, how does TGiE's 
census relate to these descriptions? What are the key points of convergence and 
divergence between TDS and a 'conventional' national census? At face value the 
TDS appears to be more in line with national, state organised, population censuses 
than most refugee population surveys. Rather than a joint exercise between 
UNHCR and the host government (Hyndman 2000), the TDS was initiated and 
organised by the refugee community itself, albeit with external funding and 
technical expertise. Moreover, never explicitly referred to as a 'refugee census', the 
TDS's objective was not to assist refugee protection and programmes such as 
voluntary repatriation, reintegration or resettlement abroad, nor is it used to issue 
identity documentation or register refugees on an individual basis. 
With regards to similarities to a state census, the use of a standardised census 
format - conducted every ten years with household and individual data stored in 
aggregate form and analysed and presented statistically - can be read as (yet 
another) attempt by TGiE to 'play the state game'. In light of this 'standardised 
technology', TGiE claims that it is 'in a position to provide reliable population data 
to the United Nations and various international aid organizations when requested' 
(planning Council 1994, Section 2.6.4.1). Secondly, in line with state rationales for 
conducting censuses, the primary objective of the survey is to facilitate planning in 
and for the community, identifying needs on a settlement-by-settlement basis, 
charting population trends, allocating resources and deriving a baseline from 
" which to measure the effectiveness of development programs (Chief Planning 
Officer, 20.03.2006). Finally, the census and statistical studies published from it 
.,,,,4-, 
form ,an important part of TGiE's nascent and state-like archive. Stored in TGiE 
•• j •••• 
offices and the dedicated Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala , 
this material record also includes data collected by each of TGiE's departments, 
,. t~ " 
testimonies from recent refugees and a range of historical, cultural and religious 
.. ", " 
documents smuggled out of Tibet. More than simply a record of TGiE's activities, 
the ~xile government's concern for gathering, using and storing information is, like 
~ ... ,~ 
state archives generally, part of the exile administration's construction and use of 
•. If' 
power (Ogborn 2003). Thus, as a process of knowledge production which constructs 
" 
'a set of bureaucratic imaginaries ... a kind of grand fiction with undoubted "reality" 
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effects' (Thrift 2000: 382), the exile archive can be understood as an attempt by 
TGiE to consolidate and reify this polity's existence and place in the world. 
However, important differences between TDS and conventional national censuses 
are also revealing. Firstly, with TGiE's limited judicial powers there is no element 
of coercion in the Tibetan census: not cooperating in the enumeration is not illegal 
and there are no penalties. Secondly, in what will be a recurring theme in this 
chapter, an important additional objective of the TDS is as a training exercise in 
demographic methods and statistical analysis, providing the exiled community 
with experience and expertise needed to conduct such a project in 'Future Tibet' 
(Planning Council 1994, Section 2.6.4.1). 
Perhaps the most enlightening disjuncture between the TDS and conventional 
national censuses is the issue of territory. The census is conventionally intricately 
linked with both territory and territorialising strategies. With regards the former, 
whilst the exile Tibetan census is fundamentally not the conventional counting of 
individuals within a contiguous and bounded space, it is shaped by the spatiality of 
the diaspora. In theory this is a transnational census in its attempts to enumerate 
the exile community resident in a number of different states. However, given the 
challenges resulting from the geographical dispersion and high levels of mobility of 
the exile community there are significant 'blind spots' in TGiE's 'vision' of the social 
body. In light of financial and bureaucratic constraints, questionnaires were not 
used beyond India and Nepal, with only the total numbers of Tibetans living 
abroad being documented (Planning Council 2000: 6). In addition, there were 
difficulties encountered 'enumerating the scattered or floating population, those 
who are living outside their permanent settlements or residing permanently in 
Indian cities' (ibid). As such, the TDS is perhaps most accurately a census of the 
population in India, and, more specifically, those residing in Tibetan settlements. 
This bias towards the bounded spaces of the settlements is also reflected in the 
Planning Commission's use of territorialising practices. Typically, a census is 
preceded by land surveys and the census results are used for demographic 
mapping. As such, Hannah describes the census as 'an important geographical 
moment in the establishment of territorial mastery' (2000: 9. See also Edney 1997; 
Scott 1998). At the micro-level of the settlements there are distinct similarities 
between the TDS and such territorialising practices. For example, following the 
Indian Census model, land surveying in the form of house-listing within Tibetan 
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settlements in India and Nepal was conducted prior to the 1998 census (Planning 
Council 2000: 5-6). Indeed, land surveying has been a regular practice within the 
settlements, both in terms of the initial demarcation and allocation of plots 
(Norgay, Dekyiling 17.04.2007), and an ongoing regulatory programme of checks 
for plot encroachment.99 The enumeration process of entering Tibetan homes and 
its prerequisite land-surveys can thus be read as fundamentally territorial 
exercises, with such practices also correlating with the assertion made in the 
previous chapter that the bounded spaces of the exile settlements are key to the 
governmental nmctions of TGiE. 
Stepping back from the details of the TDS, I want to return to literature that draws 
on Foucault's ideas of governmentality and biopower to consider the wider 
implications of the census and its role within the exiled Tibetan community. As a 
number of scholars have persuasively argued through a diverse range of case 
studies (Anderson 1991; Murdoch and Ward 1997; Scott 1998), the census and the 
statistics generated from it are techniques which do far more than merely provide 
information about a population. For a start, the presentation of demographic data 
in the form of tables, graphs and diagrams are key mechanisms through which the 
population is made legible and rendered as an entity to be organised, controlled, 
manipulated, studied and known (Barnes and Hannah 2001: 379), and thus made 
'amenable to intervention and regulation' (Miller and Rose 1990: 5; Figure 6.b). 
Figure 6.b: Population Distribution statistics (Planning Commission 2004: 41) 
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99 In terms of mapping, the census data itself is not mapped and the maps which TGiE does produce - of its 
settlements and welfare facilities in South Asia (see Chapter 5) - are descriptive tools rather than a 
'geographical moment in the establishment of tert'itorial mastery' (Hannah 2000: 9).The only map included 
in the censuS publication is one of Tibetan enumeration centres in South Asia which hows the site of 
Tibetan settlements and scattered communities in India and Nepal (planning Commission 2000: viii. 
Similar to Figure 5.d). 
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The census therefore constitutes a key part of the governing process: a mechanism 
of regulation central to the possibility of governmental control and stable rule 
(Watts 2003). In the case of TGiE, the administration claims that through the TDS 
it 'knows' 'the quality and constitution of the Community's human resource base' 
(Planning Commission 2004: 18), and establishes the boundaries of this entity by 
employing important exclusions in delimiting the Tibetan population (Planning 
Council 2000). 
With the Tibetan population in exile having thus come into view through the TDS 
as a distinct and singular entity, the TGiE has developed a range of strategies for 
examining, problematising and rationalising its internal dynamics. Encapsulated 
in the 'problem tree' produced for the third Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
(Figure 6.c), a number of 'critical demographic and socio-economic issues' (Planning 
Commission 2004: 18) are perceived to compromise the ongoing success of this exile 
population. Indeed, it is the discourses underpinning the economic, social, 
demographic and institutional issues raised in this diagram, and practices 
employed to seek to rectify and manage them which will form an important 
backdrop to the remaining sections of this chapter. 
Figure 6.c: Problem tree produced for IDP III (TGiE 2004: 9) 
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Of course the 'process of supposedly impartial assessment whereby knowledge 
gained from observation of the body politic is translated into socioeconomic policy 
remains highly imperfect' (Hannah 2000: 14), but the laying out - and one might 
say totalising - of these policy issues has the effect of generating a demand for 
long-term planning and intervention. As such, framed as key to improving the lives 
of the exiled population, an infrastructure of centralised planning in the exile 
community was institutionalised through the establishment of the Planning 
Council in 1988.100 Serving as a consultant to the Kashag in matters relating to 
socio-economic development, the Planning Commission was set the task of 
identifying and meeting the needs of the community through generating a series of 
plans 'for using the Tibetan Refugee Community's human, material and financial 
resources for the development of the Community more efficiently' (Planning 
Council 1994, Section 9.6.1). Modelled on the Indian Planning Commission's Five-
Year Plans - a formal framework of state planning instituted after India gained 
independence (Corbridge 2008) - these have been formulated as IDPs.lol Produced 
in consultation with the various departments of TGiE and with a cross-section of 
the community in the exile settlements,102 these detailed and lengthy documents 
set out the development priorities for the community and outline individual 
projects and their budgets for prospective funders (Chief Planning Officer, 
20.03.2006).103 In thus both offering a totalising overview of the exile community's 
attributes, needs and priorities, and meeting 'the demand of Western friends of 
Tibet for rationality, objective standards, prioritization of projects: in short, the 
apparatus of efficient modernity' (Lafitte 1999: 158), these substantial national 
plans can, I argue, be seen as examples of nascent state planning (and state-
building) within the TGiE. Albeit contingent on external funding and limited in 
implementation, these 'road maps' for the exile community distinguish TGiE from 
most refugee or diaspora organisations and create an elaborate fiction of a state-in-
exile. Moreover, with governmentality dependent upon 'the intellectual 
technologies, practical activities and social authority associated with expertise' 
(Miller and Rose 1990: 1), this formation of a body of experts within the TGiE 
charged with understanding this entity of the population and planning the overall 
progress of the community can be seen as a key component in this mode of power. 
100 The 'Planning Council' was renamed the 'Planning Commission' in 2003 (Tibetan Bulletin 2003, 7(4): 12). 
101 To date three five-year plans have been published and the fourth is being drafted. 
102 'Field Planning Officers' were trained by the Planning Commission and sent to the Tibetan settlements 
in India and Nepal to meet with settlement officials and conduct planning workshops with a range of 
settlers which. according to the Planning Commission was an 'exercise in grassroots democracy' (planning 
Council 1994. Section 2.1.3). 
103 The third !DP (2003-2007) consisted of 12 principal areas and 534 projects and programmes with a total 
cost of 104.40.00000 Rupees (23.2 million US$) (TGiE 2004). 
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6.2.2. Normalising judgement: creating the exile population through 
discourse 
In shifting from the techniques and micropolitics of power to the discursive 
character of governmentality (Miller and Rose 1990), I want to examine some of the 
discourses underpinning the issues summarised in the 'problem tree' (Figure 6.c) 
and, therefore, in the development planning process. Following Hannah's 
framework of the cycle of social control this entails a move from 'observational 
moments' to 'normalising judgement', attending to how the exile population is 
imagined, created and understood by TGiE through discursive and totalising 
practices. What is striking is that whilst TGiE seeks to 'know' its exile population 
using the techniques conventionally employed by states - census-taking and 
statistical analysis - its discursive construction of the population is specifically 
attuned to the exile situation. In light of the threatened 'loss of purpose and 
Tibetan language and identity' (TGiE 2004), this is a population perceived as 
having a series of interlinked and distinct purposes: as a 'resource' which needs to 
be preserved; as a population in waiting and in training ready to return to govern a 
future Tibet; and as a cultural repository, preserving a unified and essentialised 
Tibetan national identity outside the home territory. 
At the core of TGiE's construction of its population is the idea of population as a 
resource: a resource under threat in Tibet and which therefore needs to be 
preserved in exile. TGiE's concerns with demographic changes in the Tibetan 
population in Tibet are a recurrent and often highly politicised part of government 
publications and speeches by political leaders (Shiromany 1998) and, 
unsurprisingly, are a major point of contention with the Chinese authorities. The 
TGiE alleges that 1.2 million Tibetans died between 1959 and 1986 through 
detention, famine, prosecution and poverty as a direct result of Chinese occupation 
(Planning Council 2000: 1). This is a figure which, despite its reliability being 
disputed, 'has become enshrined as an incontrovertible truth in exile discourse' 
(Childs and Barkin 2006: 40). In addition, TGiE and Tibetan NGOs claim that the 
Chinese authorities are undertaking 'demographic aggression' through policies of 
forced abortions and sterilisations in Tibetan areas and deliberate population 
transfer of Han Chinese into Tibet, with the result that Tibetans are becoming a 
minority in their own land (AFP, 3 November 2007).104 This portrayal of an ethnic 
104 Whilst the 2000 Chinese census reported a 26% increase in the Tibetan population in China since 1990, 
Chinese statistics also record a 3.5% fall in the proportion of Tibetans to non·Tibetans in the 'Tibetan 
Autonomous Region between 1990 and 2000 (MacPherson et al 2008). 
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group threatened with extinction is discursively linked by the exiled 
administration to the vitality of the exiled population, with the construction of the 
latter as a population whose numbers need to be preserved (Planning Commission 
2004: 19). In light of such anxieties, and following the publication of the TDS 
results, TGiE has become 'obsessed with statistics concerning birth rates, 
morbidity and endemics' (Legg 2005: 1341). A key concern is the low and declining 
fertility rate (from 4.9 births per women in 1987-9 to 1.7 in 1999-2001) and the 
subsequent 'threat to the sustenance of the Tibetan community in India ... and 
erosion of [our] very purpose' (Planning Commission 2004: 30). 
This discourse of the Tibetan population (or rather, populations) as a resource has 
important resonances with state-like strategies of biopower. Not only has TGiE 
established as one of its central concerns the care, health and reproduction of the 
exile population, but it is also seeking to optimise the productivity of this 
population in order to meet the exile government's broader political project. 
Central to this idea is the discursive construction of this population as 'in waiting', 
ready to return to the homeland in the future. Premised on an idealised and 
arguably unrealistic notion that the exile community will move 'back home' if or 
when the political conditions are favourable (see Chapter 5), this discourse is 
articulated in terms of the need for a healthy and expanding exile population 
trained in the skills of governance, democracy and development planning in order 
to implement these ideas in governing a 'Future Tibet'. 
However, whilst important, discourses around biopolitics only tell half the story. In 
addition to the vitality of the Tibetan population being under threat from Chinese 
population policies, Tibetan identity and culture are also perceived as endangered 
(Samdup 1993). As a result, the exile population is perceived by TGiE as a cultural 
and national repository, preserving Tibetan identity and way of life outside the 
home territory. Indeed, this is articulated as one of the main reasons for coming 
into and remaining in exile: 
'The purpose of the Tibetans in exile is two-fold, viz., to seek justice for our 
homeland and to preserve our identity and language by practicing our 
culture and traditions. The first purpose is dependent on many factors 
including international situation, political changes within China etc that 
are beyond our control.. .. However, the second purpose is not dependent on 
external factors and can be fulfilled by every Tibetan in exile' (Tibetan 
Bulletin, 7(3), 2003: 16). 
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In order to construct the diasporic population as a cultural repository, TGiE needed 
to foster a very particular kind of population in exile: a cohesive, united and 
homogenous community which shares a single national identity. lOIS In doing so, the 
exile government has sought to subsume fractious regional and sectarian identities 
which dominated pre-1950s Tibet under a homogenous and pan-Buddhist national 
Tibetan identity which had previously not existed beyond the Lhasa elite (Nowak 
1984).106 It is a strategy which has been largely successful for, whilst regional 
identities and divisions remain in the community (especially with regards to the 
exile elections, see Chapter 8), most interviewees spoke of , Tibetan ness' being their 
most important identity marker, reflecting Yeh's observation that regional 
identities are 'largely papered over in the transnational nation-building' (2007: 
650). This essentialising of national identity and politicising of Tibetan ethnicity 
thus forms a key part of TGiE's nation-building project in exile (Nol'bu 1992). In 
addition, it is imperative to remember that this construction of a nationalised 
population generates a new national body formed primarily in exile. As such, an 
increasingly significant division arises between the exile population and Tibetans 
in Tibet. The decades-long project of cultural preservation in exile has produced, 
confusingly, both a static and conservative version of Tibetan culture, and one 
increasingly influenced by Indian and Western cultures (Harris 1997; Yeh and 
Lama 2006). Meanwhile, Tibetan culture and identity within the homeland has 
been suppressed and increasingly sinicized and, where exile and homeland cultures 
come together, there are often tensions over issues of identity and authenticity 
(Yeh 2007). 
Relating such discursive constructions of Tibetan identity to ideas of 
governmentality, the importance placed on the discourse of cultural preservation 
within the Tibetan government and community in exile offers an important 
interjection. For, whilst biopolitics is important to the construction and 
management of the Tibetan 'population' (as outlined above), it is matched if not 
superseded by the role of cultural politics. The role of culture is heightened in this 
case both because of the perceived threat to its existence and continuance in the 
homeland and, given the practical and legal limitations faced by TGiE, it is 
IO~ Indeed, whilst nationalist movements in general claim a distinct identity and independent history and 
strive to present an image of unity, this project is prioritised in the Tibetan case given the perceived threats 
to the Tibetan population and Tibetan identity in Tibet (Bentz 2006). 
106 Discussed in more detail in the following chapter, Tibetan nationalism is broadly understood as 
constructed through the occupation of Tibet and flight into exile (Shakya 1999: 95) with TGiE central to the 
fostering of a national identity and political consciousness. 
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through the cultural realm and construction of nationalism that TGiE primarily 
attempts to assert its authority. As a young teacher at TCV Sonamling explained: 
'The power and authority of our government, it comes from the sentiments, 
the patriotic and heartfelt sentiments of the people - what is in their hearts 
not the practicalities of our government because its finances aren't big at all 
and it cannot help people much financially but ... it's because of people's 
nationalism that it exists and is so important' (Riga, 21.05.2007). 
Such privileging of the role of culture and nationalism thus highlights both the 
danger of reducing politics to biopolitics and the need to foreground and critically 
engage with cultural politics and cultural contexts in relation to governmentality. 
Indeed, if we are to chart the transformation of a 'population' into a social body and 
national 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) through discursive practices, then 
the role of culture is central. For, while governmentality requires and constructs 
'the social' as an object of governmental concern, this is a social body imagined 
through specific cultural frames, and with a particular cultural purpose. 
6.2.3. Regulation: managing the population through regulating individual 
conduct 
In order to examine how TGiE strives to achieve the 'ideal' exile population 
outlined above I want to turn to the final moment in the cycle of social control of 
this Tibetan population in exile, that of the regulation of the body politic. Indeed, it 
is only once the social body has been identified and reified as a resource and quasi 
object that its care can be managed and its behaviour regulated (Barnes and 
Hannah 2001); a role conventionally viewed as that of the state. In contrast to the 
totalising strategies of state-planning and policy-making, I want to focus here on 
the individualising mode of governmentality and, keeping the intertwining of 
biopolitics and cultural politics in the foreground, explore TGiE's strategies for 
regulating the health, identity and mobility of its 'citizens' in exile. 
Turning first to discourses regarding the Tibetan population as a scarce resource, 
the exile government attempts to employ regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics 
through the management of the health and reproductive behaviour of its exile 
population. The TGiE's Department of Health, established in 1981 as an apex body 
to 'plan a comprehensive health care system for the Tibetan Refugee Community' 
(Planning ~ouncil 1994, Section 6), currently administers an extensive network of 
health care facilities. These include seven hospitals, five Primary Health Centres, a 
clinic in each of the 47 settlements in India and Nepal and a school for children 
I 
with special needs (Department of Health 2005). Alongside these medical 
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institutions are a range of public health policies and initiatives, with programmes 
for disease control (with a focus on tuberculosis), improving sanitation and access 
to drinking water in the settlements, and expanding health education programmes. 
In terms of promoting the reproduction of the population, 'mother and child health' 
and 'reproductive health' programmes have been initiated by TGiE and rolled out 
across the settlements (Secretary, Department of Health 21.03.2006). In addition, 
stable family units or, as they are termed in the TDS 'normal household situations' 
(Planning Council 2000: 12) are promoted within the community through the 
allocation of settlement houses and TGiE's discouragement of the annual migratory 
trade in sweaters (see below). More broadly, pronatalism is strongly promoted by 
TGiE as an essential step towards stemming the perceived threat to the existence 
of Tibetans as a distinct ethnic group. As such, members of the exile community 
are 'encouraged to further a nationalistic agenda, promulgated and disseminated 
by their leaders, by reproducing exclusively with Tibetans at a sufficient rate to 
ensure population growth' (Childs and Barkin 2006: 49). TGiE also attempts to 
regulate sexual and reproductive behaviour through managing the interaction of 
its population in exile with their host community, actively promoting ethnic 
endogamy and discouraging assimilation and citizenship in host nations (McGukin 
1997). As outlined in the previous chapter, the policy of non-assimilation was one 
supported by India and resulted in the establishment of separate and exclusive 
Tibetan settlements. In addition to this spatial separation, there is widespread 
disapproval from both the exile leadership and the general public of marriages 
outside the Tibetan community. 
This promotion of endogamy is therefore central to TGiE's attempts to foster a 
homogenous Tibetan community in exile sheltered from external influences, and 
hence aptly illustrates the exile government's pursuit of cultural politics through 
regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics. For, just as the Tibetan population is 
discursively constructed by TGiE as both a biopower resource and cultural 
repository, so the regulatory strategies the exile administration employs to manage 
the population emphasises the cultural and national identity of the population 
alongside its health and fecundity. With regards to TGiE's attempts to manage 
identity construction within the exile community, a number of regulatory 
mechanisms are employed with varying degrees of effectiveness. Perhaps the most 
obvious is the TGiE's establishment of universal Tibetan citizenship. Whilst 
discussed in detail in the following chapter, it is important to note here that TGiE's 
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definition of a 'bona fide Tibetan' through the norms and exclusions of Tibetan 
citizenship individualises exile Tibetans in specific ways (Corrigan and Sayer 
1985). It is a state-like process of simplification whereby Tibetans are produced as 
citizens and thereby made legible to the governing authority (Scott 1998). Secondly, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, the Tibetan settlements and cultural and 
religious institutions are central to the project of nation-building, both in terms of 
constituting 'national spaces' in exile, and as spaces of governance where the 
population can be kept together, observed and managed. 
In addition, a standardised version of Tibetan nationalism has been fostered in 
exile through a range of 'national' traditions and rituals which construct a powerful 
imagined sense of solidarity and belonging. These are patriotic yet banal acts and 
performances (Billig 1995) which include singing the national anthem, flying the 
national flag, staging debates on the legitimacy of Tibet's claim to independence 
and participation in national 'holidays' such as the anniversary of the national 
uprising in Lhasa on 10th March 1959 and the Dalai Lama's birthday on 6th July 
(Nowak 1978). Indeed, with its implied national solidarity in the terms 'We count 
122,078 in exile ... 74.4% of ou,r people can read', the quotation from an article 
posted on phayu1.com by Gyalpo at the start of this chapter is a prime example of 
banal nationalism at work. These performances of Tibetan nationhood therefore 
perpetuate the myth of national unity, instilling a collective sensibility and a 
uniform definition of Tibetan identity (Kolas 1996: 57). Moreover, such 'traditions' 
and practices have not only been reinterpreted in exile. but are often 'invented' 
and. crucially. 'through their position of authority. the Dalai Lama and the 
government-in-exile become primary authors of these reworkings' (Houston and 
Wright 2003: 222): a role which reinforces the administration's authority and 
legitimacy. 
Another key arena in which Tibetan identity is standardised and regulated is that 
of education. It is widely accepted that school curricula construct a citizen's moral 
order. worldview and sense of national identity (Radcliffe 2001). In the Tibetan 
case, education has been accorded the highest priority since the early years of exile 
and the Department of Education currently administers 85 schools in India. Nepal 
and Bhutan, serving around 70% (27,220) of Tibetan children in exile (planning 
Council 1994, Section 5.1.1).107 In these schools 'Tibetan textbooks and teachers ... 
107 Tibetan schools in exile can be categorised into three types depending on the source of funding and 
administrative structure. Firstly, TGiE's Department of Education directly runs and funds 34 'Sambhota' 
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transmit a curriculum of Tibetaness' (Kohis 1996: 57) alongside the Indian Central 
Board of Secondary Education-approved syllabus. In documenting the role of this 
exilic education system in promoting an essentialised notion of Tibetan nationalism 
Nowak notes that this was a 'systematic attempt to shape a more cohesive group 
identity in exile' (1978: 71) especially amongst second generation Tibetans in India. 
Such is the pivotal role of education in the eyes of TGiE that failings in the 
education system - such as 'declining education standards' particularly around 
issues of language (Figure 6.c) - are perceived to jeopardise the broader project of 
preserving Tibetan culture and identity (Additional Secretary, Department of 
Education, 17.03.2006). In light of such concerns, the TGiE has recently launched a 
'Basic Education Policy' which (re)emphasises traditional Tibetan education taught 
in Tibetan language and promotes the 'study of the value, teachings, practices and 
histories of the principles of nonviolence and democracy' (Department of Education 
2005: 69). As such, this policy aims to produce a very specific and idealised 'type' of 
Tibetan - both traditional and modern, non-violent and truthful - through what 
are in effect a series of disciplinary institutions (schools) and technologies 
(curriculum). Through this normalising of an ideal 'Tibetan', becoming and being a 
Tibetan 'citizen' can be seen as highly performative (see Taylor 1997).108 
The final set of regulatory mechanisms that I want to highlight are those related to 
distinct cohorts within the exile population who, in failing or refusing to remain 
within the established Tibetan spaces in India, are perceived as threatening the 
population ideal of a homogenous, united and nationalised community. In order to 
regula~e the mobility and residency behaviour of these groups, such individuals 
first n~ed to be identified through categorisation techniques employed in the TDS 
and a range of other socio-economic surveys (Hacking 1991; Scott 1998). Seen 
through the lens of governmentality, such formalised and codified systems of 
categorisation are, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue, central to the 
articula tion of state power and authority. 
schools. 'Secondly, 30 'Central Schools for Tibetans' are financed by the Central Tibetan Schools 
Administration, an autonomous body of the Gol, and administered by the TGiE. Finally, 21 schools are 
funded and administered by private charitable organisations, notably the Tibetan Children's Village and 
Tibetan Homes Foundation. 
108 However, the Basic Education Policy has proved controversial, especially regarding the issue of 
language. Whilst those supporting the transition to Tibetan medium stress the importance of the language 
to Tibetan identity. a number of teachers, students and parents are not convinced, arguing that Tibetan 
medium education will disadvantage Tibetan students in the Indian job market, or looking for careers in 
the West (interviews with parents in Dekyiling and Bylakuppe, and university students in Delhi and 
Dharamsala) . 
. '
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The first cohort is the thousands of refugees who, as a result of to resource 
constraints, remain 'unsettled' in India and Nepal. Consistently viewed as 'other' to 
the population residing in the Tibetan settlements, these individuals 'do not belong 
to a viable Tibetan community in which they can preserve their language and 
culture and give their children a Tibetan education' (Planning Council 1994, 
Section 3B.1.1). Prompting similar concerns are the thousands of Tibetans who, 
due to a lack of employment opportunities in the settlements, leave in the winter 
months to sell sweaters in cities across India. lo9 Although this is 'one of the oldest 
trades that Tibetans got into since their arrival in India and majority of our people 
are still dependent on it' (Paljor Bulletin June 2005: 16), the social effects of this 
annual migration, especially on the institution of the family, are viewed as highly 
problematic by TGiE. As the Additional Secretary at the Department of Home and 
then Finance and DIIR Kalon explained: 
'This seasonal work, it affects the sustainability of settlement. Able-bodied 
adults are away and ... how to say ... family atmosphere is not there. This 
doesn't serve our main aim of settlements, of keeping the community 
together' (18.03.2006), 
'there are many problems with this sweater selling - so there is a health 
hazard as they don't have proper shops and just sell from the road side so 
they have problems with dust and cold.... Also there are significant 
problems for the community, especially with bringing up children as it's not 
so decent, especially interacting with locals at that level of society. It 
hampers our society and splits our families, and the families you see are the 
centre of our tradition and culture preservation' (10.04.2006). 
These concerns about individuals leaving the homogenous Tibetan communities of 
the settlements are also articulated with regards to a third cohort. Frequently 
mentioned in TGiE policy documents and a recurrent topic of conversation in my 
interviews, this is the 'youth', or more specifically the 'unemployed youth'. Whilst 
older generations in general live sheltered lives in the Tibetan settlements, young 
Tibetans educated in exile are far more exposed to Indian and Western society 
(Strom 1995), prompting concerns regarding loss of culture, anti-social behaviour 
and increasing numbers emigrating to the West (TWA 2005: 56). 
Having identified these cohorts and constructed them as problematic. TGiE has 
sought to regulate their behaviour with the goal of integrating them into the 
'mainstream' ofthe exile community. Central to this has been an attempt to control 
109 The 1998 TDS reported that 63.71% of the total exile population are engaged in informal migratory 
trading during the winter months (planning Council 2000: 18). 
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the residency and mobility of these 'wayward' cohorts. Whilst, as noted above, the 
extent to which space is a tool of material social control is limited in this case, a 
number of territorialising mechanisms are nevertheless employed to attempt to 
manage the mobility of populations through the system of settlements. These 
include the 'listing' of Tibetan families and individuals moving to the 
settlements;110 the assigning of vacant houses within the settlements to 'unsettled' 
Tibetans; and encouraging sweater sellers and young Tibetans residing in Indian 
cities to 'resettle' in the settlements. With regards to the latter, this has been 
framed by TGiE as a process and project of 'rehabilitation' whereby the provision of 
housing and basic social amenities has an explicit aim of 'mainstreaming and 
integrating the scattered populations' (Secretary, Department of Home, 
06.11.2007). These policies carry with them distinct connotations of social 
regulation. Government officials frequently spoke of establishing a desired order 
and stability within the community, of attempting to 'settle' the 'troublesome' 
scattered populations and the young generation, and persuade them away from the 
social dangers they are exposed to outside the community. The settlements can 
therefore be seen as 'governable spaces' in exile. Indeed, in seeming to support the 
argument made in the previous chapter that governmental power is ultimately 
contingent upon, and is made possible through, spatial relations and territory (see 
Allen 2003a), it is interesting to ponder whether the territories in exile enable 
TGiE to operate as a 'government.' Or, conversely, if the Tibetan diaspora in India 
was more conventionally dispersed, would the governmental functions of TGiE be 
diminished? 
These regulatory policies have faced significant challenges and limitations. Not 
only is TGiE's governing authority limited by its operation within the sovereign 
space of India, but the territorialising strategies of resettlement often face 
significant resistance from the cohorts at which they are aimed. Although its moral 
authority - and the governmental legitimacy which stems from this - are highly 
significant and go some way to explaining the compliance of Tibetans with TGiE 
settlement policies in the past, ultimately TGiE lacks the legal authority and 
coercive (state) powers to determine the movement of its exiled citizens. The TGiE 
cannot force Tibetans to move to or remain in the settlements, or indeed remain in 
IndialNepal. Indeed, in a number of cases the TGiE's policies of settling scattered 
110 This includes the transfer of families from road construction camps to the settlements in Karnataka in 
the 1960s, and the listing of impoverished widows and newcomers to join handicraft settlements (General 
Manager, Rajpur handicrafts centre, 24.04.2007). 
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Tibetans have not been received in the way that they were intended. Several 
interviewees in Dekyiling spoke of how their families who had been living in 
scattered communities were granted a house in the settlement on a rent free basis 
but continued to trade in the hill stations in Uttarakhand, renting out their 
settlement house or using it for storage. Such use (or abuse) of the system therefore 
indicates both some of the limitations of TGiE's governance, and perhaps an 
increasingly conventional state-citizen distrust. 
However, such limitations appear almost insignificant compared to the most 
noticeable and problematic division within the exile population: that between 
newcomer refugees and those brought up in exile. Based on increasingly 
intractable cultural differences between these cohorts, Yeh notes how; 
'the fact that Tibetan identity in exile has been constituted in opposition to 
China contributes to both the scorn and suspicion of the 'Chinese' 
appearance and behavior of new arrivals who, because they are different, 
are seen as less than authentically Tibetan ... as a result, many new arrivals 
report that they feel like outsiders among Tibetan exiles in India' (2007: 
653-654). 
Such marginalisation of, and even discrimination against, refugees newly arrived 
from Tibet was readily apparent from my interviews in Dharamsala. I was often 
left with an impression of two separate communities within the town, a division 
which one Tibetan journalist described as 'a scourge in our community, a hindrance 
to our unity and so to our freedom struggle' (Nyidon, 02.05.2007). Surprisingly, this 
potentially destructive schism within the exile population is one which TGiE 
appears not to be attempting to regulate or even intervene in. Several interviewees 
asserted that TGiE has done little to integrate the newcomers into the existing 
community, with recent refugees rarely being elected to the exile parliament or 
being appointed to government jobs (which require Indian-recognised 
qualifications), and one recent exile claiming that TGiE has become a government 
for Tibetans born in exile, not for those from Tibet like himself (Khedup, 
27.03.2007). 
6.2.4. Summary 
Despite notable limitations and challenges, TGiE has been broadly successful in 
constructing the Tibetan population in exile as an entity over which it has 
responsibility and thus as an object of government. Crucially, this is a process 
which both constructs and goes some way to legitimising TGiE as a governing 
authority. For, without territory to call their own, it is the population which has 
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followed the Dalai Lama into exile over the past 50 years which has validated the 
exile administration's existence and continued functioning. As such, it is hardly 
surprising that the construction of this population has taken on a heightened 
importance in this case. However, this section has also explored how, although this 
is not a population defined by a contiguous territory in which it resides, TGiE does 
nevertheless employ territorialising strategies. These include both in its attempts 
to 'know' the population through land-surveying in the settlements, and attempts 
to manage the mobility and residency of 'wayward' cohorts. As such, the situation 
of exile has significantly shaped the construction of this population. For, whilst 
TGiE has been strategic in employing a range of state-like techniques of 
governmentality in order to appear to speak and act like a state for domestic and 
external audiences, the discourses through which the population is imagined and 
idealised are shaped by threats to the Tibetan population and culture in the 
homeland. Therefore, though revealing in terms of how cultural politics are 
pursued through the regulatory practices of biopolitics, TGiE's construction of the 
Tibetan population fails to tell us much about the nature of the relationship 
between individual Tibetans and their exile government developed through the 
strategies of governmentality. In light of this, and noting that domains of 
government beyond the population have been somewhat neglected in work drawing 
on Foucault's notion of governmentality, I now want look beyond population and 
biopower to examine the ideologies, institutions and practices of welfare and the 
construction of a 'civil society' in exile. 
6.3 Welfare provision and the delineation of 'civil society' in exile 
Seen through the lens of governmentality, 'the "welfare state" ... is a way of viewing 
institutions, practices and personnel, or organising them in relation to a specific 
ideal of government' (Dean 1999: 32). In terms of providing for the needs of a 
population, welfare is therefore a key technology through which life is managed 
and governed. However, in acknowledging that 'regulation' is perhaps not the best 
word for actions undertaken to enhance social welfare, Hannah (2000) points to the 
fact that welfare also encompasses important political ideas and ideologies - of 
rights and responsibilities and a political contract between the citizen and the state 
_ which go beyond the regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics. Keeping this mind, it 
is the relationship between welfare and the state which is of primary concern here, 
a relationship of which there are conflicting accounts. On the one hand, welfare is 
seen as a basic state function, with the state having a moral obligation to look after 
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its people (Taylor 1994). In contrast to this 'welfare state' model, and in light of 
increasing devolvement of welfare provision to non-state actors in many Western 
states, is the development of the idea of a 'welfare society' (Gould 1993). No longer 
an essential component of statehood, welfare in these cases is provided by a 
combination of voluntary organisations, private corporations and state agencies. 
Not only are elements of a welfare state and welfare society apparent in the case of 
the exile Tibetan community, but I will argue it is both through its own provision of 
welfare and through negotiating relationships with non-'state' welfare providers 
that TGiE attempts to construct itself as a government. Focusing on the 
institutional geographies of welfare, the state-citizen relations established and 
TGiE's relationship with other welfare providers therefore opens up a number of 
important questions. What does TGiE see as its remit and responsibility with 
regards to the exile community and to what extent are these framed as state-like 
obligations? How is the provision of welfare constrained by TGiE's territorial 
limitations? And how does TGiE's differentiation of its responsibilities from other 
welfare providers construct the idea of a civil society in exile and reaffirm the 
government status of this administration? 
6.3.1 Constructing a welfare 'state' in exile? 
As McGukin (1997: 68) and Klieger (1992: 102) observe, 'Tibetans have established 
an increasingly democratic welfare state in exile that provides employment, 
education and medical care for many of the refugees', resulting in Tibetans in India 
today benefiting 'from an almost cradle to grave welfare system'. At the core of the 
welfare provision is the Department of Home which, established in 1960, has the 
responsibility to 'look after the socio-economic welfare of the Tibetan refugees in 
exile ... so as to achieve the long term goal of self-sufficiency' (www.tibet.net).l1l 
Working closely with the GoI, the Department of Home receives and distributes 
donations from foreign aid agencies for its projects which include old people's 
homes, income generation schemes, handicraft centres, co-operative societies, 
agriculture development programmes, infrastructure projects and stipends for 
impoverished families. These projects are implemented and administered at a local 
level by Settlement Offices in the settlements and Welfare Offices in the scattered 
communities. 
111 In 1981, considering the expa~ding works of the Department, and to give legal standing to its activities, 
the Central Tibetan Relief CommIttee (CTRC) was formed as its relief and development wing and registered 
as a non-profit development organisation. For practical purposes the Department of Home and CTRC can be 
considered one and the same institution. 
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In its attempts to thus universalise and standardise the provision of welfare for its 
'citizens' in India and Nepal, TGiE's discourses, institutions, practices and 
materialities of welfare are a key arena in which to observe the state-like 
interaction between TGiE and their exiled community. For, following work on 
anthropologies of the state (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Das and Poole 2004), it is 
through mundane and everyday exchanges regarding health care, entitlements, 
education provision and sanitation facilities that individuals - and in particular 
poorer individuals - see the 'state' most directly. Indeed, as a young female MP put 
it: 
'Most families have some connection to the government - especially using 
the schools or health facilities. I think the government does reach all 
Tibetan people in some way, and the people ... they see us as their 
government' (Tsomo, 13.04.2007). 
This expansion of welfare facilities across the settlements can be regarded not only 
as a strategy for integrating exile Tibetan society but also as an attempt by TGiE 
to extend its responsibility for the welfare of its citizens as comprehensively as 
possible. This idea of welfare provision as a duty and responsibility they have to 
'their people' and welfare applied universally to citizens as a 'right' was articulated 
both in TGiE publications and interviews with Tibetan officials at a range of levels. 
For example, according to the Secretary of the department of Home, his 
Department is 'mandated to look after the socio-economic welfare and development 
of the Tibetan community in exile' (06.11.2007).112 Such sentiments were echoed on 
a local level with, for example, the Settlement Officer at Dekyiling explaining that; 
'our settlement people must be settled down ... all facilities they must be 
provided and our people must face no problems living here. This is our 
important duty, and now I can say we have achieved this in Dekyiling' 
(18.04.2007). 
Such benevolent rhetoric of responsibility, duty and an ethic of care, along with the 
state-like connotations of the repeated use of 'welfare' and 'entitlements' rather 
than terms such as 'charity' or 'aid' (Smith 1995: 191) indicates that, from the TGiE 
perspective at least, this is a state-citizen rather than NGO-recipient relationship. 
Looking at the story from below in terms of how Tibetans in India perceive and 
112 Interestingly. there is also an increasing trend of TGiE supporting. both financially and 
administratively, welfare and religious projects in and for Indian Himalayan tribal populations. This 
includes educational and health care projects in Ladakh and Spiti, and the admission of Himalayan tribal 
students in exile Tibetan schools and monasteries. Paradoxically, whilst Indian citizens and therefore 
having a more secure legal status than Tibetans, these tribal populations - who are Tibetan Buddhists and 
have a shared ancestry - are today perceived as 'poor cousins' of Tibetans and are increasingly dependent 
on the Tibetan administration and exiled monasteries for welfare and cultural revival (eherring, 
04.04.2007; Phunksok 16.05.2007). 
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make use ofTGiE's welfare provision, many interviewees in the settlements, whilst 
not expressing it in the language of 'rights' per se, did generally expect their 
government to provide basic welfare services. Indeed, one newcomer now based in 
Lugsum-Samdupling described how 'parents [in Tibet] put all their faith in the 
Dalai Lama to look after their children in India - they close their eyes, they also 
close their hearts and send their children to India' (Wangyal, 20.11.2007). Many 
respondents were impressed by what the exile government had achieved, 
comparing the better standards of life in India to that of many in Tibet, and 
appreciating that their access to and quality of education and health care was in 
many cases superior to their Indian counterparts. 
In addition to such totalising strategies of attempting to provide standardised 
welfare provision, the TGiE also engages in a process of individualisation through 
identifying, problematising and then (differentially) regulating cohorts within the 
exile community. Seen through the lens of biopolitics, this is 'the division of 
populations into sub-groups that contribute to or retard the general welfare and 
life of the population' (Dean 1999: 100). Turning to TGiE's construction and 
regulation of one of these cohorts - the poor, - in recent years the exile government 
has invested considerable effort in the 'production of persons who can be labelled as 
poor' (Corbridge et al 2005: 47) and subsequently developed policies and material 
relations with them through the institutions and practices of welfare. At the 
'national' level TGiE established a 'poverty line' of 30 Rupees per person per day for 
the community in India to assess poverty levels within the community,ll3 and 
formed an inter-departmental 'Central Poverty Alleviation Committee' to; 
'identify poor persons, so as to formulate suitable strategies for intervention 
and so achieve upliftment [sic] of these families from the poverty line' 
(Secretary, Department of Home, 06.11.2006). 
At a 'local' level Settlement Officers instruct the Gyabons to conduct regular door-
to-door surveys in their camps to 'see the local conditions and report problem cases 
which can then investigate [sic] and get timely and effective welfare support for 
that person' (Welfare Officer, Dharamsala, 04.04.2007). Once thus identified, TGiE, 
through a hierarchy of Dharamsala departments, CROs and SettlementlWelfare 
Offices, implements a series of welfare assistance programmes including monthly 
113 This poverty line, established by the TPiE in 2002, is noticeably higher than India's official measurement 
of 10 Rupees per day per person (planning Commission 2004: 85). Of the 14 settlements surveyed by the 
Planning Commission in 2004, 54% of the population were below the TGiE poverty level of 30Rs! day! head 
and 11% below Indian poverty level of 10Rsl dayl head (ibicl). 
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stipends for the elderly, school scholarships, grants to cover medical expenses, the 
arrangement of foreign sponsorship, business grants and vocational training. This 
is therefore a process of identification, problematisation and regulation through 
which poverty is constructed as a concern that is both concentrated upon certain 
social groups, and that is affecting the wider body politic. 
However, whilst TGiE aspires to a universal welfare state structure within exile, 
and is certainly employing state-like rhetoric and individualising strategies, this 
project is hampered by the legal limitations faced by this unrecognised government 
and its lack of a territorial base. There are important and stark differentiations 
within this state-citizen relationship, as not only is welfare provision restricted to 
Tibetans residing in India and Nepal, but within this section of the population 
access to welfare services is highly uneven. Central to this is the role and 
geography of exile institutions. Running counter to the process of de-
institutionalisation in many Western states, institutions such as monasteries, 
schools, refugee reception centres and cultural institutes are at the core of the 
Tibetan diaspora. Not only do 25% of the exiled Tibetan population live in 
residential institutions (planning Commission 2000) but, rather than 'demarcated 
spaces to which ... socially dependent populations have been more or less forcefully 
"exiled'" (Philo and Parr 2000: 513) these institutions are a central and vibrant 
part of the community. Such institutions also have a disciplinary function in the 
Foucauldian sense. For, through regulating individuals' moral and social 
behaviour, these institutions seek 'to restrain, control, treat, "design" and "produce" 
particular and supposedly improved versions of human minds and bodies' (ibid) 
and thereby encourage people to lead lives of 'benefit to society' (General Manager, 
Rajpur handicraft settlement, 24.04.2007). 
As well as being a central element in the project of cultural preservation and 
community cohesion, this archipelago of Tibetan cultural, religious and welfare 
institutions across India and Nepal is central to how TGiE manages its dispersed 
population. Crucially, such institutions constitute the spatial concentration of 
welfare and governmental dependency, with the relationship between an 
individual and TGiE weakening from institutions, through Tibetan settlements 
where TGiE welfare services are 'on-site', to scattered populations which come 
under the jurisdiction of a TGiE Welfare Office, to those living in 'Indian society' 
and therefore beyond the government's reach. Indeed, unlike a conventional 
welfare state established within the bounded territory of a nation-state, it is 
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because the exile government lacks authority over the spaces between institutions 
(and settlements), that the role of these establishments is so heightened in this 
case. 
Illustrating this is the case of newcomer refugees, a cohort which, without social or 
familial support, is often highly dependent on and closely regulated by TGiE, 
certainly for the first few years after coming into exile. A chain of institutions has 
been established by TGiE to deal with these new arrivals from Tibet, the majority 
of whom take an increasingly established route into exile via the TGiE's refugee 
reception centres in Kathmandu, Delhi and Dharamsala. After medical checks, 
testimonial interviews and an audience with the Dalai Lama, the Dharamsala 
reception centre seeks admission for newly arrived refugees into a range of exile 
institutions 'to prepare for their long-term rehabilitation' (Director, Dharamsala 
Refugee Reception Centre 05.04.2007). Children up to the age of 18 are sent to 
Tibetan residential schools in Dharamsala and Mussoorie; former political 
prisoners to an NGO which provides short term accommodation and vocational 
training (GuChuSum); monks and nuns to monasteries and nunneries in South 
India; the elderly to old people's homes; adults aged 18-30 to the 'Tibetan Transit 
School' where they attend Tibetan, English and computer classes for 1-3 years; and 
older lay adults to handicraft centres. This series of connected institutions is 
therefore an important mechanism through which TGiE attempts to incorporate 
newcomers into the community and, in providing such important welfare support, 
these refugees are often appreciative of and dependent on the exile government. 
However, after newcomers graduate from or leave these institutions they face 
significant problems. For a start, the isolation and strict rules at many Tibetan 
schools and monasteries means that those resident there often have little 
experience of 'living in India'. With little or no savings, often no family in exile and 
a lack of recognised qualifications, newcomer refugees frequently spoke of their 
insecurity and vulnerability within India and, as mentioned above, difficulties 
integrating into the exile Tibetan community. In addition, many newcomer 
interviewees described a lack of support from the TGiE once 'outside' Tibetan 
institutions: 
'After Transit School you are on your own two feet .... The government they 
do not help. I get no help from the Welfare Office. People don't go to Welfare 
Office if they have problems - they have to sort things themselves. No-one 
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else helps. Officials work honestly but maybe they have no power to help ... 
with our government we always have less power' (Tempa, 23.03.2007). 
Crucially, neither TGiE welfare support, nor indeed the exile government's 
practices of social regulation, extend much beyond this archipelago of institutions. 
With its lack of a territorial base there is neither a welfare safety net in this case, 
nor a 'swarming of disciplinary mechanisms' (Foucault 1977: 211). Indeed, it is 
questionable the extent to which this can be a disciplinary society without the 
iconic disciplinary institution of the prison. 
In presenting two contrasting pictures of the Tibetan 'welfare state' in exile - one 
of a state-like welfare ethos planning to role out standardised welfare support, the 
other of uneven access to services with welfare provision existing only in isolated 
Tibetan institutions and designated settlements - I want to consider what this 
means for TGiE's attempts to construct itself as a government. For those Tibetans 
resident in settlements or institutions the existence of TGiE was a source of 
comfort and even security in the otherwise vulnerable situation of exile: 
'As we are a homeless nation our government is the only real thing we 
have... that we can call our own. So even if our government is not 
recognised by any other government, still we are so lucky to have it. 
Because of [our] government we don't feel like refugees - everything is 
provided for us ... all is organised by Tibetans' (Osel, Lugsum-Samdupling, 
26.11.2007). 
However, a number of government interviewees expressed frustration that they 
could not do more for 'their people'. As one Chitue explained when describing his 
visit to Tibetan settlements in Arunachal Pradesh: 
'I was amazing [sic] that these remote places have so many Tibetan 
structures ... they were so far away but so familiar and all established by 
our government. But then also I feel frustrated that we cannot do more. I 
feel we should be doing more for our people, providing more, helping them 
more, but always we come up against problems - against barriers because 
we are in India. We can do little since we do not have the stamp of being a 
state ... we cannot be a complete government for our people here' (Dawa, 
27.02.2006). 
This perception that it is in its failing to provide for the exile population that TGiE 
is falling short of its 'government' title was echoed in a discussion between a self-
declared 'social worker' (Thupten) and older shopkeeper (Jampa) in Majnuka Tilla 
(05.06.2007): 
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Thupten: for me I think our government could do more for our people ... in 
some remote settlements - not Bylakuppe but in North-East - there people 
are so poor and have so much hardship. Our government it should be 
working to help them for day to day things, but instead all we have is 
meetings and discussion. 
Jampa: ... but I think our government, it does OK, and we should not 
criticise. We are refugees, we have no country and here we are on borrowed 
land, so how can our government do all these things? 
Thupten: [interrupts] but living on borrowed land does not mean the 
responsibilities they are not there. We have no country but still our 
government it has to work. Why do we have our government here in first 
place? If our government does not help its people then why is it a 
government? 
Jampa: but for our government its hands are tied because we are in India. 
We have no land, we have not so many rights - the Indians they can tell our 
government you can do this, or you can't do this. But at the same time our 
youths they expect the government to help them with everything - with 
education, with work... the youths they are too dependent on our 
government, and on help from foreigners. For our people we need more 
initiative. 
Such interview extracts portray a complex and conflicting account of TGiE as a 
government. On the one hand, the TGiE cannot meet both its own and its citizens 
expectations of a state-like provision of welfare. But, in addition to this opinion 
that there is 'not enough' government, Jampa's comments suggest a critique of 
there being 'too much' government. Indeed, this exchange rehearses familiar 
political debates, a point which in itself indicates the government-like status of 
TGiE. However, Jampa's argument points to an important additional viewpoint, 
one that is specific to the situation in exile and questions the very purpose of TGiE. 
For there are frustrations from some within the community that TGiE has over-
prioritised the welfare needs of the exile population at the expense of the freedom 
struggle and the ultimate aim of returning to Tibet: 
'What is the purpose of our government? What are they doing for our cause? 
All they do is sit down there and talk. We don't need this government, these 
schools, these hospitals. All we need is [aJ bed and food and to work for our 
cause. There is too much time wasting going on here. Our people shouldn't 
be owning buildings, restaurants here - this isn't our country' (Gyatso, 
Majnuka Tilla, 10.11.2007). 
6.3.2. Negotiating a 'welfare society' in exile 
Expanding our view beyond the relationship between TGiE and its 'citizens' in 
exile, it is crucial to acknowledge that the exile government does not have a 
monopoly on welfare provision for its diaspora. Rather, echoing the 'welfare society' 
model of contemporary Western states, welfare support is provided by a complex 
array of actors, each of which vies for responsibility for the exile population. The 
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welfare providers in this case include international donors upon which TGiE's 
welfare programmes are heavily dependent (discussed in section 6.4), remittances 
from overseas Tibetans (see Prost 2006), the GoI and Tibetan NGOs. It is on the 
TGiE's relationship with the latter two actors that I want to focus attention here, 
as each illustrates different aspects of TGiE's role and functioning. 
The GoI was instrumental in establishing and funding the settlements and in 
providing basic housing and rations in the early years. As noted in Chapters 3 and 
5, discourses of guesthood, hospitality and rehabilitation are prevalent both in 
governmental debates regarding the Tibetan refugees in the late 1950s and early 
1960sl14 and in interviews with retired and active Indian officials. On the one 
hand, there has been a gradual transition of administrative authority and 
responsibility for schools, medical facilities and settlements from GoI to TGiE. As a 
retired Ministry of Rehabilitation official explained: 
'The inter-relationship between the Tibetan government and Government of 
India has transformed from functional to formal. By functional I mean 
formerly the Government of India had a lot of control over Tibetan 
government and community with its package of rehabilitation. So there 
was... there was need for Government of India to intervene in the 
community. Now the Indian government has no administrative control, so 
we say it's just a formal relationship' (Gopal, 05.06.2007). 
On the other hand, like relations between the two administrations more generally, 
the relationship between welfare provision for the Tibetan exiles and the Indian 
state is complex and ambiguous. For example, there are often fuzzy boundaries in 
terms of welfare service provision, with Tibetan health and education facilities 
open to local Indians,ll5 and Indian facilities available to Tibetans. ll6 In addition, 
alongside continuing Gol provision of ration cards to some Tibetans,117 its 
administration of emergency disaster relief to Tibetan communities equivalent to 
their local Indian counterparts and provision of funding to the TGiE for its welfare 
projects,118 there is also ongoing Gol involvement in Tibetan-run welfare provision 
including the funding of 30 of the 85 Tibetan schools in India. The practical 
114 For example, Nehru's statement to the Lok Sabha, 27 April 1959 (,!,PPRC 200Gb: 50·51). 
116 For example, in Majnuka Tilla the admission of neighbouring Indian students is seen as a strategy for 
ameliorating local tensions, (Headmaster, Samyeling Day School OG.OG.2007). 
116 29% of the exile Tibetans questioned in the Planning Commission's socio-economic survey (2000) used 
Indian hospitals (planning Commission 2004: 59). 
117 In principal, Tibetan refugees who meet the stipulated requirements receive ration cards from the 
governments of the states in which they reside, although this has not been universally implemented. The 
ration card enables the holder to purchase government-subsidised necessities at reduced cost. 
118 'The Ministry of Home Affairs has spent ... Rs.18.17 crore (18,17,00000) up to December, 200G on 
resettlement of Tibetan refugees (Ministry of Home Affairs 2008: 123) and during the period 1995-2000 the 
Gol funding accounted for 3.2% of funding for project expenditure and 8.8% for recurrent development 
expenditure (planning Council 1994, Section 2.3.2.). 
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limitations arising from this include the fact that any construction project has to be 
authorised by the State Government and Tibetan schools must conform to the 
Indian curriculum, albeit with additional Tibetan language, religion and cultural 
classes. From the perspective of individual Tibetans in India, the range of welfare 
providers has the obvious effect of providing a choice of welfare services with, for 
example, some with the financial means choosing to access private Indian medical 
facilities and send their children to private Indian and international schools. 
Therefore, while the primary responsibility for the welfare of the exile population is 
taken by TGiE, authorisation and funding is often contingent on the Gol. As such, 
with regards to whose responsibility Tibetans in India are, who has exclusive 
rights over this population and who has a 'duty of care', the answer is both complex 
and contradictory, and indeed varies across time and space. The overlapping of 
Indian and Tibetan welfare services, and indeed service users therefore means that 
the Tibetan 'welfare state' is not a hermetically bounded entity with TGiE ruling 
on issues of inclusion and exclusion. 
In contrast to the arguably compromised welfare role of TGiE vis-a-vis the Indian 
Government, the exile administration has a considerably more government-like 
relationship with Tibetan NGOs in exile. There are a plethora of such 
organisations of varying size, and focusing on different cohorts within the exile 
community. These include Kunphen drugs rehabilitation centre in Dharamsala, 
GuChuSum which provides welfare for former political prisoners and regional 
associations which offer basic welfare and financial support to Tibetans from their 
regions. Established in 1960, the most influential NGO in welfare terms is the TCV 
which runs 15 schools in India for over 17,000 students and is increasingly 
providing additional welfare services in poorer Tibetan communities, such as 
medical facilities and stipends for the elderly in Ladakh (principal, TCV 
Sonamling, 21.05.2007). The number and range of NGOs within the exile 
community can be attributed to a number of factors including the influence of host 
state India with its vibrant NOO culture, their role in coordinating the disparate 
diaspora and providing a sense of security and solidarity within the refugee 
population and their ability to secure and deliver external funding to the wider 
community. 
With regards to the relationship between TGiE and exile Tibetan NOOs, recent 
policy changes are significant in terms of the position of NGOs and, more 
importantly for this discussion, the construction of TGiE as a government in 
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relation to them. Whilst for many years, Tibetan NGOs have had to formally 
register with TGiE,119 a series of policy directives issued by the Kashag in July 
2007 set out mechanisms by which a clearer division between these institutions 
can be established: 
'NGOs should be non-governmental. .. the NGOs should not ... rely on or look 
up at the government. Neither should the government... interfere in, 
exercise influences over or otherwise make use of NGOs. Thus, it is 
important for both sides to maintain a proper standard of relationship and 
distance on a stable basis ... In view of this, we are issuing ... the following 
guidelines' (Tibetan Review 2008 43(3): 26).120 
Such a distinction between TGiE and Tibetan NGOs is based on the rationale that 
with the TGiE's pursuit of a policy of autonomy in Tibet it found it necessary to 
distance itself from NGOs which have 'independence agendas' (Secretary, eRO 
Bangalore, 29.11.2007). Importantly, this distinction goes beyond the discursive 
and rhetorical, with the guidelines stipulating that TGiE officials are forbidden to 
take 'part in NGO meetings, TGiE-run health centres and staff must not associate 
with NGOs (in particular they are not to accompany protest marches) and; 
.' 
'in cases of arrests or detentions by the local police (of Tibetans) as a result 
of their having taken part in any campaign action ... no official or office of 
the Tibetan government (in exile) shall provide surety for bailing them out' 
(Tibetan Review 2008 43(3): 27). 
Beyond the delineation of its policy stance vis-a.-vis the future of Tibet, these 
guidelines and their enactment has two important and interrelated functions. 
Firstly, it can be seen as TGiE marking itself out as a government, distinguishing 
itself ,from the types of organisation that it has sometimes been labelled as. No 
longer a glorified NGO, TGiE is positioning itself within discourses of statehood. 
Translating this to an everyday level, a number of TGiE interviewees spoke of 
wearing two hats - one their government job, the other their personal convictions -
and rof having to be increasingly careful in distinguishing between their 
professional and personal lives. Secondly, the establishment of boundaries for 
I r 
NGO~ and the increasingly strict regulation of government interaction with these 
actors forms part of a wider TGiE project of creating and demarcating a sphere of 
Tibetan 'civil society' in exile distinct from itself as a government. Acknowledging 
that NGOs are constituent elements of rather than conterminous with the notion of 
119 This is a process which assists NOOs' registration under the Ool's Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 
1976 which permits them to solicit funds from abroad. 
120 The-full content of the guidelines was carried in the 8 August 2007 edition of Tibetan. Freedom, the exile 
govern~ent's Tibetan-language weekly. The extract quoted here is a translation by the editor of Tibetan. 
Re!Iiew: 
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'civil society' (McIlwaine 1998), such a project also involves the process of 
democratisation in exile and the Dalai Lama's attempts to reduce his prominence 
in the political sphere (see Chapter 8). 
So, why does the TGiE invest such effort in discursively and materially creating a 
'civil society' distinct from the 'state'? For a start, in light of the central role of 
'strengthening civil society' in development policy circles (McIlwaine 1998), it is a 
strategic performance of liberal democratic governance aimed at a Western (donor) 
audience. In addition to engaging with discourses of development and good 
governance, the delineation of civil society and the state in this case is also an 
attempt by TGiE to speak the language and perform the actions of modern 
statehood. For, in the classical terminology of political sociology the separation of 
state from civil society plays a central role in the organisation of modern political 
power. Whilst such distinctions are dismissed by those examining the Foucauldian 
mechanisms of power (Miller and Rose 1990), I want to argue here that it is 
precisely this deliberate and public separation of the TGiE from NGOs that forms a 
key part in the exile administration's attempts to establish governing capabilities. 
Thus, read through Mitchell's (1991) notion of the state as a set of effects which 
make structures such as the state and society appear to exist, the TGiE's 
attempted construction of separate spheres of the state and civil society can be seen 
as an important legitimising strategy. 
6.3.3. Summary 
Reflecting on this complex picture of welfare provision and providers, state-citizen 
relations and the construction of a 'civil society', I want to remain with the ideas of 
legitimacy and statehood. On the one hand, the existence of multiple welfare 
providers and TGiE's negotiation of its position within this matrix resonates with 
Rose and Miller's assertion that the 
'centres of government are multiple; it is not a question of the power of the 
centralised state, but of how, in relation to what mentalities and devices, by 
means of what intrigues, alliances and flows - is this locale or that able to 
act as a centre' (1992: 185). 
However, in attempting to 'act as a centre' the TGiE can also be seen as speaking to 
more conventionally state-like discourses. Although not uniformly experienced, 
TGiE's aim of providing a safety net of minimum welfare for its population in exile 
is significant. For, whilst TGiE cannot realise the security component of 
governmentality (it lacks institutions such as a police or military to defend its 
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population) and therefore cannot fulfil the 'state-as-protector' role for its exiled 
people, through the apparatus of welfare it does to a large extent perform the role 
of provider. Thus, as a governmental function TGiE can perform, it is in the realm 
of welfare provision and the construction of relations of rights and responsibilities 
with its 'citizens' that the possibilities of a Tibetan 'state' in exile are most 
apparent. In contrast, with the dependence of many exile Tibetans on TGiE moving 
beyond basic welfare needs - or as one respondent put it 'these days we have our 
"bellyful'" (Samdup, Dekyiling, 19.04.2007) - TGiE is increasingly having to face 
the challenging task of dealing with economic issues. Consequently, in highlighting 
the economy as a sphere of governance on a par with the population and civil 
society, I now want to turn to the TGiE's role in managing and governing economic 
activities in exile. 
6.4 Constructing an economy in exile: discursive possibilities and 
material limitations. 
'The economy came into being ... as the field of operation for new powers of 
planning, regulation, statistical enumeration and representation. Through 
these novel forms of political rationality and practice it became possible to 
imagine the economy as a self-contained sphere, distinct from the social, the 
cultural and other spheres' 
(Mitchell 1998: 91). 
A recurrent narrative within both interviews with TGiE officials and TGiE 
publications is the series of developmental transitions that the community has 
experienced during its 50 years in exile, from the welfare stage of meeting basic 
needs, through to the rehabilitation of Tibetan society within the exile settlements, 
to the contemporary aspiration of economic sustainability. This shift 'to a higher 
socioeconomic level with characteristics of more developed countries' (Bhatia et al 
2002: 421) means both that the issues of economic self-sufficiency and sustainable 
development are complex and challenging, and that the exile community is now 
having to take responsibility for these new challenges largely on their own (CTRC 
2003). Central to this are economic issues regarding employment, sustainable 
livelihoods and financial security.121 These economic challenges and concerns can 
therefore be seen to fundamentally threaten the idealised vision of the exile 
population that the TGiE strives for: as cohesive, nationalised and preserved 
within the sanctuary spaces of the settlements. In light of this, TGiE has 
121 For example. with limited land holdings. a lack of employment opportunities in the settlements - or at 
least 'meaningful employment' for university graduates - and limited numbers of jobs within TGiE. young 
Tibetans are often compelled to look for work outside the community (Additional Secretary. Department of 
Home. 18.03.2006). 
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increasingly engaged with economic Issues and, I will argue, the idea of an 
economy in exile. Indeed, the link between the construction of a population and the 
emergence of political economy can be traced to the development of modern 
governmentality, as '[t]o govern properly, to ensure the happiness and prosperity of 
the population, it is necessary to govern through a particular register, that of the 
economy' (Dean 1999: 19. emphasis in original). After sketching out the economic 
limitations faced by TGiE, I will address two key questions. How does the TGiE go 
about conceiving of and creating an economy in exile? And why does TGiE invest 
effort, time and resources into such a seemingly chimerical project? Drawing on the 
work of Mitchell (1998, 2002) and Miller and Rose (1990; 1992) I will argue that 
not only is TGiE attempting to observe, regulate and manage the economic 
activities of its population, but it is creating - at least discursively if not materially 
_ a Tibetan economy in exile as a 'separate sphere' over which it can govern. 
6.4.1. The impossibility of a Tibetan economy in exile? 
With regards to the shift from basic survival to more secondary needs, a number of 
second generation Tibetans spoke of concerns regarding 'the lack of financial 
security in India: 
'You see here we have no security, no security at all ... it is hard to get jobs, 
we cannot own property, there are no pensions or health insurance so for 
many people they feel they have to move ... to move abroad' (Choeying, 
Bangalore, 03.12.2007). 
As such, it is arguable that as the community becomes more socio-economically 
advanced with more sophisticated demands being put on TGiE the exile 
government has reached the limits of what it can provide. Indeed, at first glance 
the limitations facing TGiE's control over the economic practices of its exile 
community appear considerable, and the idea of an exile Tibetan economy 
fantastical. For a start, given its existence within the sovereign state of India, 
TGiE has no currency, no national bank and therefore no monetary policies. 
Similarly, its lack of contiguous, bounded territory means that its ability to define, 
foster and regulate a 'national' economy is severely restricted, and its job creation 
capabilities extremely limited. Thus, without judicial powers and 'the stamp of 
being a state' (Vice-chair, TPiE, 29.04.2006), the exiled administration has limited 
legal control over the economic activities of its population. 
Illustrative of such economic restrictions is the case of the Tibetan Chamber of 
Commerce (TCC). Established in June 2005 as a platform for Tibetan businesses in 
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India and Nepal, the TCC has faced significant challenges due to TGiE's lack of 
legal status. As the TCC's Deputy Director, and then a prominent Delhi-based 
businessman explained: 
'Our Chamber of Commerce is unique because it is with no state .. " It is a 
Chamber of Commerce in name rather than reality because our government 
it cannot provide incentives for business and ... really we cannot lobby the 
Indian government about trade agreements and taxation - they will never 
listen to us! So really as an organisation we are running below-par I think' 
(Bhutuk, 12.11.2007). 
'This Chamber of Commerce is for me a waste of time. It has no real 
powers"" The purpose of a Chamber of Commerce is for business people to 
lobby the government to reduce trade tariffs for their exports, reduce 
business taxes, increase international trade and the like, but our 
government doesn't have the power to do any of these things .. " In fact, the 
Indian government it went to see the Finance minister when TCC was 
launched because they were worried our government was going to collect 
taxes from Tibetan businesses and this would break Indian law. So our 
minister he reassured the Indian government that TCC was just a 
committee! So in reality what can TCC do? Nothing!' (Tsering, 11.03.2007). 
Indeed, Tibetan economic activities are both highly dependent on and restricted by 
the Indian state: individual Tibetans take loans from Indian banks, Tibetan 
businesses register with the Gol and wealthier Tibetans pay income tax to the 
Indian Government. India's rapidly changing economy has also directly affected the 
Tibetan community with the increasing regulation of and restrictions on the 
informal economy through the 'beautification' of city streets and harassment from 
local authorities causing significant problems for Tibetan seasonal traders 
(Secretary, CRO Bangalore, 29.11.2007). A second significant limitation on TGiE's 
economic autonomy is its continuing dependence on Western patrons, with the 
exile administration's welfare programmes being heavily reliant on external 
funding from international donors including NGOs, charitable trusts and 
individuals. 122 Foreign patrons are also sought for various exile Tibetan 
institutions where Klieger (1992) argues a traditional patron-client relationship 
has been re-established and re-worked in exile. At the individual level, a 
widespread system of sponsorship of Tibetans by Western benefactors, referred to 
in Tibetan as rogs ram, plays an increasingly large role in Tibetans' livelihoods 
(Prost 2006: 251).123 
12:1 During the first decade of exile. refugees received $~.300.000 in direct aid from US government 
(Grunfled 1987: 189-190), and in the period 1995-2000 74.9% of the total funding for project expenditure 
and 30% of funding for recurrent development expenditure came from foreign donors (planning Council 
1994, Section 2.3.2). 
12;1 Prost reports that the majority of Tibetan exile families in Dharamsala receive some form of rogs ram for 
their children to see them through primary and secondary education (2006: 239). Such international 
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With such limitations, a Tibetan economy in exile appears to be an unviable 
proposition. However, the situation is not as clear cut as the restrictions outlined 
above would indicate. The economic activities of Tibetans in India are neither 
entirely assimilated into the Indian economy, nor completely reliant on foreign aid. 
Rather, individual Tibetans, Tibetan institutions and TGiE itself have considerable 
economic agency. For example, the exiled administration has increasingly 
institutionalised its relationship with international donors, actively managing 
funding priorities and controlling the flow and allocation of resources within the 
exile community.124 At an individual level, informal economic exchanges such as 
loans from relatives, monasteries and wealthy individuals within the community 
are often more popular than credit from Indian banks, and remittances from 
relatives based in the West are an increasingly important source of income for 
families in the settlements (this was particularly the case in Clementown and 
Lugsum-Samdupling). In addition, Tibetan businesses, especially in tourist 
destinations such as Dharamsala, Darjeeling and Delhi, are increasingly 
successful, often employing local workers. Moreover, as explored below, TGiE is 
involving itself ever more in the economic life of the diaspora. 
6.4.2. Constructing an economic sphere in exile 
The upheaval of displacement and the re-establishing of a society and government 
in a foreign land inevitably brought with it rapid transformations in economic 
practices and relations. Dispossessed of their land and the taxes it accrued, 
monasteries and aristocratic landlords were no longer the economic elite 
(Subramanya 2004). The reliance instead on settled agriculture, petty business and 
tourism 'has generated new relations of production and exchange, both communal 
and individual, and new class, gender and ethnic structures' (McGukin 1997: 
237).125 Such fundamental shifts forced the Tibetan leadership to reconsider both 
its principles of government and the economic relations it has with its now exile 
population. Following Miller and Rose, this was broadly a shift 'from a notion that 
the ruler need do no more than extract from his or her subjects whatever wealth 
they may produce, to a notion that a ruler should seek to renew and even augment 
assistance at a range of scales often comes with the expectation that local communities will transform in 
some way so as to accommodate their patrons' norms and values' (Frechetto 2002: x). As such, the recipients 
• whether institutions or individuals· need to prove themselves as worthy and charming by demonstrating 
a true claim to 'Tibetan refugeehood' (Lafitte 1999; Prost 2006). 
I:I~ For example, the TGiE uses the lOPs to set out its funding priorities and established a 'Social and 
Resource Development Fund' under the Department of Finance 8S a platform for interaction between TGiE 
and its increasing number of bilateral donors. 
126 One notable continuation of economic practices from Tibet is long.distance trading. re.worked in the 
exile situation in the form of sweater selling (McGukin 1997). 
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such wealth' (1990: 12). However, it is only recently, with the delineation of 
contemporary challenges being faced, that economic issues have come to be seen as 
'a catalogue of problems for government' (Murdoch and Ward 1997: 310. emphasis 
in original). Understanding issues of government and economy as intrinsically 
linked, such problematisation of economic issues entailed the construction of an 
economic field which 'could be measured and calculated as though it were a free-
standing object' (Mitchell 2008: 1116). Tracing this 'process of articulating the 
national economy as an object to be known, recorded, calculated and operated upon' 
(Miller and Rose 1990: 12), I want to again turn to Hannah's (2000) framework of 
observational moments, normalising judgement and the regulation of conduct. 
Considering observational moments, as with the Tibetan population in exile figures 
and statistics concerning the financial status of the Tibetan community in exile 
have been produced and discussed since the first days in exile. This includes a 
detailed report on the first ten years in exile (Office of the Dalai Lama 1969) as 
well as the series of IDPs and budget reports from TGiE departments and 
institutions, the production and consumption of which can be seen as central to the 
emergence of a Tibetan political economy in exile. A central element in both the 
production of knowledge about economic activities, and development of a totalising 
vision of the exile economic situation was the discursive and material creation of 
distinct economic sectors. Broadly chronological, these include agriculture, industry 
(albeit short-lived),126 handicrafts, informal trading (sweater-selling) and private 
enterprise. 
Following the work of Murdoch and Ward (1997), agriculture in the exile 
settlements can be seen as 'brought into being' as a discrete economic sector 
through a variety of technologies and practices. These included the collation of 
detailed data (Office of the Dalai Lama 1969)127 and subsequent statistical analysis 
(Planning Council 1994, Section 4), the creation of an 'Agricultural Section' within 
the Department of Home and the development of training programmes for 
agriculturalists. Rendering agriculture visible and thus governable, 'farmers were 
126 Industry based settlements were established in Himachal Pradesh in the late 1960s with the assistance 
of the Gol. Eight industrial projects were initiated and coordinated under the aegis of the 'Tibetan 
Industrial Rehabilitation Society', including woollen mills, tea estates, lime processing and a fibreglass 
factory. However, due to the community's lack of prior experience and skills in this sector and insufficient 
working capital most of the projects ran into problems and closed in the early 1970s (Kharat 2003b). The 
settlements survived however, with their economic focus shifting to small·scale cultivation, sweater-selling, 
carpet-weaving and other handicrafts. The latter has become one of the chief sources of income for the exile 
community, particularly for women and newcomer refugees. 
127 This report includes data on land brought under cultivation, crop yields and prices, wages paid to 
Tibetan labourers, food ration allocations and co-operative society accounts. 
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increasingly incorporated into the prevailing mode of governmentality' (M:urdoch 
and Ward 1997: 309) and this continues today with the rolling out ofTGiE schemes 
for organic agriculture, soil conservation and sustainable irrigation. These 
technologies of government were replicated in the creation of the other economic 
sectors with, for example, TGiE surveys of sweater sellers (Poljor Bulletin June 
2005: 16) and Tibetan businesses (TCC 2006) and the establishment of a 'Business 
Unit' within the Department of Finance. Indeed, whilst formal and informal 
business enterprises have formed an important part of exilic life for decades, it is 
only in recent years that TGiE has documented them, seeking to bring these 
activities under its gaze and thus to regulate them. 
Alongside this monitoring and classification of economic activities, TGiE also 
engages in processes of totalisation and standardisation. Attempting to both 
picture and promote the Tibetan 'economy' as an integrated whole, TGiE has 
charted and documented levels of income and income disparity, employment trends 
and total domestic product (Planning Commission 2004: 92), and developed a 
'comprehensive strategy for developing livelihoods, employment and income-
generation within the Refugee Community' (Planning Council 1994, Section 4.3.3). 
The exile administration also provides a detailed breakdown of its budget each 
year. 
Shifting from the techniques through which TGiE comes to know its economic 
activities to the discourses through which it imagines and normalises the economic 
life of its exiled citizens, I want to focus on the administration's economic 
philosophies and policies. Whilst TGiE's implementation of macro-economic policies 
is severely limited given its existence within the Indian state, this has not impeded 
it from staking out its economic vision. Central to this are a range of discourses 
which both speak to broader international norms of good governance and promote a 
distinctly Tibetan set of values. These include discourses of a 'middle path 
economy' between capitalism and socialism, diversification of economic activities, 
budgetary discipline and self-sufficiency. 
Drawing directly on the Tibetan experience of Chinese communism in Tibet and 
Western capitalism in exile, the idea of a 'middle path economy' is based on 'the 
principle of cooperation, not competition and on need and not greed' (Additional 
Secretary, Department of Finance, 02.05.2007). Forming a core tenet of Samdhong 
Rimpoche's political philosophy of sotyograha, this vision of the economy is starting 
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to be implemented through the system of agricultural and handicraft cooperatives. 
An integral part of the exile settlements, the cooperatives provide common services 
and support and the collective marketing of produce for settlers whose farming has 
always been undertaken by individual households as a private activity on their 
own land (president, Lugsum-Samdupling Co-operative Society, 28.11.2007). As 
well as providing a route between capitalism and communism, the cooperatives 
form a key element of TGiE's vision of economic self-sufficiency in exile. Whilst 
dependence on foreign aid is still deemed necessary, there is increasing TGiE 
criticism of this reliance on external support: '[T]he mindset of scavenging for 
foreign aid needs to be changed by striving to emerge ... to the level of self-reliance' 
(Paljor Bulletin June 2005: 21). This long term vision of a financially self-reliant 
TGiE and economically self-contained and self-sufficient Tibetan communities 
(Finance and DIIR Kalon, 10.04.2006) is currently being pursued through the 
diversification of agriculture and the establishment of small-scale industries within 
the settlements. However, these policies are proving controversial with many in the 
younger generation who either do not want to, or cannot, make their livelihood 
within the settlements. Arguing that such policies are out of sync with socio-
economic changes in India and the desires of young Tibetans, one young web-
designer in Delhi asserted: 
'Our government is taking us in the wrong direction - why focusing on 
settlements and organic farming? This is going backwards. Which people of 
my generation with a college degree want to go back to the settlements and 
farm?' (Topgyal, 30.10.2007). 
Turning to the final moment in the creation and governance of the economy in 
exile, I want to shift attention to 'attempts to transform the calculative procedures 
of economic actors' (Miller and Rose 1990: 2). Across each of the sectors discussed 
above there is a notable trend of TGiE increasingly attempting to regulate and 
regularise the economic life of its 'citizens' in exile, and yet simultaneously to 
create the idea of an economic sphere that can be acted upon.128 In order to 
illustrate this, I want to focus on the business sector within the exile economy. In a 
remarkably similar way to TGiE's changing relationship with NGOs, the exile 
government has both distanced itself and formalised its relationship with private 
businesses in exile. To set some context, TGiE has had a complex and often 
contradictory relationship with private enterprise over the years. At a 'national' 
128 This ranges from the establishment of a handicraft export house for independent producers (Secretary, 
Department of Home, 06.11.2007), the implementation of organic agriculture schemes, and attempts to 
regularise and legalise the trade in sweater (Poljar Bulletin June 2005: 21). 
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level, TGiE for many years ran a number of businesses in Nepal and India, 
including hotels, a travel agency, gas distribution company and agricultural feeds 
business, the profits from which contributed directly to the TGiE budget (Planning 
Council 1994, Section 4.4.5). However, declining profits in the 1990s and the 
satyagraha political philosophy of Samdhong Rimpoche's administration saw the 
12th Kashag privatise these businesses and return the capital deposits totalling 
211.7 million Rupees to the Tibetan public (Paljor Bulletin June 2005: 22). As the 
Additional Secretary at the Department of Finance explained: 
'relying on this borrowed capital is not good, especially with the big risks 
with business and we were concerned that one day we would not be able to 
repay the debts .... And our constitution it is based on the fundamental 
principals of truth, non-violence and genuine democracy and so... so 
engaging with business where there can be dishonesty and competition to 
make biggest profits, so this is not in keeping with our principles' 
(02.05.2007). 
Following this privatisation of government-run businesses TGiE accorded 
increasing priority to the promotion of trade and commerce within the community, 
with businesses perceived as key to providing employment opportunities, fostering 
links across the diaspora and diversifying the exile economy (Business Officer, 
Department of Finance, 10.04.2006). As a report published by the TCC states: 
'We should encourage more of internal business relationships. If something 
is being produced by Tibetans then the marketing and the retailing part of 
the products needs to be taken up by the Tibetans. And the profit should 
reach the Tibetan artisans who produce the product. Wealth inside the 
community should benefit the community itself. Big Tibetan business 
houses also should employ skilled and unemployed Tibetans' (2006: 10). 
However, whilst TGiE is actively promoting private enterprise in the community 
through providing micro-credit and training to young entrepreneurs and 
establishing the TCC, it is simultaneously distancing itself from this newly 
constructed sphere of Tibetan business. As Samdhong Rimpoche outlined in a 
statement to the TCC: 
'Generally, a government is best who governs the least. That is why even 
TGiE is trying to engage itself the least in the businesses of Tibetan people. 
Therefore ... from our side, it is important for TCC to stay as a NGO in 
principle without having to depend on TGiE and should formulate its own 
plans and policies' (TCC 2006: 9). 
Such engagement with the exile business community is indicative not only of 
TGiE's relationship with economic activities more generally, but also of its 
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engagement with a form of liberal rationality (Lippert 1999). It is a negotiation 
between intervening in the lives of its citizens, and retracting from such 
intervention: a delicate balance between state regulation and pulling back from 
governing in certain areas to allow the 'free enterprise of individuals' (Rose and 
Miller 1992). Paralleling TGiE's construction of a sphere of civil society, this 
attitude of 'managerial liberalism' (Murdoch and Ward 1997: 310) can, I argue, be 
seen as TGiE attempting to engage in a more mature stage of governmentality. 
For, in increasingly perceiving the economy as an 'autonomous level of reality' 
(Clayton 2000: 319) TGiE is establishing itself - a government engaged in the 
realm of politics - as distinct from the economy. 
Aimed at both internal and external audiences, the fact that construction of an 
economy-like entity is an important legitimising strategy for TGiE indicates why 
the exile administration invests so much in creating - through discourses, practices 
and institutions - the 'idea' of a Tibetan economy in exile. Not only does discussion 
of an 'economy' demonstrate to the international community the increasing 
financial independence of the diaspora and economic management capabilities of 
TGiE, but the creation of a 'national economy' is key to establishing the boundaries 
of and therefore reinforcing the existence of a Tibetan nation in exile. As the TGiE 
itself puts it, 'the capacity to accumulate and invest capital and to develop human 
resources ... plays an important role in fostering the economic growth of a nation 
and its people' (planning Council 1994, Section 4.5). Such language resonates 
closely with work by scholars of governmentality on the relationship between the 
state and the economy. For example, Mitchell argues that the development of the 
economy as a discursive object and autonomous domain 'provided a new language 
in which the nation-state could speak for itself and imagine its existence as 
something natural, bounded and subject to political management' (1998: 90). 
It is in the collection of 'voluntary taxes' from the exile population that the TGiE's 
construction and regulation of its 'economy' appears most state-like. Instituted by a 
group of 'devoted Tibetans' in 1972, the collection of voluntary contributions -
chatrel - from Tibetans in exile has been increasingly regulated and managed by 
TGiE.129 Not only is chatrel an increasingly important source of income for TGiE, a 
fact the administration is keen to stress (e.g. Planning Council 1994 Section 2.1.1), 
129 Chatrel rates vary according to age, place of residence, and income. For adult Tibetans resident in India 
Nepal and Bhutan the chatrel rate is 58 Indian Rupees, compared to $46 US Dollars for those resident i~ 
other states. For those on salaried income the rate is 4% of their basic salary (Department of Finance 2005). 
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but its payment is seen as a legitimising strategy whereby Tibetan 'citizens' in 
exile render legitimacy to the government and through this act are themselves 
recognised as bona fide 'Tibetans' in exile (see Chapter 7). However, whilst state-
like in terms of the relationship between TGiE and those it purports to govern, 
chat rei does not have the legal status of conventional state taxation systems (see 
Lieberman 2003). TGiE has no legal basis on which to levy taxes and therefore 
chatrel payments are technically voluntary as there is no legal means of enforcing 
payment and to call for mandatory taxes within India would have been unlawful. 130 
Having said this, and indicative of the ambiguous relationship between TGiE and 
statehood, the exile administration does employ significant social coercive 
strategies. For example, paying chatrel is a prerequisite to functioning in the exiled 
community, being essential for accessing TGiE welfare services and stipends, 
admission to Tibetan schools and eligibility for TGiE jobs. Moreover, TGiE is 
careful to stress that chatrel - which indeed translates as 'tax' - is not a 'donation' 
as this connotes a different form of relationship, and crucially one not based on 
obligation and duty (Department of Finance 2005). 
The issue of taxation also highlights the complex and contradictory spatiality of the 
Tibetan economy in exile. As CalIon argues, the economy must operate as a series 
of boundaries, distinctions, exceptions and exclusions (1998, cited in Mitchell 2002: 
9). So, whilst increasingly being challenged by transnational economic flows, for 
conventional nation-states their bounded territory delineates the limits of and 
therefore in many ways defines, their national economy. Without such a contiguous 
territory, or indeed legal jurisdiction over the territories within which TGiE does 
operate, no such 'national' economy can be taken for granted. Nevertheless, TGiE 
has attempted to establish Tibetan economic space in exile. For example, the 
administrative framework established to collect chatrel in each settlement in South 
Asia and the Offices of Tibet collecting payments from 'overseas' Tibetans is an 
attempt by TGiE to ensure uniformity of its governance across the diaspora and 
standardise this important symbolic and material economic practice. Whilst not a 
territorialising strategy per se, the routinised practices of chatrel binds the 
population together and simultaneously positions the TGiE at the centre of the 
community. The taxation system also points to the broader territorial and 
networked components of the exile Tibetan economy. On the one hand, the Tibetan 
J;lO Similar semantic cautiousness was employed with regards to the establishment of the Tee as. with 
concerns from the Gol that such an organisation would compete with Indian chambers of commerce. the 
organisation was registered as a 'welfare society' (Assistant Director. Tee, 12.11.2007). 
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economy is obviously considerably more visible and 'present' in the settlements 
than the scattered communities. Moreover, TGiE is actively fostering such locally-
bounded Tibetan economies with the encouraged clustering of Tibetan economic 
activities, and a degree of regulation and indeed exclusion of Indian economic 
practices.13l On the other hand, transnational economic networks are also 
important in terms of chatrel contributions from the Tibetans in the West and 
increasingly systematised business networks across the diaspora. 
6.4.3. Summary 
Returning to the significant economic limitations faced by TGiE and contrasting 
this to the exile administration's attempts to construct an economy in exile over 
which it can act in a government-like way, I want to briefly consider the 
relationship between the discursive and the material. At face value, the Tibetan 
economy in exile is certainly more rhetorical than pragmatic. It exists primarily in 
the likes of parliamentary discussions, budgetary reports and TCC meetings rather 
than through economic outputs, the value of a currency or the flow of goods. 
However, rather than dismissing the Tibetan economy as an elaborate fiction on 
these grounds, and acknowledging that the distinction between the material world 
and its representation is comparatively recent and relatively unstable (Mitchell 
2002), I want to argue that this case throws a valuable spotlight on the production 
of the economic sphere more generally. Following Mitchell, 
'The power of the economy as a discursive process lies exactly with fixing 
this effect of the real (economy) versus its representation. The proliferation 
of models, statistics, plans and programmes of economic discourse all claim 
to represent the different elements and relationships of a real object, the 
national economy. Yet this object ... is itself constituted as a discursive 
process' (1998: 92). 
In terms of TGiE, its substantial legal and territorial limitations mean that in all 
likelihood any 'real object' of a national economy will fail to materialise, at least in 
the near future. As such, the fact that TGiE is nevertheless attempting to 
discursively separate the 'economy' from the 'state' means that this case offers a 
fascinating and valuable insight into the initial processes through which the 
economy as a governable sphere is willed into being. 
1:1I Whilst economic exchange with local Indian communities is vital and ongoing (Arakeri 1980). TGiE is 
actively encouraging the vocational training of young Tibetans in skills such as carpentry, auto mechanics 
and cookery in order for such activities to be taken over by Tibetans to the exclusion of current Indian 
workers (pemba, 16.04.2007). 
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6.5 Conclusion: constructing spheres of governance 
In examining TGiE's governance of lives and livelihoods in exile, this chapter has 
examined 'how different domains are constituted as governable and administrable' 
(Dean 1999: 29). Though TGiE faces considerable limitations in providing for and 
governing of these spheres - with the economy proving notably more challenging 
than the population - nevertheless its partitioning out and attempts at managing 
these domains of governance in exile is significant. Crucially, the creation of the 
population, civil society and economy in exile as realms which can be acted upon 
simultaneously defines TGiE by what it is not. TGiE is not the Tibetan population 
but regulates it; TGiE is not Tibetan civil society but shapes it; TGiE is not the 
exile economy but manages it. Following Rose and Miller's assertion that 
'[K]nowledges of the economy, or of the nature of health, or of the problem of 
poverty are essential elements in programmes that seek to exercise legitimate and 
calculated power over them' (1992: 182), I want to argue that it is through such 
strategies of governmentality that TGiE is constructed and legitimised as a 
governing entity. Therefore, employing a range of techniques of governmentality -
from regulating the health and reproductive behaviour of its population to creating 
totalising visions of the development of its exile community and differentiating 
itself from exile NGOs and businesses - TGiE has in many regards constructed 
what Mitchell sees as the state effect'. 
Importantly, TGiE has also internalised these strategies of governmentality. 
Increasingly monitoring and managing its own operations, the exile 'civil service' 
has defined roles, hierarchies, training schemes and indeed pay-scales 
standardised across the diaspora (public Service Commissioner, 16.03.2006). The 
TGiE is audited by the 'Office of the Auditor General' and working hours of 
government offices are consistent across the dispersed settlements and scattered 
communities. Such governing of governance therefore resonates with Foucault's 
(1991) assertion that through the process of governmentality by the state, the state 
itself becomes governmentalised. 
Not only is a governmentality 'toolkit' useful for understanding the governance 
strategies of TGiE, but I argue that this case is also a valuable site for exploring 
the idea of governmentality itself. As I have illustrated in this chapter, the 
nascency of TGiE's mechanisms of governance and the fact that territory, 
legitimacy and authority cannot be taken for granted in this case make this one of 
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those situations 'in which the activity of governing comes to be called into 
question ... in which actors and agents of all sorts must pose the questions of how to 
govern' (Dean 1999: 27). A key area where I have argued the case of TGiE can 
contribute to thinking on governmentality is the intersection of biopolitics with 
cultural politics. As an ostensibly non-Western case, TGiE raises the question of 
whether Foucault's undeniably Eurocentric notion of governmentality can be 
translated to different contexts (Legg 2007b). Whilst caution should be taken in 
such an exercise (philo 2001), I want to argue that by taking concepts such as 
governmentality and biopower to 'unfamiliar surroundings' and investigating them 
through ethnographic methods this recasts and empirically grounds these often 
abstract ideas (see Chatterjee 2004). Therefore, in light of Hannah's assertion that 
'governmentality always acquires its specific form in concrete cultural context' 
(2000: 222) I have argued that in this case the construction of the exile population 
as a cultural repository means that TGiE combines cultural politics with biopolitics 
in its regulation ofthis population. 
In addition, I want to argue that this case is instructive for debates regarding the 
extent to which governmentality is a state or non-state practice, and the 
relationship between governmentality and territory. With regards to the latter, 
governmentality's eschewal of an inextricable relationship between territory and 
sovereignty opens up a looser relationship between governance and territory than 
conventional state theory and has thus proved a useful framework for examining 
TGiE. As alluded to in various sections of this chapter, the case of TGiE 
foregrounds the important distinction between governing strategies and the realms 
over which governance is enacted. As a polity without either contiguous territory or 
jurisdiction over the territory it does operate in, TGiE is limited in its governance 
over territory per se. In light of this, the role of the population in exile as a realm 
over which TGiE can govern is amplified in this case, and it is notable that the 
exile population, welfare state and economy are each defined in nationalistic terms 
rather than territorially. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the exile 
administration from employing territorialising strategies of governance and, as I 
have illustrated, TGiE's governance is often more effective when it is territorialised 
within the spaces of the exile settlements. Not only is this the case with TGiE's 
regulation of the mobility and residency of its population, spatial concentration of 
governmental dependency in its institutions and management of economic 
activities within the settlements, but the exile population itself is strongly 
connected with territory in the eyes of TGiE. For example, the population in the 
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settlements is perceived as most authentically Tibetan, those scattered in Indian 
cities are thus problematised, and Tibetans residing in the West are literally and 
symbolically distant from the exile government. 
Therefore, despite the lack of territory, there is a distinct geography of 
governmentality and biopolitics in this case. It is a geography which is partial, 
fragmented, differentiated and institutionally dense, and where the practices of 
governmentality are concentrated in the bounded spaces of the settlements yet at 
the same time TGiE is constructed as a centralised governing authority. Indeed, 
through its collation of population and economic data, production of statistical 
analysis, demographic surveys and lOPs, school curricula and governmental 
practices, the TGiE headquarters in Oharamsala has become, to use Latour's term, 
a 'centre of calculation' (1987: 215). Thereby acting as a locus of government for 
this exiled population, and being able to govern at a distance through such 
practices (Murdoch and Ward 1997), this crucially justifies and reinforces the 
governance and state-like role and position of TGiE within the exile community, 
establishing it as a provider for and promoter ofthe exile community. 
Turning to the issue of statehood, it is important to acknowledge that 
governmentality does not provide a tool to differentiate between state and non-
state polities. Indeed, this theory of power is in many ways useful precisely because 
it is not restricted to the sovereign state and can be exercised by multiple agencies 
(Miller and Rose 1990: 3). This is certainly apparent in this case, both in terms of 
multiple sites of authority - the TGiE, Gol, international donors and Tibetan 
NGOs - dotting the exile political landscape (Allen 2003b), and the governing 
strategies of TGiE itself lending weight to the call to expand the researcher's gaze 
to the technologies of government employed by non-state entities (Rose-Redwood 
2006). However, whilst governmentality does not allow us to specify the type of 
polity TGiE is, a focus on the exile administration's governing practices and 
discourses does give us a valuable insight into the statehood aspirations and 
limitations ofthis polity. On the one hand, TGiE employs and defines itself through 
a number of instruments and performances of statecraft. These include the census-
like TOS, school curricula, the planning commission and state archives, and the 
establishment of state-like relationships of welfare rather than charity with its 
exile ·citizens'. In addition, in its formalised and distanciated relationships with 
Tibetan NGOs and businesses in exile, TGiE is aspiring to a particular liberal 
democratic mode of government. Moreover, though its modes of govern mentality do 
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not make TGiE a state, the process of constructing a population, civil society and 
economy in exile suggests that TGiE is striving towards the state effect identified 
by Mitchell (1991). 
On the other hand, however, as indicated at various points in this chapter, the 
state-ness of TGiE is always partial, is attuned to the situation in exile and is 
decidedly shaped by the freedom struggle and preparations for returning to Tibet. 
Furthermore, its governmentality is frequently undercut by its inability to legally 
compel or coerce its citizens to obey its orders, from cooperating with the census to 
remaining in the exile settlements. As such, it is law which is the limiting factor in 
this case. TGiE can enact the state-as-provider role, but not state-as-protector. 
Therefore, despite governmentality being promoted as a liberation from the 
theoretical privilege of sovereignty and an analytic of power that does not take law 
as its model, the legal and the sovereign still often underpin practices of 
governance. As Dean argues, 'modern forms of government cannot do without 
sovereign authority and without instruments such as law' (1999: 203). And it is to 
issues of law, legal status and regimes of identification that I turn to in the next 
chapter where attention shifts from TGiE's construction of a population in exile, to 
the negotiation of political and legal identities and the relationships individual 
Tibetans have with their government. 
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Chapter 7 
Citizens and Refugees: Constructing and Negotiating Political and 
Legal Identities in Exile 
I meet my friend Kunchok in a cafe in central London for our weekly catch-up on 
his studies and my attempts at basic Tibetan, but Kunchok arrives agitated and 
anxious, tripping over words to explain what has happened. His residency rights 
in India have been terminated because he didn't renew his papers in person; he 
cannot return to India but he also can't extend his Indian-issued travel 
documents. The only valid papers he has are a UK visa that is about to expire, 
and a Tibetan 'passport' that no state recognises. Deportation to Chinese-
governed Tibet would almost certainly lead to his arrest and detention. Over 
several hours his complex tale of opaque bureaucracy, sometimes-bribeable 
officials, adopted 'fathers' in India, new registration legislation and powerless 
Tibetan officials unfolds. What emerges is an individual who has found the 
boundary between two states - one recognised, the other 'clandestine' - and 
slipped down the gap between them. 132 
7.1 Introduction 
Having set out and explored the broad areas of TGiE's territoriality and 
governance in the previous two chapters, I now want to narrow the focus somewhat 
by turning attention to issues concerning political and legal identities in exile. The 
issue of identity is a vast and complex topic which scholars from across the social 
sciences have examined and debated in a variety of ways (e.g. Barth 1969; Calhoun 
1994; Hall and du Gay 1996). Given the focus of this study, my aim here is to 
engage with 'identity' in a narrowly specified sense by focusing on the relationship 
between identity production and issues of sovereignty, territory and statehood. 
Whilst it is now widely acknowledged that identities are associated with multiple 
political affiliations arising at a range of scales and associated with diverse 
political actors and institutions (Taylor 1994; Agnew 1999), the territorially 
bounded nation-state still remains central to political identity categories. At the 
heart of the relationship between identity and the state is the construction of a 
binary between the citizen resident in a bounded national community and 
therefore the proper subject of political life, and its archetypal 'other', the refugee. 
Through such a binary, the state wields considerable authority in shaping political 
subjectivities and defining the boundaries of inclusion into and exclusion from the 
national body politic. 
132 This narrative is based on my field diary notes from 24 January 2007. 
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With the case of TGiE fundamentally disrupting the relationship between 
sovereignty, territory and statehood, my aim in this chapter is to explore and 
ultimately disrupt this binary through an examination of the construction and 
negotiation of the legal and political identities of exile Tibetans in India. For, as 
Kunchok's complex and contradictory legal status illustrates, Tibetan exiles face a 
paradoxical situation of being simultaneously 'Tibetan citizens' in the eyes of TGiE, 
'refugees' in the eyes of many within the international community and 'foreign 
guests' in the eyes of the Indian state. Turning a critical spotlight onto this legal 
limbo, this chapter will pick through these contradictory relationships between 
Tibetans in India and each of the two 'states' - one 'theirs' but unrecognised, the 
other their long-term 'host' - which identify, label and document them. In thus 
directly addressing and theoretically dismantling the binary of refugee and citizen, 
this chapter will bring into dialogue literatures and disciplines which rarely 
interact: those of refugeehood and citizenship, statelessness and statehood. 
In seeking to understand both the institutional structures of TGiE through its 
construction of identity politics, and the agency of individual Tibetans who daily 
negotiate their legal and political identities in exile, a particular route has been 
chosen through this binary of refugeehood and citizenship. My focus is not on the 
formation and meaning of identities per se. Not only have cultural, religious and 
nationalist aspects of Tibetan identity been explored in detail in existing research 
(Kohis 1996; Anand 2000; Yeh 2007) but, following Brubaker and Cooper (2000), 
the term 'identity' is increasingly torn between essentialist connotations and 
constructivist qualifiers. Rather, my focus is on the regimes, discourses and 
practices of 'identification' (see Scott 1998; Caplan and Torpey 2001). In addition to 
lacking the reifying connotations of 'identity', the processual term 'identification' 
focuses attention on the agents which do the identifying, the most important of 
which is the state. Following Foucault and Bourdieu, 'the state monopolises, or 
seeks to monopolise. not only legitimate physical force but also legitimate symbolic 
force ... [which] includes the power to name, to identify, to categorise, to state what 
is what and who is who' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 15). Such systems of 
identification and categorisation are, as explored in the previous chapter, central to 
the articulation of governmentality. 
With regards to exploring and analysing the identification regimes employed by 
Gol and TGiE I propose two complementary strategies which correlate with the 
broader epistemological and methodological approaches taken in this study. The 
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first is to examine the legal discourses through which the identities of 'refugee' and 
'citizen' are constructed and institutionalised. The significance of these discursive 
practices will be explored through the idea of the politics and power of labelling 
(Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007). Secondly, drawing on sociological and historical 
literature which focuses on processes of identification in a literal sense, the role of 
TGiE and GoI in identity construction and the relationship between individual 
Tibetans and these administrations will be examined through the effective and 
affective attributes of the identity documents issued by these authorities. For 
centuries, written documents have been key 'technologies of power' (Gordillo 2006: 
163. See Foucault 1979; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Anderson 1991; Scott 1998) and, 
with the 'identification revolution' following World War I, states have increasingly 
used the documentation of individuals within their territory as a mechanism of 
constructing themselves as nation-states (Torpey 2000). Therefore, as objects which 
form a key interface between the state and the individual, identity documents such 
as passports, residency permits and voting cards control individuals' legal rights, 
their access to resources and their movement. Moreover, identity documents have 
an inherent duality whereby they can lead to both entitlement and deprivation, 
security and insecurity, empowerment and control (Caplan and Torpey 2001). As 
explored in this chapter, a focus on identity documents can provide a valuable tool 
for dismantling the binary of citizen and refugee and opens up a conceptual space 
for exploring the interaction of essentialised identity construction from above and 
fluid self-identification practices from below. 
Attention on identity documents has, to date, focused on the Western history of 
identity papers (Torpey 2000), transnational elite (Sparke 2006), borderlands and 
border crossings (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007), the development of biometrics 
and digital technologies (Lyon 2001) and opposition to governmental enumeration 
(Watner and McElroy 2004). Whilst offering an important insight into state 
practices and border management, there are notable lacunae within this literature. 
There is little work which takes an ethnographic approach to understanding what 
papers signify to their holders (Das (2004), Gordillo (2006) and Bakewell (2007) are 
notable exceptions) and the focus of most existing research 'is on industrialised 
states, where the use of papers is the most highly developed, rather than those 
regions of the world where the formal policies of states rarely match the realities of 
practice' (Bakewell 2007: 2). In focusing on the relationship between individuals, 
the identity papers that they hold and the state-relations that these papers create, 
facilitate and preclude, this chapter is therefore an attempt to shift attention to the 
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global South, to refugees and to an unrecognised polity. In turn, by focusing on the 
materiality of these identity papers and the social relations that produce them -
such as processes of renewal and validation, what they enable the holder to access 
and do and what obligations come with their possession - an understanding of the 
contradictions, insecurities and allegiances that individual Tibetans face will 
unfold. Not only does this facilitate an exploration of national loyalty in exile and 
the legitimacy of TGiE, but it opens up important territorial issues facing this 
community and government in exile such as residency, mobility, border-crossings 
and transnational practices. Moreover, if identity papers are to be seen as the point 
at which the state passes into material form, then the question of how this happens 
'when the s'tate in question is unrecognised and lacks sovereignty over territory 
becomes salient and revealing. 
In establishing and then deconstructing a series of binaries - refugee/citizen, 
statelessness/statehood, structure/agency, politica1l1egal- this chapter makes three 
cuts at the construction of Tibetan identities in exile. The first section focuses on 
the identification regime of the Gol, addressing the rationale and implications of 
defining exile Tibetans as 'foreigners' with de facto refugee status, the Indian 
administration's legal distinction of different cohorts of Tibetans and the everyday 
, 
practices a~sociated with the administration of identity documents issued to exiled 
Tibetans by the Indian state. As such, this raises broader questions regarding the 
." differential power of labels and categories and the gap between government policy 
and its enactment on the ground. Shifting attention to the relationship between 
'" 
Tibetans in India and TGiE, the institutionalisation of Tibetan citizenship in exile 
. .", 
will be analysed and the rationale for and bureaucratic administration of their 
c:' 
pseudo pa~sport - the 'Green Book' - examined. As citizenship which is created and 
,1 
managed by an unrecognised and territory-less polity, this therefore opens up 
fascinating questions regarding the relationship between citizenship, territory and 
.,1, 
legitimacy, as well as offering a valuable insight into the relationship between 
, '\'.' 
TGiE and its 'citizens' in exile. In shifting perspective to look at the story from 
-, , 
below, the" final section focuses on how simultaneous identities of 'citizen' and 
'refugee' are managed, negotiated and manipulated at an individual level. Further 
,,-
disrupting what is already a complex series of discourses and practices, this section 
attends to issues of agency, mobility, the fuzzy boundaries between the legal and 
,. 
the illegal and the political and emotional value individual Tibetans attach to these 
". 
different identity documents. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the implications 
200 
for Tibetans in exile of being both 'citizens' and 'refugees' and, simultaneously, 
neither. 
7.2 Tibetans as (de facto) refugees: the identification regimes of the 
Indian Government 
At every check-post and office, 
I am an "Indian-Tibetan". 
My Registration Certificate, 
I renew every year, with a salaam. 
A foreigner born in India. 
(from 'My Tibetanness,' Tenzin Tsundue 2003: 15) 
Critical scholarly attention has increasingly fIxed on the elucidatory figure of the 
refugee as an iconic symbol of our age who represents the contemporary political 
identity crisis (Xenos 1996: 244. see also Arendt 1943; Agamben 1995; Soguk 1996). 
Central to this crisis is the 'discursive externalization of the refugee from the 
national (read: natural) order of things' (Malkki 1992: 33) and the construction of 
the refugee as a transgression of statehood and an aberration of the norm of 
citizenship (Soguk 1999). But how is an individual identifIed as a refugee? Who 
does this identifying and under what rationale? And what are the material and 
performative practices associated with this practice of identification? 
As 'refugees, in the modern sense, are a creation of international law' (Hyndman 
2000: xvi) it is legal discourses which conventionally construct refugee identities at 
an international and national level and, at fIrst glance, defIning who is and who is 
not a refugee appears clear-cut. According to the 1951 UN Convention on the 
Status of Refugees, a refugee is any person who; 
'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' (Article 1 A(2». 
In light of this defInition, it would appear logical that many Tibetans fleeing from 
persecution in their homeland are 'refugees' and, indeed, it is the identification of 
'refugee' that exile Tibetans are most often associated with. The term 'refugee' is 
used unquestioningly in press reports (e.g. Barnett 6 October 2006; Sengupta 19 
March 2008), by researchers examining the exile community (e.g. Michael 1985; 
Subba 1990; French 1991) and, as discussed below, most Tibetans in exile refer to 
themselves as 'refugees' (kyab cholwa). However, whilst technically one becomes a 
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refugee when the criteria within the 1951 Convention definition are fulfilled, 
recognition of refugee status is enacted at a state rather than abstract 
international level. As Hyndman notes, the concept of 'refugee' is defined by the 
'juridical and political apparatuses of national governments, premised upon the 
territoriality of nations, and predicated on the political borders of individual states' 
(2000: 163). 
Whilst some Tibetans seeking asylum in states party to the 1951 Convention meet 
the precise requirements of the Convention's definition (Garratt 1997), the non-
signatory states of Nepal and India and the politicised situation vis-a-vis the 
Government of China means that the use of the label 'refugee' in this case is 
problematic. For example, the Nepalese Government does not recognise Tibetans 
as asylum seekers or refugees, the UNHCR's Kathmandu office does not interview 
for 'refugee status determination' (Tibetan Review 2001 36(1): 10) and China's 
objection to the term 'refugee' applied to Tibetans outside of China, 'convinced' the 
U.S. to grant Tibetans 'immigrant' rather than 'refugee' visas to Tibetans settling 
there (Yeh and Lama 2006: 813).133 In light of such confusion, Garratt's questions: 
'on what basis can Tibetans anywhere be accurately described as refugees? Are 
they exiles, stateless expatriates or Chinese citizens? How do they gain refugee 
status or asylum?' (1997: 20) frame the following discussion. Focusing on the 
categorisation and documentation regimes employed by the most influential state 
regarding this process of identification, India, the first part of this section focuses 
on the legal status and categorisation of Tibetans in India at the national level, and 
how the exile population is differentially classified by the Indian administration. 
Shifting scale to the local and the everyday, the second part examines how these 
disaggregated categories of exile Tibetans are produced on the ground, the 
ambiguities and contingencies of these bureaucratic practices and the insecurities 
for individual Tibetans that this produces. 
7.2.1 National legislation. legal status and identity documents: the 
ambiguous position of Tibetan 'refugees' in India 
In order to understand the legal position of Tibetans in India we need to step back 
from this specific case and consider India's relationship with refugees more 
generally. Though India has played host to numerous refugee communities since 
\33 This was expressed most explicitly in a statement to the UN General Assembly on 27 July 1972 when 
the Chinese delegate Wang Jun Shen stated: 'the Office of the UNHCR has regarded as "refugees" the 
Tibetan inhabitants who have gone to India under the coercion of the Indian government ... the Chinese 
delegation solemnly demands that the Office of the UNHCR must ... abolish the organs for these illegal 
activities and delete a1l the related parts from the report' (cited in Oberoi 2006: 30). 
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its independence in 1947, there is a paradox at the heart of India's relationship 
with refugees. On the one hand the provision of hospitality to refugees has been 
posited as an integral part of Indian culture (particularly the tradition of charity 
and ethic that the 'guest is god') and postcolonial politics (Samaddar 2003). On the 
other hand, these practices of refugee care and rehabilitation are precisely that: 
practices. They are not underpinned by law. As a signatory neither of the 1951 
Convention nor 1967 Protocol, India has no national legislation regarding refugees 
and is not bound by international norms. 134 Chimni (2003: 444) suggests three 
reasons behind India's refusal to sign the Convention and Protocol. Firstly, that 
these international agreements were perceived to be Eurocentric and therefore 
potentially threatening India's non-aligned status (Oberoi 2006). Secondly, that the 
regime contained in the Convention is too burdensome for developing countries like 
India to implement and, finally, that once India becomes a party to the Convention 
it would allow intrusive supervision by the UNHCR, an organisation perceived by 
the Indian leadership as acting on the behest of Western donor countries (Chimni 
2003). However, whilst not party to the international refugee regime per se, India 
does nevertheless offer protection to refugees and recognise a number of refugee 
rights in practice through its domestic laws (Vihayakumar 2000). In addition, 
under customary international law codified in the Indian constitution (Article 21), 
the state is obliged to observe the principle of non-refoulement135 and the Indian 
Judiciary has to date overwhelmingly acted to protect refugees (Rohit, 06.12.2007). 
However, whilst a degree of legal protection is apparent, this is essentially a 
regime of charity, not a regime of rights (Samaddar 2003) and, with a lack of 
refugee legislation, the Gol's approach is governed by political decisions which 
create an unstable and ever-changing domestic policy (HRLN 2005: 4). In the 
words of an Indian advocate based in Delhi: 
'~ur government alone determines refugee status, yet at the same time fails 
to define who a refugee is. The negotiation of refugee rights is informal and 
arbitrary as we have no obligations under international law, but there is 
also' open space for political negotiation' (Tejal, 05.06.2007). 
I;I~ There have been calls within some quarters in India for national legislation on refugees on the grounds 
that it would facilitate distinguishing between migrants and refugees, clarify conditions in which refugeo 
status would cease, and support India's bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council (Chimni 
2003). A draft 'Model National Law on Refugees' has been formulated by lawyers, academics and NODs, but 
has yet to be considered by the Gol (advocate, Human Rights Law Network, Delhi 03.06.2007). 
13,1 The principle ofnon·refoulement requires that a state shall not expel or return a refugee 'in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' (Article 33 
par~graph. (1) of.the 1931 Convention on the Status of Refugees). 
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As a result of the state having the power to decide who to extend hospitality to and 
whom to deny it to, India's treatment of refugees is therefore ad hoc and highly 
discriminatory. Crucially, this has led not only to the differential treatment of 
various refugee groups in terms of residency and employment rights and access to 
social services, but even to different classifications, with 'refugee' status being 
extended to some but not all groups. This ranges from mandate refugees who are 
recognised .as refugees by the UNHCR and come under the organisation's remit 
(this includes individuals from Afghanistan, Burma, Sudan and Iraq), through 
groups who are recognised as de facto refugees by the Gol (including Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Tibetans) to those regarded not as refugees but as ordinary foreigners 
or economic migrants (e.g. the majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis resident in 
India).136 
In terms of Tibetans in India, this group has, in general, enjoyed preferential 
treatment from the Gol. As discussed in Chapter 3, with their functioning 
. '" 
leadership structures, adherence (at least in principle) to non-violence, and 
attempts to create self-sufficient communities, Tibetans are regarded as model 
.'" 
refugees (Fiirer-Haimendorf 1990), As a result, India has granted more rights and 
"' 
autonomy t~ Tibetans than most other 'refugee' groups, However, whilst the Gol 
recognises and often refers to Tibetans' 'refugee status', indicating the understood 
<" 
de facto nature of Tibetans' presence in India as refugees (Hess 2006: 82), under 
~ ':: 
Indian law Tibetans are 'foreigners', and 'aliens'. Broadly speaking, Tibetans fleeing 
" persecution in Tibet are registered under the 1939 Registration of Foreigners Act 
, ~ , 
applicable tq. all foreigners entering the country, and are handled legally under the 
1946 Forei~~ers Act, whereby the Gol is empowered to regulate the entry, 
residency and departure of aliens (TPPRC 2006b: 225). The language used in these 
statutory frameworks is significant, with the categories 'foreigner' and 'alien' 
originating"as do the Acts, in the c?lonial era (Banerjee 2003). 
With regards to the documentation regime through which the legal status of 
'" 
Tibetans in India is materialised," under the 1946 Foreigners Act, Tibetans are 
( 
required to obtain an 'Indian Registration Certificate for Tibetans' or 'RC' which is 
't' . 
1:16 Alongside the' absence of an official or coordinated national verification mechanism, such a confusing 
picture means that there are conflicting figures for the number of refugees resident in India. For example 
the UNHCR cites 161,537 'refugees' in India (2008: 65), whereas the U.S Committee for Refugee and 
Immigrant's report (2008: 31) lists 420,400 refugees in India (including 110,000 Tibetans, 102,300 Sri 
Lankans, 75,O()0' 'Burmese, 50,000 Nepalese and 35,900 Bangladeshis). Meanwhile, the only mention of 
refugee number~ ,on the Gol's website is a line in 'Interesting Facts about India' which states that 'India 
provides safety for more than 300,000 refugees originally from Sri Lanka, Tibet, Bhutan, Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh, who escaped to flee religious and political persecution' (http://india,gov.in/myindialfucts,php). 
\ In 
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issued by the Ministry of Home through the local Superintendent of Police and 
needs to be renewed annually (TPPRC 2006b: 11-12). This document - a small 
black book - identifies the holder as a 'refugee' with 'Tibetan nationality' and 
permits freedom of movement in India and the fight to reside in the area where it 
is registered. The RC is also necessary for opening bank accounts, renting 
accommodation and running businesses. Tibetans with a valid RC are entitled to 
apply for a Gol-issued 'Identity Certificate' (IC). Issued under Section 20 of the 
Passport Act 1967, this document, valid for 2-10 years and renewable, is for travel 
purposes but is not a passport. Visas can be issued on the IC and a 'no objection to 
return to India' (NORI) stamp is required in order to re-enter India. However, de 
facto refugee status and the identity documents through which this is materialised 
(RC and Ie) applies only to those Tibetans who arrived in India between 1959 and 
1979 and their children (HRLN 2007: 4). The improvement in Sino-Indian relations 
in the 1980s and the increasing numbers of Tibetans coming into exile following 
the liberalisation of Chinese policy in 1979 meant that Tibetans arriving after this 
period have not been recognised as 'refugees' by Gol and, although they are 
generally allowed to remain in India they have no legal status. 
In terms of RCs, the GoI has designated three categories of Tibetans who are 
eligible for these documents. These are Tibetans who came to India between 1959 
and 1979 (Le. those with 'refugee status'), Tibetans born in India and designated 
\ 
Tibetans who have arrived in India after 2003 and who carry a 'Special Entry 
Permits for persons of Tibetan origin' (SEP) issued by the Indian Embassy in 
" . 
Kathmandu (Secretary of Department of Security, 01.05.2007).137 Such distinctions 
,-
between different cohorts of Tibetans in terms of who is bestowed with or denied 
I • 
the 'refugee' label thus imposes external divisions upon the exile community, 
" -\ 
creating 'new' categories which have significant material consequences. Crucially, 
"" . " 
the 'categories' of Tibetans entitled to Res leaves a group of Tibetans - those who 
" , 
arrived' in India between 1979 and 2003 - denied this identity document and the 
... ,' .\ " 
rights a,nd _ entitlements that go with it. Ineligible for travel documents (e.g. IC), 
this cohort is effectively stuck in legal limbo in India where they face restrictions in 
'I, I '\ 
movement, residency and accessing Indian services. Most newcomer interviewees 
J:l7 TheSEP was'introduced on humanitari~n grounds and as an attempt to monitor and regularise the 
increasing flow 9fTibetans into India, and was welcomed by TGiE as Tibetans now have fewer problems at 
the Nepali·Indian border and are no longer entering India' illegally (Director. Dharamsala Reception 
Centre, Og.04.2007). SEPs are issued for those on pilgrimage trips to India (issued for one month and RCs 
are not 'allocated on this basis), those seeking education in India (for whom a more long·term 'extension of 
stay' permit can be issued) and to those deemed 'vulnerable', including former political prisoners. These 
latter individuals, when recommended by the Bureau Office of the Dalai Lama are now (slowly) being 
issued ~ith RCs (Representative, Tibet Bureau, Delhi 15.04.2006). 
~ '! . 
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spoke b~th of considerable anxiety regarding the vulnerability of their position in 
India ~'especiany in terms of encounters with Indian police - and of their desire to 
acquire~an RC: 
'Since 2004 I have been in India but still I have no RC. Many times I have 
made applications, but this process it takes a long time. Really I need the 
RC, because without [it] life in India is very hard .... Today if I am stopped 
by Indian police or officials, I get in trouble and they tell us we have to go 
back to Tibet. Only after paying baksheesh will they say "OK, you can go 
now" and for leaving Dharamsala I am also scared because any time the 
Indians they ask to see my papers and then what do I say?' (Gonpo, 
Dharamsala, 12.03.2007). 
'The police come to my area and knocked on doors wanting to see RCs but I 
don't have RC yet so every time I have argument and every time I must pay 
bribes. For this I am scared' (Ugyen, Dharamsala, 31.03.2007), 
Such anxieties regarding securing their legal position within the host state is 
common across many newly arrived refugee communities (AI-Ali et al 2001) and, 
becaus'c. the RC is required for so many basic livelihood needs, this cohort is 
freque~tly in transgression of one law or another. Although TGiE has requested 
the Gol to issue documentation in the form of 'long stay permits' to these 
individuals and thereby legalise their presence in India, this process has not yet 
been u~iformly implemented across the exile community (Secretary, Department of 
.' Security, 01.05.2007). In reality, many such Tibetans attempt to acquire an RC 
throug~ bribery or by falsely claiming to be born in India, and there a flourishing 
n 
birth certificate forgery industry in Dharamsala (Patail, 28 November 2002). 
Whilst S-uch practices are an important example of Tibetan agency and resistance 
r 
to the systems of registration imposed by the Indian state (discussed below), as an 
Indian '~'dvocate in Dharamsala pointed out, each time there are new fraudulent 
f",' 
practice,S with RCs, so new and more stringent conditions and requirements are 
imposed, to the disadvantage of newcomers from Tibet (14.03.2007). 
With regards to the legal rights of Tibetans in India, the ambiguity, contradictions 
"'l, " 
and differential treatment continues. Whilst Tibetans do not enjoy the same 
, f • ~ 
politic~l r~ghts as Indian citizens - such as formal participation in Indian politics 
or the ability to carry a Indian passport - under the 1946 Foreigners Act they are 
., 
entitled. to the rights applicable to all non-citizen aliens residing in India as 
enshrined in the Indian Constitution. These include freedom to work and move 
" ' 
around 'the country, access to Indian health and education facilities (see Chapter 
t, ',. 
6), the right to equality (Article 14), the right to life and personal liberty (Article 
'.' , 
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21) and the freedom to practice and propagate their own religion (Article 25). 
However, 'despite such formal rights, many Tibetans I spoke to were under the 
impress'ion that they have few entitlements in India: 
'In 'india we Tibetans aren't safe. We don't have legal status here and we 
don;t have full rights so we can't vote, we can't get some jobs or have 
property and the police they don't protect us. We're treated as second-rate 
and ... and looked down on' (Dhargyal, Majnu-ka-Tilla, 07.06.2007). 
'Here, without citizenship we have no rights. We can't buy land, can't own 
property, can't get a good job, so what is our future? And if I have a problem 
with one Indian then I can say nothing - my hands are tied. Always they 
will come done on the side of the Indian. People, they say we Tibetans are 
doing well here, we are educated and making money, but really we have no 
rights' (Nyendak, Dharamsala, 24.03.2007). 
Moreover, whilst Tibetans may be technically 'foreigners' in India, the varying 
(mis)interpretations ofthis status can create problems. For example: 
'with bank accounts you have to be stating your nationality. Of course we 
put ,"Tibetan" but many banks they don't know if we are allowed to have 
acc~unts .... They think we are real foreigners but we say we are born in 
India. We always have such problems .... So the banks, they want identity 
proof so we give RC, but some banks they don't accept it and ask for 
pas~ports, but of course we don't have one, but they can't understand this!' 
(Topgyal, South Delhi, 30.10.2007). 
\ 
Similar: confusion arises regarding gaining admission to institutions of higher 
education: 
'Universities in India, they have seats for foreigner and then general 
cat~gory Indians and then STs [Scheduled Tribes] and SCs [Scheduled 
Ca'stes]. They say we aren't foreigners because we are born here, but also we 
ca;;'t sit for "general category" ... and for the local [state-level] colleges for 
~d~ission you need one "Domicile Certificate" [which confirms that the 
student's parents are legal residents of the state] but for us that is 
impossible' (Norzom, Lugsum-Samdupling, 25.11.2007).138 
7.2.2 The messiness of bureaucratic practices and unstable identity 
documents 
Attendi~g ~o this disjuncture between the presuppositions of the legal rights of 
Tibetans iIi India as set out in statutory frameworks and their enactment on the 
" 
ground p~~ns an important window onto the (mis)translation of central state policy 
into local'state practice. For, whilst there is confusion regarding the status and 
,'1 :-\" . 
docume'ntation of Tibetans at a national level, this is amplified by the capricious 
.:18 At a nlltiorial level. the Gol 'reserves seats for Tibetans in Indian institutions for the following fields of 
study: engineering (3 seats). medicine (I), pharmacy (1) and printing technology (2), (planning Council 
1994. Section '5.2.4). 
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practices and arbitrary pronouncements of Indian officials at a local level. As an 
Indian advocate working in Dharamsala put it: 
'Our law treats Tibetans and Indians equally because it makes no 
ciistinction between citizens and foreigners. But the reality is ... the reality 
IS different. You will find a lot of prejudice against Tibetans at the local 
level, so with local police they often pick on Tibetans, asking for papers and 
sometimes they are aggressive' (Kaushik, 14.03.2007). 
Therefore, whilst national legislation differentiates this exile population regarding 
their legal status within India, as I demonstrate in this section, the bureaucratic 
'messiness' surrounding the administration of identity documents means that each 
of these dis aggregated categories is contingent and unstable. Indeed, it is the 
everyday processes and practices associated with the identity documents issued by 
GoI which forms one of the primary points of contact that exile Tibetans have with 
the Indian state. By following the argument that the meaning of 'the state' lies as 
much in its details and everyday practices as in its ideologies and grand projects 
(see G~pta 1995; Shore and Wright 1997), I therefore want to turn to the micro-
political and micro-administrative practices associated with RCs and ICs: the 
issuing'l terminating, validating, recording, stamping, signing and filing of these 
documents and the information that they hold. 
The most regular encounter between exile Tibetans and the Indian state regarding 
their identity do~uments is the annual renewal of the RC. Whilst the RC is usually 
,,' 
renewed without difficulty, it is done entirely at the discretion of local officials and 
many interviewees described this as an onerous and stressful experience. As a 
hotel receptionist in Majnuka Tilla put it: 
, 
'I sometimes take my relatives to FRO office [Foreigners Registration 
Office]. Some days they will give papers OK but then other days they will 
refuse and say they are going to terminate RC, and then they demand 
baksheesh [bribe]. I'm tired of this Indian way of doing things' (Tsewang, 
15.04.2006). 
In addition, although Tibetans are required to register their departure and arrival 
in diffe~ent regions with the respective local authorities - a mechanism through 
which Gal attempts to monitor the Tibetan population - each individual must 
renew their RC in person in the FRO where it was issued. This causes significant 
hassle for those studying or working in different areas, and I spoke to several 
Tibetans who have to make the round trip from their monastery in Karnataka to 
Dhara~sala during their exam period every year. 
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Considering the bureaucratic systems behind these identity documents more 
generally, several TGiE officials spoke of their frustrations dealing with the whims 
of individual administrators and the length oftime that procedures took: 
'So much time and hassle we spend with this Indian bureaucracy. So, for 
example, it takes two days just to get a stamp or a signature on one 
document.. .. This for us is hard to work with every day - for me I think I 
will never get used to it' (Indo Tibetan Co-ordinator, Dharamsala Welfare 
Office, 10.03.2006). 
'Many times we have problems with local officials changing and interpreting 
the central government notices in different ways. Even if all the documents 
they are perfect they will cause hassle - they say come back tomorrow, they 
need more information, more certificates and so on - this is where we have 
problems.... Tibetan people they are impatient, they are not used to 
bureaucracy and don't want to wait. So they will pay bribes to get 
documents, but this causes problems for [the] whole community' (RC 
Officer, Department of Security, 01.05.2007). 
Several interviewees also spoke of problems with mis-spellings of Tibetan names 
" . 
on forms and documents: 
'I applied for IC but when it came there was [a] spelling mistake with my 
name and for more than one year I have been trying to make this change 
but still it is not finished. The SP [Superintendent of Police] he changed one 
year back so the process I had to start over again' (Wangchuk, Dharamsala, 
16.04.2007). 
However, as an Indian advocate pointed out, the blame does not always lie with 
Indian officials: 
'If there are mistakes on the RC, even small ones, then an IC cannot be 
made and this ... it causes huge problems. So I had one case where a girl had 
made her RC using official documents from TCV school but this document 
had mistakenly said that her father was "late" when in fact he was alive 
and so her RC was printed wrong and when she went to get IC they 
wouldn't make it because of this mistake - you see there was no death 
certificate for father! - and it took us so long to change RC because [we] had 
to prove that the father was alive. So, as I say, one mistake it can cause so 
many problems' (Kaushik, 14.03.2007). 
In addition, a notable feature which emerged from interviews in different 
settlements was the geographical unevenness of the administration of RCs. Far 
from a uniform, standardised system rolled out across the state, RCs were 
frequently described as easier to acquire and renew within the large agricultural 
settlements in Karnataka compared to Delhi, Dharamsala or the settlements 
around Dehradun where these documents are more likely to be spot-checked. 
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Highlighting the agency of state officials in terms of who can request, issue, renew 
or retain an identity document, this procedure again reinforces the assertion that 
the state is not a monolithic entity but rather a series of individuals who wield 
different degrees of power. Moreover, such 'ID checks' cause considerable anxiety, 
not only for newcomers without RCs or a knowledge of Hindi (see above), but also 
those possessing the required documents, as a magazine editor in Dharamsala 
recounted: 
'Often we Tibetans have so many problems with the Indian police here. Like 
one time I was working in the office too late, and then I was walking home 
maybe 10.30pm and one group of police they stopped me and said "Tonight 
is curfew, you are not allowed outside". But then I said I didn't know - there 
are no notices, announcements, but sorry and I will go home. But then they 
say ''Where is your RC? Show me your RC". But I say my RC is at home 
where it is safe with all my other documents and if he [police officer] wants, 
he can come to my home and I will show him, but they say no, you must 
carry your RC [at) all times. So he took me to police station even though it 
was late at night I was taken there and put in with the Indian criminals. So 
this is how they treat us Tibetans and really we can do nothing because we 
have no power. With only our RC we have no rights' (Nyidon, 03.11.2007). 
The police also play an important role in the issuing and administration of ICs. 
Although the document itself is time-consuming but straightforward to apply for 
(involving close coordination between Gol and TGiE as discussed below), it is the 
issuing of the NOR! stamp which can prove problematic as clearance must be 
sought from the Ministry of External Affairs confirming that the applicant does not 
have a criminal record. This 'inquiry' requires a home visit by the police, and not 
only is the process delayed if the individual is not present when the police call, but 
bribes are frequently demanded (Secretary, Majnuka Tilla Welfare Office, 
16.04.2006) and many interviewees described the experience as intrusive and 
distressing. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The ethnographic approach to the state adopted in this study reveals how the 
identification of individual Tibetans by the Indian state is put into practice on the 
ground and is in many ways arbitrary, spatially uneven and contingent upon the 
whims of local officials. Illustrating the importance of documents for establishing 
distinctions between identities, such an approach demonstrates how these 
boundaries are constantly negotiated rather than necessarily based a set of 'known 
facts' about an individual. In turn, this supports Caplan and Torpey's assertion 
that 'the documentary apparatus of identification itself has driven the history of 
categories and collectivities' (2001: 3). Turning to the label 'refugee' as a 
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classificatory device employed by the state, this case appears to both confirm and 
challenge two conflicting perspectives. On the one hand, the fact that the Gol's 
ability to sanction or deny the 'refugee' label has such significant material 
implications for individual Tibetans in terms of determining their mobility, 
residency and entitlement to rights in India affirms Zetter's assertion that: 
"'Refugee" constitutes one of the most powerful labels currently in the 
repertoire of humanitarian concern, national and international public policy 
and social differentiation. The label "refugee" both stereotypes and 
institutionalises a status' (1988: 1). 
On the other hand, the arbitrariness of Tibetan 'refugee' status in India and the 
fact that individuals can fall into and then fall out of the refugee label (Hayden 
2006) also supports claims that the category of 'refugee' is vague, fragmented and 
dynamic and as much a political as legal classification (M:alkii 1995; Black 2001). 
Finally, returning to the refugee-citizen binary, a logical assumption is that the 
insecurity and marginalities of the identity of 'refugee' is countered by the citizen 
whose identity is stable and unproblematic. However, this case fundamentally 
challenges such a distinction. Not only has the concept of the universal rights-
bearing Indian citizen been fundamentally challenged (see Chatterjee 2004), but, 
as I will explore in the next section, Tibetans in exile have an added dimension of 
complexity in that whatever status they have in India, they are simultaneously 
'Tibetan citizens.' 
7.3 Tibetans as citizens: the identification regimes of the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile 
'Modern citizenship is closely connected to the rise of the state. Conventional 
views of statehood see control over membership in its territory as a crucial 
requ,irement ... Today, only states have the authority Il,nder international law 
to grant or deny the status of citizen. Thus, citizenship is strongly linked to 
the idea of political community which in turn is seen as synonymous with the 
territorial exclusivity of the sovereign nation-state' 
(Agnew 1999: 514). 
Given that exile Tibetans attain refugee status to varying degrees and are 
uniformly stateless, a logical assumption is that their unrecognised and territory-
less administration has no role in generating political identities for this 
community. However, alongside the identification regimes of the host state which 
classify most exile Tibetans in India as de facto refugees, is a parallel identification 
regime run by TGiE which regards and labels all exile Tibetans as citizens. In 
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turning to the latter, this section attends to the discursive and material 
construction of Tibetan citizenship in exile and, through this, turns a critical 
spotlight onto the relationship between Tibetans in exile and the TGiE. 
My concern with citizenship here is a limited and specific one. Rather than the 
content of citizenship, it is the category of 'citizen' that I am interested in and, in 
light of this, I want to briefly set out two broad approaches. First, is citizenship as 
a purely legal status with the citizen defined as 'a member of a particular 
territorial state and the rights attaching to that status' (Axford 2002: 37). As such, 
the concept of the citizen is the key mechanism through which the state is 
conjoined with the nation (Agnew 1999: 514) and is thus central to the organisation 
of the modern Western state and the development of centralised political control 
(Scott 1998). However, this traditional juridico-Iegal model of citizenship contained 
within a territorial nation-state is increasingly under strain from a number of 
forces including immigration (Castles and Davidson 2000), the development of 
global conventions governing human rights (Agnew 1999) and 'supra-state' forms of 
political community such as the EU (Mandaville 1999). In light of such challenges 
to the relationship between citizenship, the state and national territory, there has 
been a shift of academic attention from citizenship as a legal formula, to citizenship 
as a social and cultural construct which exists beyond territorial borders and at 
scales other than the nation-state (Painter and Philo 1995). In considering this re-
scaling of the 'practices and privileges of citizen identity' (Kurtz and Hankins 2005: 
4), alternative models of citizenship have included urban citizenship (Secor 2004), 
transnational citizenship (BaubOck 1994), cosmopolitan citizenship (Linklater 
2002) and global citizenship (Dower and Williams 2002). As a stateless community 
coming under a territory-less polity, citizenship instituted by TGiE clearly 
intersects with these reconceptualisations. At first glance, as such, this section 
seeks to trace the legal discourses through which exile Tibetan citizenship is 
constructed and the identity documents through which this is materialised in order 
to examine both what Tibetan citizenship in exile can tells us about the state-like 
functions and aspirations of TGiE, and what this case can contribute to debates 
regarding the relationship between citizenship, statehood and territory more 
generally. 
7.3.1 The establishment of Tibetan citizenship in exile 
Tibet, as it was governed under the Dalai Lamas prior to 1959, had neither a single 
homogenous category of the citizen, nor the conferment of homogenous rights 
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across the Tibetan population (Frechette 2006). Rather, the relationship between 
the Tibetan state and its inhabitants was contingent on an individual's 
landholdings and position within socio-economic hierarchies. The exile Tibetan 
government, however, has developed a formalised notion of Tibetan citizenship, the 
definitions, criteria, rights and duties of which are enshrined in the Draft 
Constitution of 1963 and the Charter of Tibetans in Exile (1991). Outlined in the 
latter, Tibetan citizenship is granted to: 
'All Tibetans born within the territory of Tibet and those born in other 
countries shall be eligible to be citizens of Tibet. Any person whose 
biological mother or biological father is of Tibetan descent has the right to 
become a citizen of Tibet' (Article 8). 
The rights of such 'Tibetan citizens' include equality before the law (Article 9), 
religious freedom (Article 10), freedom to life, liberty and property, freedom of 
speech and expression and freedom of movement and association (Article 12). 
Under Article 13 of the Charter, 'all Tibetan citizens shall fulfil the following 
obligations: 
(a) bear true allegiance to Tibet; 
(b) faithfully comply and observe the Charter and the laws enshrined 
therein; 
(c) endeavour to achieve the common goal of Tibet; 
(d) pay taxes imposed in accordance with the laws; 
(e) perform such obligations as may be imposed by law in the event of a 
threat to the interest of Tibet'. 
At first glance, these 'statutes' of Tibetan citizenship appear to be framed in 
familiarly Western terms and to represent a conventional shift in a state's 
relationship with its population from one based around subjects and duties to one 
grounded in citizenship and the language of rights and social responsibilities 
(Miller and Rose 1990). Indeed, the institutionalisation of Tibetan citizenship can 
be seen as a key part of the broader exilic nation-building project and TGiE's 
efforts to seek acceptance and legitimacy from the international community (see 
Chapters 6 and 8 for similar strategies regarding discourses of democracy and good 
governance) . 
However, exile Tibetans have encountered significant cultural challenges and 
limitations in their efforts to accommodate such a modern Western model of 
citizenship (Frechette 2006). Illustrative of this are the difficulties faced in 
translating and interpreting the concept of 'the citizen' into both Tibetan language 
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and Tibetan cultural and political contexts (see Sidaway et al 2004).139 Crucially, 
elements of traditional Tibetan hierarchies of subjecthood remain, and there are at 
least three translations of the concept of the citizen in use in the Tibetan diaspora: 
nga-wang used in the 1963 Draft Constitution which connotes the idea of a 
'subject'; yul·mi used in the 1991 Charter and meaning 'local inhabitant'; and mi-
ser which is often used in everyday parlance to mean citizen, though it 'translates 
as "agricultural tenant" or "serf', and which was used for all non-aristocrats in 
Tibet under the Dalai Lamas' (Frechette 2006: 137). Such confusion over the 
meaning and significance of citizenship was apparent in my interviews, with a 
general lack of knowledge as to its establishment or engagement with the concept 
beyond general associations with Tibetan nationalism (discussed below). As such, 
this highlights the ongoing struggle within the Tibetan diaspora to 'develop a 
political ideology that reflects both their achievements in constructing a modern 
state and their own culture and tradition' (ibid: 138). More generally, the exile 
Tibetan (mis)interpretations of Western ideas of citizenship illustrate both the 
importance of studying citizenship trajectories and experiences outside of Anglo-
American and European perspectives (Ho 2008), and the need for our 
interpretations of the practices and understandings of citizenship to be 
contextually grounded (Brubaker 1989). 
On the one hand, therefore, the discourse of citizenship is, like the exile system of 
justice commissions (see Chapter 5) and the concept of democracy (see Chapter 8), 
understandably poorly developed given how recently the concept was adopted by 
the community and the legal restrictions faced by the situation of exile. However, 
on the other hand, the material manifestations and practical implications of 
Tibetan citizenship are widely understood and engaged with. Tibetan citizenship is 
materialised in the Rangzen Lagteb or 'Green Book' which Tibetans refer to as a 
pseudo passport, and the annual payment of chatrel to TGiE (see Chapter 6).140 
Alongside the establishment of citizenship in exile, the Green Book and chatrel 
were instituted outside the homeland. Indeed, no universal identity document 
existed in pre-1959 Tibet and Tibetan passports were only introduced in 1947 and 
issued by the Kashag to just four Tibetan diplomats. 141 
Ja9 Whilst acknowledging the fundamental difficulties associated with translating political nomenclature, 
terminology and language in this case, given that 'citizen' and 'citizenship' are the main terms used in TGiE 
documentation, these terms are employed throughout this study. 
140 Given that my interviewees referred to this document more frequently as their 'Green Book' than 
Rangzen Lagteb, including often in Tibetan, the former is used in this chapter. 
141 The first and only surviving Tibetan passport, issued to Tibet's Secretary of Finance Tsepon Shakabpa 
between 1930 and 1950, went missing in Kathmandu in 1992. After investigations and a fundraising appeal 
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As noted in the previous chapter, the Green Book and chatrel system were started 
by a group of exile Tibetans in 1972 under the auspices of the 'Tibetan Freedom 
Movement' with the dual rationale of encouraging Tibetans to make a financial 
contribution to the running of their government and, through such a contribution, 
thereby expressing their loyalty to TGiE. In 1991, the holding of a Green Book and 
contribution of chatrel became enshrined in the Charter of Tibetans in Exile 
(Article 13) as one of the main duties of Tibetan citizens in exile and, in 2004, the 
Department of Finance became the singular authority to issue Green Books (Kalon, 
Departments of Finance and DIIR, 10.04.2006). As such, the Green Book and 
chatrel have shifted from their origins within Tibetan 'civil society' to being 
managed and administered by the TGiE. More than 90% of exile Tibetans hold a 
Green Book and these documents are issued to all Tibetan children born in exile 
and to each new arrival from Tibet (Additional Secretary, Department of Finance, 
02.05.2007). 
7.3.2 Constructing identities and legitimising 'state'hood: Tibetan 
citizenship and the Green Book 
Given TGiE's unrecognised status and lack of law-making abilities, it is easy to 
dismiss Tibetan Citizenship and the Green Book as merely symbolic. The exile 
government cannot legally defend or protect its own citizens nor, given its lack of 
jurisdiction over territory, guarantee them basic rights of abode and the rights and 
obligations of Tibetan citizenship are not legally enforceable. In addition, no 
Tibetan can travel on a Green Book as it is not recognised by any state, and chatrel 
is deemed 'voluntary' due to TGiE's its operation within India. However, despite 
these seemingly insurmountable legal challenges, exile Tibetan citizenship does 
have a number of parallels with conventional state citizenship. Not only did my 
interviewees consistently speak of the Green Book as their 'Tibetan passport' and 
their duty to pay 'taxes' to their government, but TGiE exercises significant moral 
and social coercion regarding the implementation of Tibetan citizenship and the 
identification regime which the exile government has established receives a 
considerable degree of international acknowledgement and recognition. 
Firstly, the Green Book acts as both a unifying and exclusionary marker of Tibetan 
identity as, though TGiE cannot control residence in nor prohibition from any 
amongst the exile community it was recovered from an antiques dealer in Nepal in 2004 and showcased in 
an exhibition on Tibetan nationalism organised by Friends of Tibet, India (Sunita. 10.04.2007). Bearing visa 
stamps of India, UK. USA, Italy and France, the passport is regarded by exile Tibetans as affirmation of 
Tibet's independent statehood and, as such, is considered a national treasure (Mehrotra 2000). 
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territory (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 10; see Chapter 5), the exile government can 
determine and regulate membership of its exile community. On the one hand, the 
Green Book and Tibetan citizenship it signifies are exclusionary mechanisms. As 
well as excluding 'obvious' non-Tibetans, eligibility for Tibetan citizenship and the 
Green Book differentiates between Tibetans living in India and Nepal and 'border 
people:' ethnically similar groups such as Ladakhis, Bhutias, and Sherpas who are 
Indian or Nepali citizens. These communities follow Tibetan Buddhism and are 
eligible to join Tibetan monasteries, nunneries and schools but, under the criteria 
for Tibetan citizenship, are not entitled to hold a Green Book and so are excluded 
from the benefits of such a status (including jobs in TGiE, voting in Tibetan 
elections and Tibetan scholarships and welfare stipends). Such construction of 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion based on 'citizenship' therefore sets TGiE 
apart from most diasporas and transnational groups. 
On the other hand, in theory, every Tibetan citizen as defined in the 1991 Charter 
is eligible for a Green Book. In practice, however, it is only those in exile who are 
able to enact the obligations and enjoy the rights of this citizenship, although the 
Secretary at DIIR was keen to stress that the TGiE did occasionally receive chatrel 
contributions from Tibetans inside Tibet which, he argued, was 'a very 
praiseworthy thing, that these Tibetans should demonstrate their solidarity with 
His Holiness and the Tibetans in exile' (10.04.2006). Within exile, in stark contrast 
to refugee status and RCs, Tibetan citizenship and the Green Book are universal 
and standard identifications and documents which are accessible to all exile 
Tibetans, including newcomer refugees. As a monk who came into exile in 2001 
explained to me, 'for the RC I am still having problems, but the Green Book was 
easy. For this, all you need is to be Tibetan! [smiles and points to his maroon 
robes)' (Sherab, 02.05.2007). Indeed, the case of recent refugees is revealing. When 
they arrive in India these individuals, arguably 'more Tibetan' than many second 
generation Tibetans in exile (Yeh 2007), need to 'become' Tibetan citizens before 
they can start to meaningfully engage with the exile community. These refugees 
may have entered the territory of and sought asylum in India, but they are also 
required to seek membership of the Tibetan 'state' in exile and to become 'bona fide' 
Tibetan citizens and nationals. 
Crucially, this creation of 'universal' Tibetan citizenship in exile should be seen as 
the statist and pseudo-legal aspect of a broader project of nation-building and 
national identity construction in exile. Indeed, the 'nationalisation of citizenship' 
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(Isin and Turner 2007: 11) in this case means that the legal identity regime of 
Tibetan citizenship has become synonymous with the political identity regime of 
Tibetan nationality. Moreover, just as Tibetan citizenship was institutionalised in 
exile, so is it broadly acknowledged that Tibetan nationalism was created through 
the process of Chinese occupation (Shakya 1999) and solidified by Tibetans' 'sudden 
immersion into the midst of a sea of Indians' (Goldstein 1975: 21. See Chapter 6). A 
central element of this discursive construction of Tibetan nationalism has been 
TGiE's fostering of a single Tibetan identity. Universal Tibetan citizenship has 
been a key way of subsuming previously dominant regional and sectarian 
affiliations (Norbu 1992) and thus forging a sense of national unity across the 
diaspora. As such, this resonates with Corrigan and Sayer's analysis of state 
activities 'regulating into silence identification based on difference and promoting 
integrative categories of official discourse - the citizen, the voter, the taxpayer, the 
consumer' (1985: 198). 
Moreover, correlating with much work in anthropology on the essentialisation of 
national identities by state elites (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Gupta and 
Ferguson 1992), it is clearly the Dalai Lama and political leadership within the 
TGiE who are instigating, maintaining and managing this reification of Tibetan 
identity in exile: 
'We are struggling to create Tibet outside Tibet ... and for this our exile 
government provides guidance - it plays key roles in making Tibetan 
identity strong with promotion of culture, language and Tibetan way of 
life .. " The government and its schools and institutions keep the Tibetans as 
Tibetans' (Former Kalon, Department of Education, 02.12.2006). 
In light of such assertions, the promotion of nationalism can be seen as a key 
legitimising strategy employed by TGiE which firmly places this institution at the 
centre of the exile community. Such a resurgence of nationalism and promotion of 
an essentialised Tibetan identity also marks an important point of departure from 
post-structuralist approaches which problematise the notion of monolithic national 
and ethnic identities, and instead suggest understanding identities as categories of 
practice that are fragmented, multiple and hybrid (Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1997). 
Indeed, not only does the exile Tibetan government and community's 'compelling 
affirmations of essential subjectivity, genuine national desire, and demonstrable 
ethnic integrity ... seem to fly in the face of narratives of fragmented and 
contingent identity' (Venturino 1997: 99, 100), but such strategies lend weight to 
claims that 'diasporas can also reproduce the essentialized notions of place and 
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identity that they are supposed to transgress' (Carter 2005: 54; Mitchell 1997b). As 
Lavie and Swedenberg assert, 'hybridity does not appear to be a viable strategy in 
the ... case of an exiled identity demanding to return to its historic territory' (1996: 
12). Significantly, however, this is not a return to realist essentialism, but a 
conscious strategy of exilic governance. Recognising that 'identities can be 
important political resources' (pratt 2000: 368), the TGiE's strategic 
essentialisation (Spivak 1988) of Tibetan identity in exile can therefore be seen as 
central to its raison d'etre. 
Underpinning this mutually reinforcing relationship between TGiE and the 
construction of Tibetan identity is the fact that the Green Book and payment of 
chatrel are key signifiers of authenticity and legitimacy through which the TGiE 
and Tibetans in exile reaffirm each other's status. The holding of a Green Book and 
contributing chatrel are the primary mechanisms by which exile Tibetans recognise 
TGiE as their legitimate government, thereby solidifying the link between the 
diaspora and the exile administration rather than other organisations or 
institutions. Meanwhile, TGiE claims that 'from the legal point of view those who 
contribute towards chatrel and hold a Green Book are recognised as bona fide 
Tibetans in exile' (Department of Finance 2005: 2).142 In this sense, the Green Book 
does appear to function as a passport in some respects in that it is the material 
manifestation of Tibetan citizenship, it represents the contours of state-citizen 
relations between TGiE and its diaspora and is a crucial technique for 
nationalising these 'citizens' (Ong 1999). Moreover, the establishment of a social 
contract between exile Tibetans and TGiE through the rights and obligations of 
Tibetan citizenship in effect creates state-like political subjects. Whilst lacking 
legal standing and in many regards symbolic, these rights and responsibilities that 
accompany membership of this community take on a heightened importance in this 
case given the denial of many rights to Tibetans within Tibet (TCHRD 2008) and 
their legally ambiguous status within India. As such, the creation of citizenship 
and its attendant privileges and rights provides a degree of security for the exile 
community. 
In addition, following the assertion that citizenship is 'an assemblage of techniques 
and technologies aimed at producing governable subjects' (Sidhu and Christie 2007: 
142 Questioned on the equivalence of a 'bona fide Tibetan' and Tibetan citizenship, the Additional Secretary 
at the Department of Finance stressed that, whilst any Tibetan without a Green Book was of course a 
'Tibetan' in an ~thnic sense, the TGiE does not 'legally' recognise them as Tibetan 'citizens' (02.05.2007). 
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15), it is the privileges and responsibilities intrinsic within Tibetan citizenship 
which means that the Green Book system is a key mechanism through which TGiE 
attempts to manage its exile population. As noted in the previous chapter, whilst 
lacking legal underpinnings, TGiE does exert moral and social coercion through the 
Green Book and chatrel systems, with the holding of this document and payment of 
this 'tax' being essential to functioning in the exiled community. This includes 
gaining admission to Tibetan schools, accessing TGiE-run welfare services, being 
eligible for scholarships, stipends and TGiE jobs and voting in exile Tibetan 
elections. This is therefore a key mechanism through which the exile government 
attempts to gain loyalty, as individuals failing to pay chatrel face discrimination 
and a general renegade status in the Tibetan community (Norgay, Dekyiling 
17.04.2007). Moreover, the confiscation of a Tibetan's Green Book - and thereby 
loss of Tibetan citizenship and the rights and entitlements that go with it - is the 
only punishment that the exile Tibetan judiciary can impose on members of the 
community. 
This population management function of the Green Book also has important 
spatial dimensions. On the one hand, an expansive and increasingly state-like 
bureaucratic administration has been established to issue and renew Green Books 
and collect chatrel payments. This includes branches of the Tibetan Freedom 
Movement in each settlement in India and Nepal and Offices of Tibet in states 
outside South Asia. These networks come under the jurisdiction of the TPiE, while 
the Department of Finance keeps detailed records of all Green Books and chatreZ 
payments (Kalon, Departments of Finance and DIIR, 10.04.2006). In light of 
Caplan and Torpey's argument that 'systems of standardised registration have 
contributed in large part to the character of the modern bureaucratic state' (2001: 
1) and Scott's (1998: 71) assertion that systems of documenting individuals' 
identity are based on mechanisms of legibility which extend the reach of state 
surveillance, this increasingly standardised administration of Green Books and 
chatrel can be seen as a key performance of statehood. However, on the other hand, 
like access to and dependence on TGiE-run welfare services (see Chapter 6), the 
benefits and duties of Tibetan citizenship are more relevant in the exile 
settlements than in scattered communities and the diaspora in the West. To this 
extent, whilst not territorially bounded as in conventional nation-states, Tibetan 
citizenship is to a degree territorially concentrated and certainly geographically 
uneven. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the Green Book as a signifier of 'authentic' 
Tibetan identity is not restricted to discourses and practices internal to the exile 
community. Rather, TGiE's identification regime is increasingly acknowledged and 
tacitly recognised by significant external actors, albeit in starkly different ways. 
With regards to China, given that the Chinese Government publically declares 
TGiE to be a 'splittist' organisation (Wei 1989), Tibetans may be persecuted by the 
Chinese authorities if they were to return to Tibet and found to be carrying the 
most official document issued by the TGiE: the Green Book (Home Office 2003: 
Section 6.304). Equally revealing, if from a somewhat different geopolitical 
framework, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada declares that 'one of the 
best ways to determine if a person is a bona fide Tibetan in exile is to see if they 
have a "Green Book" ... the authenticity [of which] can be verified by the Office of 
Tibet that issued the document' (10 November 1998, CHN30745.E). Such 
acknowledgement of an 'official' Tibetan identity in exile - albeit not recognition of 
Tibetan citizenship per se - therefore challenges assumptions that stateless 
individuals and peoples are "'invisible" because they do not conform to the modern 
political imaginary' (Mandaville 1999: 663). Rather, the validation of Tibetan 
identity by the TGiE and through the Green Book can be read as an important 
attempt to create an international political (if not legal) presence for this 
community. 
It is in India that the TGiE's ability to determine and verify Tibetan identity is 
most evident. Indeed, it is through interactions between the Indian and Tibetan 
administrations regarding the administration of their Indian-issued identity 
documents that TGiE's identification regime is given most credence. Crucially, the 
Indian Government relies upon the TGiE both to verify an individual Tibetan's 
identity and to assist in the administrative processing of both RCs and ICs at a 
range of bureaucratic levels. For example, in order to apply for an RC a copy of the 
applicant's Green Book must be submitted as proof that the applicant is a 'bona 
fide Tibetan' along with letters of recommendation from the applicant's local 
Settlement Office and the Kashag (Secretary, Majnuka Tilla Welfare Office, 
16.04.2006). With regards to the issuing of ICs, through interviews with a number 
of Tibetan officials I pieced together an involved series of exchanges between TGiE 
and Gol. The applicant first approaches their Settlement Officer or head of Tibetan 
school or monastery for a letter of recommendation and proof of residency. This, 
along with a letter of invitation from a host in the destination country and copies of 
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the applicant's Green Book and RC are sent to the TGiE's Department of Security. 
Then, as the Department's data manager explained: 
'I receive all the IC forms and I register them all in a book. These days we 
need a photograph for each person so my job is also to write to the 
Settlement Officers ifthere is no photo, and then to log all the documents .... 
every year we have to make one annual report of all RC and IC applications 
for the and this is read out in the parliament. From here I send everything 
to the Kashag and there, if they approve [it] they issue a support letter and 
send everything to the Delhi Bureau' (11.03.2007) 
The Representative at the Tibetan Bureau in New Delhi then picks up the paper 
trail: 
'when the IC applications they arrive here, our staff they log them and then 
we send them to the Ministry of External Affairs .... After the MEA has 
conducted the checks of the applicant and if there is approval from [the] 
Indian side then the IC it comes back to this office and from here we send it 
direct to the individual' (15.04.2006). 
The TOiE's role does not finish with the issuing of the IC however. The Secretary 
at the Chief Representative Office in Bangalore explained how: 
'sometimes in this office we get calls from the immigration counter at 
Bangalore or Mumbai airport. They have a Tibetan with IC and they want 
to make sure the person and the IC are real and there are no problems so 
we ... they want additional recommendation letter from this office. A letter 
to say this person has this IC and this IC is genuine. This really helps 
people because there are [a] few cases when some individuals might misuse 
[the system] and this affects the whole community. We thoroughly 
scrutinise each case before we write and stamp the letter. We contact 
settlements, we get a copy of RC, check other documents. We are very 
thorough, making many inquiries for each case' (29.11.2007). 
As such, TGiE in effect takes on a watchdog role, with the Indian administration 
relying on TOiE's literal and metaphorical 'stamp' of approval to verify a Tibetan's 
identity before RCs or travel documents will be issued. Whilst not an endorsement 
ofTGiE as a government per se, nor indeed legal recognition of Tibetan citizenship, 
this reliance on the exile administration does indicate that the GoI has a 
significant degree of trust in TGiE, viewing it as a partner in particular security 
issues and the ultimate guarantor for its exiled population. In light of this, TOiE's 
involvement in the IC system can be read as giving a degree of legal meaning and 
legitimacy to this polity. 
However, it is important not to overstate the case as there was also frustration and 
criticism from some within the community - notably newcomers - that the exile 
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government is not doing more to facilitate their acquisition of Indian identity 
documents. As an NGO official who works with newcomer refugees asserted: 
'Our government should really do a lot more to help newcomers with the 
RC. These recent exiles don't have the contacts, money or information of the 
Indian system so they cannot speed up the process. But the government, 
they're scared of upsetting India and they never challenge the Indian 
government policies' (Dhukar, 13.03.2007). 
These sentiments were echoed by one recent refugee in Dharamsala who explained: 
'I went to the Welfare Office but he [Welfare Officer] told me he could do 
nothing to help me with RC. He said it was Indian law and rules and they 
are above us, we have less power than Indian police. For me, I think our 
government people work honestly but maybe they have no power to help' 
(Ugyen, 31.03.2007). 
The TGiE's powerlessness when it comes to trying to intervene in such cases is 
revealing, as the administration's inability or, in some cases unwillingness, to 
stand up for its 'citizens raises the key question of whether a 'government' which 
cannot protect its citizens deserves that title. Once again, the TGiE has the 
capacity to enact the 'provider' roles of the state, but not the 'protector' role. 
7.3.3 Summary 
I want to conclude this exploration of Tibetan citizenship by returning to the 
distinction set out at the start of this section between citizenship as a legal status 
which is founded upon membership in a territorial nation-state, and citizenship as 
a social and cultural construct which is increasingly de-territorialised. Given the 
situation of exile, it was intuitive to presume that exile Tibetan citizenship would 
fit only within the latter model. However, having examined the establishment, 
discourses and material practices of Tibetan citizenship, this case appears to cross-
cut these models, both fitting and failing to fit with each. Tibetan citizenship and 
its reification in the Green Book are certainly intimately connected with ideas of 
belonging and form a key part of the strategy to unite the exile community under a 
single national identity. Indeed, in interviews with Tibetan 'citizens' in India, 
questions regarding this identity prompted responses which overwhelmingly 
focused on issues of belonging and 'Tibetanness' rather than rights and 
membership. However, at the same time, exile Tibetan citizenship is also evidently 
aspiring to legal citizenship and in many ways meets the criteria for state-based 
citizenship, a~ least on paper. This includes the conflation of Tibetan nationality 
with citizenship in exile (Isin 2007), the construction of boundaries of inclusion and 
'/ 
exclusion regarding this socio-political community and the enshrinement of rights 
", 
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and obligations in the 1991 Charter. Whilst TGiE is particularly limited in how 
these rights and responsibilities can be upheld and enforced, the Green Book 
system provides an important proxy. In light of such challenges and strategies, 
whilst not legally equivalent to conventional state citizenship, exile Tibetan 
citizenship is considerably more state-like than definitions of the citizen which 
refer simply to 'those who belong to almost any human association' (Smith 2002: 
105). 
What then does this example of exile citizenship tell us about the nature of 
citizenship more generally, and the state-like functions and ambitions of TGiE in 
particular? In terms of the former, alongside disrupting the distinction between 
legal and socio-cultural models of citizenship (see Kurtz and Hankins 2005), this 
case supports assertions that citizenship is a relative concept which can exist in 
partial forms with different degrees of citizenship being enacted in different times 
and places (Doty 1996). In addition, the existence of this state-like citizenship 
outside a conventional nation-state goes some way to offering new geographies of 
political membership and new political geographies of membership which can 
complement existing models of transnational, urban or cosmopolitan citizenship 
(Castles and Davidson 2000). Turning to TGiE itself, Gordon and Stack's assertion 
that 'citizenship beyond the State has something to offer the many people who need 
legitimacy for their struggles to create some room for manoeuvre in their lives' 
(2007: 130), has strong resonances with this case. As I have argued above, the 
construction of Tibetan citizenship in exile is a key legitimising strategy for both 
the institution of the TGiE and for individual exiled Tibetans. Moreover, by 
framing this identification regime in state discourses of citizenship, including a 
social contract between TGiE and members of the Tibetan diaspora, this is a 
central mechanism through which TGiE attempts to assert moral authority and 
the political right to classify persons as citizens. Crucially, this is also a political 
right which is receiving a degree of external recognition. Finally, returning to the 
refugee-citizen binary, this construction of exile Tibetan citizenship challenges 
such a distinction in important ways. For, whilst TGiE is certainly limited in the 
protection, security and territorial stability it can offer to its citizens, it has 
established stable socio-cultural affiliations, shared understandings with other 
Tibetan exiles (which are indispensable to welfare and democracy) and secure ties 
to a community. These are key elements of citizen-subjecthood which, by definition, 
refugees fundamentally lack (Soguk 1999: 19). 
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7.4 Blurring the boundaries: self-identification, agency and the 
materiality of identity documents 
'identity is always mobile and processual, partly self·construction, partly 
categorisation by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a 
shield, a fund of memories, et cetera. It is a creolised aggregate composed 
through bricolage' 
(Malkki 1992: 37) 
So far in this chapter two identification regimes operating in parallel have been 
described and analysed: the Gol conferment of pseudo refugee status materialised 
in the RC and Ie, and the TGiE's institutionalisation of pseudo citizenship through 
the Green Book. As such, the focus of attention has been on how political and legal 
identities are constructed from above and imposed on exile Tibetans by state (like) 
institutions. The aim of this third section is to shift attention to the story from 
below in order to examine how these identification regimes are received and 
appropriated by individual Tibetans in exile and, through this, to focus on issues of 
agency and the varying values attributed to these identity documents. Such an 
approach reflects recent critical research on Tibetan identity (Korom 1997; Anand 
2000; Houston and Wright 2003) and trends in cultural theory-informed refugee 
studies and feminist geographers' work on citizenship. Where there has been a 
shift towards deconstructing the iconic figures of the refugee and citizen, focusing 
on individual stories and voices and attending to the inconsistencies inherent 
within these. For example, in a call to re-humanise and re-personalise refugee 
studies, Soguk argues that there is; 
'no commonality to the refugee experience, save the experience of 
displacement. Similarly, there is no intrinsic paradigmatic refugee figure to 
be at once recognised and registered regardless of historical contingencies. 
Instead... there are a thousand refugee figures whose meanings and 
identities are negotiated in the processes of displacement in time and place' 
(1999: 4. see also Turton 2003). 
In a similar vein, there are increasing calls to 'ground' the social practices of 
citizenship by focusing on its contingent and contested nature, the affective 
element of belonging and the lived experiences and agency of citizens (Marston and 
Mitchell 2004; Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006; Ho 2008). Drawing on and contributing 
to ethnographic research examining the relationships between individuals and the 
identity documents that they hold (poole 2004; Gordillo 2006; Bakewell 2007), this 
section focuses on how Tibetans in exile daily negotiate their political and legal 
identities. The first part attends to issues of dual citizenship, the appropriation of 
224 
the 'refugee' label and the significance of pragmatic and patriotic associations with 
different identity documents. Disrupting this already complex situation further, I 
then turn to how individual Tibetans use, misuse and manipulate these 
identification systems, focusing on the heterogeneity of the exile experience and 
issues of agency, mobility and the acquiring of illegal documentation. 
7.4.1 Pragmatism versus patriotism: Indian citizenship and the choice to 
remain stateless 
Whilst the TGiE's involvement in the administration of Indian identity documents 
to exile Tibetans begins to blur any neat division of identity labels, administrations 
and documentation, there is a more important issue which cross-cuts these 
identification regimes and in many ways disrupts the distinction between citizen 
and refugee in this case. This is the issue of Indian citizenship and the desire of 
Tibetans to remain as stateless refugees. The Citizenship Act of India 1955 makes 
provision for the acquisition of citizenship either by birth (Section 3), descent 
(Section 4) or by naturalisation (Section 6). As such, many of the first Tibetan 
exiles in India and their children are eligible for Indian citizenship (TPPRC 2006b: 
161-3; 332).143 Considering the matter of dual citizenship, the 1991 Charter of 
Tibetans in Exile does recognise and sanction dual citizenship, while, though the 
Constitution of India does not allow holding Indian and foreign citizenship 
simultaneously, this is not breached as India does not legally recognise Tibetans in 
India as either Chinese or Tibetan citizens. Indian citizenship brings with it 
significant and obvious advantages such as the ability to own land and property, 
apply for government and public sector jobs, vote in Indian elections and acquire an 
Indian passport and therefore travel abroad considerably more easily than on an 
IC. However, despite these benefits, the vast majority of Tibetans currently living 
in India choose not to take Indian citizenship. No exact figures on the number of 
Tibetans who have applied for or been granted Indian citizenship are available, but 
estimates put it at between 1-4% of the Tibetan population in India. 144 
This widespread refusal to take Indian citizenship is a 'sensitive and emotional 
issue' (Tsering 1990: 13) within the exile community and, in many ways, epitomises 
the struggle at the heart of the exile experience. The most commonly articulated 
14;1 Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act (1955) stipulates citizenship by naturalisation can be acquired by 
a foreigner who is ordinarily resident in India for 12 years. 
144 This figure was obtained from interviews with Tibetan officials and a report in The Hindu 26 May 2005 
which cites 2-4% of Tibetans having Indian citizenship. Several of my Indian interviewees did speak of 
Indian resentment that more Tibetans did not take citizenship, especially those born in India, with lIuch 
criticism linked to frustration that the Tibetan community had 80 resolutely refused to assimilate with the 
host community. 
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reason for declining Indian citizenship is that this is a deliberate and political 
choice to remain stateless refugees. From a legal perspective this decision is based 
on the logical assumption that acquiring citizenship of a recognised state would 
mean that Tibetans lose their political identity as refugees and the attendant 
international recognition of statelessness (Van Hear 2003). As such, this is a 
conscious choice of one legal status over another for, as Strom argues, 
'paradoxically, because their nation is not internationally recognised, they must 
remain stateless and without passports in order to maintain their national identity' 
(1995: 39). 
Specifically, it is the connection between Tibetan national identity in exile and the 
desire to remain stateless refugees which is fundamental to understanding the 
identity constructions within the diaspora and Tibetans' perceptions of themselves 
as a collectivity. As de Voe sums it up: 
'keeping refugee status is viewed as an action, an act of integrity in defence 
of the faith. A Tibetan who has kept refugee status is thought to have kept 
his Tibetan-ness, an ethos mutually understood by Tibetans around the 
world' (1987: 63). 
Intermeshed with the determination to resist assimilation into the host community 
(see Chapter 5), this 'refugee consciousness' (McLagan 1996: 204) is therefore 
'affirmed as patriotism in order to emphasise the desire of returning to Tibet' 
(Anand 2000: 275). As such, many interviewees spoke of taking Indian citizenship 
as 'giving up hope of returning home' (Rinchen, 15.03.2007), of 'becoming too 
settled here [India]... being too comfortable and letting the Chinese and the 
foreigners see that we don't believe in a free Tibet' (Sangpo, 23.05.2007) and as 
meaning 'you have lost some of your Tibetan identity. It means you have become 
part Indian and will start to think that you are Indian' (Thinley, 14.03.2007). 
In light of such sentiments, it is unsurprising that those few Tibetans who have 
taken Indian citizenship usually keep the fact quiet and do face a degree of 
hostility. When posing the question of Indian citizenship to the focus group of 
Tibetan university students in Delhi, the participants looked to one member of the 
group who, appearing embarrassed at first, explained: 
Nyandak: my father, he had issues in the past and was a special case to get 
Indian citizenship and so I have Indian citizenship. But as well as Indian 
passport I have a Green Book [everyone nods and agrees]. .. so really I am a 
Tibetan. The Green Book is more important, but the Indian passport is 
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useful. But for us with Indian citizenship we face so much prejudice here -
we are treated as "low" like we have given up on the Tibetan struggle. But 
this is so hypocritical because Tibetans who get citizenship from the West 
are seen as "high," like they have achieved something. But what is the 
difference? I am always Tibetan. 
Palmo: [interrupts] And you know, many high officials have Indian 
citizenship but they don't say to many people (30.04.2007). 
Whilst any discrimination against Tibetans with Indian citizenship is often of the 
mildest form - for example one interviewee who had recently attained Indian 
citizenship joked that as 'non-resident Indians' are called 'non-reliable' the same is 
being said of him - Nyandak's comments raise two important issues: the 
hierarchies of citizenship and the relationship an individual has with different 
identity documents. 
Turning first to the issue of TGiE's role in Tibetans acquiring 'dual' citizenship 
more generally, whilst there are no codified TGiE restrictions regarding Indian 
citizenship, nor any form of punishment for Tibetans who become Indian citizens, 
societal and ideological pressures against it are considerable. This includes the fact 
that the Dalai Lama has frequently stated his opposition to taking Indian 
citizenship (Shiromany 1998: 242; 263; 337) and, as Goldstein argues: 
'a consequence of this policy (whether intentional or not) is the greater 
dependence of the refugees on the Dalai Lama's Government. Since as 
individuals Tibetans are stateless "guests" of the government, their strength 
lies in their collectivity and is precisely the role of the Dalai Lama's 
Government to organise and represent them collectively' (1975: 24). 
However, accusations like Nyandak's of double standards regarding citizenship in 
the West are increasingly common. Tibetans in North American and Europe often 
adopt citizenship and, crucially, are actively encouraged to do so by TGiE on the 
grounds that citizenship of a Western state would enable Tibetans to become 
'ambassadors' for their lost homeland and provide the opportunity to travel to Tibet 
(RC Officer, Department of Security, 01.05.2007). Meanwhile, in India, not only is 
there growing frustration that Tibetans in the West are viewed differently by TGiE 
but, as the community remains in exile and young Tibetans increasingly struggle 
to find employment (see Chapter 6), the issue of Indian citizenship is becoming a 
fiercely contested topic. As one interviewee put it, 'should more of us [Tibetans] get 
Indian passports so we can get Indian jobs and progress and go into Indian politics, 
or will this mean we will be just one more scheduled tribe in India?' (Chimi, 
07.06.2007). 
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Related to such dilemmas is the relationship between an individual's sense of 
national identity and the variety of identification papers that they hold. The few 
Tibetans I interviewed who had Indian citizenship articulated a pragmatic 
approach to this aspect of their identity. Tsering, a successful businessman in 
Delhi, explained how: 
'having Indian citizenship doesn't make me less Tibetan. At the end of the 
day all it is is a document that makes life easier and I think ... I think for all 
of us here it would help ... it would help all Tibetans be more successful 
here, especially in MT [Majnuka Tilla] with all these land problems. For me 
I see Indian passport ... I am still Tibetan and always will be but having an 
Indian passport helps me in my business life and in my leisure life' 
(16.04.2006). 
Considering the identity documents discussed in this chapter more generally, this 
interview extract and Nyandak's earlier comments about his Green Book illustrate 
an expected division of political subjectivity between a pragmatic relationship with 
Indian-issued RCs, ICs and passports and a patriotic relationship with Tibetan 
identity documents. Drawing on research on migrants in Zambia and Angola, 
Bakewell describes such a distinction in terms of handheld and heartfelt notions of 
identity and sets out a disjuncture between an individual's sense of identity and 
the more consistent views of state officials who 'tended to see the papers as symbols 
of nationality and residence that people should feel privileged to hold' (2007: 1). 
In terms of patriotic attachments to the Green Book, most interviewees expressed a 
strong connection with this document, perceiving it as a material symbol of their 
national identity, taking pride in using it and regarding the payment of chatrel and 
renewal of their Green Books as a 'sacred duty' (Riga, 21.05.2007). Indeed, in most 
homes Green Books are carefully wrapped and kept on a high shelf, with height in 
the Tibetan Buddhist context denoting importance and reverence. Moreover, if I 
was conducting interviews in Tibetan homes my respondents would often be keen 
to show me their and their family's Green Books, careful to point out how their 
chat rei payments had been recorded each year. Such actions have striking 
similarities with Gordillo's (2006) research on the relationship between the 
indigenous people of the Argentinean Chaco and their documentos in terms of how 
identity papers are perceived as highly valued possessions with great care taken to 
protect them. Moreover, Gordillo's assertion that this indigenous community has 
'internalized their past alienation from citizenship rights through the fetishization 
of those objects long denied to them: identity papers' (2006: 162) also has strong 
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resonances with this case. For, whilst the Argentinean documentos were issued by 
a recognised state, I want to argue that the fetishising of Green Books likewise 
represents a state-like fetishism of the institution of the TGiE (Taussig 1997). The 
preoccupation with the materiality of these identity documents enacts a reification 
of state-like power. 
However, there are important exceptions to this distinction between pragmatic 
legal status and an emotional sense of belonging to a nation. For example, as 
outlined above, the Green Book has significant pragmatic value within and, to a 
more limited extent beyond, the Tibetan community in exile and in many ways is a 
more secure and stable document than the RC. Meanwhile, the possession of an RC 
has somewhat surprising patriotic value in terms of the status of remaining 
stateless. Crucially, in order to be an 'authentic' Tibetan in exile in India, at least 
in the eyes ofTGiE, an individual must hold both a Green Book and an RC. All jobs 
within the TGiE and its institutions specify that applicants must submit copies of 
their RC as well as Green Book and, as one currently unemployed college graduate 
put it: 
'really I want an Indian passport, but I can't give up my RC - it's too 
valuable. Any contact with our government or our community and they 
want to see your RC - so for jobs, scholarships, any help - you always need 
an RC... So for me if I stay here I will always have the RC' (Dechen, 
19.04.2007). 
Therefore, while the Green Book proves that an individual is a 'bona fide Tibetan', 
the RC verifies 'refugee' status in India and therefore confirms that prioritisation of 
Tibetan identity. As de Voe puts it, 'for the Tibetan, the refugee paper is expressive 
of a cultural, ethnic and national identity, an allegiance to the past and a candid 
avowal of dedication to Tibet's future freedom' (1987: 56). Indeed, although the 
contingency and legal instability of the RC was a source of anxiety and 
vulnerability for many newcomers (see above), at the same time the annual 
renewal of this document was seen by a number of interviewees as a powerful and 
valuable reminder of their refugee status and the fact that India is not 'home', even 
if they were born there: 
'Every year we Tibetans have to renew our RCs - a formality like this ... and 
each time this reminds me I am a refugee and each time it provokes a 
strong emotion .... The RC - this is the real identity of Tibetans in India - it 
reminds us that we have to go back to Tibet. That we are visitors in India 
and our stay cannot be permanent' (Bhuchung, 26.02.2006). 
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As an annual prompt to renew their efforts in fighting for the homeland, the 
renewal of this document is a key way of sustaining an identity based on 
statelessness, dislocation and displacement and is thus a poignant material marker 
of exile Tibetan identity. Moreover, like the fetishisation of identity documents, 
this situation is not unique to exile Tibetans. Rather, it has significant resonances 
with Malkki's research among Hutu refugees in western Tanzania where she 
observed that: 
'Far from being a "spoiled identity," refugee status was valued and protected 
as a sign of the ultimate temporariness of exile and of the refusal to become 
naturalized, to put down roots in a place to which one did not belong. 
Insisting on one's liminality and displacement as a refugee was also to have 
a legitimate claim to the attention of "international opinion" and to 
international assistance. Displacement is usually defined by those who 
study refugees as a subversion of (national) categories .... Here, in contrast, 
displacement had become a form of categorical purity' (1992: 35). 
Through the action of rejecting Indian citizenship and the patriotic attachment to 
the RC, the 'refugee' label is therefore not simply a classification imposed from 
above by the GoI (section 7.2.3), but is actively appropriated by both individual 
Tibetans and the exile community more generally. Used to define themselves and 
their wider struggle, the refugee label in this case therefore fundamentally 
challenges the common conception of refugees as a 'helpless undifferentiated mass 
of humanity' (Chamberlain 2005: 17) characterised by institutionalised 
dependency. The choice to remain stateless and the conflicting attachment to 
different identity documents can also contribute to debates regarding the category 
of 'citizen' and its disconnection from issues of nationality (Gottlieb 1993). In 
supporting Bakewell's (2007) assertion that the meaning of legal documentation 
and notions of nationality are contested and open to a variety of interpretations, 
Tibetans' experiences of and responses to state categorisations is an important 
example of 'emerging reconfigurations of citizenship and national belonging' (Hess 
2006: 92). Indeed, the fact that the statuses of 'refugee' and 'citizen' each 'grants 
types of identity benefits and restrictions associated with different axes of 
[political] power' (Houston and Wright 2003: 230) means that examining how exile 
Tibetans navigate these options provides an invaluable insight into how 
individuals negotiate their political and legal identities. It is to such issues that I 
now turn. 
7.4.2 Negotiating identities: flexibility, mobility and illegality 
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In further disrupting what is already a complex story of identification regimes and 
documents, this section focuses on how multiple legal and political identities are 
negotiated on an individual level: how exile Tibetans use, misuse and manipulate 
these systems and how this is differentiated across the diaspora. In doing so, this 
turns attention to relationships between identity documents and issues of agency 
and resistance, border crossings and residency rights and the fuzzy boundaries of 
the legal and the illegal. As a way into these issues I want to first provide a 
snapshot of one exile Tibetan whose possession and management of identity 
documents and legal statuses, whilst specific to her particular circumstances, 
highlights and contextualises a number of important issues. 
Dolma is in her late twenties and was born in Nepal. Her parents are wealthy 
traders who travel regularly between Tibet, Nepal and India and, aged 13, she was 
sent to an international school in Pondicherry, South India. Her husband's family 
had been based in Darjeeling since the 1960s but, 10 years ago, relocated to 
Dharamsala where they run two successful restaurants and a gem trading 
business. Dolma manages one of the restaurants and she has a two year old son. I 
asked Dolma to describe the different identity documents she and her family 
possess and what they are used for: 
'My family, when they first were in Nepal they had no papers but these days 
they all have Nepali passports. My father visits Lhasa twice a year for 
trading and comes to Darjeeling and Delhi and for this a Nepali passport is 
OK. Though these days going to Tibet from Nepal is more difficult [ ... ] All in 
my family and my husband's family have Green Books. For my son I have 
recently applied for Green Book and we will pay his chatrel when he is 
young. For all Tibetans it is important to have the Green Book, though the 
chatrel it is so low. When the Kashag it sold all the government businesses 
everyone they thought chatrel would increase, but it stays the same. For us 
it's not really important - it's tea money! [laughs]. For me I have RC and IC 
and Nepali passport. For going to Nepal I always use Nepali passport 
because with IC you always have problems at the airport. Even by bus 
those with IC have to pay more at the border. But I have one aunt in 
Canada and few years back maybe ... we were thinking I would go there and 
work for my uncle's business in Canada and people they say it is easier to 
travel and get visa on IC than on Nepali passport because with IC you are 
Tibetan and the Canada government, they think better of Tibetans than 
Nepalis [laughs] ... But in the end I met my husband and I am still here! [ ... ] 
I have a big collection of IDs [identity documents] these days! I am the 
organised one in the family so I keep all the documents safe in a shoe box. 
Documents are so important - many Tibetans don't realise that. [They are] 
more important than money. So it's important to keep them safe .... So I 
have Green Books, Nepali papers, RCs, ICs for me, my husband and my in-
laws. My in-laws they have Indian passports not RCs - they have been in 
India since the early days and then it was easy to get RC or Indian passport 
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and they are a business family so for them Indian passport is essential, and 
if they don't work for our government then not having RC is OK. And then 
with the passport ... it gives you security and it's easy to travel. You only 
renew it every few years - not like RC - and you don't get hassle. You get 
treated as an Indian would be treated. So I am thinking, with the business 
here maybe I also will get [an] Indian passport, and definitely for my son I 
will get him an Indian passport ... ' (08.03.2007). 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Dolma's narration is the sheer number of 
identity documents she and her relatives possess. Whilst noting the contrasting 
socio-economic circumstances and the fact that such a collection of papers has more 
to do with necessity than privileged choice, Dolma's strategy of acquiring identity 
documents does have significant resonances with Ong's (1999) description of the 
flexible citizenship practices of the South-East Asian transnational elite. This 
includes the obtaining of several passports, the simultaneous holding of multiple 
loyalties and the economic imperative shaping the 'diasporan subjects' choice of 
citizenship' (ibid: 112). Indeed, Ong's description of the 'multi-passport holder' as 
'an apt contemporary figure ... [who] embodies the split between state-imposed 
identity and personal identity caused by political upheavals, migration, and 
changing global markets' (ibid: 2) correlates strongly with assertions made 
throughout this chapter, albeit that the unrecognised status of TGiE gives an 
added twist to this case. 
However, whilst carrying multiple documents and embracing multiple identities is 
a consistent feature across exile Tibetans and a key trait of migrants and citizens 
of stateless nations more generally (Keating 2001), an individual's attachment to 
y' 
different documents varies considerably depending on their circumstances. For 
example, compare Dolma's narration to Kunchok's tale of being stuck in a legal no-
man's land as sketched out at the start of this chapter. With her extensive and well 
,{ 
connected family networks, financial security and knowledge of how the systems 
., 
'work', Dolma offers a key example of an active 'citizen' in control of her legal and 
political id~ntities. In contrast, newcomers like Kunchok often find themselves 
powerless ~nd caught between systems which they do not understand and with 
which they struggle to engage, let alone intervene in or manipulate. Illustrative of 
" 
this dispa~ity is how differently this cohort regarded the Green Book compared to 
those bor~ in exile. Dolma's dismissal of the Green Book and chatrel as 
i; 
unimportant, symbolic, almost a bit of a joke compared to her 'proper' passports 
was common among those settled in exile. In contrast, newcomers like Kunchok 
" 
frequently expressed pride in their Green Book, narrating how it gave them access 
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to the exile community and 'peace of mind' (Dekit, 12.03.2006). As well as 
highlighting the heterogeneous legal statuses and differential experiences across 
the exile community, these 'cleavages within and among different domains of the 
diaspora' (Van Hear 2003: 12) also undermine any idealised, unified Tibetan 
subjectivity. For, not only is TGiE-prescribed Tibetan citizenship only one form of 
Tibetan identity, but the multiple and often competing forms of identification that 
characterise this diaspora underscores how exile Tibetan identity itself is complex, 
contradictory and dynamic (Venturino 1997). 
Alongside the proliferation of identity documents, another key issue arising from 
both Dolma and Kunchok's stories is that of crossing borders. The relationship 
between state boundaries and identity documents is an obvious one. As 'symbols 
and institutions that simultaneously produce distinctions between social groups 
and are produced by them' (Paasi 1998: 80) borders are key points at which 
political and legal identities come into stark relief and, therefore, 'offer revealing 
research windows through which to examine the changing meaning of citizenship 
and statehood' (Sparke 2004b: 279). Based on information from TGiE officials and 
interviews with Tibetans who have crossed these borders recently, Figure 7a 
illustrates the identity documents required to cross the state boundaries between 
Tibet (China), Nepal, India and Western states. In highlighting the complexity of 
border crossings for exile Tibetans, this diagram demonstrates the sheer number of 
documents needed, the arbitrariness of border controls, the porosity of effective 
sovereignty at many boundaries and how immigration policies construct and are 
contingent upon a strict hierarchy of identity documents. 
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Figure 7a: Border crossings and identity documents 
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Leaving Chinese papers behind, most Tibetans enter Nepal with no 
identity documents 
1. Whilst travel to Tibet by Tibetans with Nepali passports is legally 
possible, many are refused entry or are detained for questioning if 
entering directly from Nepal Several interviewees explained that 
going via Singapore or Honk Kong presented fewer obstacles 
2. Nepali passports are obtained by Tibetans either legally through 
residency in Nepal or illegally by Tibetans claiming to be Sherpas. 
3. It is difficult for Tibetans to travel to Tibet on Indian passports due 
to the Dalai Lama and TGiE being based in India 
4. There is an increasing trend of Tibetans who have recently arrived 
in India and want to return to Tibet after their studies applying for 
Chinese passports at the Chinese embassy in Delhi 
Border: NepaV India 
Tibetans enter India with an exit permit from the Nepalese 
Government, a 'Special Entry Permit' from the Indian 
Government and letter of recommendation from the TGiE 
run Refugee Reception Centre in Kathmandu. Despite this 
seemingly comprehensive documentation, however, 
Tibetans face significant problems at this border, including 
verbal and physical abuse, detention and deportation. 
Nepal is the only country, along with China, which refuses 
to grant entry to Tibetans carrying an Indian IC, a ruling 
which causes significant problems for the exiled Tibetan 
population and has lead to high levels of bribery at the 
border crossings. 
Border: India/Western states 
Delays and questioning are frequently 
faced at immigration checks by 
Tibetans travelling on an Indian IC 
due to immigration officials not being 
familiar with it as a travel document. 
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A striking politics of mobility (Massey 1993) and hierarchy of citizenship (Vasta 
2006) is apparent from this overview, with desirable and valuable Western 
passports contrasting most directly with the inability to travel anywhere holding 
just a Green Book. However, it is the IC which is not only the document most 
Tibetans travel on, but is the most interesting and revealing document vis-a-vis 
border crossings. Reflecting the highly unequal and discriminatory international 
visa regime (Neumayer 2006), though most states are willing to issue visas on the 
basis of this legally recognised travel document, others are not. The arbitrary 
nature of this process causes considerable anxiety for exile Tibetans, with many 
interviewees who travelled on ICs describing how nervous they felt going to Delhi 
airport and recounting tales of confused, distrustful and abusive immigration 
officials. As Tendar, who had recently travelled from India to the US and back on 
an IC, explained: 
'Travelling with IC is so difficult. At every airport you are treated with 
suspicion - the immigration officials they stare so hard at our yellow book 
[IC] and then ask "What is this, where are you from, where is your real 
passport?" And then they take [the] IC and go speak to their superior. So 
often they have stopped me for interrogation. I really don't want my 
children to have to go through this - this feeling that you have no country, 
that you are not an equal person' (18.03.2006). 
Whilst such frustrations were common amongst my interviewees, a few individuals 
also spoke of the IC in similar terms as the RC with regards to its conferment of 
refugee status and therefore a symbol of being an exile Tibetan struggling for their 
homeland. For example, one young Tibetan working for an international Tibetan 
NGO narrated the following story: 
'So to get the cheapest ticket my boss, he booked a flight via Uzbekistan. 
But when I got to Uzbekistan to change planes no one in the airport spoke 
English and I was really worried about trying to get through with my IC. 
They stopped me and they took away my papers to a room and made signs 
for me to wait. So so many hours I had to wait and I was getting so nervous! 
I mean, I didn't know where I was in the worldl [laughs] Then they called 
me into the room and they had a huge huge book with a photocopy of every 
passport in it and they turned some pages and there was a copy of [the] 
Tibetan ICl So they pointed to my IC and to the copy in the book and they 
let me go - just like that. That day I was so proud that my Ie was in the 
book beside all the other passports. It has a place in the world - we Tibetans 
refugees are recognised' (Dhukar, 13.03.2007). 
In contrast to this account, yet often intrinsic to the issue of border crossings and 
certainly readily apparent in Dolma's narrative, is the issue of forged and illegally 
acquired identity documents. The prevalence of fraudulent identity documents in 
India is widely acknowledged (Hindustan Times 24 February 2007) and, whilst the 
use of forged papers by exile Tibetans is understandably a sensitive issue, it is 
important to contextualise these practices.145 Crucially, the issue of forged 
documents enables a critical spotlight to be shone on both the instability and the 
value of these various identity documents and the heterogeneous experiences and 
unequal access to power within the exile community. 
Once again, the divergent experiences of newcomer refugees and those born and 
settled in exile emerges as a key issue. On the one hand, well-established exiles 
such as Dolma to a certain degree 'play the system' so as to acquire multiple 
identity documents in order to travel and develop their business interests. As such, 
'[H]uman agency remains a decisive factor in the genealogy of identification 
practices, which tend automatically and immediately to generate strategies by 
individuals ... to undermine their effectiveness' (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 7). On 
the other hand, for many newcomers forging documents is the only way for them to 
remain in India or attempt to travel abroad and this is a process which is 
understandably fraught with anxieties and dangers. For example, in order to apply 
for an RC, newcomer refugees have to falsely 'prove' that they were born in India 
by persuading elderly Tibetans to 'become' their parents. Not only does this place 
these individuals in a vulnerable position given that if there is any cause for 
scrutiny of their background they could be expelled from India, this was also a 
practice which a number of my interviewees described as an upsetting betrayal of 
their sense of identity. 
Considering briefly the impact of these practices of forgery on the diaspora more 
generally, whilst this reputation for transgressing Indian law does reflect badly on 
the community as a whole, these issues also highlight the ambiguity of law more 
generally. For example, the shifting rules regarding RC and ICs, their ad hoc and 
spatially uneven enforcement and the lack of clarity on both the Tibetan and 
Indian sides regarding what constitutes the law demonstrates the contested and 
unstable boundary between the legal and the illegal (see Chatterjee 2004 for a 
discussion on the 'paralegal' in the Indian context). Notably, such ambivalence 
regarding the law and identity documents is not unique to this case with, for 
145 Whilst most of my interviewees spoke openly about their own illegally acquired documents and 
fraudulent practices. it is ob~iou~ly im?ortant to, be cautious in how this material is presented. with extra 
care being taken in anonymlsmg mtervlew matenal. 
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example, Poole noting in the context of peasant communities in Peru that there is a 
'curious division of labour between the abstract principle of "the law" and the 
concrete materiality of the "documents" through which law is given form' (2004: 
61). 
Finally, the issue of forged and illegally acquired documents is also key to 
understanding the relative importance, utility and socio-economic value of different 
identity papers. While the efforts to tighten the regulations regarding applications 
for RCs and TGiE's 'watchdog' role in this process has been discussed above, it is 
notable, and somewhat surprising, that forgeries are not confined to Indian (and 
Nepalese) identity documents. Rather, as the Additional Secretary at the 
Department of Finance explained; 
'These days we are having problems with forgeries of Green Books ... so for 
example by individuals who failed to register for Green Books many years 
ago or they didn't keep up with chat rei payments and now ... now we are 
more strict about needing Green Book for scholarships and jobs and so now 
they need one. So we have these cases, they pretend to be newcomers so 
they can get one easily without making chatrel backpayments, but we are 
having these checks and balances in place now, so every newcomer they will 
have proper papers from Kathmandu, and for the Green Book we have last 
year introduced one hologram which goes over the photograph, so hopefully 
this will help' (02.05.2007). 
In addition, several interviewees also described how a small number of Sherpas in 
Nepal have also forged or falsely claimed to be Tibetan and applied for Green 
Books in the belief that this document would facilitate asylum claims in Western 
states. Whilst I could not validate such accusations, this story nevertheless 
reinforces assertions that the Green Book provides 'proof of exile Tibetan identity 
and gives a clear indication of the value of the Green Book in its own right with 
regards to the social relations and access that it is perceived to enable. 
7.4.3 Summary 
In focusing on how individual Tibetans negotiate their political and legal identities 
through identity papers, this section has illustrated how involvement with these 
documentation regimes is highly differentiated within the population and how 
individu~is are both caught up in and agents of complex and contradictory legal 
systems. Using personal stories, I have argued that exile Tibetans can both be seen 
as victims' of an international system which values the legally recognised citizen 
over the stateless, and at the same time as neglected examples of the flexible 
subject demonstrating flexible citizenship. Thus, though the policies of TGiE, GoI 
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and numerous other states certainly shape and constrain the construction of exile 
Tibetan identities, the agency of individuals is also significant and is materialised 
through choices to refuse Indian citizenship and remain stateless, and to engage 
with legally questionable practices in order to acquire identity documents. With 
regards to approaches to identity, this ethnographic research therefore affirms 
Malkki's (1992) description of identity as mobile, processual and socially and 
politically constructed. Indeed, the fact that the RC, IC and Green Book are such 
unstable and contingent identity documents, means that the processual nature of 
identity is in many ways more acute in this case compared to more conventional 
'citizens'. As Kelly notes regarding the case of persons and states in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict: 
'identity documents are inherently unstable, both as a technique of 
governance and as objects to be manipulated .... Far from being static 
judicial constructs, legal status is generated by laws that are filled with 
anomalies, are produced by conflicting pressures, and are enforced by 
multiple institutions' (2006: 91). 
Therefore, as objects of both legibility and illegibility and where 'the possibility of 
forgery is always immanent' (ibid: 90), identity papers produce partial and 
unstable identities which are open to appropriation, manipulation and resistance. 
7.5 Conclusion: challenging the citizen-refugee binary 
Focusing on identity as an analytical category (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), this 
chapter has examined the construction and negotiation of Tibetan legal and 
political identities in exile. Charting the trails of paper through which Tibetan 
legal identities are created, denied and monitored by the Indian and Tibetan 
authorities, a picture has emerged of a population caught between the 
... 
identification regimes of two 'states'. As such, through the lens of identity 
documents, this chapter has examined the contested label of 'refugee' and the 
politics of labelling more generally; the construction of state-citizen relations by an 
unrecognised polity; the agency of individual Tibetans as they negotiate the 
contradicti~ns of exile life; and the complexity of the relationship between TGiE 
and its host state. Whilst the purpose of this chapter has been to progressively 
1, 
unpack and problematise the construction of Tibetan legal and political identities 
in exile, I want to use this concluding section to return to the binary of citizenship 
and refugeehood. Specifically, I want to position the case of exile Tibetans and 
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TGiE in terms of opposing theoretical stances on this binary, and then focus on 
important intersections with issues of sovereignty and statehood. 
As outlined at the start of this chapter, conventional political theory sees the 
citizen as the subject of political life, as the natural bearer of rights and as 
intrinsically linked to and rooted in the territorial space of the state. Constructed 
as the archetypal 'other' of the citizen, the refugee is seen as 'the pariah or outcast, 
the displaced, homeless individual of the twentieth-century diaspora' \'l eoh et al 
2003: 21O-211}. This subject is inherently stateless, 'uprooted, dislocated, 
displaced, forced out, or self-displaced from the community of citizens' (Soguk 1999: 
10). However, as this chapter has argued, such a positivist view of essentialised 
political identities has been critiqued from critical and poststructuralist 
perspectives, with the convincing assertion made that the analytical categories of 
refugees, migrants and displaced persons fall into the territorial trap of reifying 
sovereign state territories (Agnew 1994; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002). Central to 
this has been the espousal of the quintessential figure of the refugee as a 'limit 
person' who 'calls into question the principles of the nation state' (Agamben 1995: 
117), undermines 'sovereign territoriality as a sine qua non for a coherent domestic 
community' and challenges the 'heart of identity politics' (Soguk 1999: 216-8). 
From the other side of the binary, the relationship between citizenship and the 
territorial state is also challenged by critical scholars with, for example, Linklater 
asserting that citizenship needs to be uncoupled from issues of sovereignty and 
territoriality in order to 'envisage forms of citizenship which are appropriate to the 
post-Westphalian condition of multiple political authorities and allegiances' (1998: 
200). 
Through focusing on the legal contexts, mundane bureaucratic practices and 
material identity documents and by highlighting the individual stories behind 
these identity constructions, this chapter has sought to illustrate how the case of 
exile Tibetans intersects with and problematises both sets of approaches to the 
creation of political identities. Firstly, this case fundamentally refutes the citizen-
refugee binary. Exile Tibetans in India are simultaneously both de facto citizens 
and refugees, and yet legally neither. For, whilst most but not all Tibetans in India 
might be labelled as refugees by the GoI, given India's lack of refugee law, they are 
not legally refugees. Similarly, though all exiles are Tibetan citizens in the eyes of 
TGiE, this category has no legal standing internationally. Moreover, in holding 
multiple political and legal identities and at times resisting state identification 
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regimes through possessing forged identity documents, many of these individuals 
'defy the spaces, categories and structures in place to assist and monitor them' 
(Hyndman 2000: xxviii). Indeed, focusing on the level of the individual and 
quotidian practices associated with the administration of identity documents, this 
chapter has highlighted the heterogeneity of the exile community and challenged 
notions of an idealised and unified Tibetan political subjectivity. 
In addition to disrupting the binary of citizen and refugee, this case also highlights 
significant ambiguities surrounding the particular labels of 'refugee' and 'citizen'. 
By exploring the disjuncture between exile Tibetans and these conventional 
categories, this chapter has outlined how each is challenged, subverted and 
manipulated at a range of scales: from colonial era national legislation to the 
misinterpretation and ad hoc implementation of policies by officials at the local 
level and the agency of individual Tibetans in acquiring multiple identity 
documents. In light of this, exile Tibetans can be seen as an aberration of 
categories, as existing betwixt and between the identification classifications which 
dominate our understanding of the world (Malkki 1995). In turn, such ambiguity 
exposes the socially constructed nature of these categories, the fictive quality of 
legally statuses and the power relations inherent in the categorising and labelling 
process (Foucault 1978). 
However, this chapter has also demonstrated how revealing this categorisation 
process itself is and thus the utility of critically working with the tradition of 
categorical thinking. The discourses, bureaucratic processes and everyday practices 
which constitute the categorising of exile Tibetans as refugees and as citizens 
exposes the power relations exercised by the key identifying agents of Gol and 
TGiE. For example, the state or state-like relations and practices of constructing of 
exclusive boundaries of community membership. sustaining relations with a 
population through instituting rights and obligations (Torpey 1997) and the 
creating citizens out of subjects in themselves constitute an important aspect of 
sovereignty and bureaucratic rationalisation (Caplan and Torpey 2001). 
Particularly revealing in this respect has been the focus on identity documents as 
points at which the state passes into material form and thus where state-individual 
connections, power relations and the politics of the labelling process become visible 
(Gordillo 2006). Equally instructive has been how individual Tibetans react to, 
resist and appropriate both the identity documents and accompanying 
categorisations issued or denied to them. Finally, attending to categorisation 
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processes has also illustrated how this case turns a number of post-structuralist 
assumptions about identity on their head. This includes the resurgence of Tibetan 
nationalism, TGiE's promotion of an essentialised Tibetan identity in exile and the 
fact that exile Tibetans broadly embrace rather than resist Tibetan citizenship and 
their relationship with the state-like TGiE. Overall, therefore, this chapter 
suggests that it is the juxtaposition of seemingly rigid identity categories with 
variable and unstable practices and relations; the ability of identity documents to 
both standardise and differentiate individual identities; and the interaction of 
essentialised identity construction from above with dynamic self-identification 
practices from below which enables us to get to the core of complex processes of 
political identity construction. 
The third way that this case challenges understandings of the construction of 
political and legal identities is through disrupting the conventional mapping of 
'citizen' and 'refugee' onto the binary of statehood and statelessness. Starting with 
the state-citizen relationship, I have argued that TGiE aspires to and in many 
ways enacts a distinctly state-like model of political identity construction. Whilst 
the legal limitations of Tibetan citizenship should not be underestimated, and its 
rights and obligations are often symbolic, nevertheless the discourses of citizenship 
and its material manifestation in the Green Book are important performances of 
statehood. Moreover, in addition to creating significant bonds of belonging and 
loyalty within the exile community, this conferment of 'bona fide Tibetan identity' 
is achieving increasing external recognition. The ability to prescribe and validate 
Tibetan identity is therefore a key legitimising strategy for TGiE and this case 
offers a fascinating example of reconfigured relationships between citizenship, 
statehood and sovereignty. 
Turning to the connection between refugeehood and statelessness, a complex 
picture has emerged from the above discussions. On the one hand, the legal and 
political status of statelessness is one which has been actively appropriated by 
many exile Tibetans through their rejection of Indian citizenship and 
determination to remain 'refugees'. However, on the other hand, the state-like 
institution of TGiE and its conferment of citizenship on these 'refugees' 
fundamentally problematises the correlation of Tibetan refugeehood with 
statelessness. Central to this is the issue of rights. The general assumption is that 
rights are conceived in terms of geographical relationships (Blomley and Pratt 
2001), the most important of which are citizen rights which are enshrined in and 
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protected by the state (Kibreab 1999). Therefore, as non-citizens belonging to no 
state, refugees occupy an in-between status with no 'rights to rights' (Arendt 1967; 
Agamben 1995). The condition of statelessness thus connotes the absence of rights 
and, 'falling outside of the nation state, they [refugees] are easily rendered invisible 
and abject' (Sidhu and Christie 2007: 12). This chapter shows that the Tibetan case 
deviates from such descriptions. As a state-like structure which claims moral 
legitimacy, TGiE has the potential to act for and to represent exile Tibetans and 
actively strives to render these individuals 'visible' to the wider international 
community. Through its construction of Tibetan citizenship, its establishment of 
rights and obligations which go with this and vouching for individual Tibetans in 
dealings with the Indian state, TGiE is attempting to create and preserve rights for 
its 'citizens'. Whilst its lack of legal standing means that the protection that TGiE 
can offer these individuals is significantly limited, this exile administration has 
constructed an alternative register of pseudo-legal status for its exile population. 
As such, though exile Tibetans do not have the full legal protection and rights of 
conventional citizenship, they also do not lack legal status in the same way as the 
stateless refugee archetype does. This case therefore exposes the variation and the 
ambiguity of rights and begins to blur the boundaries between citizen and refugee, 
statehood and statelessness, sovereign and non-sovereign. 
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Chapter 8 
Democracy and Elections in Exile: The Strategies and Limitations 
of (Non)territorial Exile Politics 
Figure 8.a: Ballot box at TCV Day School, Dharamsala, TPiE election day, 
18th March 2006. (photograph: Tenzin Dasel) 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters have focused on issues of territoriality, governance 
and political identities respectively and, in this final substantive take on the 
functioning of TGiE, I want to focus on an aspect of this exile administration which 
brings together these themes: the establishment of democracy in exile and the 
organisation of Tibetan parliamentary elections. Hailed as the most important 
achievement of the exile Tibetan community, the democratisation of Tibetan 
politics is central both to how this exile administration functions, and how it 
presents itself to the international community. As such, this chapter focuses on the 
ideological and procedural development of Tibetan democracy and its material 
manifestation in the parliamentary election system in order both to unpack the 
raison d'etre and everyday operations of the TGiE, and to reflect on what a 
territory-less polity can contribute to existing theories of democracy. As 
Huntingdon (1991) has argued, we are currently in a 'third wave of 
democratisation' where 140 of the world's nearly 200 countries hold multiparty 
elections and where the ideological popularity of democracy has never been 
stronger (UNDP 2002). However, whilst we have witnessed a 'contagion of 
democratic ideas' (Anderson 1999: 1), much of this democratic progress is shallow 
and democracy is increasingly experiencing intense pressures from within and 
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without. It is therefore salient to look at what appears to be a nascent and 
relatively successful democracy that is carving out a unique path in the adverse 
circumstances of exile. 
With the emergence of new democracies in the last 20 years, and an increasing 
trend towards electoral reform in well-established democracies, there has been 
growing interest in the theories of democracy and the study of electoral systems 
from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives. Acknowledging that 
democracy is an inherently messy and contested concept, approaches to democracy 
can be divided into three broad sets of debates into which this case makes a 
number of critical interjections. In engaging with each of these sets of debates, the 
overarching question posed here concerns the implications of the combination of 
Tibetan culture and the situation of statelessness for both the intrinsic value of 
democracy within this exile community, and for the everyday functioning of this 
democracy. 
The first issue of contention regards the purpose of democracy. In general, there is 
a division between analytical and instrumental approaches which define democracy 
as a mechanism or practice of government, a set of institutional arrangements and 
a means to an end (see Dahl 1989, 2000; Putman 1993; Lijphart 1999) and 
ideological or normative approaches which define democracy as a political 
philosophY, an ideal and end in itself (e.g. Falk 1995; Sen 1999). A second set of 
debates centre on the issue of the cultural contingency of democracy. On the one 
side are scholars such as Lakoff (1996) and Linz and Stepan (1997) who 'argue that 
only societies with particular institutional arrangements - those that guarantee 
meaningful popular participation in the spirit of the Western liberal political 
tradition - should be referred to as democracies' (Frechette 2007: 98). On the other 
side are theorists who perceive democracy as a relative political form significantly 
influenced by and able to thrive in different local political cultures (Schaffer 1998; 
Saward 2003). An important aspect of this debate has focused on the issue of Asian 
values and democracy, with a number of Asian leaders in the 1990s asserting that 
values such as loyalty towards the family and nation, collectivism over 
individualism and preference for social stability over civil liberties predisposed 
these societies to authoritarian rather than liberal democratic models of 
governance (Lee 1995. see critiques from Fukuyama 1997). These issues will be 
addressed broadly in light of the role of Tibetan cultural and religious values in 
shaping this form of democracy, and specifically through the case of Tibetan party-
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less politics. Thirdly, debate has also revolved around the role of the state and 
territory vis-a.-vis the functioning of democracy. 'Discussions of democracy usually 
assume the territorial state as the frame and opportunity for its execution and 
practice' (Smith 2000: 158) and, as such, democracy is conventionally seen as a 
territorialised form of politics (Dahl 2000), with territorial boundaries specifying 
'the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in 
decisions affecting their lives' (Held 2006: 292). However, in light of the 'extension 
of orthodox democratic practices beyond national boundaries' (Saward 2003: 31), 
increasing academic attention is being paid to the role of external actors in the 
initiation and legitimising of democracy and the concept of 'cosmopolitan 
democracy' (Archibugi et al. 1998; Linklater 1998) premised on 'flexible frameworks 
based on the rights of the global citizen, freed from territorial restrictions' (Pugh et 
al 2007: 107). 
Remaining with issues of territory and statehood, as the mechanism through which 
modern democracy functions, electoral systems are conventionally territorialised 
decision-making processes whereby the consent of the governed is translated into 
governmental authority through the act of voting for representatives. As such, 
elections are a key site of engagement between citizens and 'the state' and, given 
the situation of exile, the role and design of exile Tibetan elections are particularly 
unusual. The operation of Tibetan parliamentary elections constitutes possibly the 
most widely dispersed representative democracy in the world, with voters on three 
continents exercising their franchise on the same day to elect 43 members of the 
Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE). Yet, this conventionally state-like political 
function is conducted by a territory-less administration operating within the 
sovereign space of a recognised nation-state. Thus, in terms of existing 
understanding of election systems, the Tibetan example poses a fundamental 
question: if elections are conventionally based on political representatives 
representing voters in territorially defined constituencies, what happens in 
parliamentary elections in a 'state' without sovereignty over territory? 
At first glance, the case of TGiE, and indeed my methodological approach and 
epistemological framework, appear to have little in common with traditional 
theorisations of electoral systems. Unlike policy-based election studies (e.g. 
Franklin and Wlezien 2002) a mass-survey is not being conducted to determine 
voting patterns and, given the uncommon situation of exile, there is limited utility 
in typologising this electoral system and drawing direct comparisons to other cases 
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as has been the convention for electoral studies in political science (e.g. Lijphart 
1995; Landman 2000). Similarly, though focused more specifically on issues of 
territory the sub-field of electoral geography has few intersections with this study 
(Taylor and Johnston 1979). Whilst the overarching aim here is to use the TPiE 
electoral system as a vehicle by which to explore broader political issues within the 
exilic community, electoral geography research has traditionally focused on the 
technocratic and administrative aspects of elections, producing empirical 
description based on quantitative analysis. However, recent developments on the 
fringes of electoral geography do offer important connections with this case. This 
includes a focus on electoral systems outside the traditional domain of established 
democracies in the 'first world', and, crucially, a 'deeper theoretical involvement 
which ... enables electoral geographers to make a wider contribution to the 
understanding of contemporary politics' (Shelley et al 1990: 10). Indeed, social and 
political geographers such as Bell and Staeheli (2001), Secor (2001) and Clayton 
(2002) have used elections as a lens through which to view the diffusion of political 
information, the relationships between territory and political authority, and 
political identity construction; issues directly relevant to this study. Crucially, such 
studies represent a transfer in focus from the grand strategy of elite politicians and 
electoral engineers to the actions and opinions of voters. This shift has instigated 
an important change in methodological approaches with an increasing adoption of 
qualitative research techniques, including ethnographies. Correlating with such an 
approach, the qualitative methods employed in this study enable both a top-down 
and bottom-up picture of Tibetan elections and democracy to be constructed. This 
therefore provides a nuanced interpretation which is sensitive to the fact that 
democracy is a political form which emerges through complex processes of cultural 
practice and everyday application. 
In light of these theoretical and methodological issues, this chapter is structured 
around three takes on exile Tibetan politics. The first section focuses on Tibetan 
democracy. After charting the unique evolution and characteristics of Tibetan 
democracy, attention will turn to the official rationale for such democratisation, 
framed in terms of consolidating the exilic body politic and the strategic seeking of 
external legitimation. The question of just how democratic exile Tibetan democracy 
is ~ill then be posed, and the limitations and successes of this nascent political 
experiment traced. Secondly, attention will turn to the election system for the 
. 
TPiE, sketching out its idiosyncratic quota system and exploring the narratives of 
0, 
com~unity unity and attachment to the homeland posited by the political elite to 
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justify this system. Countering this will be a focus on the critiques of and 
challenges to this electoral system as asserted by various groups within the 
electorate, including issues of a lack of accountability, the perpetuation of divisive 
regionalism and voter apathy. This section will conclude with a discussion on the 
relationship between political representation and territory - both 'real' and 
symbolic. Finally, bringing together and ethnographically illustrating the range of 
issues raised by these discussions on exile democracy and the structure of the 
election system, the final section will focus on the 2006 TPiE elections. Seen 
through the lens of an innovative electioneering youth coalition, a montage of 
research materials - field diary and interview extracts, photographs and campaign 
posters - will be used to build up a picture of the moments and sites of this 
election. The chapter will conclude by returning to the relationship between 
instrumental and strategic roles of democracy and the reconfigurations of political 
representation, territory and statehood which this case throws into relief. 
8.2 Tibetan Democracy in exile 
'Change is also coming to the Tibetan political system. It is unfortuna.te that 
it happens in exile, but this does not stop us learning the art of democracy. I 
have long looked forward to the time when we could devise a political system, 
sltited both to our traditions and the demands of the modern world .... This 
democratisation has reached out to Tibetans all over the world .... I believe 
that future generations of Tibetans will consider these changes among the 
most important achievement of our experience in exile' 
Dalai Lama, speech to All·Party Parliamentary Group, London, 21 March 
1991 (TPPRC 2003: 2). 
Given that 'liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that 
spans different regions and cultures around the globe' (Fukyama 1992: xiii), 
"'democracy" is an enormously rich, suggestive, evocative political term, and it is 
partly this fact that makes it such a potent political weapon' (Saward 2003: 14). In 
examining the development and rationale of exile Tibetan democracy, how it can be 
understood using existing democracy theory and what it adds to our understanding 
of democratic governance more generally, this section focuses both on democracy as 
a normative ideal and as having instrumental functionality within the exile 
community. 
8.2.1 The evolution of a 'unique' democracy 
Tibet prior to 1959 has been called an 'absolutist theocratic state' (Ardley 2003b: 
350) with political power vested in the Dalai Lamas on whose behalf government 
ministers ruled. As such, the spheres of governance and politics lacked any 
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mechanisms for political participation. However, it was from Tibet's religious 
traditions that nascent roots of democracy can be traced, with consensus-based 
decision-making being the guiding principle of life in monastic institutions 
(Monkhar 1991). A more direct engagement with democratic ideas was initiated by 
the current Dalai Lama who, after assuming the temporal and spiritual leadership 
of the Tibetan state in 1950, and before his flight into exile, had, in his own words: 
'come to the conclusion that in the changing circumstances of the modern 
world the system of governance in Tibet must be modified and amended so 
as to allow the elected representatives of the people to playa more effective 
role in guiding and shaping the social and economic policies of the state. 1... 
firmly believed that this could be done through democratic institutions 
based on social and economic justice' (foreword to 1963 Constitution for 
Tibet, cited in TPPRC 2003: 13). 
However, although the Dalai Lama introduced a number of progressive changes in 
Tibet through his Reform Committee (Gyalpo 2004b),146 his initiatives were 
severely impeded by the Chinese occupying forces, and it was only in exile that he 
had the freedom to implement his vision of introducing democracy based on the 
union of political and spiritual value systems. 
Therefore, whilst there are antecedents to democracy in pre-1959 Tibet, the exile 
community had no direct experience of democratic governance when it came to 
India, and the participatory democracy developed by the Dalai Lama and TGiE 
since 1960 was the first in Tibet's history. The evolution of Tibetan democracy in 
exile, in both an ideological and instrumental sense, can be divided into two phases 
(Chief Election Commissioner 16.03.2006). From the establishment of the first 
parliament on 2nd September 1960147 until 1990 was a period of gradual democratic 
reforms, where the idea of democracy informed by Buddhist values was proposed, 
political changes were predominantly symbolic with limited impact on Tibetan 
society, and where the Dalai Lama ultimately made the final decisions. Secondly, 
substantial fiscal and electoral reforms in the 1990s radically altered both the 
democratic functioning of the exiled administration and the political role of the 
Dalai Lama. 
This first exile parliament saw the abolition of hereditary titles and the traditional 
system of appointing monk and lay officials to each position. The role of the 
146 This was a committee of 50 monks and lay officials who had the task of suggesting and implementing 
changes to the administrative set-up in Tibet. 
147 The 2nd September as been observed by the exile Tibetan community ever since as 'Democracy Day'. 
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parliament's 13 members was largely symbolic and, whilst these deputies were 
elected from the exile population, their candidacy was based on nomination by the 
Dalai Lama. It was not until 1975 that candidates put themselves forward for 
election in the primary rounds (Edin 1992). This nascent democracy was formalised 
in the 'Draft Constitution for the Future Tibet' promulgated by the Dalai Lama in 
1963 (see Chapter 3). Combining principles of Buddhism with Western popular 
democracy, the constitution outlined democratic reforms which would serve as a 
guideline for a future Tibetan polity. However, significant controversy surrounded 
this document with major points of contention being clauses that related to the 
provision to impeach the sovereign position of the Dalai Lama and the 
renouncement of his leadership in the government of future Tibet. Protests and 
petitions from the diaspora ensued, imploring the Dalai Lama not to remove his 
political prerogatives and, in deference to these demands, the Dalai Lama 
reluctantly took out the offending clauses (Shiromany 1998: 277). 
The 1980s saw a number of abortive attempts to develop a more genuine 
democracy in exile, political scandals in Dharamsala and the rise of organisations 
run along factional lines which were, according to the outspoken Tibetan writer 
Jamyang Norbu, 'basically reactionary, and their influence on society unhealthy 
and divisive' (2004: 19). As a result, the Dalai Lama intervened in 1990, 
introducing a number of major reforms and accelerating the process of 
democratisation. After dissolving the exile parliament and suspending it for a year, 
His Holiness reinstated it as a fully-fledged legislative body with an expanded 
membership, independent authority and effective powers over the executive. In 
addition, the Dalai Lama renounced his ultimate authority to endorse elected 
representatives and appoint Kalons, the latter of which was henceforth replaced 
with election by the parliament. 
A further step towards genuine democracy was the adoption of the 'Charter of 
Tibetans in Exile' in 1991 which, specifically designed for the interim exile 
situation, documents the Dalai Lama's vision of the period of exile as a chance to 
practice democracy in order to implement it in Tibet. Establishing the three pillars 
of Tibetan democratic government (executive, legislature and judiciary), the 
Charter also instituted the Election Commission and formalised democratic 
practices at a local level by introducing Local Assemblies to Tibetan settlements in 
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India and Nepal (see Chapter 5).148 Finally. the most recent reform has been the 
direct election of the Kalan Tripa in 2001. a move which Gyalpo described as '''a 
, 
great leap forward" that ushered in a new and more mature phase in the 
governance of the Tibetan administration' (2004b: 26).149 
Apparent from this chronology is the fact that Tibetan democracy has had a highly 
unusual development and is significantly different in evolution and form from that 
of Western democracies. It is usually prudent to avoid naive discussions of Tibetan 
exceptionalism in favour of contextualising Tibet and Tibetan issues (see Anand 
2006). However, in the case of Tibetan democracy. descriptors relating to 
'uniqueness' are genuinely apt and. as I discuss below. apply to the transition to 
democracy, the ideologies underpinning this model of democracy and its 
instrumental functioning. Perhaps the most unusual aspect of Tibetan democracy 
is the fact that rather than the conventional process of democracy being driven by 
popular demand (often through uprisings and armed struggles) or imposed by a 
foreign power, it was instituted from the top-down by Tibet's traditional leader. 
and voluntarily established by Tibetans at his initiative. As such, Tibetan 
democracy is often referred to as 'a blessing or gift from the Dalai Lama. with one 
interviewee describing how His Holiness 'gave democracy like Buddha giving 
teachings' (Togden, 18.03.2006). This reversal of the norms of democratisation is 
deftly illustrated by Losang Gyato's cartoon (Figure B.b) and. as Edin (1992) points 
out. traditional literature on democracy simply fails to take into account a situation 
where a leader wishes to give away his power due to his convictions. 
148 The Election Commission is a two·tier institution with the Dharamsala·based Central Election 
Commission as the apex body and 65 Local Election Commissions in India, Nepal, Bhutan, Europe, North 
America. Taiwan, Japan and Australia. The Commission organises and oversees a series of elections within 
the exile community, including those for the TPiE, Kalan Tripa, Local Assemblies, Tibetan Freedom 
Movement and Board of Directors of Co-operative societies. 
149 The 2001 Kalan Tripa election was won by Professor Samdhong Rimpoche with 84% of the votes polled. 
He was re-elected in the second Kalan Tripa election in 2006 with almost 91 % of the vote. 
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Figure 8. b Tibetan Review, January 1992: 11 
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8.2.2 Discursive framing of Tibetan democracy: consolidating the body 
politic and seeking legitimacy 
Shifting attention to how this model of democracy is framed and ju tified in elite 
narratives, I want to argue that this case not only challenges conventiona l 
understandings of the origins of democratic governance, but also provides a 
valuabl~. insight into TGiE as an institution and its self-perceived raison d' A tr . 
Crucially, as I explore in this section, democracy is conceived as key to both TGiE's 
shaping lof the internal dynamics of the exile community, and how this exile 
administration presents itself to and positions itself within the international 
Tibetan ~ democracy has revealing and complex temporalities and spatialities , 
, 
Whilst only exile Tibetans can engage in democratic pl'actices vis-a-vis their own 
t 
govern~~nt, Tibetan democracy has a very specific relationship to the homeland of 
Tibet. The parliamentary election system is designed to foster a symbolic 
attachment to the territory of Tibet (discussed below), and the period in exile is 
perceive'd
r 
by the exile leadership as a chance for the community to experience and 
practice democracy in anticipation of implementing democratic governance within 
If" 
a future Tibet: 
'\ . 
'A democratically elected, representative government, with an open, 
~9countable and efficient administration, will be one of the greatest needs of 
future independent Tibet. Professional expertise in conducting elections will 
be' inv~luable in devising appropriate modes of democratic governance after 
, ,. 
1 I 
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Chinese occupation has ended, and in undertaking the necessary 
reconstruction ofthe nation' (Planning Council 1994, Section 9.3.9).150 
Underpinning this project are the 'Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity', a manifesto 
and blueprint for governance in future Tibet published by TGiE in 1992. Setting 
out the nature of the polity, rights of Tibetan citizens and administrative 
structures, these 'guidelines' describe a situation where the present exile 
administration would be dissolved as soon as the issue of Tibet is resolved, and 
Tibetans currently residing in Tibet would instead head a popularly elected 
government. 151 As such, the exile government is perceived as an active democracy-
in-waiting; a set of institutions, processes and practices through which the exiled 
community is experimenting, modifying and rehearsing democracy in order to 
employ it 'for real' back in the homeland. Alongside being portrayed as offering 
hope for a future democratic Tibet, the development of democracy is also presented 
as key to ensuring stability and security for the community's shorter-term future in 
exile. For, in light of an imminent power vacuum, the Dalai Lama established the 
system of democratic leadership as a way of inculcating a sense of individual 
political responsibility amongst exiled Tibetans and preparing for a smooth 
transition period after his death (Ardley 2003b). 
In addition to this temporal dimension there is an important spatial context. The 
establishment and functioning of TGiE within India - the world's largest 
democracy - has been a key influence. On the one hand, the decades spent within 
this accommodating host state has, Norbu (1990) argues, provided the Tibetan 
community with an ideal space, time and opportunity to experiment with 
democracy and enabled new structures of government to emerge. On the other 
hand, Indian democracy itself has been an inspiration to the Tibetan community 
(Chenga, 08.03.2006). Not only was the 1963 Constitution based on the Indian 
Constitution, but the Election Commission has 'held discussions with Indian 
central and state government election officials' regarding the parliamentary 
election system and has translated Indian election documents into Tibetan 
(Planning Council 1994, Section 9.3.2). Western models of liberal democracy have 
also been drawn upon by the Tibetan leadership. The Dalai Lama's extensive 
150 However it should be noted that. given the current 'Middle Way' policy of the Dalai Lama and TGiE 
which is calling for genuine autonomy for Tibet within a greater China rather than full independence (see 
Chapter 3). it is puzzling to speculate how a democratic Tibet would function within the one-party state of 
China. 
151 Crucially. the Dalai Lama would not be h~ad ?f. or play any role in such a government, and as such this 
marks a significant shift from the 1963 ConstItutIOn as far as the power and the responsibility of the Dalai 
Lama are concerned. 
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travels to the West and meetings with numerous world leaders have provided the 
Tibetan leader with first hand accounts of how modern democratic systems 
function - or indeed fail to function - and, as Sangay notes, such experiences 
meant that 'the Dalai Lama's political maturity and embrace of democracy 
deepened over time' (2003: 123). 
However, as stressed by many of my interviewees, it is misleading to trace Tibetan 
democracy solely to Indian and Western models as the influence of Tibetan cultural 
and religious values is significant with, for example, the 1963 Draft Constitution 
reinterpreting 'democracy as if it is - and has always been - a part of the Tibetan 
tradition, with the Buddha himself as its ultimate source' (Frechette 2007: 109). 
Indeed, whilst the limitations of a democracy bestowed by a leader who is widely 
regarded as having 'enlightened governance' (ibid: 108) will be discussed below, 
broadly speaking, an ongoing compromise is being sought by the exile elite in terms 
of constructing a system of democracy that is culturally and religiously attuned to 
the community it represents, yet at the same time displays democratic practices 
acceptable to a Western audience. This has proved to be a challenging balancing 
act, as illustrated by opposition to the Dalai Lama's attempts to renounce his 
political power (see above) and heated debate regarding the inclusion of the term 
'secular' in the 1991 Charter (see Chapter 3). 
One place where the role of Tibetan cultural and religious values is clearly 
manifest is in the choice to establish a partyless political system in exile. Despite 
attempts to introduce political parties - such as the arguably misnamed 'National 
Democratic Party of Tibet'152 - the current system is a rare example of non-party 
democracy. In outlining the Buddhist underpinnings of such a system, Samdhong 
Rimpoche has explained that: 
'equality can be established in the day to day living through co-operation 
and not through competition.... Realising this phenomenon of human 
behaviours, Lord Buddha had long back recommended a democracy free 
from competition. Therefore, a kind of partyless democracy could be an 
alternative where each individual may have the freedom to deal with every 
issue according to his or her wisdom, without imposition of any conditions 
from groups or ideologies' (The Pioneer 28 November 1996). 
152 Founded in 1994, the National Democratic Party of Tibet (NDPT) has a broadly nationalist and pro-
independence agenda. Howe~e~, the ND~~ has failed to ~ake a significant impact on exile politics as it 
lacks fundamental characteristics of a political party: the Will to govern, a durable structure at a locallovel 
and coherent ideology (DaseI24.02.2006; Yonten 19.02.2006). 
253 
As such, with no opposition party to challenge government policies there is also no 
guaranteed support from a ruling party, and so each proposal has to be rigorously 
argued and justified; a practice inherent to Buddhist debating (Kalon, Department 
of Finance and DUR, 10.04.2006). Partyless politics is thereby perceived by the 
TGiE leadership as consonant with Tibetan cultural values which promote 
humility and regard self-promotion negatively. Such distinctly Tibetan democratic 
values are illustrated by one Chitue who stated that: 163 
'In my case, I have been elected as a representative of Kham region but ... 
personally speaking, I don't have a particular ability and capability. I think 
the people who have elected me have been paying attention to my writings 
[in the exile Tibetan press]. I didn't expected to be elected, but as our society 
is democratic, I am willing to take the right' (Tsomo, 29.03.2007). 
The choice of this model of democracy was also explained by TGiE interviewees as 
reflecting the nature of their existence as an exiled government, as a concession to 
the quietly expressed wishes of the host state and as being key to forging social 
unity within the exile community. With regards to the latter argument, this 
resonates both with classical democratic theory (Dahl 2000) and with Muscveni's 
(1994) argument that multiparty democracy is premature for many African states 
because parties have no grounding in the social reality and would polarise the 
population on sectarian rather than political grounds. l54 Indeed, several Tibetan 
MPs made the argument that political factions and the internal divisions they 
exacerbate are detrimental to the political expediency of retaining the identity of 
traditional Tibet. Conversely, democratisation is perceived by the exile elite as key 
to strengthening and uniting the geographically dispersed community and, as a 
result, is seen as playing an integral part in the freedom struggle. As both Edin 
(1992) and Herzer (2001) assert, this coupling of participatory democracy and the 
advancement of a freedom movement within the institution of TGiE is a calculated 
political strategy which has few parallels within traditional literature on 
democracy. 
Turning attention to the role of democracy vis-a-vis the international community, 
the discourse and visible implementation of democracy has been used by TGiE to 
frame this polity within international norms of good governance and therefore to 
position the broader Tibet issue within a pre-defined moral framework. For 
153 The terms Chitue and MP are used interchangeably in this chapter, as they were in interviews with 
Tibetan officials and voters. 
154 Such comments from Museveni should, however. be seen in light of his subsequent actions in Uganda, 
including his abolition of Presidential term limits before the 2006 elections and the harassment of the 
democratic opposition. 
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example, since its inception, Tibetan democracy has had the implicit aim of setting 
contemporary exile Tibetan political culture apart from both pre-1959 Tibetan 
politics and the modern Chinese state. A 'potent weapon for the cause and ... an 
absolute necessity for the credibility of the freedom struggle', Tibetan democracy is 
framed as repudiating 'Chinese propaganda claims that Tibetan independence 
would mean a reversion to theocratic feudalism' (Norbu 2007: 35) and ensuring 
that the 'exiled administration is seen as occupying the moral high ground in 
comparison with China' (Ardley 2003b: 358). Allegations that the Tibetan struggle 
seeks to resurrect old Tibet are thereby dismissed as obsolete (Gyalpo 2004b) and a 
clear differentiation is made between Dharamsala's progressive approach to 
participative politics with Beijing's one-party communist system. 
Closely linked to this is the strategic and discursive use of democratisation as a 
way of eliciting respect and support from the international community. As Anand 
notes, 'the Tibetan elite has been learning the language of international politics as 
dominated by the West' (2000: 281), a language in which democracy is widely 
regarded as 'the leading standard of political legitimacy in the current era' (Held 
2006: x). Therefore, aimed at a Western audience and supported by young Tibetans 
educated at Indian, European and North American universities, the transition to 
democracy in exile has been a key mechanism by which international legitimacy is 
sought by TGiE. Such explicitly outward looking rationales corroborate the shift in 
focus from democracy as contingent primarily on domestic factors to the 
importance of international influences and global interconnections (Huber et al 
1999). However, rather than the external pressures of economic liberalisation and 
structural adjustment as has dominated the 'impetus, rationale and sometimes 
material support for democratic initiatives' in Africa (Anderson 1999: 9), in this 
case TGiE is actively seeking a Western audience to appreciate and actively 
support its embrace of liberal democracy. As such, the TGiE's employment of the 
rhetoric of democracy can usefully be understood in terms of Appadurai's concept of 
'ideoscapes': 
'concatenations of images ... [that] are often directly political and frequently 
have to do with the ideologies of states and ... are composed of elements of 
the Enlightenment worldview, which consists of a chain of ideas, terms, and 
images, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation and 
the master term democracy' (1996: 36. emphasis in original). 
Identifying the global circulation and mediation of key political and ideological 
principles, 'ideoscapes' not only opens up conceptual space for democracy to be 
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renegotiated and reworked in different cultural contexts, but it frames Tibetan 
democratisation as a key image-building exercise and an attempt to situate the 
Tibetan exiled polity and its broader cause firmly within contemporary discourses 
about good governance. 
8.2.3 How democratic is Tibetan democracy? 
Presented so far have been official narratives of the transition to democracy: what 
the nature of Tibetan democracy is and why it looks this way. Attention will now 
shift to questions of how genuine and deep the democratic transition in the Tibetan 
community in exile is. At first glance, this case seems to be an 'ideal' model of 
democratic transition. It was not imposed by external actors and spared a violent 
popular uprising. However, ironically, the very fact that Tibetans in exile did not 
experience democratisation through first-hand personal involvement means that 
the process has been far from smooth, straightforward or complete. Due to its 
initiation as a conscious policy decision by the Dalai Lama, Tibetan democracy has 
not evolved gradually over time, nor been actively built from within the community 
and embedded in local social structures. As such, Tibetans arguably have little 
sense of its ownership. As a number of politically active interviewees asserted, a 
gifted democracy is impossible to refuse, but without asking for it in the first place 
it is also difficult to appreciate and appropriate: it is 'like a solution in search of 
problems' (Nyendak, 05.03.2006). The resulting weak form of democracy is 
manifested in a lack of public awareness of democracy, a reluctance to assume both 
decision-making and leadership responsibilities and low participation in 
democratic practices. Therefore, whilst democracy exists in terms of institutions, 
legislative provisions and 'rhetorical hype' (Thinley 2001: 3), this is in many ways a 
paper democracy: one which has lofty ideals but which has yet to become a way of 
life that permeates all levels of the exile society (Boyd 2004). 
A second stumbling block to the realisation of a 'fuller' democracy, even defined in 
the exile community's own terms, is the unique patron-deity status of the Dalai 
Lama. Being an unelected monk, the Dalai Lama's political legitimacy is based on 
his 'special wisdom' and the obedience with which his citizens treat him. This 
appears anachronistic to a Western audience and sits uncomfortably with liberal 
democratic ideals (Ardley 2003b). Indeed, despite his intention to withdraw from 
Tibetan politics, 'with or without official constitutional authority, the Dalai Lama 
remains the most powerful and influential leader among Tibetans' (Sangay 2003: 
126). As such, Tibetan democracy appears to be stuck in a form of democracy-
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autocracy in many ways redolent of Taiwan's 'guided' model (Cooper 2003) or 
Singapore's 'trustee' model of democracy (Roy 1994). Parallels with 'Asian values' 
include the preference for consensus and social harmony over political 
confrontation, the rejection of political pluralism and the prioritisation of 
community cohesion. However, with its premise on Tibetan Buddhism rather than 
Confucianism and the limitations of the exile context, this case raises important 
questions for the Asian democracy literature. As Frechette argues, exile Tibetan 
democracy asks; 
'whether there are one or more distinct Asian forms of democracy, whether 
Asian democratic forms should be viewed as viable alternatives to Western 
forms, and whether Asian forms can be considered "consolidated" ... as 
opposed to "in transition" toward some other political arrangement' (2007: 
99). 
In terms of how the position of the Dalai Lama vis-a.-vis Tibetan democracy is 
played out on the ground, the respect and faith Tibetans have for him has meant 
that many Tibetans participate in democratic activities primarily because the 
Dalai Lama asked them to do so, rather than wanting to influence exile politics per 
se. Amongst younger Tibetans there is growing frustration with such dependence 
on the Dalai Lama - what one interviewee called a 'mental block' within the 
community - and a lack of engagement with 'democratic responsibilities'. As a 
young careers councillor in Delhi put it: 
'Democracy! We have no democracy. The older generations, they have not 
grasped the concept of democracy - for them whatever the Dalai Lama says, 
they will believe and go along with, for them his word that is Tibetan law .... 
For Tibetans in exile to unite behind a common cause the concepts of 
democracy need to be better understood ... for now we have the legislative 
provisions, but a mentality of democracy in our community it is severely 
lacking' (Karchung 01.03.2007). 
The third limitation of exile Tibetan democracy are the challenges faced when the 
, 
principles of partyless politics are translated into reality. Whilst its resonances 
with Tibetan cultural and religious values are significant, its practical implications 
mean that the freedom to dissent - a core feature of modern democracy - is taboo 
within Tibetan society. As a result, with MPs effectively acting both as the ruling 
party and the opposition, the parliament rarely proposes alternatives to 
govern~ent policies and, when there is political controversy or confrontation, the 
system struggles to cope. In light of this, there is increasing criticism from younger 
Tibetans who argue that the lack of parties creates a dulled and stagnated politics. 
As a politics graduate in Majnuka Tilla put it; 'our politics has no atmosphere of 
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debate for it is very hard for someone to be different, to be radical or outspoken in 
our government' (Chimi, 07.06.2007). 
Whilst such issues provide a significant barrier to the deepening of Tibetan 
democracy, it should also be acknowledged that this democracy is still very young 
and, given the community's lack of democratic experience in Tibet, progress is 
being made and Tibetan democratic ideas and practices continues to develop and 
evolve. A key part of these transformations, and indeed the important expansion of 
democracy beyond the institutions of government, has been the development of 
Tibetan civil society in exile through the increasing influence of Tibetan NGOs (see 
Chapter 6), and the growing sophistication and prominence of independent Tibetan 
media. With regards to the latter, Tibetan and English language newspapers, 
magazines, websites and radio services are increasingly acting as a watchdog on 
the Tibetan administration, providing a forum for political participation and 
contributing to increasingly lively political discussions. As Samphel notes: 
'As a pillar of the exile body politik, the ... transparency ofthe decisions and 
deliberations of the exile legislature through the exile media has enabled 
the refugee community to watch, gauge and understand the actions of their 
elected representatives and reserve their right to reward or punish the 
concerned deputies in the next elections' (2004: 184). 
As such, rather than a prerequisite to democracy, the development of Tibetan civil 
society has occurred in reaction to and alongside the development of democratic 
institutions. This therefore supports Putnam's arguments that 'changes in formal 
institutions induce changes in political behaviotir' (1993: 17) and that the 
development of social capital through a thriving third sector builds up the basic 
foundation for mutual trust and democratic practices. 
8.2.4 Summary 
In summary, I want to consider how this seemingly unique democratic transition 
and system relate to existing theories and models of democracy. Firstly, on an 
institutional level Tibetan democracy performs well with regards to Dahl's (2000) 
minimum criteria required for an entity to be democratic, albeit with the exception 
of political leaders competing for support. The TGiE has free, fair and frequent 
elections; a formal democratic structure with a balance of power among the three 
branches of government; inclusive citizenship with civil liberties institutionalised 
in the Constitution and Charter; and formal government accountability through 
the TPiE. However, as this chapter explores, contemporary exile Tibetan 
democracy remains in a democratic. transition rather than a fully fledged 
258 
democracy, with the community continuing to 'struggle to interpret democratic 
values in the context of their own worldview and political circumstances' (Frechette 
2007: 97). As such, following Cunningham (2002), it is perhaps more productive to 
conceive of democracy as a matter of degree of democratisation, rather than a strict 
democra tic/non -democra tic delineation. 
Secondly, comparing exile Tibetan democracy directly to Western models of 
democracy, a key place to start is the range of approaches - from classical 
pluralism to structuralism and radical critiques of these ideas - which focus on a 
range of assumed preconditions for democracy. What is striking about the Tibetan 
case is that it appears to refute each of the preconditions that these schools of 
thought outline (see Table 8.i).155 
Table 8.i: Comparison of assumed preconditions for democracy with the case 
of the Tibetan community-in-exile (based on Lipset 1959 and Cutright 1963). 
Preconditions for transition to 
democrac 
Economic prosperity 
Social and political stability 
An educated population 
Widespread adherence to liberal 
and democratic values 
Prevalent urban residence 
Case of Tibetan community-in-exile in 
earl 19608 
Refugee population lacking funds and 
infrastructure 
Period of social and political upheaval and 
uncertainty 
Low literacy rates in the early years. 
No experience of democracy and 
emergence from a previously theocratic 
system 
Large nomadic population and exile 
community was scattered in rural refugee 
camps 
From such perspectives, the Tibetan case appears to be a deviation from Western 
norms. However, a copy of conventional Western liberal democracy is not the end 
goal of the exile Tibetan community and, if we employ a different frame of 
reference - Rustow's (1970) dynamic model of democratic transition - it is possible, 
and fruitful, to see Tibetan democracy as culturally particular and forging its own 
democratic path.156 Crucially, in questioning the conflation of the primary causes 
155 It is salient to note that the TGiE's host state of India is itself a significant outlier within comparative 
studies of democracy as, with high levels of poverty, a large rural population and low literacy levels, it also 
fails to meet the traditional pre-conditions of democracy (see Kolhi 2001). 
1M With regards to Rustow's (1970) four-stage model the Tibetan case; (a) corroborates the common 
'background condition' of national unity (discussed below), (b) lacks the inconclusive and prolonged political 
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and sustaining conditions of democracy, Rustow emphasises the dynamic process of 
democratic change. This therefore opens up conceptual space for considering 
democracy in societies which fail to currently meet such 'preconditions', nor are 
likely to meet them in the foreseeable future. Whilst not dismissing preconditions 
theory outright, as Anderson argues, this approach has 'liberated analysts and 
policy advocates from the confines of functional analysis and Western historical 
models' (1999: 1), and opened up the possibility of democracies taking root and 
thriving in different cultural and religious soils (Saward 2003). In addition, 
Rustow's approach allows for circumstances - in this case the act of the leader 
imposing democracy from above - which somehow persuade non-democrats to 
adopt democratic behaviour. 
8.3 Elections in exile 
'If Governments-in·exile are rich in one thing, it is symbolism' 
(The Economist, 22 December 2001: 45) 
A focus on Tibetan democracy therefore provides a valuable insight into the 
intersection of Tibetan culture, religion and politics, the emergence of Tibetan civil 
society in exile and the TGiE's strategies for legitimising its presence on the 
international stage. However, in order to probe the relationship between TGiE and 
its diasporic population, and examine the challenges raised by the administration's 
lack of contiguous territory, it is salient to turn attention to the mechanism 
through which modern democracy functions: electoral systems. As noted above, a 
range of elections are organised through the TGiE's Election Commission, but the 
focus of attention here is the elections to the TPiE which are held every five years. 
" 
This is an electoral system innovatively designed by the political elite in order to 
serve a number of functions within the exile community and, as such, it offers a 
valuable insight not only into important structures and procedures of exile Tibetan 
democracy bilt also how TGiE perceives its role and function and its relationship 
with the diasporic population. As such, in asking how elections function in a polity 
without sovereignty over territory, this section focuses on the unusual structure of 
TPiE elections, the official narratives employed to justify this system and how 
/; . 
these practices of democracy are perceived, debated and engaged with by a 
geographically differentiated electorate. 
struggle associated with ,the, 'prepar~tor~ phase' due to, the position and role of ~he Dalai Lama, (c) has 
experienced the gradual institutIOnalisation of democratic procedures characteristic of the 'decision phase', 
and (d) has arguably only just entered the 'habituation phase' where the elites retain their commitment to 
democratic procildures and the population at large engages with these new structures, 
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8.3.1 Voting by quota: the TPiE election system 
Whilst all parliamentary election systems are shaped by and in turn reflect the 
specific characteristics and circumstances of the polity in question, there is a basic 
assumption that the national constituency will be divided into territorial units, and 
that the elected representatives will represent voters in their spatial 
constituency.157 However, in the Tibetan case, democratic political representation 
does not reflect a territorial constituency's socio-economic structure as, instead, the 
parliament is organised according to a symbolic quota where the dominant 
categories are regional and religious affiliation in Tibet. As such, the current 43 
member TPiE was elected in 2006 on the basis of three electoral formulas 
operating simultaneously. 
The central element is a regional quota system whereby 30 MPs are elected by 
voters in India, Nepal and Bhutan to represent each of the three traditional 
provinces of Tibet: U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. Representation is split equally with 
ten members elected from each region and voters exercise their franchise according 
to the region in Tibet that they are from. In the case of second or third generation 
exiles, they elect a representative from their parents' region, and, where parents 
are from different regions the child chooses which of these two regions to elect 
from. Candidates are put forward by regional associations which act as 
constituency 0 interest groups rather than political parties. If elected, the supported 
candidates have no formal obligation to their regional association. 
Secondly, the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism - Gelug, Kagyu, Sakya and 
Nyingma - and the traditional Bon faith each have two elected members in the 
0' 
TPiE. Only monks and nuns registered with monasteries in India, Nepal and 
Bhutan can vote for candidates from their religious denomination, which effectively 
(, 
entitles them to a second franchise, an important contradiction to the basic 
0' 
democratic i4,eal. Thirdly, to reflect the increasingly global Tibetan diaspora three 
MPs are elected by Tibetans living in the West. Voters in North America elect one 
representative and those in Europe elect two. These representatives are elected 
1 ; 
without reference to a particular province or sect, making this the only 
p 
territorially-~ased constituency aspect of the parliamentary system. These 
'constituenci~s' of Tibetan regions, Buddhist sects, Europe and North America are 
~( 
therefore based on a microcosm model of representation whereby the Tibetan 
o 1 
"I 157 The notable exception to this are elections to the Israeli Knesset where the entire country constitutes a 
single electoral constituency. 
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community in exile and in Tibet is symbolically represented. Revoking convention, 
however, this microcosm model is not based on proportional representation, but 
rather on equal constituency representation through an engineered quota system. 
Neither the number of regional nor sectarian seats reflect the proportion of exile 
voters from each region and sect and, whilst not based on a symbolic quota, the 
election of candidates in the West is also not proportional to constituency size. 158 
When questioned on the issues of proportional representation, double franchise for 
monks and nuns and lack of representation for Tibetans in East Asia and 
Australia, the Chief Election Commissioner offered no explanation other than that 
it was written in the Charter and so would remain policy until challenged through 
the Tibetan juridical system (16.03.2006). 
8.3.2 Justifvinl: the current electoral system: narratives of exile. homeland 
and unity. 
Rather than being 'born kicking and screaming into the world out of a messy, 
incremental compromise between contending factions battling for survival, 
determined by power politics' (Norris 1995: 4 cited in Farrell 2001: 174), the TPiE 
election system was consciously designed by the political elite both to accommodate 
life in exile and to serve a number of wider functions for the diaspora. As such, the 
narratives offered to justify its quota systems provide a valuable insight into the 
role the Tibetan leadership perceive for TGiE within the exile community. From 
interviews with government officials and voters, three core and intertwined 
discourses emerged regarding the reasons for the creation of such highly symbolic 
electoral formulas: the restrictions faced by governing in exile; the forging of 
symbolic links with the homeland; and the unification of the Tibetan population 
both across exile and between exile and Tibet. 
Most government officials began their explanations of the regional and religious 
quota systems by asserting that it was the situation of being in exile that had 
forced the decision-makers at the time to look beyond conventional electoral 
systems and develop their own model. As such, the symbolic constituencies were 
framed as a way to overcome the limitations of organising political representation 
in a diasporic community scattered over dispersed territories (Dawa, 27.02.2006). 
158 Approximately 65% of the population in exile is from (].Tsang, 25% from Kham and 10% from Amdo. 
with 52% belonging to the Gelugpa sect. 22% to Nyigma, 13% Kagyu. 10% Sakya and 3% Bon (Anand 2000; 
Planning Council 2000). When the 1991 Charter was adopted. the Tibetan population in North America was 
around 1.000 and thus one representative was allocated. However, immigration to the US and Canada has 
increased dramatically. with the number of Tibetans residing there now numbering around 7,000. By 
contrast, the Tibetan population in Europe has remained relatively static, with 2,290 registered in the 1998 
TDS. The North American MP has lobbied for an increase in the number of representatives but no move to 
do so has yet been seriously initiated. 
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This notion of symbolism is crucial. The quota of representatives from religious 
sects and the traditional regions of Tibet creates a system where the symbolic 
representation of Tibet, rather than the realities of life in exile, has formed the 
basis of the election system. On a pragmatic level, and echoing arguments made in 
Chapter 5, having symbolic rather than 'real' constituencies on Indian soil can be 
read as a strategy for avoiding confrontation with the Indian political system, 
although, somewhat surprisingly, this was a rationale rarely asserted by TGiE 
interviewees. 
The inclusion of religious sects signifies the central role that religion has played in 
the Tibetan polity in the past, and ensures that the religious aspect of Tibetan life 
is represented within the exile parliament. In terms of the three regions this is 
both an articulation of Tibetan nationalism and a form of resistance to Chinese 
occupation. Notably these provinces follow the traditional (pre.1949) regional 
demarcation and is thus an assertion of Tibetan rights over the territory of Tibet as 
defined on their own terms (see Chapter 3). As such, the electoral system offers an 
alternative geo-political vision to today's Chinese-governed Tibet. This is a strategy 
which, following Reisman (1991), is essential to the 'government.in.exile technique' 
whereby the exiled administration is constantly conceptualised in relation to and in 
contradiction of the government-in-situ. Thus, as several interviewees stressed, the 
inclusion of all three regions symbolises a united Tibetan nation and, consequently, 
the TGiE is constructed as the representative body of all Tibetans: 
'traditional regions means we are loyal to all of Tibet. Our government, it 
has to symbolically represent all of Tibet - from the very west to the very 
east... and the regional system, it is a strong form of symbolism' (Legdup, 
04.11.2007), 
'you can look around the Assembly room and see people from all corners of 
our nation ... it links us with our history ... We have to keep this link so 
when we can go back to Tibet we have this mentality of the three regions -
the whole of Tibet' (Rigzin, 22.02.2007). 
Through the TPiE, therefore, the exile constituency votes for its stake in the 
homeland and to articulate its Tibetan identity, with election system functioning as 
a political tool to formalise the diaspora's link with Tibet. Following Mach's 
observation that 'communities which have lost their land preserve their landscapes 
in the cultural memory ... where land becomes idealised and its regaining is the 
major goal and duty' (1993: 174), the electoral system therefore reinforces a sense 
of the temporariness of exile and the 'inevitable' return to Tibet. Indeed, a number 
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of voters mentioned how the regional system kept them 'thinking about Tibet'. 
Moreover, reifying the homeland within the heart of the exile political structure 
emphasises the nationalist conception of territory as the basis for the construction 
of political identity, especially in the case of second and third generations in exile. 
This symbolic territorial aspect therefore highlights a key tension at the heart of 
Tibetan democracy. On the one hand, democracy is employed as an unconventional 
means of strategically linking the exile population with the homeland and training 
them for political life in future Tibet. On the other hand, the election system and 
democracy generally is intended to be a mechanism for governance in a 
conventional and instrumental sense within the time and space of exile. 
The third discourse is that of unification of the Tibetan population. Within exile, 
equal representation from the three regions is seen as a key way of maintaining a 
strategic regional balance and preventing community fragmentation. As indicated 
earlier, the realpolitik need for an external display of Tibetan unison against the 
Chinese government means that a social norm of unity pervades Tibetan politics in 
exile and, as a number of government officials argued, is exemplified in the TPiE 
election system. The narrative of unity is also articulated in terms of bringing 
together the population in the homeland with the diaspora. As the Vice-Chair of 
the Parliament explained: 
'There was debate in the 11th house about whether we should continue with 
the system or not but finally we decided that it is important for us to keep it 
principally because of one reason - we want a Tibetan parliament-in-exile 
not a parliament of Tibetans-in-exile. If we had a system which was done 
only by people living here in exile and with no link to Tibetan people living 
inside Tibet then that wouldn't be correct. Therefore ... and so we felt it 
important that we keep it ... not the territory as in exile but our territory in 
free independent Tibet' (29.04.2006). 
Therefore, while Tibetans in Tibet cannot vote in the parliamentary elections, they 
are represented by proxy by the regional MPs. This symbolic representation of an 
otherwise disconnected population is also a strategy through which TGiE 
constructs its claim that it represents, and thus is conferred with legitimacy by 
Tibetans both in exile and in Tibet. 
In summary, therefore, it can be seen that the Tibetan parliamentary electoral 
system is not simply a mechanism for conducting elections. Instead, it was 
designed to play an active role in shaping the political consciousness and identity of 
the diaspora. It forges a symbolic link with the homeland, uniting the electorate 
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under a banner of Tibetan nationalism, and creating a strategically balanced 
microcosm of the community-in-exile. In light of which, the electoral system, and 
Tibetan democracy more generally, are often oriented more towards the past and 
the future rather than the lived realities of present-day exile; a situation which, as 
explored below, raises a number of practical and ideological difficulties. 
8.3.3 Limitations of the exile parliamentary election system: accountability. 
division and apathy 
Examining the functioning of the parliamentary elections 'from below,' it became 
readily apparent during interviews with the Tibetan electorate in the settlements 
across India that the operation of a symbolic electoral system in a diaspora of real 
voters with local, grounded issues inevitably creates problems and tensions. 
Criticism of this aspect of the system revolved around three inter-related 
narratives: the fact that representatives were accountable neither to 'real' 
constituencies nor to political parties with manifesto promises; the perception that 
the system perpetuates divisive regionalism and creates identities which do not 
reflect the reality of 'modern' exiled Tibetans; and, finally, that such detachment 
leads to political apathy. Significantly, the articulation of these critiques of the 
electoral system had a distinct spatial dimension, with a marked division between 
Dharamsala and the settlements. 
As Tsomo (2004) points out, the issue of accountability is debated in every liberal 
democracy, but the issue is further complicated in the Tibetan case due to this 
being a partyless system. Crucially, the fact that MPs do not commit themselves to 
any particular line of action means that there exists no basis upon which the 
electorate can hold them accountable once in power (Sherab, 25.03.2006). The 
symbolic dimension of the regional system has also led to considerable criticism 
regarding accountability, especially among those born in exile who are increasingly 
questioning of the role that representatives actually play for their region or sect. As 
a college student in Bangalore expressed it: 
'If I vote for MPs then how are they accountable to me - answer me how? 
For they represent this half-real place of Kham - where I'm from - but what 
can they ever do in Kham? Sure it is occupied by the Chinese! But then, if! 
am in South [settlements in South India] and I have some problem with 
Indian police, then my MP cannot help me because their constituency is in 
Kham!' (Migmar, 04.12.2007). 
Such frustrations point to a significant challenge faced by the lack of 'real' 
territorial constituencies in exile. The fact that individuals from the three regions 
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in Tibet and the five religious sects are generally scattered in exile means that the 
effective 'constituency' of anyone elected representative is dispersed over 
settlements in India and Nepal. This lack of a fixed spatial district has, 
unsurprisingly, led to a significant communication gap and lack of accountability 
between MPs and their constituents. Moreover, the issues faced by the majority of 
'ordinary' Tibetans based in the exile settlements often fail to be represented 
within the parliament due to the fact that most MPs reside in Dharamsala and, 
with specific needs of different settlements in exile thus not being effectively 
addressed by the current electoral system, this leads to a disenfranchising of voters 
from the political process. As a farmer in Sonamling explained: 
'Each Tibetan settlement in India, it has different problems and issues - for 
some it is high unemployment, for some drugs or alcohol abuse, conflict with 
Indians. Here our problems are with water shortage, infrastructure and 
[being] so remote ... but if most MPs they are living in Dharamsala, then 
these issues they don't come in our parliament' (Woser, 20.05. 2007).1119 
One explanation for such an over-representation of Dharamsala-based MPs within 
the parliament (12 out of 30 in the current assembly) is that voters see 'residency' 
listed as Dharamsala, associate this with the Dalai Lama and TGiE and therefore 
vote for that individual (Bhuchung, 26.02.2006). This therefore highlights an 
important spatial dimension of the election process which echoes the core-
periphery ~elationship between TGiE and the settlements as outlined in Chapter 5. 
Democratic ideals, policies and practices are 'created' in Dharamsala and rolled out 
to the settiements where they sometimes receive a less than enthusiastic reception. 
This predictably varies across the settlements, with those established 
independently of TGiE such as Clementown being more resistant to the 
implementation of democratic reforms compared to TGiE-run settlements such as 
.(. 
the Dekyiling where, notably, voter turnout is considerably higher (Jetsan, 
16.04.2007). 
Regionalism is also deeply ingrained in the exile community and, whilst in many 
,n-
ways a r.~sult of the persistence of pre-1959 forms of religious and social 
organisati?n (Shakabpa 1967; Chapter 6), there is a strong argument that the 
symbolic constituencies of the current voting system perpetuate social cleavages 
I ~~ 
within th~ 'Tibetan diaspora. A microcosm of the homeland in exile is created, but it 
." 159 Besides Ladakh, Tibetans Jiving in South India are under-represented in the TPiE (29,000 Tibetans in 
Karnataka have only 3 Chitues) and those living in remote settlements in NE India (around 7,000 Tibetans 
in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Nagaland) have no representative in the present parliament (planning 
Council 2000J.~ 
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is a microcosm emphasising regional and religious differences. As a monk from 
Kirti monastery in Dharamsala explained: 
'the electoral system just serves to divide people. Candidates when they are 
campaigning they highlight regional differences and the real issue of future 
of Tibet and Tibetan struggle is forgotten but ... if we divide ourselves this 
provides a platform for the Chinese to rule us more' (Gadong, 18.03.2006). 
Such assertions that the current electoral system perpetuates the Chinese 'divide-
and-rule' policy and undermines a united freedom movement thus directly 
challenges the narratives justifying the system outlined above. Criticism is also 
levelled at the continued close relationship between religion and politics within 
TGiE, with the increasingly secular youth arguing that the persistence of seats for 
the religious sects and a double franchise for monks and nuns runs counter to the 
basic democratic ideal of 'one man one vote'. Thus, whilst Tibetan political leaders 
seem acutely aware of the 'problems of sectarian and regional prejudices' and 
indeed 'call on all Tibetans to remain alert to the dangers of regionalism' 
(Samdhong Rinpoche cited in Tibetan Bulletin 2001 5(4): 25), their loyalty to and 
promotion of the current electoral system, appears contradictory. The strategy of 
integrating and unifying the community in exile through differentiation of the 
electorate along symbolic regional and religious lines appears to be faltering, if not 
having the completely opposite effect. 
Finally, whilst regional classifications may have reinforced latent regional 
identities for older generations and recent refugees from Tibet. the majority of 
those born in exile have little affiliation to a region in Tibet or much sense of 
regional identity. As an older cafe owner in Dharamsala put it. 'my son and 
daughter were born in Yoll60 and Delhi ... to which region do they belong? The 
current system is meaningless' (Rinchen, 15.03.2007). Therefore, the imposition of 
a symbolic and in many ways alien notion of territorial identity onto a 'real' 
political community whose territorial affiliations lie in exile has had significant 
implications. On the one hand, younger Tibetans are attempting to negotiate new. 
non-regional identities. as Tsundue argued in Tibetan Review: 
'Tibetan youngsters are choosing to steer clear from such [regional] 
typecasting. This is the new generation emerging with its own sense of 
identity. They have seen such categorisation resulting in communal 
fundamentalism. The challenge is to know one's own parental and cultural 
roots. and yet not fall into the trap of clannish groupism. which has stifled 
160 An Indian village several miles south of Dharamsala which has a number of exile Tibetan institutions 
nearby such as the Norbulinka cultural centre and Gyuto monastery· 
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Tibetan parliamentarian politics. This is the fine balance I believe our 
youngsters must maintain to take the community forward' (2004: 19). 
On the other hand, this lack of connection to traditional Tibetan regions was also 
one of the reasons cited for the increasing problem of voter apathy among 'the 
youth' .161 Whilst this trend appears to have been reversed to some extent in the 
2006 parliamentary elections (discussed below), a number of younger respondents 
declared a detachment from and disinterest in the elections. Such voter apathy can 
be attributed to a number of systemic problems within Tibetan democracy, and 
indeed citizenship: 
'With the elections here there is not so much interest. Our people, they have 
engaged with the rights and privileges of citizenship and democratic 
politics, but they are ignorant for [sic] the corresponding responsibilities .... 
There is no ideology, no politics in the Tibetan community. You ask most 
people what they think about the elections and politics and they will have 
no opinion - they have nothing to say. People here, they have little politics-
they just want leadership from the Dalai Lama' (Taklha, 13.03.2006). 
Again, the spatiality of the exile community is important here. My Dharamsala. 
based interviewees perceived the settlements as politically apathetic, detached 
from and ignorant of political developments within the TGiE. From the opposite 
perspective, many interviewees in the settlements complained of a lack of 
information regarding candidates standing for election and a general 
disengagement from the everyday functioning of the exile government. The 
distance between the settlements and Dharamsala can therefore be seen to exist 
both materially - in terms of remoteness and inaccessibility - and in the political 
imagination: 
'In places like here [Sonamling] people, especially young people, they don't 
know anything about the candidates. There is very little campaigning, so 
when you are choosing candidates it is just a list of names. Some of older 
people might recognise the names but for the youth there is no connection." 
and for us we think it is not so important these elections, for us our studies 
and our job are important, not what happens in Dharamsala' (Khenpo, 
18.05.2007). 
" 
My interviews also revealed two other important cohorts who, to a greater or lesser 
I 
extent, fiel disenfranchised from exile politics, The first are newcomer refugees 
who, with few connections in exile and certainly no experience of participatory 
\' 
politics, struggle to comprehend or engage with TPiE elections. The second group 
'( 
161 In a 20Q5 Tibetan World Magazine survey of 150 Tibetans aged 18·25,70% claimed they did not vote, 
69% knew nothing about the preliminary round of voting in September 2005 and 60% claimed their 
knowledge about democracy and Tibetan electoral system was 'poor' (TWM August 2005: 18). 
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are Tibetans in the West. Whilst the fact that these individuals are able to vote for 
a conventionally territorial representative can be read as an implicit assumption 
that Tibetans in the West are more educated and politically aware (Director, 
TCHRD, 25.03.2006), the distance of such voters from the exile government and 
their lack of contact with TGiE administrative structures and welfare services 
means that there is considerable apathy. As the Chairman of the Tibetan 
Community in Britain asserted: 
'There has been very little interest in the elections in the UK. Our people 
here don't see it as relevant to their lives. It's not a priority and our election 
officials here are really struggling. So far I think very few people have 
registered [and are therefore eligible to vote]. Tibetans in the West ... often 
we feel disenfranchised from our government ... often there is not so much 
communication on either side' (11.02.2006). 
Over the years such disillusionment and frustration with the electoral system has 
instigated the sketching out of alternative systems by various interest groups and 
individuals, including the Dalai Lama himself. One option, proposed by the TYC in 
1974 but never implemented, would retain representatives from the three regions 
but every citizen in exile would have the right to vote for any candidate, 
irrespective of regional affiliations. Secondly, petitions for a multi-party system in 
exile are a continuing, if currently less vocalised, theme in Tibetan political 
discussions (TCHRD 2000). Finally, the most popular, and arguably most viable 
alternative election system is a proposal for a two-tier system with an upper house 
with members from regions and religious sects and a lower house with members 
representing constituencies in exile and based on proportional representation. 
Similar to proposals put forward in the 'Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity' (1992), 
proponents of this option stressed that it would reflect more accurately the 
geographical and political reality of the exiled population and thereby increase 
political accountability and participation. This therefore appears to be indicating a 
desire for more conventional electoral system of territorially-defined constituencies 
which enables local issues to be addressed, an assertion supported by Johnston and 
Pattie's claim that local constituencies are 'salient elements in the structuration of 
local political activity' (2003: 348). 
Although not seriously considered to date at the governmental level- due both to a 
reluctance to change the system and pressure from Kham and Amdo constituencies 
to retain the current regional quotas - it is worth briefly speculating what the 
implications would be of adopting a more conventional system of local 
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territorialised politics. Such a scenario links directly into a series of fundamental 
dilemmas and contradictions at the core of the Tibetan exile experience and the 
purpose. Central to this is the dilemma between meeting immediate needs and 
thus becoming increasingly 'permanent' in exile, and retaining the strong 
emotional and political desire to return home by maintaining a sense of 
restlessness whilst in exile (see Chapter 5). 
At first glance, the current system appears to create a 'permanent sense of 
temporariness' while the alternative system seems to compound trends towards 
increasing permanence by rooting political representation in locations in exile. In 
addition, it is arguable that the alternative system would shift Tibetan diasporic 
identity to one based on an individual's location in exile rather than on a collective 
sense of 'Tibetanness'. However, it could equally be asserted that the current 
system has an unsettling effect on identity, situating it in a symbolic no-man's-land 
rather than a 'real' territorial realm, while the alternative system consolidates 
connections between exile Tibetans and the political structures of TGiE and 
therefore strengthens the freedom struggle. In general, therefore, whilst calls for 
exile-based territoriality within the electoral system appear at face-value to equate 
with a shift towards welfarism over politicisation, individual needs over societal 
imperatives and permanence in exile over temporariness in expectation of 'return', 
such an intuitive reading of these debates obscures important complexities and 
ambiguities. Instead, the contradictions brought to light by an analytical focus on 
the electoral system goes some way to challenging the bifurcated image so often 
constructed of exiles, and gives a valuable insight into their complex negotiations of 
identity, territory and political representation. 
8.3.4 Summary 
I want to conclude this discussion of Tibetan parliamentary elections by remaining 
with issues of identity and territory. With regards to the structural features and 
fractures of the electoral system, a key theme which has emerged is the attempted 
integration of the exile community through differentiating it along regional and 
religious lines whereby different 'categories' of people are assigned to different 
electoral formulas and even different numbers of votes. The outcomes of this in 
terms of perceived perpetuation of regionalism and the disengagement of many 
young Tibetans has sparked heated debates in exile which strike at the heart of the 
nature and form of both Tibetan democracy and the exile community. Significantly, 
the two sides of the argument highlighted here - the official government line and 
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the views put forward by younger Tibetans - both see the election system as a 
potentially unifying force within the exiled community but, whilst both face the 
same fundamental challenge of (non)territorial constituencies, their (actualised 
and proposed) resolutions are very different. 
Turning to issues of territory, the system of symbolic quotas functions as TO iE's 
way of 'creating' territorial constituencies, albeit contradictory constituencies 
where representatives have no jurisdiction over the people living in the territory 
that they 'represent' (regions in Tibet), but do have a constituency of voters 
scattered across India and Nepal. As such, alongside the 'real' territory of the exile 
Tibetan settlements, 'the notion of territory exists in the imagination and 
simultaneously in the past and the future - in "old" Tibet and "free" Tibet' (Ardley 
2003b: 351). This unusual relationship between democracy and territory speaks to 
broader debates in democracy literature in interesting ways. Whilst supporting the 
argument that territory is crucial to the form and operation of democracy, the case 
of exile Tibetan democracy refutes Dahl's (2000) assertions regarding the necessary 
territorialisation of democracy, as this case illustrates a democracy functioning 
alongside de-territorialising processes (see Chapter 5). In ongoing discussions 
regarding how democracy is and should be responding to globalisation and the 
associated rethinking of (political) territory, two models have been posited: 
Archibugi et al's (1998) notion of cosmopolitan democracy whereby democracy is 
deepening and extending across global networks; and Hirst's (1993) model of 
associational democracy operating at the level of regions and cities. Tibetan 
democracy's complex articulation of space can be seen to lie between and across 
these models, and is a key example of a functioning transnational and diasporic 
democracy. Therefore, suggesting that the relationship between geographical scale 
and democracy needs to be re-imagined, the Tibetan case raises pertinent 
questions about the stretching of political authority and participation beyond 
'national' frontiers, and how this affects issues of legitimacy, constituency, 
participation and the meaning ofrepresentation. 
8.4 The 'youth factor' in the 2006 TPiE elections 
In this final section, I want to illustrate and literally 'put a face' to the above 
discussion regarding the nature of Tibetan democracy and the structure TPiE 
elections. While the discursive analyses presented above are necessary for 
understanding the complex functioning and important limitations of this case, such 
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an approach fails to capture the fact that democracy is an inherently dynamic, 
complex and participatory process, and voting is a key moment of encounter 
between the individual and the state. In order to attempt to offer such an insight, I 
want to provide an ethnographic snapshot of the 2006 elections to the TPiE. These 
elections were notable for an increase in voter turnout compared to previous 
parliamentary elections,162 and saw important attempts to instigate new political 
discourses, alter voting behaviour and radicalise the composition of the parliament. 
Key to this trend, and indeed the buzzword of the 2006 elections, was the 'youth 
factor' and the driving force behind this was a coalition of politically active young 
Tibetans - from a variety of backgrounds although overwhelmingly male, lay and 
born in exile - who called their activities 'Youth for Better MPs'. In the run up to 
the TPiE elections on 18 March 2006 I spent considerable time with this group, 
sitting in on their meetings, chatting to individuals and groups of those involved, 
joining them as they campaigned in Dharamsala, meeting up with them on polling 
day and asking others what their reaction to the group was. Therefore, whilst what 
follows is to a large extent a one-sided account of this period - my engagement with 
other interest groups such as regional associations was limited - I hope it offers an 
insight to what was an important political episode. 
Following arguments made in Chapter 4, in order to both present the ideas and 
strategies of this youth coalition and provide a 'feel' for the election process, the 
following is a montage of field notes, excerpts from interviews and discussion 
groupS, press articles, photographs and election posters, presented in the order I 
encountered, initiated and recorded them. In light of Crang's argument that the 
use of pictures and research materials in montage forces us to consider the 
interrelations between different kinds of evidence (2005: 230), these research 
records build up a narrative of the intense 12 days running up to the TPiE 
elections, giving a sense of the rush of electioneering and contextualising a number 
of the issues outlined above. 
6th March 2006: 'Youth for Better MPs' meeting 
Attending the main 'Youth for Better MPs' meeting ahead of the final round of 
voting, I made the following observations in my field diary: 
162 The nun,ber or ~Iiilered yolen (or 1M 2000 my. eloclinn - R2.2;U - lAW In incroaae nf II\~ rrom the PMVjOll1 .,1N'linn in 2(0) Ind Ihl! turnnu! lOr lho 
p",liminary round w.' 80%, ron,pared 'n 60% in 2001 (Tribune India, II Sop"""'" :10(0), 
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6 March 2006: 
12 young Tibetans present - 10 men, 2 women, all in their 20s-30s. 
Occupations include TCV teacher, secretary at Men-tse-khang, teacher at 
Institute of Buddhist Dialectics, political activists associated with Students 
for a Free Tibet, Regional TYC, Friends of Tibet, shopkeeper, nurse, secretary 
at Oeden Choeling nunnery. Sonam translating for me. 
Aim of the meeting is to draw up a shortlist of candidates that they will 
promote for the final poll. They had compiled a list for the preliminary round 
in September. Each nominated candidate from the primary round is 
discussed in turn regarding whether they should be supported. Some are 
dismissed outright, others automatica.lly put on the list with a unanimous 
show of hands but some provoke a lot of discussion. Individuals argue their 
case - try to persuade others and, if opinion is split, there's a show of hands. 
Important factors in selecting candidates seem to be which exile 
organisations/institutions they had been involved with, whether they are 
pro-independence, and what the group think of their 'character'. Most 
candidates nominated are based in Dharamsala - they obviously have links 
with/ worked for NODs etc, but are also known personally - people know 
their political views, they have done favours for / worked with the 
organisations represented in the room. The point is made several times that 
the group's aims are to educa,te the voters and to get the 'right' people in 
government - people who are 'young, active and educated' and have 'sincerity 
for their dedication for Tibet.' In contrast, many incumbent MPs are 
portrayed as sectarian, poorly educated and wanting the position for the 
power and influence rather than progressing the Tibetan cause. 
Having come from chatting with Oonpo [a nun who had been a political 
prisoner in Tibet and came to exile 12 years ago] to sitting in on this meeting 
feels like two different worlds - completely different views on life in exile and 
Tibetan politics. Also reminds me of conversations with Khedup [who had 
escaped into exile in the mid 1990sJ and his view that the government is far 
too dominated by Tibetans from India. To what extent are the views 
expressed in this discussion shaped by being second generation? - not 
understanding the different mindset of Tibeta,ns from Tibet - i.e. those older 
MPs who were being criticised? To what extent is this organisation part of 
the creation of a political class? 
Two important issues are worth noting from these jottings. The first is the contrast 
between newcomer refugees and those born in exile, an issue which reinforces 
assertions made above regarding the alienation of recent arrivals from TGiE and 
the election process more specifically. As noted in Chapter 6, the division between 
these cohorts is a significant challenge facing the community and, despite their 
talk of. progressive politics, the youth coalition appear to be perpetuating this 
schism." Secondly, the group's promotion of 'pro-independence' candidates is key. 
Not only central to the rationale of their campaign (and their politics more 
generally), this political stance forms part of a broader movement within sections of 
the exile community to promote a rangzen agenda within the TGiE itself in 
opposition to the current 'Middle Way' policy (see Chapter 3). Whilst a 'Rangzen 
" 
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party' is not (yet) on the agenda, such discussions can be read as an important shift 
towards party-style politics and the development of political ideologies within the 
community. 
8 th March 2006: Producing campaign posters 
The outcome of this meeting was the drawing up of lists of candidates for the final 
poll which, two days later, was printed in the form of these posters:l 63 
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Making an explicit link between the role of MPs and the freedom struggle, the 
posters outline the characteristics the group believes MPs should have - sincerity, 
education, substance, accountability - and positions this coalition strongly against 
the 'ugly petty politics guided by age old regional prejudices and factional politics'. 
Significantly, this is in opposition to factional politics rather than to the structure 
of the election system itself. 
163 Following the Indian election system 'symbols' are connected to each candidate to facilit .. lte voting by 
illiterate members of the electorate. Domed and Dotoe refer to Arodo and Kham regions respectively. 
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9th March 2006: Interview with Ngawang 
I interview Ngawang, one of the self-appointed leaders of the 'Youth for Better 
MPs' group and a prominent and often controversial political figure in exile, in a 
Tibetan cafe in Dharamsala. We discuss why the coalition was established, how 
they were going to organise their campaign and how their efforts had been received 
thus far: 
Fiona: what have people's reaction been to the 'Youth for Better MPs' 
campaign? 
Ngawang: Ah, very positive, very supportive ... so many people have taken 
an interest. Coming up to the preliminary poll we had these posters all over 
Dharamsala [gestures widely) ... and so many people were reading them, 
some taking them off the wall so they could make copies of the names! 
Fiona: so how is your campaign different from what has happened in other 
years? 
Ngawang: For a start we are professionals at campaigning [laughs] ... we 
design good posters and get the message out there. Also, we are so different 
from the regional associations. Each of the three regions is split into smaller 
regions and each of these smaller regions has this association. You see, 
these regional associations, they put forward lists of candidates for the 
preliminary round, but they only put up people from their small part of one 
of the three regions and they only put up posters in some small areas where 
people from that region they live. And what we are doing is very different, 
very different - we are listing our chosen candidates for all three main 
regions, and putting it all on the same page. Nice and simple. And for each 
candidate we give the important information - who they have worked for, 
what experience they have, what they have contributed to civil society. So 
every Tibetan in India and Nepal they can see the same sheet - they can see 
who we have recommended for their region but they can also see who we 
have recommended from other regions - and they can see how everyone is 
qualified. And so they can stop thinking only of their small region and see 
the bigger picture .... And so in this way we are trying to unite this 
community - by uniting the candidates on the single page! And for our lists 
we have 2 versions - Tibetan and English - but these regional associations 
they have a list only in Tibetan, but some of the youth, their reading 
Tibetan is not so good. So our list is ... is more accessible to the modern 
youth. 
Fiona: how did the prelimary round go for your campaign? 
~ang: Now for the preliminaries we mainly concentrated our posters in 
Himachal [Pradesh] and Delhi, but for the final poll ... for this we are going 
to have these posters all over India and Nepal. And for this we are going to 
use our network of activists. So I will send batches of posters by bus to Delhi 
and they will be collected and sent with someone going by bus to 
Kathmandu, and to Bangalore and so forth. And this way we will cover all 
the settlements. For you see it is very important that it reaches everyone, 
especially those common people who are not so well educated. Because if 
they don't have list of names, who are they going to vote for? - they don't 
know these candidates. It is these people in the settlements who are the 
main vote banks you see and so it is important that we reach them. 
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As indicated in this interview extract, the group aimed to establish themselves as 
distinct from and an alternative to the regional associations, perceiving themselves 
as representing 'modern' young Tibetans in contrast to the traditional values 
represented by the regional groups. In addition, it is instructive to chart how their 
belief in and promotion of a united 'Tibetan' community in exile (albeit only in 
India and Nepal) is mobilised and realised both through their political strategies of 
including all three regions on one poster and distributing the posters widely across 
the settlements. As such, this network of youth activists indicates a very different 
imagined geography from both the regional associations and the electoral system 
itself. It is a geography based on shared political aspirations (for Tibetan 
independence) and on long-distance communication, rather than on face to face 
contact and a shared 'clan' history. 
lIth March 2006: New media and the emergence of political debate 
In doing some background research on the 'Youth for Better MPs' group, I find they 
caught the attention of the Indian press during the preliminary round, with an 
article appearing in the Hindustan Times on 8 September 2005 outlining key 
differences between the youth coalition and regional associations. When posted on 
phayul.com, which has become the main online discussion and debating forum for 
exile Tibetan politics, this article generated a number of comments from young 
Tibetans across the diaspora. Those presented below illustrate a range of views 
about the 'Youth' campaign and reflect a number of the narratives critical of the 
election system discussed above: from demanding more radical changes and 
challenging the system itself, to calls for the establishment of political parties and 
finally opposition to any change in the equal electoral representation of Tibetan 
regions. 
Location: Dasa [Dharamsala] 
Sep 08 2005 01:49 PM 
[ ... ] youngsters, we are in exile we dont have regions. all we have is the 
scattered settlements, so the seat for election should be based on 
settlements for better representation. and yes two votes for monks and one 
vote for lay people is all discrimination of political rights [ ... ] 
Location: nalandaanda [Bihar, India] 
Sep 08 2005 12:35 PM 
Congratulations for graduating to a sensible, responsible Tibetans. Idea is 
good but it would have been excellent if these very peole [sic] whose names 
has been suggested, formed a Tibetan Freedom Party. That would have sent 
the right signals and touched each and every sensible, responsible Tibetans 
who want to fight only for the FREEDOM OF TIBET. 
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Location: UK 
Sep 08 2005 01:32 AM 
Glad to know that some of our younger folks have realized that sectarianism 
and regionalism have hurt us and slowed us down and are making efforts to 
break out of this mold. [ ... ] And like many who expressed their opinion on 
this site it is time for change and the ultimate goal is One United Tibet for 
All Tibetans. 
Location: Paris 
Sep 07 2005 08:13 PM 
Tib Youth's attempts to replace regional representation by open election to 
Exiled Parliament is nothing new and betrays the sinister design of 
majority Utsangwas in exile to dominate the Tibetan parliament in exile ... 
If the Tibetan Parliament is to represent the whole of Tibetan people in and 
outside Tibet, then regional and religious representation cannot be done 
away with in the foreseeable future ... 
(www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10602&t=1&c-}) 
Such online discussion forums constitute an increasingly important space for 
political debate, and have been key to connecting the globally dispersed electorate. 
Two other innovative media initiatives for engaging the younger generation with 
exile politics are worth mentioning. The first was Radio Free Asia's live election 
broadcasts which included constituency hustings and a town hall discussion with 
all candidates, the latter of which was filmed and copies distributed to the 
settlements (RFA, 8 March 2006). Secondly, several members of the 'Youth for 
Better MPs' group were involved in producing a I5-minute information film about 
the importance of voting which was widely distributed across settlements in India 
and Nepal and broadcast several times on Dharamsala cable TV (Tsultrim, 
09.03.2006). Aimed at encouraging youth participation in politics, the film featured 
interviews. with the key players in the election process - the Election 
Commissioner, Kalon Tripa, presidents of NDPT and TWA and prospective 
, ,~' 
candidates. Indeed, this film, and the activities of the youth coalition more 
generally, "formed part of a wider movement to attempt to engender a more 
engaged se~se of citizenship through greater voter responsibility. 
15th Marc~ 2006: Election campaigning around Dharamsala 
I,,. 
Whilst th~'se media innovations are increasingly important in providing a forum for 
exile political debate, the majority of campaigning is still carried out through the 
!." 
more traditional medium of posters displayed in Tibetan settlements. Although the 
)" 
Election Commission pastes posters of each candidate in public places in each 
.4,..· 
settlement - verified with the TGiE stamp and signature of the local electoral 
,1 
officer - it 'is down to each individual candidate to campaign for themselves in the 
(;' 
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form of posters, adverts in the exile Tibetan press and, in some cases, shouting 
slogans from the back of jeeps being driven around the streets of Dharamsala. 
However, as indicated above, interest 
groups such as regional associations, 
NGOs and the youth coalition 
increasingly campaigned on behalf of 
selected candidates. This again took 
the form of lists of candidates being 
pasted ill the settlements and 
advertised on websites such as 
phayul.com. As I noted in my field 
diary three days before the election: 
[Left] Members of the Tibetan 
electorate examining candidate 
posters on Temple Road, 
Dharamsala. This was one of two 
sites in the town where the Welfare 
Office pasted official campaign 
posters. 
[Below] Campaign poster for a 
candidate running for a seat in the 
Arodo constituency 
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15th March 2006 
Electioneering seems to be stepping up a gear. The campaign is being fought on the 
walls of Dharamsala - teams from different interest groups head out at night with 
posters and paste, and effectively wallpaper the town. As well as 'Youth [or Better 
MPs', the most active other group is Chushi Gangdruk [representing Kham region] 
but posters from NDPT, Todue welfare association, Ngari Chilthum Association 
and posters of individual candidates have also appeared in the last couple of days. 
With the internal problems at TYC over the winter they haven't put out a list, but 
• " .' • I • 
chatting to the acting president he thought 
their list would have been pretty similar to 
that of the Youth group. TWA doesn't 
publish a list of candidates but, according 
to one MP, has defini tely put people 
forward behind the scenes. So, with the low 
standing of NDPT at the moment it's really 
just the Youth group up against the 
regional associations and, according to 
Ngawaing, tensions are rising . 
[Left] 'Youth for Better MPs' posters on 
display outside the Tibetan Welfare Office 
in Dharamsala. 
Following my enquiries into how campaigning in 2006 compared to previous 
elections, one TGiE civil servant reflected on a possible shift in cultural attitudes 
towards political promotion: 
'I think compared to last time there is a lot more campaigning - both from 
the organisations putting up their lists and from individual candidates. Last 
time I can't remember much individual campaigning - I think our people 
find it very hard to promote themselves .... To put up posters with their 
photo saying how good they are! Now a few people have done this and so 
when some start others will follow' (Ketu 15.03.2006). 
18th March 2006: Polling day in Dha ramsala 
Voting happens on one day in Tibetan settlements and scattered communities 
across the world and, in order to coordinate this daunting procedure, an extensive 
network of election offices and personnel have been established. As the Chief 
EJection Commissioner explained; 
'We have 53 permanent offices in the settlements of over 160 persons and 
regional offices in the West and they organise everything - so the 
registration of names of the people, polling stations, counting the vote and 
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collating the vote and then they send the results here and we do the final 
counting and announcing the results .... Also at the local level they organise 
all the education about elections, voting, ballot papers. And with this it is a 
good way of building democracy at local levels' (16.03.2006). 
In terms of the voting procedure, any Tibetan aged 18 and over and holding a 
Green Book with chatrel duly paid is eligible to vote, but must register with their 
local election commission in advance. Once registered and entered onto the 
Election Commission database, voters can cast their ballot at any Tibetan polling 
station - established in Tibetan schools, monasteries and welfare offices - which is 
an important accommodation of the highly mobile electorate. I spent the morning 
of the TPiE elections at the polling station at Gangchen Kyishong, the 
headquarters ofTGiE, and noted the following in my field diary: 
desk who checks their name, then they move 
to another official who stamps and issues 
ballot papers - one for lay people and two for 
monks/nuns. 
Three separate queues at the 
chorten in front of the parliament 
building - one lor each region -
with U- Tsang queue noticeably 
longer. There's a mixture of 
government staff, MPs, monks, 
nuns, lay people - old and young. 
Everyone queues up, presents their 
Green Book to the official at the 
People then move to the side and fill in the 
forms - but it's not exactly a secret ballot. 
Two low tables with pens are left to one side, 
but few people use them. Instead, people fill 
out the forms on top of car bonnets, motorbike seats, some go into the garages under 
the Planning Commission. Some people look for privacy - one monk runs away from 
his friends and hides to make his ballot paper - others fill out the forms together. 
Voters then fold the ballot papers and post them into the ballot boxes - monitored by 
a Tibetan official. For much of the morning Indian police have been loitering 
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around the ballot boxes as well, but don't appear to interfere. Two Indian 
journalists are trying to get interviews with voters but not having much success -
they say people are camera shy and reluctant to talk about their political views. 
I had a little more luck speaking to voters than the Indian press, and the following 
are some sound-bites from interviews conducted at the TGiE headquarters at 
Gangchen Kyishong and the polling station at TCV Day School in Dharamsala: 
'This is a proud day for Tibetans - we can show the world our democracy, 
.. and we can carry our Green Books. Today we are Tibetan, but our brothers 
and sisters in Tibet cannot have this day - this we have to remember' 
(Gadong, monk from Kirti monastery), 
'it looks like children revising before their exam [laughs] ... everyone is 
sitting in the streets reading posters, trying to memorise it' (Togden, 
Teacher, Yongling School), 
'So that is my civic duty done ... I have done my responsibility and I hope my 
candidates they will win' (Tendar, housewife). 
In the evening I reconvene with members of 'Youth for Better MPs' and catch up 
with their day's activities: 
Tsultrim: I was in the queue to vote and some people had these posters from 
. other organisations so I had some of our posters and ... you know we have all 
three regions on one poster so I just cut each into three and go along each 
line giving these and talking to people. I maybe gave out 40 lists ... 
Damdul: [interrupts] I went to Upper TCV to vote. It's a really important 
polling station with all the TCV staff. So I was standing in queue and these 
people - older people - are discussing who to vote for, and saying they really 
don't know. So I was listening and I had a pile of our yellow posters in my 
pocket so I just gave one to this guy and explained we aren't [an] 
organisation, we are just some youths coming together and we think these 
people would be good MPs. And I said, you know, I am not telling you how to 
vote, I am just suggesting these people, and you can take or leave it. And 
then people saw and started coming to me for copy and in the end I gave out 
lots - you could see people reading them in all the queues! 
Dechen: [much laughter] I didn't only give out posters to the queue, I stuck 
some in the ballot room! I put one on the blackboard and some on the desks. 
It's making it easy for people - they just copy! 
Tsultrim: [laughter] anyway we can say that it was not us who put up those 
posters - some voter must have taken it in! 
Along with the lack of a fully secret ballot, such activities certainly undermine any 
claims that this was an entirely free and fair election, and highlight more general 
limitations faced by this nascent democracy. Yet, at the same time, the enthusiasm 
and determination to engage with the political process demonstrated by these 
young activists does fundamentally challenge the political apathy discussed earlier. 
Indeed, perhaps the journey to a more participative and potentially multi-party 
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democratic system will necessarily involve some less than democratic practices and 
interventions. 
19th April 2006: The results are announced 
Regional election committees are responsible for ensuring that their communities 
hear the election results, which are also published in Tibetan newspapers, journals 
and websites and picked up by some Indian press. In terms of the outcome for the 
youth campaign, there was a significant increase in the number of young and pro-
independence MPs, with 20 candidates from the Youth for Better MPs list being 
elected. Indeed, the formation of a more youthful and radical assembly was the 
story of the elections: 
'Tibetans have opted for a younger look for their parliament-in-exile in 
northern India, with some new members saying they would press for 
independence for their homeland ... The new parliament has 16 new faces, 
most of them from younger generation Tibetans ... the results give younger 
Tibetans, generally viewed as more radical than their elders, a voice in 
parliament for the first time' (AFP 21 April 2006). 
In summary, this narrative montage has aimed to give an impression of how the 
electoral process was experienced and in turn shaped by an increasingly influential 
group within the exile community and provide an insight into their motivations, 
ideas and strategies. Whilst 'Youth for Better MPs' did not directly challenge the 
electoral system per se they nevertheless managed to forge new political 
discourses. By representing a different style of politics (modern, youth-focused and 
based on political activism), promoting an alternative political agenda (rangzen) 
and employing innovative political strategies (campaigning across the settlements 
and using new media) from the regional associations, the 'Youth for Better MPs' 
campaign was effectively a critical intervention into the political and electoral 
status quo. Acting as a catalyst in instigating heated debates regarding the nature 
and problems of regionally-based politics, this youth coalition brought into the open 
latent issues within the community and went some way to challenging the apathy 
perpetuated by the existing system. More widely, these debates, discussions and 
interventions are a positive sign for Tibetan democracy in general as they are 
generating the beginnings of genuine democratic debates and political engagement 
within the community. 
8.5 Conclusion: the possibilities and limitations of strategic 
democracy 
This chapter has sought to build up a picture of the evolution, rationale and 
limitations of both Tibetan democracy in exile and the TPiE election system 
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through an analysis of official and popular narratives, and an ethnographic focus 
on the 2006 elections. What has emerged is a picture of a nascent and often 
experimental form of democracy shaped by a very specific set of circumstances, 
spatialities and ideologies. Facing significant barriers to full democratisation, TGiE 
is nevertheless attempting to forge a democratic path different to that of the West. 
It is one rooted in Tibetan cultural values but also influenced by the realities of life 
in exile, and actively constructing links between the exile population and the 
homeland. It is a democracy which, initiated and sustained in a refugee community 
with previous experience of only theocratic rule, has achieved a considerable 
amount. In terms of a lens through which to view the role, rationale and 
limitations of TGiE as an institution, a focus on issues of democracy and elections 
has been instructive. For, in this case where the election system is so consciously 
designed to fulfil specific normative functions for the exilic citizenry, the TPiE 
election system have elucidated issues of political and national identity 
construction; exilic dilemmas; the politicisation of Tibetan culture and religion; 
how different parts of the diaspora are viewed by the Tibetan administration; the 
TGiE's externally facing legitimising strategies; and the rehearsal of state-like 
practices in preparation for future territorial governance. 
Returning to more theoretical debates, despite its 'uniqueness,' I have argued that 
this case does have a lot to offer broader debates regarding the development and 
nature of democracy and the socio-political functioning of election systems. Turning 
first to issues of democracy, rather than force Tibetan democracy into theoretical 
boxes into which it simply does not fit, this chapter has argued that it is more 
fruitful to examine the ways that this case intersects with democracy literature in 
both confirmatory and challenging ways. Perhaps the most significant confirmatory 
lessons learned from this case are that democratisation is a protracted, fragile and 
difficult process (Held 2006: 1). Democracy imposed from the top-down is inevitably 
weak, and democracy is both difficult to teach and requires a process of gradual 
evolution in order to take root. In addition, this case substantiates the key 
relationship between democracy and legitimacy, but does so in a way which 
complicates conventional interpretations of the role of external actors in the 
initiation of democracy. Rather than imposers of democracy, actors such as China, 
Western states and inter-governmental organisations are perceived as key 
audiences for the performance of this democracy, with TGiE seeking legitimacy 
through its distancing from Chinese politics and adherence to international norms 
of good governance. 
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The case of Tibetan democracy also challenges and contributes to key debates on 
democracy and culture. With its idiosyncratic evolution and characteristics, exile 
Tibetan democracy contests the structuralist school of thought with its focus on 
Western historical models and the socio-economic and cultural preconditions for 
democracy (Dahl 1989; Lakoff 1996) and instead (re)focuses critical attention on 
Rustow's (1970) dynamic model of democratic transition. In addition, this case 
lends weight to assertions that democracy is pluralistic and culturally contingent. 
In essence that 'countries will necessarily be "differently democratic'" (UNDP 2002: 
2). Moreover, the close relationship between Tibetan culture, Buddhism and 
democracy provides an important contribution to the Asian values and democracy 
debate and supports Saward's claim that the 'serial "indigenisation" of democracy 
represents its future' (2003: 114). In addition, the Tibetan case highlights issues 
hitherto overlooked by existing literature on democracy. These include a leader 
imposing democracy on 'his people', democracy being an integral part of a freedom 
struggle and democracy as deeply symbolic: a symbolic rebuke to the Chinese; a 
symbolic renewal and strengthening of the community; and a symbolic outreach to 
the West. 
In light of this, the fact that this is a democracy functioning in a stateless polity 
demands rethinking of the relationships between political representation, territory, 
democracy and statehood more generally. This chapter has shown that a key 
tension at the heart of the TPiE election system, and exile Tibetan democracy more 
generally, is between its instrumental role as a mechanism of governance within 
the exile polity and its multiple strategic roles. The latter include appealing for 
international recognition and legitimation; a training exercise in order to 
implement democracy in Tibet; shaping the political consciousness of the diaspora; 
uniting the electorate under a banner of Tibetan nationalism; and creating a 
strategically balanced microcosm of the community in exile. This is, therefore, a 
democracy which spans and innovatively attempts to integrate different spatial 
and temporal contexts. It is forging links with the past in terms of the traditional 
regions and religious sects of the homeland. It is an acknowledgement of the 
present situation of being in exile, representing a global diaspora and attempting to 
symbolically unite the populations in exile and in Tibet. And it is a strategic form 
of planning for the future with regards to a united electorate familiar with 
democratic procedures. 
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However, as has been discussed above, the prioritising of these strategic roles over 
democracy as a means of governing in exile has, given the almost five decades in 
exile, proved to be increasingly problematic on an everyday level. Ironically, it is 
the mundane functioning of democracy on the ground in exile - especially in the 
settlements - which is most limited in this case. Indeed, with regards to the 
question of how parliamentary elections function in a 'state' without sovereignty 
over territory, I have argued that an artificial and symbolic electoral system, albeit 
established for key strategic reasons and eloquent in theory, faces considerable 
challenges when translated into reality on the ground. Perhaps the most pertinent 
response that this study has thrown up in response to this initial query is therefore 
to highlight how essential local territorialised politics and representation is to 
effective democracy and governance. As such, this case encourages us to rethink 
the intersection of political and territorial identities with and by electoral systems 
and the (dis)functionality of symbolic territory as a basis for political 
representation. 
Finally, since neither in present-day exile nor in TGiE plans for the future is this 
democracy associated with a conventional sense of statehood, this case exemplifies 
the 'complex relationship between state formation, or reformation, and transitions 
to democracy' (Anderson 1999: 8). Echoing the wider argument in this thesis 
regarding the spanning of issues of statehood and statelessness, Tibetan democracy 
is attempting to function in both transnational and state-like ways. However, with 
the challenges faced by a lack of territorial constituencies in exile this case cannot 
be read as an affirmation of cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi et alI998). Rather, 
the ambiguous relationship between TGiE and statehood vindicates calls to extend 
empirical and theoretical gazes beyond the territorial sovereign state as the basic 
political unit for democracy and seriously engage with the 'extension of orthodox 
democratic practice beyond national boundaries' (Saward 2003: 31). This therefore 
opens up the possibilities for stateless! diaspora! refugee democracies and 
alternative territorial ways ofthinking about political communities more generally. 
Indeed, as I will argue in the concluding chapter, Tibetan democracy, and the TGiE 
itself as an institution can and should be read as a laboratory of innovative politico-
territorial strategising and as a harbinger of possible geopolitical reconfigurations. 
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Chapter 9 
The Political Geographies of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
'what if these kinds of states were allowed to coexist, to be exemplars of state-
ness everywhere, to speak to what states elsewhere might also become? Then 
we would have a basis for starting to radically alter the political geography 
of the state which we teach, analyse and perhaps occasionally create. ' 
(Robinson 2003: 651) 
9.1 Introduction 
Based on ethnographic research on exiled Tibetan political institutions and 
practices in India, this study has investigated sovereignty in exile. The preceding 
chapters have unpacked a range of aspects of TGiE's state-like functioning and 
articulations of sovereignty: its territorialised administration of exile settlements; 
its governance over its population; its construction of political identities; and the 
establishment of its democratic practices and institutions. The purpose of this final 
chapter is two-fold. Firstly, to pull together the arguments made in the empirical 
chapters and, secondly, to sketch out the wider theoretical implications of this 
study. In order to work through these, I want to return to the research aims set out 
in Chapter 1: 
(i) to examine the nature of sovereignty articulated by this territory-less polity 
(ii) to investigate what kind of political entity the TGiE is. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, as both state-like and territory-less the 
TGiE has an ambiguous relationship to statehood and can fruitfully be used to 
interrogate key political concepts such as the nature of the state, questions of 
sovereignty and the role of territory. Attending to the first aim, this chapter begins 
by summarising the key arguments via three cuts at TGiE's exercise of sovereignty, 
focusing on issues of recognition, legitimacy and legality; territory and 
territoriality; and relations with the host state. Turning to the question of what 
kind of polity TGiE is, the second, shorter, section examines how TGiE fits and 
fails to fit modes of both statehood and statelessness, interrogates the utility of 
such a distinction and reflects on issues of temporality. Finally I broaden the 
perspective and sketch out the implications of this research for thinking about 
alternative geopolitical futures. 
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9.2 De facto, displaced, tacit: the sovereign articulations of the TGiE 
The issue of sovereignty has been central to this study, underpinning how and why 
TGiE functions as it does. As noted in Chapter 2, sovereignty is a complex and 
increasingly contested concept which from conventional perspectives is central to 
the geographical assumptions of the 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994) and, under 
more critical interpretations, is a lens through which to view the operation of 
political power at a range of scales and by a variety of polities. I want to draw 
together a number of arguments made in this study by focusing on three aspects of 
TGiE's articulations of sovereignty. Firstly, the relationship between sovereignty 
and authority will be unbundled through an examination of legal recognition, and 
it will be argued that TGiE has a degree of de facto sovereignty based on its claims 
to and production of legitimacy. Secondly, the relationship between sovereignty 
and territory will be untangled through examining the range of territorialising 
strategies TGiE engages in and its articulation of displaced sovereignty. Finally, 
attention will shift from TGiE as an entity in and of itself to its contradictory 
relationship with its host state India, and the notion of 'tacit sovereignty' is 
developed to describe the undeclared and provisional nature of exilic Tibetan 
sovereignty. 
9.2.1 Recognition. legitimacy and de facto sovereignty 
The most common bases for asserting that TGiE lacks (de jure) sovereignty is that 
it is not legally recognised by any state or government, and that it has no law-
making or law-enforcing abilities (see Chapter 2). As outlined in Chapter 5, 
although the institutional framework of a judiciary has been developed in the form 
of the Tibetan Justice Commission, there is a fundamental lack of juridical power. 
Thus, as a legally unrecognised polity, TGiE is in the 'unenviable position of having 
no "legal" or "constitutional" status ... and consequently is not able to use coercive 
force to compel acquiescence with their policies' (Goldstein 1975: 20). Rulings from 
the TPiE and judgements passed by the Justice Commission are not legally binding 
and, without a monopoly over the use of violence, not legally enforceable. 
In light of this, it is logical to argue that 'sovereignty' is an inappropriate term to 
use with regards to TGiE, and that employing it overstretches the concept. 
However, TGiE is not in a state of paralysis, or a shadow administration deficient 
in all governmental powers. On the contrary, TGiE has existed for almost half a 
century, enacts a wide range of governmental functions, claims legitimacy and has 
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constructed a pseudo-legal personality.164 In asking what this means for the realist 
assumption that a polity not recognised is thus not sovereign, I want to argue that 
the teasing apart of recognition, legitimacy and sovereignty enables us to focus on 
non-state entities such as TGiE and interrogate their claims to and production of 
legitimacy and sovereignty. Such 'unbundling' requires an important distinction to 
be made between de jure and de facto sovereignty. 
Widening the notion of sovereignty 'to include other forms of power that are not 
strictly juridical' (Ong 1999: 216) opens up the idea of de facto sovereignty: the 
ability and capacity to exercise power. As such, sovereignty is released from purely 
legal definitions and becomes a far broader concept applicable beyond conventional 
statehood. So, can a polity have de facto sovereignty without de jure sovereignty? 
The conventional response would be no, sovereignty requires both elements. There 
are, however, important empirical cases where these forms of sovereignty have 
diverged. For example, as noted in Chapter 2, the postcolonial 'new sovereignty 
game' has seen the establishment of both quasi states (Jackson 1990) which are 
internationally recognised but lack basic state functions, and de facto states which 
exercise state capabilities but lack recognition (pegg 1998). In light of such 
contradictions and broader global economic transformations, Austin and Kumar 
assert that the 'existence of sovereignty (in a legal sense) is no longer a useful 
indicator of a state's actual capacity to carry out its will' (1998: 53). Agnew takes 
this further and challenges the very assumption 'that there actually is a pure de 
jure sovereignty from which de facto sovereignty is a lapse or anomaly,' and instead 
claims that 'de facto sovereignty is all there is' (2005: 437). 
My argument here, however, does not rely upon dismissing de jure sovereignty. 
Rather, I want to suggest that traditional legal readings of sovereignty have 
important purchase, even in cases such as TGiE, and that there are indeed dangers 
in stretching the concept of sovereignty too far. So, following Murphy (1996), de 
jure sovereignty over bounded territory can be seen as the dominant 'political-
territorial ideal'; a rigid order which, although never fully realised, does retain 
ideological and practical significance. It is this 'gold standard' of sovereignty which 
TGiE strives towards and which shapes how this polity constructs itself. 
Exemplifying this are the 'Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity' (1992) discussed in 
J6~ For the purpose of the following discussion, I am defining legitimacy both in a normative sense as the 
right to govern and in a positive sense as the popular acceptance of an administration as an authority by 
those over whom it governs. 
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Chapter 8. Whilst keeping this ideal of de jure sovereignty in mind, it is to TGiE's 
everyday articulations of de facto sovereignty that I now want to turn. 
De facto sovereignty is constituted by both the production of and acquiescence to 
governance and coercive power. In terms of the former, an important starting point 
is the exclusivity of TGiE's exercise of political authority within the Tibetan 
community-in-exile. Whilst the exile administration has had its fair share of critics, 
unlike many exile movements (see Shain 1989; Goddeeris 2007) there has never 
been a serious challenge to TGiE's authority and legitimacy. In addition, as 
demonstrated throughout this study, TGiE has established 'an ensemble of 
institutional arrangements for rule' (Luke 1996: 498) and has centralised control 
over its scattered population. Emblematic of this is the administration's IDPs 
which, as explored in Chapter 6, are examples of nascent state-planning, setting 
out a vision for a standardised 'welfare state' within the exiled community and 
being implemented by an expanding administrative reach. 
Shifting to the 'subjects' of governance, as explored through the contexts of 
citizenship, democracy and welfare provision, TGiE is looked upon by the Tibetan 
people as their legitimate government and the majority of Tibetans in exile do 
comply with TGiE policies. I have documented how the early refugees moved 
thousands of miles to the unfamiliar environment of South India because their 
government told them to (Chapter 5), Tibetans in exile continue to pay voluntary 
taxes (Chapters 6 and 7), and TGiE acts as a legitimate arbiter of conflicts within 
the community (Chapter 5). Therefore, distinguishing between legitimacy and 
legality, whilst TGiE's authority cannot be based on legal powers, this exile 
administration achieves compliance through its management of societal pressure 
and cultivation of moral authority. 
Alongside their leader's charismatic authority based on his status as a 
reincarnation of the patron deity of Tibet (Ardley 2003b), TGiE's claims of 
historical precedence and the transplantation of customary institutional structures 
directly from Tibet, the moral authority and popular support enjoyed by TGiE is 
also founded upon the influence of Tibetan nationalism. Explored in Chapters 5, 7 
and 8, Tibetan nationalism was solidified in exile through TGiE's initiation of 
nation-building projects and fostering of a standardised Tibetan national identity 
which is intended to unite the geographically disparate exile community. Not only 
does this challenge poststructuralist dismissals of essentialised identities, 
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territorial rootedness in exile and the resurgence of nationalism, but a symbiotic 
relationship between nationalism and constructions of sovereignty is also apparent 
in this case. TGiE is the primary architect of these re-workings and reinventions of 
Tibetan traditions and, in turn, Tibetan nationalism forms a crucial element in the 
performance and maintenance of the legitimacy vested in TGiE. 
As argued in Chapters 6 and 7, central to the everyday practices through which 
TGiE produces de facto sovereignty, ensures legitimacy and claims loyalty are the 
range of technologies of government (Foucault 1991 ; Dean 1999) underpinning 
TGiE's attempts to construct a Tibetan 'population' in exile and institutionalise 
state-citizen relationships. In light of Weber's observation that 'what a state must 
do in order to be sovereign is control the simulation of its "source" of sovereign 
authority and simulate a boundary which marks the range of its legitimate powers 
and competencies' (1995: 129), I have asserted that a key simulation of TGiE's 
sovereignty is its differentiation from exile NGOs and businesses and the 
concurrent fashioning of a Tibetan population, civil society and nascent economy in 
exile as quasi-objects separate from the 'political' realm through which they are 
governed (Hannah 2000). The construction of an exile 'population' in particular has 
been key, not only to a Tibetan 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991), but as a 
legitimising strategy for TGiE claims to be 'their' rightful representative. As an 
extra-territorial form of power, governmentality has therefore proved to be a useful 
framework for examining TGiE's 'regimes of practice' (Corbridge et ol 2005: 11). 
However, as distinct modalities of power, sovereignty and governmentality are 
arguably impossible to reconcile and, as I concluded in Chapter 6, whilst TGiE 
effectively employs a range of techniques of government, this framework has 
limitations. Governmentality cannot be used to differentiate between state and 
non-state modes of power and, given TGiE's lack of juridical status, its inability to 
claim the legal right to govern is a significant barrier to this polity 'qualifying' for 
statehood. As such, and following Agamben (1998), bringing sovereignty back into 
dialogue with the practices of governmentality can offer a more productive 
approach to examining the intersection of the law, statehood and power. 
Turning to the 'international' audience for TGiE's constructions of de facto 
sovereignty, Reisman (1991) argues that governments-in-exile appropriate symbols 
oflegitimacy in order to engage with the international community. For TGiE, these 
performances of statehood and sovereignty are enacted principally through 
discourses of good governance and practices of paradiplomacy. Focusing on the 
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former, I have argued that conceiving of power as mediated by modes of 
representation, the 'language of stateness' (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 9) is 
particularly important as TGiE engages in processes of self-construction and 
negotiates its place on the international stage. It is through discourses of 
democracy, ethnic nationhood and universal citizenship that TGiE most clearly 
employs such techniques. For example, as I asserted in Chapter 8, TGiE's strategic 
implementation and rhetorical articulation of democracy are key image-building 
exercises and an attempt to deploy for the Tibetan exiled polity (particularly in 
relation to China) the contemporary discourse of democratic good governance which 
is seen as the contemporary foundation of legitimate sovereignty (Frechette 2007). 
Therefore, like other non-state nationalist movements lacking international legal 
stature, TGiE seeks to create an 'international persona' through alternative routes 
to the global audience (Shain 1989) based around demonstrating its 'worthiness' 
and deservedness of material and ideological support. 
In summary, I want to make two assertions as to why the framework of 
'sovereignty' is an appropriate one for critically examining this case. First, whilst 
TGiE arguably exercises autonomy within India and the exile community has 
achieved a considerable degree of self-governance in exile, this polity is also 
engaging in sovereignty practices. As asserted throughout this study, TGiE 
articulates a particular form of authority, constructing legitimacy through moral 
compliance from its population and territorialising its governance to the extent 
that it can in an exile situation. Secondly, teasing apart the constituent elements of 
authority has identified two routes to sovereignty: a dominant discourse of de jure 
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sovereignty b~sed on recognition by other sovereign states and legal coercive 
powers, and !in alternative route of de facto sovereignty based on claims to and 
constructions of legitimacy through which forms of compliance are generated. In 
focusing on the latter and examining how TGiE constructs a realm in exile over 
which it claims authority, this therefore refutes both the assumption that a polity 
not recognised is not sovereign and the idea of sovereignty as absolute. Thus, 
despite its l~ck of official recognition, TGiE can function as a legitimate, if not 
legal, government with de facto, if not de jure, sovereignty. Put another way, TGiE 
might be achieving more than autonomy, but its legitimacy amounts to less than de 
jure sovereignty and it is in this gap between de jure sovereignty and autonomy 
that a range ~f modes of de facto sovereignty lie (Austin and Kumar 1998; Agnew 
2005). My aim has therefore not been to over-stretch the concept of de jure 
sovereignty b~t rather to differentiate the idea of de facto sovereignty; an approach 
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which does not undermine our ability to engage with the ideological hegemony of 
dominant readings of legal sovereignty, but rather enhances our understanding of 
the concept. However, this remains an unstable articulation of legitimacy, 
authority and de facto sovereignty which, as I shall explore in the following section, 
is based on important contradictions and limitations. 
9.2.2 Strategic territorialisation and displaced sovereignty 
Whilst considerable critical attention has been given to the relationship between 
sovereignty and political authority (Walker 1993; Luke 1996), the connection 
between sovereignty and territoriality has enjoyed less systematic analysis 
(although see Murphy 1996; Agnew 2005). As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, as 
bounded territory is fundamental to classical definitions of sovereignty, a 
reasonable assumption is that without legal jurisdiction over territory in Tibet or 
in exile, TGiE has a highly tenuous relationship to territory and therefore lacks 
sovereignty. However, like all polities TGiE does occupy some sort of space (Agnew 
and Corbridge 1995) and, though far from having a conventional state-like 
territorial form, this exile administration is engaged in processes of 
territorialisation. 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated, TGiE exercises a modality of power and space which is 
in many ways state-like. This is evident not only in its hierarchies of control but 
also in the discourse of 'jurisdictions' articulated by TGiE officials (Section 5.3.2). 
However - and there are always 'howevers' in this case - TGiE's lack of official 
sovereignty over these spaces means this is far from legal jurisdiction. There is a 
territoriality to TGiE's sovereign practices, but this is de facto rather than de jure 
control over territory. Moreover, conceptualising the spatiality of power in this case 
requires careful navigation between realist and post-structuralist interpretations. 
Though decidedly not a conventional case of centralised power operating over 
absolute, bounded territory, TGiE achieves more than simply exercising diffused 
power over de-territorialised, transnational networks. This exile administration's 
construction of territory and power is somewhere between state-space and 
diaspora-space. The settlements as dispersed sites of territorialised power 
therefore confirm Forsberg's (1996) claim that sovereign statehood should be 
treated as only one form of territorial practice and offer a functioning example of 
Agnew's assertion that 'political authority is not restricted to states and ... such 
authority is thereby not necessarily exclusively territorial' (2005: 441). Indeed, an 
ethnographic focus on such partial forms of state ness exposes the contingencies in 
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bundling together sovereignty, territory and statehood and reveals the everyday 
workings of territoriality: sovereign 'achievements' which are so often hidden from 
view in recognised states. 
Therefore, while 'territoriality ... is widely seen as a largely successful strategy for 
establishing the exclusive jurisdiction implied by state sovereignty', de facto 
sovereignty, as the case of TGiE illustrates, is 'not necessarily so neatly 
territorialized' (ibid: 437). Central to this is the issue of the homeland. Whilst TGiE 
lacks de jure and de facto sovereignty over the territory of Tibet, as I argued in 
Chapters 5 and 8, the idea of homeland underpins its raison d'etre. At the same 
time, the territory over which TGiE does exercise de facto sovereignty - the 
patchwork of exile settlements - is land which at face value has little meaningful 
connection to the Tibetan population now resident there. As the symbolic territorial 
organisation of the TPiE elections demonstrates, this disjuncture between 
population, homeland and sovereignty has important implications for the 
articulation of sovereignty and territoriality in this case (see Chapter 8). 
Encapsulating the strategies TGiE employs to connect multiple notions of territory 
within a regime of governance, this electoral system symbolically and materially 
brings the homeland into the heart of TGiE politics. Though the limitations of 
symbolic territory for democratic practices are significant and revealing, the 
association between the community-in-exile and the Tibetan homeland enables 
TGiE to maintain its de facto sovereignty within the settlements without 
contesting the judicial sovereignty of the host state India. With regards to the 
electorate itself, the symbolic representation of an otherwise disconnected 
population (Tibetans in Tibet) is a significant strategy through which TGiE 
constructs its claim that it represents - and is legitimated by - Tibetans both in 
exile and in Tibet. 
Furthermore, the issue of distinct Tibetan 'populations' in different places and with 
diverse relationships to TGiE signals a key complication of the notion of a 'home 
territory'. As illustrated in Chapter 5, Tibetan spaces in India in effect constitute a 
second or pseudo homeland for many in the exile community. Such a displacement 
of ideas of 'homeland' not only requires a shift in conventional frames of reference 
regarding transnational practices and the concept of diaspora but disrupts the 
relationship between sovereignty and territory. While TGiE invests considerable 
material and ideological work in creating distinctions between an 'inside' and an 
'outside', including the establishment of exclusive Tibetan citizenship (in exile) and 
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the (re)creation of Departments of 'Home' and 'International Relations', the 
location of and relationship between the domestic and the foreign in this case is far 
from conventional. As such, the operations of TGiE fundamentally challenge the 
binary of national/international which is at the heart of realist discourses of 
sovereignty (Agnew 1994; Taylor 1994). 
Following Agnew's observation that 'the negotiation and redefinition of political 
authority in geographically complex ways suggests the need to change the terms of 
debate about sovereignty' (2005: 438), I asserted in Chapter 5 that these 
dislocations force us to think beyond binaries of 
deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation, homelandldiaspora, national/transnational 
and enable us instead to consider the notion of displaced sovereignties. This is 
sovereignty which has both been constructed in exile - de facto authority over the 
'real' territories of the exile settlements - and which has travelled into exile -
TGiE's inherent sovereignty based on its legitimacy as a continuation of the 
Government of Tibet. This dislocation of the source and enactment of sovereignty 
therefore breaks down the assumed correlation of sovereignty with a single 
bounded territory, yet does not eschew the link between sovereignty and territory 
altogether. Rather, it is reconfigured in complex and contradictory ways. What 
TGiE lacks in official jurisdiction over territory it compensates for by incorporating 
a symbolic and imagined territory into its sovereign practices, thus reinforcing the 
assertion that the idea of territory helps frame governmental actions (Luke 1991). 
Indeed, tensions between sovereignty articulated over 'real' territories, and 
legitimacy claims based on symbolic links to a distant homeland get to the heart of 
TGiE's spatialised authority and the core dilemmas of life in exile. Essentially this 
is between retaining the desire to return home by maintaining a sense of the 
temporariness of exile, and the community becoming increasingly attached to and 
rooted in the 'real' spaces of exile as their sojourn there extends (Diehl 2002). In 
general, therefore, this case exemplifies the need to recognise and be sensitive to 
the fact that territory comes in many different forms, and that territoriality can be 
enacted in a range of ways. 
9.2.3 Host state relations and tacit sovereignty 
Thus far, my aim has been to expand the notion of sovereignty by shifting attention 
away from the legal singularity of de jure sovereignty to TGiE's multiple 
articulations of de facto sovereignty. However, stretching the concept of sovereignty 
can compromise our ability to analyse its power and influence. I now want to 
294 
establish some boundaries regarding my deployment of 'sovereignty' by focusing on 
the functioning of TGiE vis-a-vis the Indian state and highlighting the 
juxtaposition ofTGiE's de facto sovereignty with Indian de jure sovereignty. 
Established from the beginning of this thesis, the relationship between an exiled 
administration and its host state is central to the functioning and limitations of 
such polities. Fundamentally not one of equals, the relationship between TGiE and 
GoI is framed within official discourses on both sides as one between a generous 
host and a grateful guest (Diehl 2002), founded on long-standing spiritual 
connections between Tibet and India, and the fact that Tibetans are largely seen as 
model refugees. However, as outlined in Chapter 3, the relationship - and more 
specifically the status of TGiE in India - has varied considerably over time, 
contingent on ever-changing Indo-Sino relations. In thinking through how to 
conceptualise this relationship, a number of shared assumptions underlying 
contemporary critical (re)interpretations of sovereignty have resonance. First, in 
terms of the rejection of a zero-sum-game with regards to territory and sovereignty 
my argument has been that the existence of TGiE-run settlements in India does 
not lead to a loss of Indian de jure sovereignty per se. Rather, following Ong's 
observation that 'the state has to will a piece of territory to be put outside the 
normal juridical order ... and to agree to outsource state functions ... to other 
regulatory agencies' (1999: 239), this is a consensual delegation of authority and 
devolution of certain sovereign prerogatives to TGiE. The resulting configuration of 
sovereignty and territory may expose the fallacy of pure de jure sovereignty 
(Agnew 2005), but it impinges little on the legal sovereignty of the host state. It is a 
'floating sovereignty' which creates shadows but does not affect the core 
characteristics of the sovereignty 'underneath'. 
Secondly in dismissing sovereignty as absolute and indivisible (Agnew 2005; Elden 
2006), a more flexible approach has been promoted with sovereignty posited as 
labile, divisible and existing in 'varying degrees of "sovereignty" or 
"nonsovereignty'" (Constantinou 1998: 37). As such, a host of 'multiform sovereign 
visions' (Sidaway 2003: 160) have been proposed, and my intention here is to 
examine their utility and limitations for the sovereign relationship between TGiE 
and Gol. As a compromise between the retention of central sovereign control and 
competing, shared or overlapping sovereignties which imply perhaps too strong an 
equality between TGiE and GoI sovereignty, Ong's concept of 'graduated 
sovereignty' initially appears appropriate for this case. Denoting a 'series of zones 
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that are subjected to different kinds of governmentality and that vary in terms of 
the mix of disciplinary and civilising regimes' (Ong 1999: 7), graduated sovereignty 
implies the fragmentation and flexibility of sovereignty regimes where the nature, 
but not existence, of sovereignty has been transformed (Agnew 2005). Reading 
TGiE's management of its settlements through the lens of 'graduated sovereignty', 
many of the practices and processes involved appear similar: Tibetan settlements 
can also be 'institutional domains that vary in their mix of legal protections, 
controls, and disciplinary regimes' (Ong 1999: 215). 
Although 'graduated sovereignty' is useful for thinking through the territorial and 
institutional structures of TGiE, in order to interrogate more thoroughly the 
relationship between Indian de jure sovereignty and TGiE de facto sovereignty I 
want to turn briefly to the notion of a 'third-space of sovereignty' as derived from 
Bruyneel's (2007) study of U.S.-indigenous relations. My point here is not that the 
Tibetan community-in-exile articulates a notion of indigenous sovereignty per se. 
Rather, indigenous studies and postcolonial criticism more generally open up 
fruitful avenues by facilitating a 'decolonisation of our spatial imaginations to 
reveal forms of political space that cannot simply be mapped onto the boundary 
lines of the international state system' (ibid: 222. See also Anand 2008). Focusing 
attention on interstitial locations, indigenous politics fundamentally challenges the 
absolutism of state sovereignty with, for example, Cassidy's notion of 'concurrent 
sovereignty' (1998: 99) providing a constructive alternative to the idea that the 
indigenous (or indeed exile) politics can result only in the elimination of state 
sovereignty or the denial of exile sovereignty. In light of this, Bruyneel's Bhabha-
inspired formulation of a 'third-space of sovereignty' offers a productive framework 
for problematising the concept of sovereignty in this case, with the position of 
Tibetan settlements being conceptualised as residing neither simply inside nor 
outside the Indian political system, but rather existing on these very boundaries. 
Yet, missing from these formulations of 'graduated sovereignty' and 'third-space 
sovereignty' is a vocabulary that can describe the contradictions and ambiguities 
inherent in the relationship between TGiE and Gol. Both Tibetan and Indian 
interviewees described a relationship which was both official and unofficial, 
benevolent yet restrictive, ambiguous and clandestine; a case where 'what is said 
and what is done is so very different' (Anoop, 13.04.2007). Within this relationship, 
the boundaries of authority, legitimacy and legality are constantly being 
negotiated. A key example is the use of terminology by TGiE. In common parlance 
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in the Tibetan community TGiE is referred to as a 'government', yet in official 
interactions 'Central Tibetan Administration' is used. In a similar vein, while 
Tibetans refer to their 'embassies' abroad, they are officially termed 'Offices of 
Tibet', the 'constitution' becomes a 'charter', and 'taxes' are 'voluntary 
contributions.' This semantic cautiousness is significant in two regards. Firstly this 
strategy was described by a number of interviewees as the Tibetan government 
'tip-toeing' around the GoI and its sovereignty in deference to Indian law and 
giving due regard to its non-legal status in order to safeguard the continuing 
Tibetan presence in India. Secondly, it illustrates how China impinges on TGiE's 
'sovereign articulations' both in terms of ongoing Chinese pressure on the host 
state and TGiE's downplay of its existence in an attempt to foster a 'conducive 
atmosphere' for ongoing negotiations with Beijing. 
The key distinguishing feature of this case, therefore, is that TGiE's de facto 
sovereignty is never openly declared by TGiE nor explicitly acknowledged or 
officially sanctioned by Gol. As such, I want to suggest the notion of 'tacit 
sovereignty'. Whilst the Tibetan settlements might be 'spaces of exception' within 
the sovereign state of India, TGiE is fundamentally not a limit case 'which throws 
into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty' (Agamben 1995: 118). This is not 
sovereignty in its final instance, with everything stripped away. Quite the opposite 
in fact. This is sovereignty which exists through practice; in what is done but not 
named, in what is held in suspension. Thus, TGiE's de facto sovereignty is based on 
implicit understandings and is assumed through the everyday interactions and 
performances outlined above, but is never openly declared or identified. 
9.2.4 Summary 
I want to conclude this section by further examining this idea of tacit sovereignty 
in relation to TGiE's sovereign articulations. When observed through the lens of 
tacit sovereignty, TGiE's lack of recognition is far from a clear-cut issue. Whilst 
legally unrecognised, a range of sovereign (and less-sovereign) entities interact 
with the exiled administration in ways which imply its recognition and confer it 
with legitimacy: from India granting TGiE autonomy within its settlements 
(Chapter 5), to international NGOs regarding TGiE as the official representative of 
the refugee population and mediator for aid programmes (Chapter 6), and indeed 
exiled Tibetans' recognition of TGiE as their 'legitimate government' (Chapter 7). 
The existence of such inferred recognition therefore challenges and broadens our 
understanding of this 'act', suggesting multiple forms of recognition which reveal 
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the existence and functioning of otherwise 'illegal' polities. The unstated and the 
assumed are also key features of TGiE's spatial expressions of sovereignty, 
illustrated by the disjuncture between local-level Indian bureaucrats working with 
TGiE officials as governmental counterparts, yet their superiors denying the legal 
existence of a 'government' operating on Indian sovereign territory. As such, I have 
argued for the geographical contingency of de facto sovereignty, such that 'what 
counts and/or functions as sovereign is not the same in all times and places' (Weber 
1995: 2). Finally, the undeclared 'don't ask, don't tell' nature of TGiE's sovereignty 
is key to the administration's ability to exist and function within the host state, 
with TGiE's de facto sovereignty over its settlements functional only through the 
crea tion of 'fictions' of sovereignty. 
Unpacking sovereignty in this way therefore transports us 'beyond the issue of 
more or less sovereignty, beyond the presence or absence of undifferentiated 
sovereign power, towards a contextual understanding of different regimes, 
apparatus, expressions and representations of sovereignty' (Sidaway 2003: 174). As 
such, I have asserted that if sovereignty is treated only as an uncomplicated model 
of power and in purely legalist terms - as de jure sovereignty founded on legal 
recognition by other judicial sovereigns - then a vast array of sovereign practices, 
innovative territorialising strategies, legitimacy claims and expressions of 
authority are obscured. On the flip side, therefore, a focus on the undeclared yet 
daily enacted, the clandestine yet morally authoritative, the unrecognised yet 
effective augments and enriches understandings of sovereignty, positing it as 
multiple, processual, performative and emerging. 
9.3 Between statehood and statelessness: categories, temporality 
and the 'rehearsal state' 
If we consider sovereignty as the foundation upon which different polities can be 
based, then the disaggregation of sovereign power opens up conceptual space for 
the analy~is of different political entities. Turning to the second research aim 
regarding. what kind of polity TGiE is, this project can therefore be seen as a 
process of mapping out the constitution of this state-that-is-not-a-state. One of the 
central theoretical starting points for this research is theories of the state and, in 
asking whether TGiE is a state-like polity or not, I have attempted to demonstrate 
that the response is primarily contingent on the theories of the state that one buys 
into. If we are to follow conventional state theory based around Max Weber's 
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assertion that a state must meet a strictly defined list of criteria including a stable 
government with a bounded territory, a self-defined people and a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force then this polity will never count as a state. As noted 
repeatedly in this study, TGiE faces seemingly insurmountable barriers to 
achieving fully recognised sovereign statehood. Given its lack of jurisdiction over 
territory and restricted law-making abilities, TGiE's authority is limited and, 
whilst it can fulm. the provider role of the state, it struggles to protect or defend its 
own population. 
However, ifwe adopt a critical engagement with the state and, as I have advocated 
in this project, follow Mitchell (1991), Abrams (1988) in conceiving the state not as 
something concrete there to be observed and analysed but rather as a structural 
effect, then TGiE does appear to have distinctly state-like attributes and functions. 
Each focusing on a different aspect of state ness, the preceding chapters have 
charted and analysed how this exile administration has accrued and reproduced a 
number of specifically state-like institutions, techniques and practices. These 
include the division of political power between a judiciary, executive and 
legislature; the centralisation and territorialisation of TGiE's authority and 
administrative structures across its dispersed settlements; the institutionalisation 
of citizenship, democracy and parliamentary elections; and the construction of a 
Tibetan population, civil society and economy as spheres separate from the TGiE 
and over which this polity can exercise a degree of governance. Indeed, though 
TGiE is engaged in nation-building in terms of cultural preservation, Tibetanised 
school curricula and fostering Tibetan identity, this polity is arguably doing more 
than 'just' nation-building and constitutes more than 'simply' a nation-in-exile. As 
noted above, its establishment and development of state-like institutions in exile 
and its territorialisation of power also points towards significant state-building 
processes. Outlining and analysing how TGiE is constituted through discourses 
and texts (1991 Charter, IDPs), performances and state rituals (parliamentary 
sessions, the paradiplomacy of Tibetan 'embassies'), everyday practices (the 
payment of chat rei, voting in elections) and materialities (the Green Book, 
settlement boundaries) this research therefore concurs with and contributes to 
critical approaches which perceive the state as something constituted by fleeting 
moments and everyday practices and relations (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; 
Painter 2006). 
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What then can the case of TGiE - as seen through the lens of critical state theory -
tell us about the nature of statehood and the roles and functions of 'conventional' 
states? For a start, TGiE is a particularly revealing case as its establishment of 
state-like institutions since the early 1960s mean that it offers a fascinating insight 
into the early stages of state development and the construction of material 
thresholds of the 'state' as an institution. In addition, by focusing on state-making 
as a process and the state as a set of routinised norms and practices (Mitchell 
1991), this therefore broadens our notion of what the state is, revealing it not as a 
monolithic entity but, rather, 'a set of practices enacted through relationships 
between people, places, and institutions' (Desbiens et al 2004: 242). Central to this 
has been the employment of ethnographic methodologies and a focus on agency and 
the bureaucratic messiness of state practices (Thrift 2000; Mountz 2003). For, it is 
at the local level and through everyday interactions, objects and people that TGiE 
is 'magicked into existence' as a government (Sidaway 2002: xi), engaged in 
democratic decision-making and providing welfare services to its exiled population. 
As such, this ethnography of TGiE's everyday articulations of state ness highlights 
the importance of focusing on the level of the quotidian as a site of state formation 
and powerfully exposes the contingent practices which underlie the social 
construction of political power in so-called 'normal' states. Focusing on a case which 
exemplifies the partial and processual nature of statehood can therefore demystify 
'the state as the organising frame for social and political life' (Keating 2001: viii), 
rendering problematic the taken-for-granted. 
By exposing the fallacy of a unified organisation called 'the state', the case of TGiE 
encourages us to think of statehood as relative and of the possibility of a polity 
having a degree of state ness without full statehood. Following Clapham (1998), I 
therefore want to argue for regarding different entities as meeting the criteria for 
international statehood to greater or lesser degree, rather than distinguishing 
sharply between entities that are, or are not, states. Given that no state fully 
realises the modern state ideal - no state has a true monopoly on physical force 
within its territory or restricts its power to the space within its borders - the 
conceptual dividing line between the sovereign state and other political entities is 
always contestable. It is also the case that it is the 'model of the western state 
[that] continues to resonate through theories of "the" state' (Robinson 2003: 648). 
This not only ignores and denigrates numerous state and non-state polities but 
creates an unhelpful division 'between "strong" long-established Western states at 
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the apex and postcolonial states [and I would add, non-state polities] as somehow 
abnormal or simply lacking the features of the western state' (Sidaway 2008: 49). 
However, by arguing that stateness is a process which is always partial and 
undercut I do not want to downplay the ideological influence of statehood itself. 
Rather, the signifiers and institutions of statehood are strategic resources that are 
continually deployed by both recognised and unrecognised polities. The TGiE might 
emphasise some state functions (the provision of education, establishment of 
democracy and construction of political identities) over others such as military and 
defence, trade and foreign affairs which are noticeably absent or insignificant, but, 
in general, this polity's selective appropriation and adaptation of aspects of 
statehood is central to furthering its agenda. For, in addition to underpinning the 
practical project of governance in exile, TGiE's signifiers of statehood constitute an 
important role in seeking legitimacy and demonstrating the exile administration's 
ability to govern competently (Spears 2004). This is particularly salient in terms of 
proving to the Chinese authorities - and the international community more 
generally - that the Tibetan nation is capable of democratic self-governance and is 
therefore deserving of support (Shiro many 1998: 326). Therefore, just as de jure 
sovereignty is a powerful ideal to aspire to for the TGiE, so is being able to 'play the 
state game'. As such, non-state entities that claim aspects of state power should be 
treated neither as pretenders nor as states-in-waiting, but rather as players who, 
much like 'rear states, leverage aspects of sovereignty and statehood as they 
engage in the global political arena. 
Of course, TGiE's state-like attributes only tell half the story about this polity. As 
outlined in Chapter 2, as a globally dispersed diaspora engaged in a range of 
transnational practices, often labelled as refugees and maintaining a strong desire 
to return to their homeland, exile Tibetans and their political administration share 
many characteristics with other stateless communities. However, as demonstrated 
through the empirical chapters, the relationship between this community and 
literature on statelessness is problematic. TGiE's governmental capabilities, re-
territorialising practices in exile, displacement of 'conventional' home and host 
states roles and strategic essentialising of Tibetan identity through the 
construction of pseudo state-citizen relations complicate accepted understandings 
of transnationalism, diaspora and refugeehood. This case therefore adds empirical 
weight to calls to ground studies of transnationalism and turn critical attention to 
the political structures and practices which refugees and migrants bring with them 
301 
into exile (Mitchell 1997a; AI-Ali et al 2001). In summary, therefore, this state-like 
polity is also fundamentally stateless. Both depictions are important and valid, and 
yet neither tells the full story. Rather, contradictions are at the core of this case. 
Caught between and disrupting the descriptors of statehood and statelessness, I 
have therefore argued that this case necessitates bringing together and blurring 
the boundary between literatures on the state and on statelessness. 
In light of TGiE simultaneously demonstrating characteristics of both statehood 
and statelessness, how then can we best begin to categorise this polity? What pre-
existing model best describes TGiE: government, state, regime, liberation 
movement, nation, institution or NGO? The issue of labels and categories has been 
a recurrent and important one in this study as, across a range of classificatory 
regimes, TGiE and its exile population have proved to be been notable misfits and 
outliers. For example, Chapter 2 discussed how TGiE shares little in common with 
other polities described as 'governments-in-exile' - especially those established 
during the World Wars - and how the exile community deviates from conventional 
interpretations of the concept of diaspora. Meanwhile, in Chapter 7, I outlined in 
detail how individual exile Tibetans are simultaneously both de facto refugees and 
citizens and yet legally neither. In light of such conceptual ambiguities, it is logical 
to shift attention away from fixed categorisations and binary conceptualisations 
and instead focus, as I predominantly have in this study, on the processes, 
practices, boundaries, thresholds and relationships through which TGiE constructs 
itself. As such, and following Doty's suggestion that: 
[p]erhaps it is not so critical to arrive at definitive understandings of 
important concepts such as national identity, the state, or sovereignty. 
Perhaps the critical questions revolve around determining the issues and 
uncertainties that elicit sovereignty-producing practices' (1996: 143), 
my aim has been not necessarily to pin-down exactly what kind of political entity 
TGiE is but rather to consider what it does. Moreover, as a polity and community 
which appears to exist between and across a range of political categories and 
binaries - state/non-state, citizen/refugee, statehood/statelessness, sovereign/non-
sovereign - this case fundamentally challenges not only the construction of such 
labels and dualisms, but their conceptual mapping onto each other. In light of this, 
I want to develop these critiques of the positivist technique of labelling and binary 
thinking by focusing on two broad themes which have framed many of the issues 
discussed in this project. 
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First, I want to consider the perspective of postcolonial critiques. On the one hand, 
it is important to be aware of and to problematise my application of ostensibly 
Western-centric theories, models and categories - of sovereignty, the state, 
governmentality, democracy and citizenship - to a non-Western context. On the 
other hand, when we focus on such discourses, we see that the situation is far from 
a one way imposition of Western ideas onto a non-Western case. Neither, of course, 
is it the case of TGiE constructing completely new political structures based on 
Tibetan or even 'Asian' political and cultural values. Rather, what has been 
revealed throughout this study is the exile Tibetan appropriation and re-working of 
Western political institutions, models and discourses: from participatory liberal 
democracy, to the tripartite division of political powers and the institutionalisation 
of universal citizenship. Emerging from this investigation is therefore a polity and 
politics which is shaped by distinctive Tibetan cultural and religious principles -
and indeed where cultural preservation is a political act in and of itself - but where 
a constantly negotiated balance is being sought between adhering to Tibetan 
values and reflecting Western ideals back to a Western audience in order to seek 
legitimacy. Such a strategy of deliberately articulating discourses around 
democracy, environmentalism and human rights for specific Western audiences in 
order to strive for international 'recognition' is, I want to tentatively suggest, an 
example of 'strategic cosmopolitanism' (Woodward and Skrbis 2004) which 
warrants future analytical investigation. More generally, the crucial role that 
cultural and religious values plays in constructing political ideologies and 
institutional structures highlights conventional IR and political geography's 
dismissal of government and governance as culturally specific practices. As such, 
we need to shift our vantage point from 'viewing the rest of the world as 
peripheries or sites for testing models crafted in the West' (Ong 1999: 24) to 
learning from 'diverse political contexts' (Robinson 2003: 648). 
A second recurrent theme which intersects with the question of what kind of polity 
TGiE is are a series of temporal issues. Noted in Chapter 2, the politics of 'return' 
and uncertainties regarding the political future define exile polities and 
populations (Shain 1989) and the Tibetan diaspora is no exception. As Lafitte 
observes, exile Tibetans are 'at once embodiments of an imagined timeless past, 
and citizens of the world, harbingers of a new world order, visionary futurists 
charting critical paths to sustainable futures' (1999: 156). As revealed in this 
thesis, balancing these different roles has been highly challenging and the 
bifurcated mandate of continuing the struggle for the homeland and dealing with 
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immediate needs in exile creates conflicting responsibilities on both personal and 
institutional levels and strikes at the heart of the purpose, role and function of 
TGiE (see Chapters 5 and 8 in particular). 
Having been in exile for almost 50 years, the case of TGiE also challenges the 
presumed correlation between statehood and permanence, and statelessness and 
temporariness. This is a polity which has increasingly become 'stuck' in exile and is 
far from the 'fleeting or temporary phenomena' (Spears 2004: 28) of 'conventional' 
stateless communities. Teleological assumptions that this polity is at a 'halfway 
house' on the road to statehood (Gottlieb 1993: 32) should therefore be treated with 
caution as there 'is no "end of history" here - no one road to statehood that these 
entities will ultimately find themselves on' (Kingston 2004: 7). Rather, this 
research has been premised on TGiE existing as a polity in its own right rather 
than 'in transition' (Anderson 1996). Having said this, the future of the exile 
Tibetan community is also of fundamental importance to TGiE as an institution 
and is cross-cut by important uncertainties. In the short-term there are insecurities 
regarding the legal and political position of Tibetans within India after the current 
Dalai Lama dies while taking a longer view there is a distinctly ambivalent 
relationship between the Tibetan nation and statehood both in pre-1959 Tibet and 
in TGiE's proposal for a 'Middle Way' of genuine autonomy within a greater China. 
Indeed, it is the importance that TGiE attaches to future planning that offers a 
particularly enlightening insight into how we might tentatively attempt to define 
this polity. 
As I have noted at a number of points through this study, TGiE has, through its 
lOPs, 1963 Constitution, 1991 Charter and 1992 Guidelines explicitly stated that 
the purpose of the time in exile is primarily to practice and experiment with aspect 
of statehood such as participatory politics, fiscal administration, sustainable 
agriculture, and 'modern' education and health care in anticipation of 
implementing these within a future Tibet. In light of this, TGiE emerges as an 
active state-in-waiting; a set of institutions, practices and actors through which the 
exiled community is experimenting, modifying and rehearsing statehood in order to 
employ it 'for real' back in the homeland. Or, to frame it in another way, this is a 
'rehearsal state', complete with playwright (Dalai Lama, and increasingly the 
Kalon Tripa) , designated roles amongst the Tibetan civil services, a dedicated 
rehearsal space in the exile settlements and a range of key audiences (notably 
Western states and the Chinese Government). Not only does the idea of rehearsal 
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chime with the opening vignette of this thesis where I describe a polity which 
appears to be 'playing' at being a state and trying out state roles, but it also 
provides an alternative and revealing aspect to the idea of 'state practices'. For, if 
we are to accept that 'conventional' states are always in process, then it is does not 
require too much of a conceptual leap to argue that all states are to some extent 
rehearsal states, experimenting with political discourses, practices and 
materialities in order to evolve and adapt to changing global geopolitical realities. 
9.4 Conclusion: Envisioning alternative geopolitical futures 
Shifting from a focus on individual states to the interstate system, I want to 
conclude this study by expanding the conceptual and empirical perspective and 
considering the extent to which this case can inform broader questions and debates 
within and beyond political geography. In many ways TGiE is an exceptional case. 
Not only is uniqueness a narrative through which exile Tibetans view themselves 
and present their community, culture, religion and politics to the world, but, as I 
have illustrated in this research, the TGiE and wider Tibetan diaspora have many 
distinctive features. These include the dual spiritual and religious roles of the 
Dalai Lama and influence of Tibetan Buddhist values in shaping political 
ideologies and strategies (e.g. the 'Middle Way Approach' and political philosophy 
of satyagraha); the evolution of exile Tibetan democracy and its realisation in the 
TPiE election system (Chapter 8); and the ambiguous relationship between TGiE 
and the host state India. An empirical focus on the exceptional in order to shine a 
critical spotlight on the 'normal' is a powerful and insightful strategy and one 
which has been employed to valuable effect within political and geopolitical theory 
(see Agamben 1998; Navaro-Yashin 2003). 
However, I also want to assert that TGiE's articulation of alternative modalities of 
sovereignty and state-like practices should not be seen simply as an exotic anomaly 
or theoretical experiment. Rather, this case should be de-exceptionalisd in order to 
open up the possibility of using it as a framework or model for the specific case of 
refugee groups, and communities marginalised from the international system more 
generally. With regards to the former, the institutions and practices of TGiE can 
make important interjections in refugee policy debates regarding the issue of 
'durable solutions'. Conventionally conceived as distinct stages in a refugee 'cycle', 
the three primary 'durable solutions' which the UNHCR is charged with pursuing 
for refugees are integration in the country of first asylum, resettlement in a third 
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country or return to the homeland, of which repatriation is the currently prioritised 
option (Van Hear 2003). However, for the majority of exile Tibetans, a fourth 
'solution' has been sought in the form of autonomy within the host state. Distinct 
from integration or assimilation, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, 
TGiE can provide a pragmatic, viable and durable model of self-governance in exile 
whereby refugees preserve their culture and identity and the burden on the host 
state is significantly reduced over time. In addition, though distinctly limited in the 
legal realm, the institution of TGiE also provides a degree of security for this 
refugee community, both in tangible terms with regards to the provision of welfare 
and conferment of pseudo-legal status, but also by constituting a focal point for the 
diaspora to rebuild their lives, sustain traditional cultural practices and provide a 
sense of belonging. Alongside the territorialising strategies TGiE has engaged with 
in India and Nepal, these practices provide an important empirical grounding for 
Van Hear's assertion that 'transnationalism may in itself be a "durable solution" 
for conditions of displacement - or at least an "enduring" solution' (2003: 14). 
Considering implications of this case beyond refugee communities, as a lived 
reality of reconfigured and constantly negotiated sovereignty, the TGiE's structures 
and ideologies and its operations within the state of India could be instructive for 
other communities and polities traditionally marginalised from the interstate 
system. If tolerated by a host state, such de facto autonomy within mutually agreed 
legal boundaries, organised networks of cultural and educational institutions, 
state-ness without statehood and practicing of democracy could be a valuable 
template for other diasporas, or even for indigenous populations and national 
minority groups. 
Shifting attention to more conceptual applications of this research, I want to argue 
that a focus on geopolitical anomalies offers a valuable glimpse of possible 
geopolitical futures. To date, the fall~cy of the state as the principal container of 
society and sovereignty as absolute and invariably territorial (Agnew 2005) has 
been thrown into stark relief through critical analysis of dramatic geopolitical 
processes and events.165 In contrast, I have argued here that the geographical 
assumptions constituting the territorial trap can also be approached from tho 
perspective of non-state polities which challenge the geopolitical world order in 
166 For example, the context of post-soviet fragmentation (Agnew 1994); global economic trends such as 
accelerated globalisation (Herod et 011998; Sparke 200~b), exchange-rate arrangementa (Agnew 20015) and 
the current financial crisis (Bieri 2009); and th~ contmgency of territorial sovereignty a8 demonstrated 
during the 'war on terror' military intervention8 m Iraq and Afghanistan, rendition flights and detentions 
at Guantanamo (Kaplan 2005; Elden 2006; Dalby 2007). 
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markedly understated ways. Returning to the tension between secession and the 
maintenance of the 'international order' outlined in Chapter 2, one outcome is the 
continued existence of geopolitical anomalies in their present ambiguous status: 
neither attaining independent statehood nor being reincorporated into existing 
sovereign states. Such a situation is certainly evident beyond the case of TGiE, 
with a number of de facto states (e.g. Somaliland, Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus) and dependencies (e.g. Faroe Islands, Saint Helen) having endured in 
their present status for considerable time. In addition, although denied diplomatic 
recognition, the PLO's 'non-member entity' status at the UN and SADR's 
membership of the African Union indicates that these non-state polities have 
garnered a degree of legal international personality. Therefore, while the 
persistence of international norms such as territorial integrity and the practice of 
state recognition has, and will likely continue to, prevent a number of geopolitical 
anomalies from 'graduating' to full statehood (Pegg 1998: 209), the very endurance 
of such polities in their present status can give empirical grounding to important 
speculative questions of 'what if the core political unit was not a nation-state and 
what if sovereignty did not have to be tied to territory?' As such, if polities such as 
TGiE are examples of reconfigured territorial-political relations which are being 
created and lived today, then a critical analysis of their existence and functioning 
should be a key starting point for discussions seeking to venture beyond the 
conventions of the contemporary international system. 
The disaggregation of the concept of sovereignty into its constituent parts, the 
unbundling of sovereignty, territory and statehood and an ethnographic focus on 
everyday state-like practices enacted at the margins of the interstate system offers 
one such view of the future. This is an approach which has the potential to 
contribute to broader debates on a more diverse international society characterised 
by geopolitical arrangements displaying varying degrees of sovereignty and 
territoriality (Murphy 1996; Agnew 2005). Constituting a shift towards 'thinking of 
the state, sovereignty and territory in the plural rather than the singular' 
(Anderson 1996: 135), this would provide 'a richer vocabulary to accommodate the 
national claims that cannot be expressed within existing state structures' (Gottlieb 
1993: 35) and 'ways of grasping and fashioning new forms of less restrictive 
political space' (Camilleri and Falk 1992: 9). Importantly, this is not necessarily a 
utopian vision of a state-less world consisting of fluid political communities as 
envisioned by proponents of hyper globalisation (O'Brien 1992; Appadurai 1996; 
Ohmae 1996). Rather, it is a geographical imagination based on a complex political 
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order with multiple sites of sovereign authority and where the boundaries of the 
existing international legal regime are stretched and reconfigured. Not only does 
this open up the possibility of alternative political arrangement but, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, the continued existence of such entities could lead to greater 
stability in the international system as they can be seen as a 'pragmatic and ad hoc 
way of reconciling irreconcilable principles' (Pegg 1998: 196); facilitating genuine 
self-determination but yet stopping short of granting independent sovereign 
statehood. Therefore as a complement rather than competitor to the existing 
politico-legal order this plurality of degrees of sovereignty could be 'a messy 
solution to a messy problem' (ibid: 194). 
Thus, as I have demonstrated in this research, expanding our empirical gaze to 
critically engage with more varied forms of geopolitical arrangements eschews a 
view of the international system as constituted solely of territorially-bounded 
polities of indivisible sovereignty and offers valuable interjections into current 
thinking within political geography. Such an analysis of geopolitical formations 
which are alternatives to Western political imaginings lends weight to calls for 
political geography to embrace ethnographic methods, can be instrumental in 
blurring disciplinary boundaries and provides an 'invitation to an ethically 
sensitive evaluation of future possibilities' (Camilleri and Falk 1992: 252). In thus 
seeking to re-pluralise our understanding of political space, this examination of a 
dynamic and innovative polity which is daily enacting sovereign relations, 
articulating aspects of state-ness, and forging an alternative space for political 
authority opens up conceptual space for a more 'progressive geopolitics' (Kearns 
2008) and are-evaluation of the political. 
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~ ~ ~ ';l 
bII'" CI 
TGiE Officials 
Lhadon Secretary, Supreme Justice Commission M 0 22.03.2006 
Tenzin Chief Election Commissioner M 0 16.03.2006 
Kunchen Public Service Commissioner M B 16.03.2006 
Lhundup Researcher, Audit Commission M B 21.03.2007 
Themba Officer, Kashag Secretariat M B 15.03.2006 
Senge Chief Planning Officer M B 20.03.2006 
Choden Former Kalon, Department of Education F 0 02.12.2006 
Jungney Additional Secretary, Department of M 0 17.03.2006 Education 
Ketu Researcher, Department of Education M B 15.03.2007 
Dorji Secretary, Department of Home M 0 06.11.2007 
Yeshi Additional Secretary, Department of Home M B 18.03.2006 
Jinpa Secretary, Department of Health M 0 21.03.2006 
10.04. 2006 -
Kusang Secretary, Department of Information and M 0 office International Relations (DIIR) 06.11.2007 
-
cafe 
Loten Researcher, DIIR F B 02.03.2007 
Rabten Representative, Bureau of His Holiness the M 0 15.04.2006 Dalai Lama New Delhi 
Choejor Kalon, Department of Finance & DIIR M B 10.04.2006 
Lekshay Additional Secretary, Department of M B 02.05.2007 Finance 
Palkyi Business Officer, Department of Finance M B 10.04.2006 
" 
Lobsang Secretary, Department of Security M 0 01.05.2007 
, 22.03.2006 Dhala RC Officer, Department of Security M B 01.05.2007 .. 
j 11.03.2007 -
- office 
Lha!'pa Data manager, Department of Security F B 05 .04.2007 
-
home 
Exile.. Tibetan Parliamentarians 
1 
Vice-chair, Tibetan Yan~~hen (TPiE) Parliament-in-Exile 1 FIB 129.04.2006 
I 
,r,r, 0 : 'Old'er generation' who came to Tibet in the first wave of refugees with or just after the Dalai Lama in 
1959 ~ I 
B: 'Born ,in exile' I 
N: 'Newc mer refuge,e' who arrived in India after the mid 1980s 
I: Indian- I 
'r 
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Samphel Chitue in TPiE, V-Tsang constituency M 0 27.02.2006 
Chitue in TPiE , U-Tsang constituency. 24.02.2006 Dasel President of National Democratic Party of M 0 11.03.2007 Tibet 
29.03.2007 
-
Tsomo Chitue in TPiE, Kham constituency F B Dharamsala 13.04.2007 
-
Delhi 
Chitue in TPiE, Amdo constituency. 16.03.2006 
Rabgyal Director, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy M 0 14.04.2006 
Research Centre (TPPRC) 
Dawa Chitue in TPiE, Sakya constituency M 0 27.02.2006 
Palden Chitue in TPiE, Europe constituency M B 06 .07.2007 
Tseten Chitue candidate in 2006 F B 17.03.2006 
Tibetan NGO officials 
Phegyal Director, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights F B 25.03.2006 and Democracy (TCHRD) 
Migyur Education officer, TCHRD M N 25 .03.2006 
Gonpo Acting President, Tibetan Youth Congress M B 17.03.2006 (TYC) 
Rigzin Researcher, Tibetan Women's Association F 0 22.02.2007 (TWA) 
Techung Director, Tesi Environmental Awareness F B 13.04.2007 Movement 
Sonam Director, Students for a Free Tibet, India M B 23.03.2006 03 .03 .2007 
Khedup Director, Tibetan Multi-education Centre M N 27.03.2007 
Dhukar Researcher, International Campaign for M N 13.03.2007 Tibet [based in Dharamsala] 
Dugtak Vice-president, Ngari Chiltrum Association M B 21.03 .2007 
Hortsang President, Dal'jeeling branch of V-Tsang M 0 06.04.2007 association [interviewed in Dharamsala] 
Bhutuk Assistant Director, Tibetan Chamber of M B 12.11.2007 Commerce 
Tibetan Press 
Gedhup Editor, TibeToday magazine [interviewed in M N 22.03.2007 Dharamsala] 
Nyidon Editor, Contact magazine [interviewed in M 0 02.05.2007 Dharamsala] 03.11.2007 
Bhuchung Editor, Voice of Tibet [interviewed in M 0 26.02.2006 Dharamsala] 
Taklha Editor, Tibetan Review [intel'viewed in M 0 13.03.2006 Delhi] 11.11.2007 
Chenga Reporter, Phayul.com [interviewed in Delhi] M B 08.03.2006 
Phurkyi Producer, Bhod Gyalo [monthly news video, F N 12.11.2007 interviewed in Delhi] 
Dharamsala 
Shamba Welfare Officer, Dharamsala M 0 04.04.2007 
Norzin Indo-Tibetan co-ordina tor, Dhal'amsala M B 10.03.2006 Welfare Office 20.04.2007 
Yangzom Local Assembly member, Dharamsala F B 06.04.2007 
Phakpa Director, Refugee Reception Centre M 0 05.04.2007 
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Narendra District Commissioner, Kangra M I 07.11.2007 
Yon ten Political activist & formel' Tibetan M 0 19.02.2006 
resistance fighter 
Togden Teacher, Yongling day school F 0 18.03 .2006 
Rinchen Cafe owner F 0 15.03.2007 
Tendar Housewife F 0 18.03.2006 
Legdup Teacher, Dolma-ling Nunnery F 0 04. 11.2007 
Ngawang Writer and political activist M B 18.03 .2006 14.03.2007 
Dechen College graduate F B 01.04.2007 19.04.2007 
Dohna Restaurant owner F B 08.03 .2007 23.10.2007 
Damdul Teacher, Upper Tibetan Children's Village M B 23.10.2007 (TCV) 
Tsultrim Amateur fi lm maker M B 09.03.2006 03 .03.2007 
Gelek Waitress F B 08.03.2007 16.04.2007 
Namdrol Student, Upper TCV M B 31.03.2007 
Nyendak Law graduate, doing freelance work fol' M B 05.03.2006 Dharamsala based NGOs 24.03.2007 
Gadong Monk, Kirti monastery, Dharamsala M N 18.03.2006 
Sherab Monk, Namgyal monastery, Dharamsala M N 02.05.2007 
Thinley Monk studying English in Dharamsala M N 14.03.2007 
Dekit Nun, Ganden Choeling nunnery F N 12.03.2006 
Thubten Student at Tibetan Transit School F N 20.02.2007 
Tempa Unemployed, volunteering at community M N 23.03.2007 
cafe 
Ugyen Unemployed M N 31.03.2007 
Gonpo Former political prisoner, unemployed F N 12.03.2007 
Perna Thanka painter M N 21.03.2006 29.10.2007 
Wangchuk Writer and publisher M N 17.03.2007 16.04.2007 
Deepak Former TCV teacher M I 28.10.2007 
Satish Landowner in Lahaul, visiting Dharamsala M I 05.11.2007 
Bhupen Businessman M I 05.11.2007 
Kaushik Legal advocate M I 14.03.2007 
Madhu Reporter for IBN-CNN F I 18.03.2006 
Cherring Director of Spiti education project M I 04.04.2007 
Majnuka Tilla Tibetan Colony, Nor.th Delhi 
Lakpa Secretary, Majnuka Tilla Welfare Office M B 16.04.2006 04.06.2007 
Jagdeep Headmaster, Samyeling Tibetan day school M I 06.06.2007 
Khandro Nurse, Majnuka Tilla Clinic F B 05.06.2007 
Wangdak Secretary. Majnuka Till a Residents F 0 07.06 .2007 Association -
--
Jampa Shopkeeper M 0 05 .06. 2007 
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Thupten Social worker M B 05.06.2007 
Tsering Hotel owner and businessman M B 16.04.2006 11.03.2007 
Gyatso Activist and casual labourer M B 10.11.2007 
Chimi Politics graduate, unemployed F B 07.06.2007 
Passang Sweater seller M N 02.03 .2007 
Tsewang Receptionist F N 15.04.2006 
Dhargyal Trader F N 07.06.2007 
South Delhi 
Karchung Careers counsellor, Youth Opportunity M B 01.03.2007 Trust Asia 
Topgyal Website designer M B 30.10.2007 
Gyurme Youth worker F N 13.04.2007 
Lalita Student, Delhi University F I 10.04 .2007 
Sunita Member of 'Friends of Tibet, Delhi' F I 10.04.2007 24.10.2007 
Manoj Freelance journalist M I 11.11.2007 
Anoop Newspaper journalist M I 13.04.2007 
Vijay Former Indian-Tibetan liaison officer M I 04.06 .2007 
Gopal Former Officia l, Ministry of Rehabilitation M I 05.06.2007 
Tejal Advocate, Human Rights Law Network F I 05.06.2007 
Dekyiling settlement and surrounding Tibetan institutions, Dehrndun 
Dhargey Chief Representative, Uttarakhand Region M 0 18.04.2007 
Gyalwa Settlement Officer, Dekyiling M 0 18.04.2007 
Jetsan Accountant, Dekyiling Settlement Office F B 16.04.2007 
Kgtlden General Manger, Rajpur Handicraft Centre M B 24.04.2007 
Zopa Headmaster, Tibetan Homes Foundation M 0 20.04.2007 (THF)school Mussoorie 
-
Norgay Retired TGiE official, Dekyiling M 0 17.04.2007 
Chungtak Guest house owner, and former Gyabon, M 0 17.04.2007 Dekyiling 
Dliamchoe Teacher, Sambhota school, Dekyiling F B 18.04.2007 
Tashi Taxi driver, Dekyiling M B 18.04.2007 
Samdup Librarian, Dekyiling M B 19.04.2007 
K~wa Hairdresser, Dekyiling F B 19.04 .2007 
K.esang President, TWA Dekyiling F B 19.04.2007 
" Teacher, Ngoenga school for handicapped F B 18.04.2007 Tseyang 
children 
- Teacher, TCV Vocational Training College, Peinba SelaQui M B 16.04.2007 
Youngdrung THF student F N 19.04.2007 
Preeti Housewife, living next to Dekyiling F I 25.04.2007 
settlement 
Clementown Settlement, Dehradun 
s" 1 Vice President, Clementown Settlement 1 M 1 0 
angye Society 1 25 .04.2007 
I' 
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~ • 1 , 
Tara Khandro Rimpoche, Mindrolling Monastery 
Jingme Retired monastery secretary 
Kalsang Shopkeeper 
Ngodup Sweater seller and cafe owner 
Lhanze Student and captain of settlement football team 
Sonamling Settlement, Ladakh 
Jamyang Chief Representative, Ladakh Region 
Metok Principal, TCV Sonamling 
Chonpel Gyabon, Camp 11 
Riga Teacher, TCV Sonamling 
Thokmey Farmer, Camp 6 
Sangpo Taxi driver and shopkeeper, Camp 4 
Kunga Casual labourer, Camp 7 
Woser Farmer and casual labourer, Camp 4 
Khenpo Teacher, Lamdon school, Leh 
Penpa President, Tibetan Market Association Leh 
Phuntsok Ladakhi NGO worker 
Lugsum-Samdupling Settlement, Bylakuppe, Karnataka 
Karma 
Namsel 
Gyaltsen 
Chokyi 
Devesh 
Thakchoe 
Osel 
Tsepak 
Tharchin 
-
Norzoln 
Dolka~ 
Wangdue 
Dhondup 
Wangyal 
.r 
~aiigalore 
bekshey 
~ 
Bhutit 
" 
" 
,. 
, 
.. 
Secretary, Lugsum-Samdupling Settlement 
Office 
Agricultural Officer, Lugsum-Samdupling 
Settlement Office 
President, Lugsum-Samdupling Co-
operative 
Accountant, Lugsum-Samdupling Co-
operative 
Assistant to Superintendent of Police, 
Priyapatna 
Farmer and sweater seller, Camp 13 
Farmer, Camp 7 
Thanka painter, Camp 2 
Student, Central School for Tibetans 
Bylakuppe, Camp 4 
Student in Mangalore, staying with family, 
Camp 13 
Housewife, Camp 5 
Teacher, Tashi Lhunpo Monastery 
Monk at Tashi Lhunpo Monastery 
Monk at Sera Me Monastery 
Secretary, Chief Representative Office, 
Bangalore 
Director, TCV hostel Bangalore 
F B 20.04.2007 
M 0 20.04.2007 
F B 22.04.2007 
F B 19.04.2007 
M B 16.04.2007 
M 0 25.05.2007 
M 0 21.05.2007 
M 0 24.05.2007 
M 0 21.05.2007 
F 0 28.05.2007 
M B 23.05.2007 
M B 18.05.2007 
M B 20.05.2007 
F B 18.05.2007 
M N 19.05.2007 
F I 16.05.2007 
F B 28.11.2007 
M B 27.11.2007 
M 0 28.11.2007 
M B 28.11.2007 
M I 25.11.2007 
M 0 16.11.2007 
F 0 26.11.2007 
M 0 25.11.2007 
M B 19.11.2007 
18.11.2007 M B 25.11.2007 
F B 18.11.2007 
M B 15.11.2007 
M N 15.11.2007 
M N 20.11.2007 
M B 29.11.2007 
F 0 10.12.2007 
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Choeying IT consultant F B 03 .12.2007 
Choezum College student F N 28.10.2007 
Migmar College student M N 04. 12.2007 
Rohit Lawyer. Alternative Law Forum M I 06 .12.2007 
rribetans in the UK 
Tsundue Representative of Dalai Lama for North M 0 16.09.2008 Europe 
Tenchoe International Tibet Support Network co- M B 06.07.2007 
ordinator 
Dhonyoe Secretary. Tibetan Community in Britain F B 11.02.2006 
Kunchok Student M N 11.02.2006 24.01.2007 
lFocus groups 
Location Participants Topic of discussion Date 
After meeting of 5 older men Future of Tibetan national 23.03.2006 
Gyalchen Lhenzom, identity a nd changes in 
Dharamsala exile government a nd 
community 
Tibetan hostel, 7 university students: 4 Role ofTGiE, education in 30.04.2007 
Rohini Delhi male 3 female exile ideas of refue-eehood 
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Appendix II: Information sheet for Tibetan citizens 
REC Protocol Number QMREC 2006/03 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COpy OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Sovereignty without territory: The political geographies o/the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
I would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. Please ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
This study looks at how the Tibetan Government-in-Exile functions, and what kind of Tibetan 
political community is created outside of Tibet. I will be looking at which welfare services the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile provides (e.g. health care, education, employment training) and 
how these services are delivered and used. I will also be looking at how and why people vote in 
Tibetan elections, the importance of the Green Book and how Tibetans in India consider their 
citizenship. 
Tibetans living in exile, and over the age of 18 (and therefore able to vote), are being asked to 
participate in this study. 
If you agree to take part in this study you will be interviewed by myself (with a translator if 
necessary) about these issues. The interview will last 30-90 minutes and will be tape recorded or 
written down, whichever you are comfortable with. Audio tapes and written transcripts will be 
kept securely and not made available to any other person. 
Your name will not be used in the research. Original data and consent forms will be held by 
myself only. When finished the research will be presented as a PhD thesis, and reports given to 
the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and Tibetan organisations. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
Many thanks 
Fiona McConnell 
PhD student, Department of Geography 
Queen Mary, University of London. 
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Appendix III: Information sheet for Tibetan officials 
REC Protocol Number QMREC 2006/03 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COpy OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
Sovereignty without territory: The political geographies o/the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
I would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. Please ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
This study looks at how the Tibetan Government-in-Exile functions, and what kind of Tibetan 
political community is created outside of Tibet. I will be looking at which welfare services the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile provides (e.g. health care, education, employment training) and 
how these services are delivered and used. I will also be looking at how and why people vote in 
Tibetan elections, the importance of the Green Book and how Tibetans in India consider their 
citizenship. 
Tibetans living in exile, and over the age of 18 (therefore able to vote), are being asked to 
participate in this study. 
If you agree to take part in this study you will be interviewed by myself (with a translator if 
necessary) about these issues. The interview will last 30-90 minutes and will be tape recorded or 
written down, whichever you are comfortable with. Audio tapes and written transcripts will be 
kept securely and not made available to any other person. 
Your name will not be used in the research, but some details about your official position may be 
included (i.e. the organisation you work for, and in some cases the level of authority you hold). 
Therefore complete anonymity cannot be assured. 
Original data and consent forms will be held by myself only. When finished the research will be 
presented as a PhD thesis, and reports given to the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and Tibetan 
organisations .. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
Many thanks 
Fiona McConnell 
PhD student, Department of Geography 
Queen Mary, University of London. 
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Appendix IV: Consent form 
REC Protocol Number QMREC 2006/03 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: Sovereignty without territory: The political geographies of the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile. 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: ______ _ 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already 
given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be 
given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time. 
I understand that I can withdraw from the project at any time. 
I consent to the storing of basic personal information (name. residence. occupation. age) for 
the purposes of this research study. 
Participant's Statement: 
I agree that the research project named above 
has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have 
read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and 
understand what the research study involved. 
Signed: Date: 
Investigator's Statement: 
I confirm that I have carefully explained the 
nature of the proposed research to the volunteer. 
Signed: Date: 
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